Matrix Games Forums

Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

RE: House Rules Discussion

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> RE: House Rules Discussion Page: <<   < prev  1 2 [3] 4   next >   >>
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/27/2018 5:43:59 PM   
jmolyson

 

Posts: 141
Joined: 11/27/2006
Status: offline
Are these rules encoded in the AI or are they an understanding between players?

Thanks

Joe Molyson

_____________________________

Joe

(in reply to davbaker)
Post #: 61
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/27/2018 8:05:00 PM   
spence

 

Posts: 4972
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
quote:

3.Allied subs that are not at sea Dec 7 cannot go on attack missions until the new year as most were not able to...(if anyone has record and any sinkings by allied subs (1941) on the japanese please share )


The following US submarines sank Japanese Merchies during DEC 1941. According to the OOB at least 3 of them were in-port on Dec 7th.

Atsutasan Maru - sunk 12/16 by USS Swordfish

Torukawa Maru - sunk 12/21 by USS Skate

Hayataka Maru - sunk 12/23 by USS Seal

Hayo Maru - sunk 12/22 by USS S-38 (is this one at sea on 12/07?)

Source: Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses
During World War II by All Causes
Prepared by
The Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee
NAVEXOS P 468

February 1947

(in reply to vettim89)
Post #: 62
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/27/2018 8:14:16 PM   
Yaab


Posts: 3528
Joined: 11/8/2011
From: Poland
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: jmolyson

Are these rules encoded in the AI or are they an understanding between players?

Thanks

Joe Molyson


Only agreed between players.

(in reply to jmolyson)
Post #: 63
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/29/2018 7:50:38 PM   
spence

 

Posts: 4972
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
It probably is gamey to put PT boats into multiple TFs however it also seems that their abilities have been nerfed in this game: to wit, as illustrated on the 2nd night of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the Japanese were loathe to risk their big ships when PTs were around. An attack by 2 of them convinced the Henderson Field bombardment force to cut short their bombardment and head back to Rabaul. PTs sank few ships but neither were Japanese DDs or CLs particularly good at sinking PTs.

So if multiple PT TFs puts major Japanese surface units at risk then maybe such things as the one-off Japanese BB bombardment of Henderson Field will not be so widely accepted as a realistic Japanese ability.

< Message edited by spence -- 11/29/2018 8:26:59 PM >

(in reply to davbaker)
Post #: 64
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/30/2018 1:01:33 PM   
Macclan5


Posts: 855
Joined: 3/24/2016
From: Toronto Canada
Status: offline
My apologies to the original poster.

I started a thread with significant overlap in the War room forums.

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=4558727

In fairness - my thread was targeted at "Allied vs AI players" with some basis of historical accuracy... so not exactly the same.

This list as I understand is being positioned as "here are your options - pick and choose as two players agree".

A wonderful addition.

I might opine on AirPlane Altitude: CAP / Sweep / Etc

Rather than being guided by "maneuver range" be guided by whether the air frame was "oxygen equipped high altitude capable"

The P39 for example was not and should therefore be limited to circa ~ 12000 FT altitude which is effectively the highest level for the pilot - rather than the air frame.



_____________________________

A People that values its privileges above it's principles will soon loose both. Dwight D Eisenhower.

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 65
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/30/2018 4:03:30 PM   
Buckrock

 

Posts: 456
Joined: 3/16/2012
From: not all there
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

It probably is gamey to put PT boats into multiple TFs however it also seems that their abilities have been nerfed in this game: to wit, as illustrated on the 2nd night of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the Japanese were loathe to risk their big ships when PTs were around. An attack by 2 of them convinced the Henderson Field bombardment force to cut short their bombardment and head back to Rabaul. PTs sank few ships but neither were Japanese DDs or CLs particularly good at sinking PTs.

So if multiple PT TFs puts major Japanese surface units at risk then maybe such things as the one-off Japanese BB bombardment of Henderson Field will not be so widely accepted as a realistic Japanese ability.

Curious about your source for that particular November bombardment being cut short. I know the PT's of MTB 3 believed they forced the Japanese to prematurely end their (cruiser) naval bombardment on the night of the 13th/14th November but Japanese accounts I've seen haven't supported that claim. The cruisers that night (Maya&Suzuya) fired for around half an hour, which is around the same length of time as two earlier bombardments conducted in October, also by pairs of cruisers but not in those cases attacked by PTs. Maya&Suzuya also managed to fire more shells in their bombardment than either of those previous two bombardments. Frank in "Guadalcanal" stated the PT attack that night in November did not impede the bombardment mission.

