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RE: Test Question

 
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RE: Test Question - 6/22/2010 11:33:05 PM   
IronDuke

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Americans are kinda weird on the whole POW business in general. Not just a WW2 thing, btw.


Americans are just kinda weird...

quote:

Once again, the casualties in Hammelburg are the result of a poorly conceived and executed raid; but if it had been done right and the camp liberated, nobody would be very much concerned about Waters having been rescued along with the rest of the camp. The problem was that Patton did it half assed.


But done right meant committing a Combat command or more. Given the camp was liberated within a couple of weeks anyway, and the end of the war was clearly in sight, provoking a major battle with no operational aim was criminal. It was not possible to get this one man out without killing Americans, Americans who might well have survived and gone home in a few short weeks/months. Why was GI Joe worth killing in order to save one man's son-in-law?

If America is about anything, it is advancement by merit and everybody equal under the constiutution. Which "American" merit did Patton's son-in-law have that the man who died trying to get him out didn't have?

Or put another way. What would everyone's response (including americans) have been historically if Mark Clark had attempted this? Crap is crap, even when an American icon is shovelling it.

quote:

Oh, and, MacArthur's entire Philippine liberation strategy rather trumps Hammelburg in terms of sheer egotism, if you want to get het up about that kind of thing. (Although I'm personally sympathetic to it on political grounds if not military ones.)


Not my theatre, but pointing out you had more than one "Leader" pulling this sort of stuff in no way excuses Patton.

quote:

I'm not quite sure what you think Patton should've done in Sicily. My own view is that he made lemonade out of lemons.


No issue here. My issue tends to be with people who point at this and the breakout and go "Genius..."

quote:

Once again, Falaise failed not because of Patton. I'd primarily blame Bradley on this, and for the Brittany sideshow.


I'd blame doctrine. American warfare depended on logistics and logistics needed deep water ports. Brittany was always a given then. British doctrine advocated not sticking your head too far behind German lines, so no one was in a hurry to complete the encirclement. Bradley was certainly cautious, but then the mass of Germans (if surrounded) would most likely have burst across his lines and there were instances of Americans getting bloody noses from isolated and ad-hoc German Kampfgruppe as it was.

quote:

Patton always wanted to complete the encirclement and was restrained from doing so out of Bradley's exaggerated respect for the Germans. Rightly or wrongly Bradley felt it was better to drive the Germans out of the salient and rake them with artillery and airpower, and more or less wreck the Germans in the process. I don't agree with the strategy -- the Germans showed a remarkable ability to reconstitute divisions that weren't completely encircled and destroyed -- but I note this "golden corridor" concept looms large in Asian conceptions of the art of war. It's not totally crazy if you follow Sun Tzu rather than Clausewitz.


I think Patton wanted to go long and complete the encirclement by the Seine, but it's correct to say he would have been more aggressive if given the green light.

If memory serves, Sun Tzu talks about the golden corridor as a means of unsettling enemy will to resist. Cornered animals fight more desparately. True up to a point, but then he wrote all this before copious artillery was invented. I'd have encircled then gone hard at it. Allied forces could cope with the losses from an encirclement battle, the Germans couldn't.

Regards,
ID

< Message edited by IronDuke -- 6/22/2010 11:34:40 PM >

(in reply to Flaviusx)
Post #: 91
RE: Test Question - 6/23/2010 12:50:21 AM   
IronDuke

 

Posts: 1572
Joined: 6/30/2002
From: Manchester, UK
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quote:

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

Why? In 1944, the German manpower barrel was in real trouble. They had largely static forces to act as a tripwire and mobile formations to act as the Fire Brigade. Committing the Fire Brigades with offensive action and then attriting them would never hurt the Americans as it would the Germans. American formations improve after D-Day whereas the quality of German forces steadily declined. The americans could afford the losses, the Germans couldn't.


quote:

ORIGINAL: ComradeP
In 1944, the Americans could afford the losses. The problem is that the 90 division army and their doctrine were finalized a year before that. A doctrine that works mostly because the Germans lost most of their strength on the Eastern Front (a fact which could never have been correctly estimated when the doctrine and the army were "designed") isn't really a good doctrine.


