ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
The "75x 75mm AT Guns" is a serious error. I suspect it is a typo. The Handbook has a number of typos.
?? How could you know that if you don't even have a copy of it? As I said, it could be based upon a later ('42 or '43) version of the "Old Type" division.
Regarding your assertion that I was/am seeking a single "perfect" version of an 'early-wave' division in 1941 is not entirely correct. What I was/am more interested in was/is to generate discussion regarding what those "differing philosophies" and what some of those "subjective factors" are.
That was not the impression I got. I'll leave it at that.
In general, my philosophy is:
1) Specialized manpower is specialized for a reason--namely, to make the division function better. If you strip the specialists away from their specialities and force them to use their rifles, then this is never a good thing. Never ever. Never. It is always a bad thing. Always. Therefore, double-representing specialists in a divisional TOE is giving the division a bonus that it should never get.
ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
But they will be forced to use their rifles if the enemy penetrates into the division's rear-areas. At that point, it is a bonus the division should get. Here I'll just repeat the conundrum I detailed in a previous thread:
"Let's just consider two different situations:
First, a division is ordered to assault the enemy front lines. It does so for some time, until its entire frontline combat elements have been destroyed. At that point it is withdrawn from the frontline to the rear for re-fitting. It's lost about 4,000 combat troopers.
Second, a division is cutoff and surrounded behind enemy lines by enemy maneuvers. Trapped, every man must fight. But it's hopeless, and eventually the entire division is destroyed. All 18,000 men in the division are lost - including vast numbers of specialized, highly-trained officers, etc.
Now, consider that only the frontline elements were modeled in a TOAW scenario for this. In game terms, both results are exactly the same! In both cases, the division has been entirely destroyed. In both cases, the amount of equipment that had to be eliminated was the same. In both cases, the loss penalties awarded the enemy player are the same. In both cases, the replacement equipment needed to rebuild the division is the same.
But in the real world, those two situations are vastly different. In the first case, the division only needs some grunt replacements and it's ready to rejoin the fight. The really valuable parts of the division weren't damaged at all. Whereas, in the second case, the division must be rebuilt from scratch, with lots of very expensive equipment and personnel needed to be able to do so.
That's why I continue to believe that, if the situation is going to get wild or desperate, you've got to model the rear-areas."
Now, there's just no perfect solution to this issue in TOAW. But how can you simply ignore it and dogmatically declare that those rear-area elements should "never ever" be modeled? The rear-area elements form both an additional defensive buffer any attackers must fight through and a "prize" that the attackers will receive for bagging them. Therefore, the consequences of only modeling the frontline elements impact the strategy & tactics of the players:
1. The rationale for pincer movements is artificially reduced.
2. Defense-in-depth is artificially weakened.
3. Opportunities for counteroffensives are artificially increased.
Now, there are topics where the rear areas never saw combat (WWI, for example, maybe some modern topics). But WWII in general (and Barbarossa in particular) was not one of them.
No German infantry division ever had 75x 75mm AT guns. When the 37mm AT gun was phased out, the larger AT guns were reorganized. Instead of 9x 37mm AT guns per regiment, this was reorganized into 3x (or at most 4x) 50mm/75mm AT guns per regiment.
Further, the divisional AT battalion was reorganized into two companies of AT and one company of AA instead of the earlier three companies of AT. Also, even the two companies of AT was reorganized into one company of 12 towed 50mm/75mm AT guns and one company of StuGs (14 StuGs).
So, by 1942-43, the total divisional component of AT guns was 52 at most, and more likely 36, 50mm/75mm AT guns.
Oh, and by the way, I did indeed at one time (back in the 1970s during my PanzerBlitz and Panzer Leader days) physically own a hardcopy version of the Handbook. So, I have actually seen it and handled it and read it and noted the typos contained within it (during that same period I also physically owned a copy of the Soviet Handbook, too).
Situation A: You have trained specialists performing their specialties which allows the division to function at the Proficiency you've assigned it. Result? Your division gets to operate as an integrated division at that Proficiency.
Situation B: You strip the trained specialists away from their specialties and force them to use their rifles in an emergency. Result? You have an armed mob instead of a division, which is not operating as an integrated division because it no longer has the specialists it needs to integrate the division. Also, by definition, this armed mob cannot be operating at the divisional Proficiency originally assigned.
Situation A is the only rational and justifiable way to depict a division in TOAW III.
< Message edited by vahauser -- 5/17/2009 2:40:54 PM >