_____________________________

This was the only sig line I could think of.

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 66
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/30/2018 7:36:56 PM   
mogami


Posts: 12794
Joined: 8/23/2000
From: You can't get here from there
Status: offline
Hi, Let the allies sortie their subs and make sure they do not have the improved torpedos.

_____________________________






I'm not retreating, I'm attacking in a different direction!

(in reply to Buckrock)
Post #: 67
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/30/2018 9:36:56 PM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 24713
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Macclan5

My apologies to the original poster.



I wouldn't worry about it too much. The most recent resurrection of this old thread was earlier this month. This thread had been dead 8 years-give or take.

@Joe Molyson-Many of the HRs in the thread that you resurrected have been addressed satisfactorily by patches in the interim. The game plays more smoothly than it did in the first few patches or 'stock-unpatched' versions, that's for sure! The age of the thread and HRs bandied about doesn't do the serviceable patch work sufficient justice in its ability to reduce HRs.

There are many more recent threads that discuss contemporary game version HRs that you may avail yourself of.

_____________________________


(in reply to Macclan5)
Post #: 68
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/30/2018 10:46:43 PM   
spence

 

Posts: 4972
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
quote:

Curious about your source for that particular November bombardment being cut short. I know the PT's of MTB 3 believed they forced the Japanese to prematurely end their (cruiser) naval bombardment on the night of the 13th/14th November but Japanese accounts I've seen haven't supported that claim. The cruisers that night (Maya&Suzuya) fired for around half an hour, which is around the same length of time as two earlier bombardments conducted in October, also by pairs of cruisers but not in those cases attacked by PTs. Maya&Suzuya also managed to fire more shells in their bombardment than either of those previous two bombardments. Frank in "Guadalcanal" stated the PT attack that night in November did not impede the bombardment mission.


I honestly can't say as I read it somewhere a goodly while ago. So perhaps you're correct about the PTs in this case.

The bombardment wasn't effective in any case as the planes from Henderson Field and USS Enterprise savaged both the bombardment force and its covering force the next morning sinking HIJMS Kinugasa and damaging HIJMS Mays. After that the same planes (with Enterprise's planes flying from Henderson Field) turned their attention to the Japanese reinforcement convoy sinking 6 transports and forcing another to turn back before ending their operations for the night.

In the game,I have seen virtually every bombardment by the IJN approximate the one-off BB bombardment of October 42. That seems a bit absurd for a Navy which had no bombardment doctrine (the USN had a faulty doctrine at the time but the IJN had none other than to point their guns in the general direction of the enemy).

So I have no problem if the Japanese Player has to think about conducting bombardments a little bit because some big beautiful cruiser or battleship catches a torpedo or two from a 1 VP PT in the second or third PT TF guarding an Allied base. That would just be too bad for the Japanese Player.

I might add that in the case of the earliest USMC bombers employed on Henderson Field they were SBD-1s which had a considerably shorter range than the SBD-3 used by the USN. Because of their short range the Japanese could sail in from out of range at night, bombard Henderson Field, and then be out of range when morning came. That was quite obviously not the case for HIJMS Kinugasa/Maya.

< Message edited by spence -- 11/30/2018 10:48:05 PM >

(in reply to Chickenboy)
Post #: 69
RE: House Rules Discussion - 11/30/2018 11:18:15 PM   
bomccarthy


Posts: 328
Joined: 9/6/2013
From: L.A.
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Macclan5

I might opine on AirPlane Altitude: CAP / Sweep / Etc

Rather than being guided by "maneuver range" be guided by whether the air frame was "oxygen equipped high altitude capable"

The P39 for example was not and should therefore be limited to circa ~ 12000 FT altitude which is effectively the highest level for the pilot - rather than the air frame.



The P-39 was equipped with oxygen; a few P-400s (export version) that were delivered to Guadalcanal had the equipment removed for some reason. The real reason pilots rarely took it above 12,000 feet was its single-stage, single-speed supercharger. The engine quickly lost power above 12,000 ft; later P-39Ns and Qs had the supercharger adjusted to provide max boost around 15,000 feet, so the plane performed okay up to 18,000 ft. The P-40 suffered from the same problem (since it was also stuck with a single-stage, single-speed supercharger).