It was American doctrine. It had been during WWI and it remained so until the Russians turned up with more Tanks and nukes in the 60s and 70s and you started sexing doctrine up with AirLand Battle. It was a winning doctrine in the end. Besides, a year before 1944, it was clear the Germans were bleeding to death in the east and that 90 Divisions would be plenty.

quote:

But it didn't need to be. The American replacement system provided a steady stream of replacements.


quote:

Replacements that had to be shipped across the Atlantic, with in many cases little means of slowly getting accustomed to combat (few chances for field training). The combat in Italy already showed that the US replacement system had its limitations, and that was against a handful of German divisions in difficult terrain. Marshall had all the time in the world to change it between the first landings in Italy and the landings in Normandy, but he didn't.


Change it inside a year? How? German and British replacement systems differed, but only because they had existing regimental/medium unit establishments and traditions to build on. The only other way the americans could have done it was to have devolved replacements and training into the homeland structure of the existing divisions. This would have required a complete re-organisation and wasn't practical in the middle of a war.

quote:

I'm getting a little lost here. The point of the German advance was not to cross the Ardennes, but strike the Meuse. Therefore, the French 2nd Army and a lot more besides would have to dealt with before very long. They also planned to force the Meuse by assault crossing, whereas the British planned to drive across the bridges, which they did in many cases on the way to Arnhem.


quote:

There were 4 French quality divisions, about a division worth of quality non-assigned troops and 4 poorly equipped or poorly trained divisions within an area dozens of kilometres wide between Dinant and Montmedy. Those poorly equipped or poorly trained troops were mostly static forces supposed to defend certain sectors of the Maginot Line or seperate (not attached to the rest of the line) fortifications west of Montmedy. The Germans basically had air superiority on day 1 and could see what was happening on the French side of the front. With 24 divisions in the first wave, there was a lot less risk involved than what XXX Corps faced on their drive to Arnhem, where commanders chose to ignore warnings of quality troops being in the area, which was especially risky for 1st Airbourne. Had there been any further delays in capturing Nijmegen and the bridges over the Waal, 1st Airbourne would've been done for, the same goes for the Poles.


Sorry, but this looks way out to me.

Firstly, how are the 24 divisions being counted? If forces like 14th Motorised Corps are being included, then the French reserves get to the scene before this formation did, and you have to include for the French a couple of Armoured divisions and a motorised division that turned up around the 14th May.

The German's did not assault with 24 Divisions out of the Ardennes in the first wave. Secondly, most of Guderian's assault crossings with elite Pzgr and men of the crack GD Regiment failed at Sedan, so to suggest it was somehow less risky is simply not true. Thirdly, 1st Airborne units that did reach Arnhem held out for days longer than planned, so elite troops or no, it was a difficult fight for the Germans to contain this. Finally, as the Germans moved for the coast in 1940, they opened up flanks ripe for counterattack. They took a tremendous operational risk. By comparison, Monty had much more limited objectives.

Monty lost at Arnhem but still won the campaign. a loss in the Ardennes for the Germans would most likely have cost them the war. The risks just don't compare.

There were errors in planning and execution, but for something thrown together in 7 days, Market Garden was remarkable.

quote:

German traffic was backed up halfway across Germany. The roads were so good that the various Divisions got in each other's way attempting to get off some of the roads assigned to them and several "good roads" is hardly the point if you want to move an Army Group over them.

Ultimately, Monty attempted the most audacious Allied operation of the war. It was arguably the most audacious operation of the war. My point was that those that give Monty a hard time for being cautious, reflect on MG's failure, not on the fact it was the most incautious Allied effort of the 20th century. You can't have it both ways.


quote:

The difference is that the Germans did not move over a single contested road, whilst Monty planned to do so.


But they were moving far more over their larger (but still very limited) road net. It all evens out.

quote:

Traffic jams are a natural feature of large scale military operations in a limited area. The Germans did not have to clean up the logistical mess under fire in most cases, whilst the Allied transport units supplying the forces involved in Market Garden were in many cases at least halted for a short while by enemy fire.


The Germans had real issues supplying the forward units during the invasion of France. Given the roads available couldn't support the combt units, exactly how easy was it ever going to be? German tanks units carried extra fuel with them, sometimes strapped to the tank. You underestimate German logistical difficulties.


quote:

In which case we can characterise Patton;s breakout as cautious since the only forces captured were generally those penned up in coastal fortresses who did their utmost to become entrapped.


quote:

Patton shattered a front without reserves,


Hmmm....Hodges shattered the front.

quote:

the achievement is Patton's for making that happen,


No, it is Hodges and Collin's.

quote:

the achievement is the German defence which made it possible to hold the Allies without any substantial reserves at first and basically no reserves afterwards. Patton basically advanced into a void after the breakout, with mostly token German resistance as the non-static forces were relocating.


