Matrix Games Forums

Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summaries

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Norm Koger's The Operational Art Of War III >> Scenario Design >> Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summaries Page: [1] 2 3   next >   >>
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summaries - 4/28/2009 7:42:44 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
Every scenario I play seems to evaluate divisional summaries differently. There seems to be as many different opinions about evaluating divisional summaries as there as scenarios. Even different scenarios designed by the same designer seem to evaluate divisional summaries differently.

Question #1:
Where can you find reliable historical documentation regarding divisional summaries?

Question #2:
Once you find reliable historical documentation, how can you interpret and evaluate that information consistently and accurately within the context of TOAW?



_____________________________

Post #: 1
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 7:52:47 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
What follows is a list of five depictions of the German 269th Infantry Division.  The 269th was chosen because it is the only division common with all five of the scenarios selected (actually, the 267th is depicted in the Operation Typhoon scenario instead of the 269th, but since they are both identical organizationally, then that's okay).  The five scenarios chosen are:  Soviet Union 1941, Operation Barbarossa, Directive 21, Russian War 1941-44, and Operation Typhoon.

The five scenarios were chosen using the following criteria:
1) Summer/Fall 1941 timeframe (EDIT: This was deliberate in order to achieve consistency and uniformity of the samples)
2) Recent scenarios that all use TOAW III (no 'older' scenarios were chosen)

< Message edited by vahauser -- 5/1/2009 7:53:35 PM >


_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 2
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 7:56:31 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
This is the 269th on 22 June 1941 as depicted in the Operation Barbarossa scenario:






Attachment (1)

_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 3
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 8:00:05 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
This is the 269th on 22 June 1941 as depicted in the Directive 21 scenario (note that the divisional HQ is separate from the rest of the division in Directive 21, so you are seeing the division "as combined").




Attachment (1)

_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 4
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 8:03:04 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
This is the 269th on 22 June 1941 as depicted in the Russian War 1941-44 scenario.




Attachment (1)

_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 5
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 8:04:48 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
This is the 269th on 22 June 1941 as depicted in the Soviet Union 1941 scenario.




Attachment (1)

_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 6
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 8:07:02 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
This is the 267th in October 1941 as depicted in the Operation Typhoon scenario (the 267th is identical to the 269th organizationally).




Attachment (1)

_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 7
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 8:13:15 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
As you can see from the above 5 depictions of the 269th Infantry Division, there are significant differences between them, even though it is the same division at the same moment in time. 

From a scenario-design perspective, what are the "good" features of these depictions?  What are the "bad" features?

_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 8
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 9:12:26 PM   
golden delicious


Posts: 4750
Joined: 9/5/2000
From: London, Surrey, United Kingdom
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

From a scenario-design perspective, what are the "good" features of these depictions?  What are the "bad" features?


A lot of it depends upon design philosophy, and other aspects of the scenario.

For example the division in Soviet Union 1941 has far more combat squads than the other divisions. This is a result of Bob's design philosophy and, frankly, it works very well for the strategic treatment he's given to the campaign in this scenario. It would be less appropriate at, say, 15km/hex

Clearly the division in Operation Typhoon has included a lot of machine guns which were in the TO&E, but are not in combat elements- a total of 376 machine guns excluding those which form part of the combat squads. If we are assuming the division is going to be hard pressed and constantly defending its own rear areas, this would be reasonable, but in the context of Barbarossa this is perhaps unrealistic.

Transportation is also subjective. While an infantry division contains numerous horses and motor vehicles, the impact that horse teams and trucks have on the performance of the unit can be dramatic. I'm going to guess that Operation Typhoon was designed for TOAW Volume I as the levels of transport in the division are boosting its movement up to far more than would ever be possible for leg infantry.

Where one can definitively say there is a problem is where there are artillery peices or AFVs which simply should not be in the unit, or which are missing. For example we can tell from the TO&E here;
http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany/41_organ_army/41_id_04-welle.html
that there are 67 37mm AT guns and 6 47mm AT guns in this division. This should be the basis for the unit's AT equipment, even if it is anticipated that the division's equipment might change over the course of a long scenario. Interestingly, not one of your 5 examples have hit the mark in this case, though a couple of them come close.

< Message edited by golden delicious -- 5/1/2009 9:24:09 PM >


_____________________________

"Event 902: Bob Cross slays dragons!"

http://www.savemstateathletics.com/tdg/

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 9
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 9:27:35 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
golden delicious,

So, there is no "bad", only "good"?

_____________________________


(in reply to golden delicious)
Post #: 10
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 10:08:34 PM   
golden delicious


Posts: 4750
Joined: 9/5/2000
From: London, Surrey, United Kingdom
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

golden delicious,

So, there is no "bad", only "good"?