(in reply to Macclan5)
Post #: 70
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/1/2018 7:51:10 PM   
LargeSlowTarget


Posts: 3865
Joined: 9/23/2000
From: Hessen, Germany - now living in France
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

In the game,I have seen virtually every bombardment by the IJN approximate the one-off BB bombardment of October 42. That seems a bit absurd for a Navy which had no bombardment doctrine (the USN had a faulty doctrine at the time but the IJN had none other than to point their guns in the general direction of the enemy).


The use of special land bombardment shells, of floatplanes with illumination flares to light-up the target area, gunnery officers to spot and correct the aim sent aloft in floatplanes and positioned at observation posts on land plus lights set-up on land as reference points - all this seem to indicate that the Japanese had a bit more consciousness of the "art of land bombardment" than just "pointing their guns in the general direction of the enemy"?

_____________________________


(in reply to spence)
Post #: 71
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/1/2018 8:49:43 PM   
rustysi


Posts: 5617
Joined: 2/21/2012
From: LI, NY
Status: offline
quote:

use of special land bombardment shells, of floatplanes with illumination flares to light-up the target area, gunnery officers to spot and correct the aim sent aloft in floatplanes and positioned at observation posts on land plus lights set-up on land as reference points - all this seem to indicate that the Japanese had a bit more consciousness of the "art of land bombardment" than just "pointing their guns in the general direction of the enemy"?


Ya think.

I suggest a read of Rising Sun, Falling sky's to get an idea of how relentless the Japanese could be with such tactics. Yes, its mostly naval action, but shows they did have a clue as to what they were doing.

_____________________________

It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Hume

In every party there is one member who by his all-too-devout pronouncement of the party principles provokes the others to apostasy. Nietzsche

Cave ab homine unius libri. Ltn Prvb

(in reply to LargeSlowTarget)
Post #: 72
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/1/2018 11:30:51 PM   
Anachro


Posts: 1758
Joined: 11/23/2015
From: The Coastal Elite
Status: offline
I don't think the area where the Japanese were found wanting was naval bombardment, but in close fire support of forces operating on land. i.e. if the Japanese had been tasked with conducting fire support missions in the same way as the US Navy did at Iwo Jima, Saipan, etc. (like, say, if they had actually invaded Midway) it's an open question as to how effective they'd have been with no doctrinal focus or training in such matters.

(in reply to rustysi)
Post #: 73
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 12:08:51 AM   
spence

 

Posts: 4972
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
quote:

The use of special land bombardment shells, of floatplanes with illumination flares to light-up the target area, gunnery officers to spot and correct the aim sent aloft in floatplanes and positioned at observation posts on land plus lights set-up on land as reference points - all this seem to indicate that the Japanese had a bit more consciousness of the "art of land bombardment" than just "pointing their guns in the general direction of the enemy"?


And that was a one-off. It never happened before and it never happened again. Although 4 CA's were tasked with bombarding Midway the neither of the landing force battalions had any communications link with any of those ships, nor did the ships have any special bombardment ammunition. During the Guadalcanal Campaign the IJN conducted multiple bombardments of Henderson Field and all but the one time their battleships bombarded the field were ineffective (as the sinking of Kinugasa and damaging of Maya and Isuzu and the massacring of the transports/38th Division immediately following the bombardment clearly illustrate). IIRC that bombardment had expended 400 rounds of 8 inch ammo - but seemingly all they did was to blow up a bunch of trees. The night before the bombardment of 13/14 November the Kirishima and Hiei were loaded with those special bombardment shells and I suppose the that the IJN or IJA had all the previous arrangements for the bombardment as in October but it is clear that the IJN had no ability to cobble up a different bombardment protocol on the fly the following night.

IRL the IJNs abilities were entirely focused on winning "The Decisive Battle". They never trained for or developed much in the way of doctrine for anything that didn't directly contribute to that particular goal. The game GIVES the IJN a whole bunch of abilities that they never possessed or developed. I suppose that the price we pay for having a game designed by a "Zoomie" is having the all the abilities of a crew of 2000+/- (to say nothing of a Division of 15000 +/-) summarized with one general experience number that is applied to everything they do while pilots have to be trained for months in practically everything seemingly including tying their shoes.