And advancing in the face of no resistance is how difficult exactly....?

quote:


Before that, the Allies slugged their way through Notmandy, fought a broad front advance to the borders of the Reich then everything collapsed. Arguably, the Ruhr was an operational encirclement, but then everything was over bar the shouting at that point. At Falaise, the Allies demonstrated that real manouver warfare was simply not in their makeup.


quote:

You mean manoeuvre warfare against a foe that would actually have a chance to resist was not really their kind of warfare.


There is no other type. Manouver warfare against a foe incapable of resisting is known as "pursuit".

quote:

There's also the point of how "broad front" the advance was. The front was indeed fairly broad, but the Allies had the forces to do it, with the 60-70 divisions they had in France and Belgium in late 1944.


The front stretched from the northern coast down to Switzerland. the Allies advanced the length of it. It was a broad front advance. How long or broad the front was is not the point. It was whay type of advance was being made that formed the heart of the point.

quote:

They were. We dropped thousands of them during the Rhine crossing.


quote:

If you're referring to Varsity: They were dropped almost directly behind German lines, that's not a deep insertion or a good use for paratroopers, as it takes away most of their advantages and placed them at a disadvantage against organised resistance due to lacking heavy weapons. Of course, German resistance was already breaking apart by then.


The Normandy landings were not deep insertions, what difference does it make. the point was the Allies tried hard at Arnhem, and when that failed, still had the specialist para resource to go again six months later.

quote:

It was significant because it convinced Hitler paratroopers were not a strategic, or perhaps even operational weapon.


quote:

Limited Luftwaffe transport production and requirements on other fronts for transport aircraft meant paratrooper operations involving one or more divisions would not be possible,


Why? The Germans massed enough transports at Stalingrad to airdrop a Division. Successfully lifted an Army into Tunisia. It was nothing to do with transport aircraft. It was will. The casualties persuaded Hitler these operations wouldn't work.

quote:

By 1943/44, Britain had a lot of bad experiences and lessons to draw upon. They may well have sounded high handed to proud American warriors, but it was Brits who developed specialised armour for Normandy, added bigger guns to the Shermans and successfully argued for a later rather than earlier D-Day.


quote:

Yet until late 1944 the British had failed to develop and produce in any significant numbers a tank that could use the 17 pounder,


Which western Allied Nation fielded a 17pdr or 90mm weapon before that? British doctrine called for infantry tanks and cruiser tanks. The cruisers were designed for manouvre so didn't need thick armour and the infantry tanks were consistently the best in class. British tank design was also stunted because production in the early years concentrated on pumping out proven existing designs to maximise production to replace the losses of the French campaign. There was no doctrinal pressure within either the US or British Armies to build anything bigger until the first Tigers appeared in 1942.

As they cottoned on to the fact that they needed a weapons system capable of dueling with the German cats, the Brits improvised.

quote:

failing British tank production of newer designs being one of the main reasons the Shermans were converted to begin with. The majority of the British tanks were still using a gun type that was close to being obsolete 2 years earlier (6 pounders and short barreled ~75mm guns).


Weapons ideally suited to infantry support, which is what the tanks were designed for.

quote:

I've also always been amazed at how the British failed to develop a truly modern scout vehicle, especially as they had seen captured German equipment so they would know how it should be done. The British equipment list had some serious shortcomings that were never ironed out, in some cases not until after Korea.


Which nation didn't have shortcomings? A "truly" modern scout vehicle was hardly as desparately needed as heavy armour etc. We developed a range of specialised armoured vehicles that gave us real advantages in Normandy; developed the war's most successful heavy bomber; produced good fighter designs and fight bomber platforms etc. All nations had pluses and minuses.

(in reply to ComradeP)
Post #: 92
RE: Test Question - 6/23/2010 12:04:26 PM   
ComradeP

 

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quote:

Imagine not 600 paratroops at one end of the Arnhem bridge, but a significant part of the division, even with the scattering common in airborne operations, it would be thousands of men in a much larger bridgehead. The gliderborne 6pdr antitank guns caused problems for the Germans, how much more effective would they have been over the open country to the South of Arnhem. The whole of Arnhem would have been turned into a battleground, which the Germans would have had to advance through, losing some of the power of their AFVs.


