By all accounts the representation of the officers was pretty spot on. They were clear, in the book, to make clear that these officers weren't idiots and actually hugely effective intelligence officers who were widely read and theoretically excellent. The problem is that brilliant staff officers do not necessarily make good commanders at the tip of the spear. This appears to be what happened here.
I've always thought the German/Prussian model whereby officers can specialise in staff roles or command roles is excellent as it recognises that an officer might be excellent at staff work ( or vice versa ) but rubbish in command ( or vice versa ). If the marines had had that doctrine I doubt we'd have seen these officers in command of recon units.
One of the issues in the Gulf War I was that these recon marines were used to operating as very small units ( squads and possibly a short platoon ) but were, for the invasion, organised into a Bn force. As such the officers who were nominally in command of the Companies - but who, in reality, didn't actually command them in the field, instead focussing on higher level stuff - actually had to command them in the field in situations for which they didn't have the experience and temperament. That and the officers' knowledge of how they were viewed ended up being a lethal cocktail.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.