< Message edited by spence -- 12/2/2018 12:21:15 AM >

(in reply to Anachro)
Post #: 74
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 2:12:47 AM   
BBfanboy


Posts: 12521
Joined: 8/4/2010
From: Winnipeg, MB
Status: online

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

The use of special land bombardment shells, of floatplanes with illumination flares to light-up the target area, gunnery officers to spot and correct the aim sent aloft in floatplanes and positioned at observation posts on land plus lights set-up on land as reference points - all this seem to indicate that the Japanese had a bit more consciousness of the "art of land bombardment" than just "pointing their guns in the general direction of the enemy"?


And that was a one-off. It never happened before and it never happened again. Although 4 CA's were tasked with bombarding Midway the neither of the landing force battalions had any communications link with any of those ships, nor did the ships have any special bombardment ammunition. During the Guadalcanal Campaign the IJN conducted multiple bombardments of Henderson Field and all but the one time their battleships bombarded the field were ineffective (as the sinking of Kinugasa and damaging of Maya and Isuzu and the massacring of the transports/38th Division immediately following the bombardment clearly illustrate). IIRC that bombardment had expended 400 rounds of 8 inch ammo - but seemingly all they did was to blow up a bunch of trees. The night before the bombardment of 13/14 November the Kirishima and Hiei were loaded with those special bombardment shells and I suppose the that the IJN or IJA had all the previous arrangements for the bombardment as in October but it is clear that the IJN had no ability to cobble up a different bombardment protocol on the fly the following night.

IRL the IJNs abilities were entirely focused on winning "The Decisive Battle". They never trained for or developed much in the way of doctrine for anything that didn't directly contribute to that particular goal. The game GIVES the IJN a whole bunch of abilities that they never possessed or developed. I suppose that the price we pay for having a game designed by a "Zoomie" is having the all the abilities of a crew of 2000+/- (to say nothing of a Division of 15000 +/-) summarized with one general experience number that is applied to everything they do while pilots have to be trained for months in practically everything seemingly including tying their shoes.



It was a long way from Rabaul to Lunga, so the plan to use bombardment ammo had to be decided a day or two before the ships left Rabaul. It's been a while since I read about that bombardment in between Naval Battles of Guadalcanal 1 and 2, but I think those CAs were not planned to bombard, they were sent as surface combat support for the transport TF. When BBs Hiei and Kirishima did not bombard because of the NBG1 battle, I think the commanders in Rabaul told the CAs to bombard with the unsuitable ammo they had. They also may have lacked detailed maps of the latest recon on Henderson Field. I wouldn't say that makes them incompetent or incapable, just 'scrambling to do something they didn't plan on'.

_____________________________

No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 75
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 2:55:20 AM   
spence

 

Posts: 4972
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
quote:

It was a long way from Rabaul to Lunga, so the plan to use bombardment ammo had to be decided a day or two before the ships left Rabaul. It's been a while since I read about that bombardment in between Naval Battles of Guadalcanal 1 and 2, but I think those CAs were not planned to bombard, they were sent as surface combat support for the transport TF. When BBs Hiei and Kirishima did not bombard because of the NBG1 battle, I think the commanders in Rabaul told the CAs to bombard with the unsuitable ammo they had. They also may have lacked detailed maps of the latest recon on Henderson Field. I wouldn't say that makes them incompetent or incapable, just 'scrambling to do something they didn't plan on'.



From the Nihon Kaigun website:

quote:

13 November 1942:
MAYA departs Shortland for Guadalcanal in Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) Nishimura Shoji's (former CO of HARUNA) Bombardment Unit: SUZUYA, light cruiser TENRYU and four destroyers. They accompany Vice Admiral Mikawa in CHOKAI with KINUGASA, light cruiser ISUZU and two destroyers. MAYA launches her floatplanes to drop magnesium parachute flares and light targets for Henderson Field's bombardment.

14 November 1942: The Bombardment of Henderson Field:
From 0130 until 0200, Rear Admiral Nishimura's unit bombards Henderson Field with 989 8-inch shells. The task force retires towards the Shortland Islands.


So it would seem that the force that bombarded Henderson Field on the night of 13/14 November was intended right from the beginning to be a bombardment force. They fired somewhat more than 900 8" shells and apparently really smashed up a bunch of trees. They did not however seriously damage Henderson Field and paid the a significant price for their failure.