The SS would've mostly had to ferry troops across the Rhine to get to them, so they would be safer south of Arnhem, with water on three sides. However, in that case the SS or other German forces could also try and relocate (through Germany) to Nijmegen in order to engage American forces and drive North across the bridges at Nijmegen, which is why it think that success would've been only possible if both the bridges at and around Nijmegen and the bridge at Arnhem could've been held until the arrival of XXX Corps.

quote:

It was a winning doctrine in the end.


I'll repeat it again: whether a doctrine was successful or not is not the sole issue that matters, as it does not necessarily have a relation to the merits of the actual doctrine.

quote:

Change it inside a year? How?


Mobilise more men, create a number of divisional sized training units as a pool for frontline units and move some of them to Europe with the rest of the army, so the replacements would be trained and on site. That would've given them enough time for at least 6 months of training, with the rest spend on preparing to move to Europe and moving to Europe.

quote:

The German's did not assault with 24 Divisions out of the Ardennes in the first wave.


No, but they could have, as those forces were available.

Comparing the forces that could have been used in the Ardennes and the area around it (from troops South of Liege to Montmedy):

German:

Infantry divisions: 3,5,8,12,15,16,17,21,23,24,28,32,34,36,62,68,73,76.
1st Gebirgs Division.
Motorised: 2nd Motorised Infantry, with 13th Motorised Infantry and 29th Motorised infantry arriving in a few days.
Panzer: 1,5,6,7,8,10.

A few of the infantry divisions would be needed to keep the French units in the Maginot Line honest and in place.

Belgian: 1st Cavalry, 1st and 2nd Ardense Jagers division as mobile formations, with the 2nd, 3rd and 8th Infantry divisions protecting Liege and Namur.

French:

Initially (in the area described earlier or within a few kilometres West, or South of the Meuse): 1st, 2nd, 3rd (would have to move from Maginot Line reserve duty) and 5th Light Cavalry, as well as about a division worth of non-divisional mobile units, with the 55th and 61st Infantry division and the 102nd Fortress/static division assembled in defences/defensive positions behind the Meuse.

Possible Reserves (including some reserves of the Maginot line): South of the Meuse: 1st Colonial Infantry division, 6th Infantry division and another division worth of mobile troops, in several days: 3rd Armour and after that 2nd Armour. West of the Meuse: 4th North African Division, 22nd Infantry division and the 4th Light Cavalry. 1st Armour could possibly act as a reserve should it decide to move South.

The French had enough men in the area to stall the Germans, they just didn't have a sensible defensive strategy so they could not stop them.

quote:

The Germans had real issues supplying the forward units during the invasion of France. Given the roads available couldn't support the combt units, exactly how easy was it ever going to be? German tanks units carried extra fuel with them, sometimes strapped to the tank. You underestimate German logistical difficulties.


I'm not underestimating anything, I'm saying that the Germans were not under fire when they had their supply difficulties, whilst the Allies were during Market Garden.

quote:

Hmmm....Hodges shattered the front.

&

No, it is Hodges and Collin's.


The front was still there, it was shaken, but still there, Patton finished what others had started but did not finish. That's what we can credit him for, for delivering the final blow that dislodged the German line in the area. I don't give him any credit for the wearing out the defenders.

quote:

And advancing in the face of no resistance is how difficult exactly....?


It isn't, that's why I don't credit him for it.

quote:

There is no other type. Manouver warfare against a foe incapable of resisting is known as "pursuit".


I meant: a chance to resist their mobile forces. The Germans were still resisting, but they were virtually immobile. The Allied mobile divisions bypassed tens of thousands of German forces that couldn't stop them because they had no mobility. That was not "pursuit".

quote:

The Normandy landings were not deep insertions, what difference does it make. the point was the Allies tried hard at Arnhem, and when that failed, still had the specialist para resource to go again six months later.


It makes a substantial difference. The Normandy landings, as well as the German landings in Holland and in Crete, were made with the knowledge that if no friendly follow-up forces would arrive, the paratroopers would be screwed. The same goes for the landing around Arnhem. In the case of the landing at Arnhem and the German landing in Rotterdam, the paratroopers were nearly defeated by the defenders before they could withdraw/be rescued. The paratrooper operations in Germany made little to no use of the advantages of paratroopers by dropping them almost directly behind German lines. Allied paratroopers did not quite "go again" on an operation comparable to the landings of Normandy, Market Garden or the German paratrooper operations.

quote:

Why? The Germans massed enough transports at Stalingrad to airdrop a Division. Successfully lifted an Army into Tunisia. It was nothing to do with transport aircraft. It was will. The casualties persuaded Hitler these operations wouldn't work.


First: the Germans did not airlift an army into Tunisia, they lifted about a division in. Most forces were shipped in.

Second: the Germans could not air drop a division because that would mean the forces in the pocket would not be supplied by the transports being used to deliver and supply the paratroopers.

The point is that the German transports always had other tasks and could in most cases simply not be used to drop large quantities of troops. That's the result of the early war losses and lacking production, not "will".

quote:

Which western Allied Nation fielded a 17pdr or 90mm weapon before that?


By the time 17 pounder equipped tanks became more common in late 1944, the Americans had the M36.

Of course, the 17 pounder had been developed and produced prior to the US conversion of the 90mm AA gun to an AT weapon, but it effects had not really been felt because British tank design did not keep up with the improvement in armament.

quote:


British doctrine called for infantry tanks and cruiser tanks. The cruisers were designed for manouvre so didn't need thick armour and the infantry tanks were consistently the best in class.

&

British tank design was also stunted because production in the early years concent
rated on pumping out proven existing designs to maximise production to replace the losses of the French campaign.


And here we have the primary flaws of British tank designs: tanks designed for the wrong kind of war/enemy and good tanks not being produced because early and mid war designs were kept in production.

quote:

Weapons ideally suited to infantry support, which is what the tanks were designed for.


A concept of which the bankruptcy had become painfully apparent during the battle for France in 1940, but which was still kept in place.

quote:

A "truly" modern scout vehicle was hardly as desparately needed as heavy armour etc.


We have already established that the British did not have good "heavy armour" for most of the war either, at least no heavy armour that packed a punch that matched its protection.

(in reply to IronDuke)
Post #: 93
RE: Test Question - 6/23/2010 1:59:58 PM   
Rasputitsa


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ComradeP

The SS would've mostly had to ferry troops across the Rhine to get to them, so they would be safer south of Arnhem, with water on three sides. However, in that case the SS or other German forces could also try and relocate (through Germany) to Nijmegen in order to engage American forces and drive North across the bridges at Nijmegen, which is why it think that success would've been only possible if both the bridges at and around Nijmegen and the bridge at Arnhem could've been held until the arrival of XXX Corps.



Which is more or less what I am saying, if the Germans had been forced into large scale movements they would not have been able to bring their full force to bear quickly and would have faced allied air power. The the plan was flawed because it did not ensure that the Arnhem bridges were taken quickly (within minutes of landing, as on the Orne on D-day) and with sufficient force to hold them. The problem was not so much the road, but the choice of landing grounds that 1st Airborne was required to use. That choice may have reduced aircrfaft losses, but it doomed the operation. However, that failing did save the town of Arnhem from complete distruction.

We will never know if the attack could have pushed beyond Arnhem, after XXX Corps arrived, but that is why we play these games, to find out.


(in reply to ComradeP)
Post #: 94
RE: Test Question - 6/23/2010 4:57:09 PM   
ComradeP

 

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Well, as it was, out of around 25.000 houses, only 200 were undamaged after the war, so it's not like the city was spared. Similarly, parts of Nijmegen were destroyed by a not on purpose but also not accidental bombing raid by US bombers (they were supposed to bomb cities in Germany, but turned back due to the weather, decided to attack the railyard at Nijmegen but ended up bombing the city center after the lead bomber dropped its load too early), by operations during Market Garden, and by prolonged German shelling. Eindhoven was damaged during the fighting and in a Luftwaffe bombing raid. The cities had barely been scratched before Market Garden.

The question of whether XXX Corps could've pushed on beyond Arnhem is interesting. I'd say: not by itself and certainly not with one armoured division.

(in reply to Rasputitsa)
Post #: 95
RE: Test Question - 6/23/2010 9:09:23 PM   
Flaviusx


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From: Southern California
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It seems to me altogether unlikely that XXX corps, unsupported and lacking secure logistics to supply any kind of larger force could've gone much beyond Arnhem. No Antwerp, no Germany. This isn't even a close call. Taking the bridgehead itself would have been nice for future operations once we got the rear straightened out, granted.