Generalizing the results of one bombardment by battleships to be applicable to practically every bombardment of anything by any units of the IJN is male bovine feces.



< Message edited by spence -- 12/2/2018 2:56:17 AM >

(in reply to jmolyson)
Post #: 76
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 4:47:27 AM   
witpaemail

 

Posts: 113
Joined: 3/2/2015
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: War History


quote:

ORIGINAL: Sun Tempest

"No use of portions of parachute units to seize hex's"

I don't think that there should be a rule for this. Sometimes I use paras to seize empty airbase, just before the landing, mainly because it is the only way to occupy an air base without needing to wait 1 day after the landing to launch an attack. It would nice to have the possibility to attack immediately after landing, but afik, this is possible only in case of atolls.


Which is the primary mission of WWII airborne units. To seize undefended or lightly defended airfields.


Historically the Japanese took most of those little bases in the eastern part of the NEI with single squad para units. So prohibiting it would actually be not historically correct.

Also: http://www.navalaviationfoundation.org/donor-kiosk/squadron-flight-log-entry-kiosk/?id=24

According to this site on VPB117, they did indeed fly "patrol missions" As you say. Which only makes sense since the PB part of VPB means "patrol bomber". I personally am unaware of any successful 4E squadron size attacks on naval targets AT SEA. Docked, yes, but not moving targets. Thats what the B25s and A26s were for.

< Message edited by witpaemail -- 12/2/2018 4:49:57 AM >

(in reply to War History)
Post #: 77
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 6:16:57 AM   
Buckrock

 

Posts: 456
Joined: 3/16/2012
From: not all there
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: spence
So it would seem that the force that bombarded Henderson Field on the night of 13/14 November was intended right from the beginning to be a bombardment force. They fired somewhat more than 900 8" shells and apparently really smashed up a bunch of trees. They did not however seriously damage Henderson Field and paid the a significant price for their failure.

You're correct. The CA bombardment on the night of 13/14 Nov had been put in place as part of the original planning for the Japanese November offensive. It was always intended to be the next-night follow up to the Nov 12/13 BB bombardment.

The Japanese realised even as they completed this CA bombardment that it had likely failed in the objective of knocking out Henderson Field. Low cloud and misty rain affected the effectiveness of the illuminating flares for targeting, contributing to none of the shells hitting the objective runway. However, the bombardment did somewhat more than smash up a bunch of trees. According to the MAG 23 diary, it landed a number of damaging hits on the right side of the Fighter One runway, wrecked an SBD, flamed two F4Fs and shrapnel damaged 15 more, leaving only 14 F4Fs operable for the morning's operations. The diary of the 67th USAAF mentions widespread damage in their dispersement area, Lundstrom stated 15 of 16 P-39/400s took shrapnel damage, leaving only 3 operational for the next morning's operations.

The real issue for the Japanese was that no matter how accurate any bombardment by a pair of BBs or CAs was, there were already one too many runways in operation by Cactus at the time the BB and CA bombardments began in October. The spectacular Kongo&Haruna bombardment of Henderson Field failed to shut the Cactus Air Force down because they still had the Fighter One airfield available for operations the next day. By November, Cactus had three airfields available, spread over an area of more than three miles and with inter-connecting taxiways. The Maya and Suzuya never had a hope on their own.

I'm sure this doesn't make you feel any better about the effectiveness of Japanese bombardments in game though.

My own pet peeve is that I'm yet to see any advantage of radar equipped bombardment TFs over non-radar equipped in the level of damage done by naval bombardments. Can anyone confirm whether radar plays a part in this area?

_____________________________

This was the only sig line I could think of.

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 78
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 8:11:35 AM   
Dili

 

Posts: 4353
Joined: 9/10/2004
Status: offline
Only if there is some relevant geographic mark near the target that appear in radar that could help. By 1942 there wasn't even PPI.

(in reply to Buckrock)
Post #: 79
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 1:17:21 PM   
BBfanboy


Posts: 12521
Joined: 8/4/2010
From: Winnipeg, MB
Status: online

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

It was a long way from Rabaul to Lunga, so the plan to use bombardment ammo had to be decided a day or two before the ships left Rabaul. It's been a while since I read about that bombardment in between Naval Battles of Guadalcanal 1 and 2, but I think those CAs were not planned to bombard, they were sent as surface combat support for the transport TF. When BBs Hiei and Kirishima did not bombard because of the NBG1 battle, I think the commanders in Rabaul told the CAs to bombard with the unsuitable ammo they had. They also may have lacked detailed maps of the latest recon on Henderson Field. I wouldn't say that makes them incompetent or incapable, just 'scrambling to do something they didn't plan on'.



From the Nihon Kaigun website:

quote:

13 November 1942:
MAYA departs Shortland for Guadalcanal in Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) Nishimura Shoji's (former CO of HARUNA) Bombardment Unit: SUZUYA, light cruiser TENRYU and four destroyers. They accompany Vice Admiral Mikawa in CHOKAI with KINUGASA, light cruiser ISUZU and two destroyers. MAYA launches her floatplanes to drop magnesium parachute flares and light targets for Henderson Field's bombardment.

14 November 1942: The Bombardment of Henderson Field:
From 0130 until 0200, Rear Admiral Nishimura's unit bombards Henderson Field with 989 8-inch shells. The task force retires towards the Shortland Islands.


So it would seem that the force that bombarded Henderson Field on the night of 13/14 November was intended right from the beginning to be a bombardment force. They fired somewhat more than 900 8" shells and apparently really smashed up a bunch of trees. They did not however seriously damage Henderson Field and paid the a significant price for their failure.

Generalizing the results of one bombardment by battleships to be applicable to practically every bombardment of anything by any units of the IJN is male bovine feces.



Thanks for the info on the mission plan. Don't think I ever saw that before.

_____________________________

No matter how bad a situation is, you can always make it worse. - Chris Hadfield : An Astronaut's Guide To Life On Earth

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 80
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 1:29:01 PM   
spence

 

Posts: 4972
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
I'm not sure that gyroscopic input was part of the SG radar but one did get a "god's eye view" of the battlefield with the owning ship in the center and either true (gyroscope input) or relative bearings (to the ship's present heading) and accurate ranges. Using 2 or more prominent radar reflecting land features one could determine one's own position and "fire by the map" at targets such as an airfield. Artillery spotting was very helpful since the bombardment depended on the accuracy of the map. Maps of SW Pacific islands were not all that accurate though.

(in reply to jmolyson)
Post #: 81
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 3:28:29 PM   
Buckrock

 

Posts: 456
Joined: 3/16/2012
From: not all there
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Dili

Only if there is some relevant geographic mark near the target that appear in radar that could help. By 1942 there wasn't even PPI.

I was asking about the use of radar with bombardments in the game.

Pretty sure in real life that PPI's came standard as part of the SG outfit in the second half of '42. The SG equipped ships in the October and November naval clashes off Guadalcanal all used PPI's.

_____________________________

This was the only sig line I could think of.

(in reply to Dili)
Post #: 82
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 3:32:52 PM   
Buckrock

 

Posts: 456
Joined: 3/16/2012
From: not all there
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

I'm not sure that gyroscopic input was part of the SG radar but one did get a "god's eye view" of the battlefield with the owning ship in the center and either true (gyroscope input) or relative bearings (to the ship's present heading) and accurate ranges. Using 2 or more prominent radar reflecting land features one could determine one's own position and "fire by the map" at targets such as an airfield. Artillery spotting was very helpful since the bombardment depended on the accuracy of the map. Maps of SW Pacific islands were not all that accurate though.


From what I've read, SG was at best more of a targeting guide than a fire control radar, although it could spot the fall of shot.

In what was possibly the very first use of US cruisers in a night bombardment mission (Jan 5th '43), the SG radar was initially used to locate two pre-selected landmarks off the target (Munda airfield) in order to determine the ship's relative position and help guide it to its planned starting position for the bombardment. As that point approached, the SG data was used to coach the more precise FC fire control radars onto the landmarks to begin a running plot of bearings and ranges to both generate target data as well as accurately gauge the point to begin the timed firing plot. Once the FC fire control radars had taken over, the SG returned to its role of navigation aid and search radar during the firing run. And as you indicated, central to everything they had to have a very accurate grid-map for the night fire mission. The mission was also performed without any form of target illumination.



_____________________________

This was the only sig line I could think of.

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 83
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 7:20:26 PM   
spence

 

Posts: 4972
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
quote:

From what I've read, SG was at best more of a targeting guide than a fire control radar, although it could spot the fall of shot.