If the British were serious about making this the area of a single thrust they should have gotten Antwerp settled out -- it might have forced Ike's hand and completely altered the broad front strategy. As things stood, they had no case.

(in reply to ComradeP)
Post #: 96
RE: Test Question - 7/22/2010 8:55:52 PM   
punkjock

 

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With all due respect the best general in any military anywhere without question was Hoth!! He unlike any Russian commander always lead with dash flare and on a regular basis he was the Germans go to man for impossible missions. He was critical in the 41 army group center victories. he whipped ass in the south with his 42 victories and in 43 at kursk he out fought, out smarted, and out maneuvered even the great russian war master zukov by smashing through the Russian defenses south of kursk. he single handedly forced the Russians to comite the steppe front to stop him alone 400,000 men to stop one army.
With regard to is defensive skills he held up time and time again the Russian attacks east of Kiev after kursk and he single handedly save nearly a 100k men at uman that were encircled by a massive Russian army in late 43 . he was also in charge of the relief offensive towards Stalingrad but was ordered to call it off with the collapse of the Italian and Hungarian army's northwest of him.
If historic credit was given to manstein for being the greatest field marshall of WWII then Hoth is without a doubt the greatest general! Oh for you american and russian general lovers anyone can win with brute force the greatness of a general is his skill not his ablity to mass the biggest army!!! Thats why history remembers Lee's greatness not Grant or his predecessors

(in reply to Flaviusx)
Post #: 97
RE: Test Question - 7/23/2010 4:30:13 AM   
Skanvak

 

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I am surprised only one person cite Guderian? I still have to read the books I bought on both of them but I think that Guderian defenitly beat Patton as Guderian are as bold if not more wihtout Patton flaws.

_____________________________


Best regards

Skanvak

(in reply to Rasputitsa)
Post #: 98
RE: Test Question - 7/23/2010 5:13:52 AM   
Flaviusx


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From: Southern California
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I'm pretty sure that Grant hasn't been forgotten except by those determined to forget him.








(in reply to Skanvak)
Post #: 99
RE: Test Question - 7/23/2010 5:47:01 AM   
flipperwasirish


Posts: 1643
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From: The Nutmeg State
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quote:

ORIGINAL: punkjock

Thats why history remembers Lee's greatness not Grant or his predecessors


Gen. Grant "forgotten"? You were either sleeping in history class or not there at all. Or perhaps your dog ate your textbook...

_____________________________

Flipper

(in reply to punkjock)
Post #: 100
RE: Test Question - 7/23/2010 9:52:52 AM   
von Jaeger


Posts: 872
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From: Lancaster, England
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Certainly not forgotten, but not held in the same sort of awe perhaps?   A kind of Montgomery to Rommel relationship?   Grant excellent on the control, the carefully planned and thoroughly supported advance, and the use of mass, logistics etc - here's a man who is going to win the war for you.   Lee bursting with elan and artistry, the intuitive grasp of where to strike and where to hold, and speed, always speed.   Add to that the brave failure, the heroic defence against hopeless odds, the command of smaller forces, less well supplied but elite troops with high morale and initiative and the parallels become clearer still.   It's not surprising that one has the good looks, historically! 

These impressions from over the pond, looking at 'your' war, so please be gentle if I've not got the true picture!
Stuart

(in reply to flipperwasirish)
Post #: 101
RE: Test Question - 7/23/2010 9:57:03 AM   
von Jaeger


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In reply to Skanvak and Punkjock - both Guderian and Hoth are very high on my list too, as Model, Hube etc.  All products of that classy German officer training system - understand what is the overall intention in your orders, then you decide what to do (and do it quickly).   

(in reply to von Jaeger)
Post #: 102
RE: Test Question - 7/23/2010 11:12:43 AM   
ComradeP

 

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There are many historical examples of commanders on the losing side (or commanders whose gains quickly crumbled after their death) being more well known today than their victorious counterparts, but it's debatable whether that's due to their legacy or purely due to modern interests.

(in reply to von Jaeger)
Post #: 103
RE: Test Question - 7/23/2010 12:11:07 PM   
Flaviusx


Posts: 6314
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From: Southern California
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I hold Grant in far higher regard than Lee. Plainly mileage varies.

(in reply to ComradeP)
Post #: 104
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