The SG radar was the first radar to use the PPI display which provided the user with a "god's eye view" of the battlefield (sorta like standing over a map). One could obtain a bearing (direction) to the target and a decent range to the target but one could see both the range and bearing right off the PPI display. Fire control radars needed to be pointed directly at their target but did give an extremely accurate range using an "A scope". They were unable to determine the direction of the target unless they were pointing at it either purposefully or by accident.

The problem with spotting the fall of shot with an SG radar is the length of time the shot's image would actually remain on the PPI scope. Generally the fleeting image of a shot faded before one was able to physically move "the bug" onto the image to determine range (forgot what the official terminology of bug is). The images of important landmarks on the PPI scope would remain and hardly change much between sweeps of the radar antenna.

< Message edited by spence -- 12/2/2018 7:23:16 PM >

(in reply to Buckrock)
Post #: 84
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 8:24:41 PM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 24713
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock
From what I've read, SG was at best more of a targeting guide


One must ask Mandrake-san if SG need to provide targeting guidance.

_____________________________


(in reply to Buckrock)
Post #: 85
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/2/2018 9:00:59 PM   
Zorch

 

Posts: 5504
Joined: 3/7/2010
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy


quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock
From what I've read, SG was at best more of a targeting guide


One must ask Mandrake-san if SG need to provide targeting guidance.

DANGER - Cross Thread posting! This thread may be sucked into the AE AAR vortex at any time. Proceed at your own risk.

(in reply to Chickenboy)
Post #: 86
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/3/2018 4:38:34 AM   
Buckrock

 

Posts: 456
Joined: 3/16/2012
From: not all there
Status: offline
Just think how vast the forum's knowledge base might have become by the time this thread next emerges from its slumber. Perhaps they might even have the answer to my question on radar&bombardment in the game.

_____________________________

This was the only sig line I could think of.

(in reply to Zorch)
Post #: 87
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/3/2018 5:42:24 AM   
Buckrock

 

Posts: 456
Joined: 3/16/2012
From: not all there
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: spence
The problem with spotting the fall of shot with an SG radar is the length of time the shot's image would actually remain on the PPI scope. Generally the fleeting image of a shot faded before one was able to physically move "the bug" onto the image to determine range (forgot what the official terminology of bug is). The images of important landmarks on the PPI scope would remain and hardly change much between sweeps of the radar antenna.

If used for tracking fall of shot, the SG would be set for a narrow sector search to ensure the target was continually illuminated but obviously this would be at the cost of the SG's 360 deg search capability. Use of the SG in such a manner was generally frowned upon by leadership above SAG TF level. The temptation to use SG radar for salvo spotting was less compelling after early '43 when the FC fire control radar began to be replaced by the more powerful FH model, a type that proved capable of clearly tracking salvo splashes in relation to the target.

_____________________________

This was the only sig line I could think of.

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 88
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/3/2018 7:35:26 AM   
Alfred

 

Posts: 5481
Joined: 9/28/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

Just think how vast the forum's knowledge base might have become by the time this thread next emerges from its slumber. Perhaps they might even have the answer to my question on radar&bombardment in the game.


It was first answered circa 2010 and often repeated since.

There is no FC in the game.

The game design is both more complicated and simplified abstracted in terms of detection levels and their impact on game play.

Alfred

(in reply to Buckrock)
Post #: 89
RE: House Rules Discussion - 12/3/2018 8:00:54 AM   
Buckrock

 

Posts: 456
Joined: 3/16/2012
From: not all there
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred


quote:

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

Just think how vast the forum's knowledge base might have become by the time this thread next emerges from its slumber. Perhaps they might even have the answer to my question on radar&bombardment in the game.


It was first answered circa 2010 and often repeated since.

There is no FC in the game.

The game design is both more complicated and simplified abstracted in terms of detection levels and their impact on game play.

Alfred


Thanks Alfred. I'd not been able to identify any relevent threads through a site search but since you've stated the case, I'll now stop wondering.


_____________________________

This was the only sig line I could think of.

(in reply to Alfred)
Post #: 90
Page:   <<   < prev  1 2 [3] 4   next >   >>
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> RE: House Rules Discussion Page: <<   < prev  1 2 [3] 4   next >   >>
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.162