No. A lot of scenarios have badly designed OOBs with lots of glaring mistakes. However, I was just illustrating how two different scenarios might have the same unit with different equipment, and both would still be right for that scenario.

< Message edited by golden delicious -- 5/1/2009 10:09:40 PM >


_____________________________

"Event 902: Bob Cross slays dragons!"

http://www.savemstateathletics.com/tdg/

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 11
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 10:35:33 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

golden delicious,

So, there is no "bad", only "good"?


No. A lot of scenarios have badly designed OOBs with lots of glaring mistakes. However, I was just illustrating how two different scenarios might have the same unit with different equipment, and both would still be right for that scenario.


But in the example I've provided, there are five (not two) scenarios with five (not two) differing TOEs for the same division at the same moment in time.

Here is my goal for this thread: to provide readers with reasons for doing things one way or another. It won't do to merely say, "Well, it's right for that scenario." No. That won't do at all. There must be reasons. Why is it right for that scenario?


< Message edited by vahauser -- 5/1/2009 10:36:02 PM >


_____________________________


(in reply to golden delicious)
Post #: 12
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 10:42:47 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
If I had to choose, I'd say that the TOE given for the 269th in Directive 21 got it closest to being an accurate depiction on 22 June 1941.  I'd rank the 267th in Operation Typhoon second.  The 269th in Russian War 1941-44 and Operation Barbarossa tied for third.  And the 269th in Soviet Union 1941 fifth.

EDIT: There are some aspects of each of those TOEs that I find praiseworthy. Other aspects not so much.

EDIT2: I've already changed my opinion regarding how I would rank those five TOEs. Stay tuned for my reasons why. In the meantime, disregard my first attempt at ranking the five TOEs.

< Message edited by vahauser -- 5/1/2009 10:53:02 PM >


_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 13
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 11:39:56 PM   
golden delicious


Posts: 4750
Joined: 9/5/2000
From: London, Surrey, United Kingdom
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Here is my goal for this thread: to provide readers with reasons for doing things one way or another. It won't do to merely say, "Well, it's right for that scenario." No. That won't do at all. There must be reasons. Why is it right for that scenario?


...there are reasons, but I've only played two of the five scenarios above, so I'm unable to comment on the design of the others. Russian War was designed for Volume I, hence the excess transport. As it is intended to cover a three year period, it's unsurprising to see the units set up in a very rough way, but it would have been quite easy to get closer to the initial organisation of the division in terms of the more measurable items.

Bob has expressed his own "count everything" design philosophy here and while I disagree with it in some cases it works excellently for a scenario where attrition is emphasised. Again the exact numbers of some types of equipment are wrong and could be corrected.

So if you want hard rules for designing a unit;
a) Get a good source for what was actually in the unit and make sure you're reading it right (i.e. not double counting). Put the artillery (including AA and AT) and AFVs in as per this source, except where these are transport vehicles
b) Decide what your design philosophy is for combat squads and light support weapons and vehicles. Do you follow Bob Cross' approach or are you more inclined to follow the formal structure of the TO&E and represent just the actual line infantry? Whatever you do, justify to yourself (and ideally record in the briefing) your reasoning, and apply it consistently with regard for conditions
c) Figure out how fast the real unit would have covered ground. Add transport to reach this level. If part of the unit's transport was made up of APCs, decide whether you want to put in the full number of APCs and make up any extra transport with trucks, or instead use some kind of ratio. Again, be consistent.

The fact is scenario design is subjective. You will never reduce it to a science. If it were possible to do so, we would not still have an active scenario design forum for TOAW some eleven years after the game was released.

_____________________________

"Event 902: Bob Cross slays dragons!"

http://www.savemstateathletics.com/tdg/

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 14
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/1/2009 11:47:33 PM   
golden delicious


Posts: 4750
Joined: 9/5/2000
From: London, Surrey, United Kingdom
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

If I had to choose, I'd say that the TOE given for the 269th in Directive 21 got it closest to being an accurate depiction on 22 June 1941.  I'd rank the 267th in Operation Typhoon second.  The 269th in Russian War 1941-44 and Operation Barbarossa tied for third.  And the 269th in Soviet Union 1941 fifth.

EDIT: There are some aspects of each of those TOEs that I find praiseworthy. Other aspects not so much.

EDIT2: I've already changed my opinion regarding how I would rank those five TOEs. Stay tuned for my reasons why. In the meantime, disregard my first attempt at ranking the five TOEs.


I won't give a ranking- but here are the highlights from my perspective;

The TO&E from Soviet Union 1941 is good within the context of the design of the scenario. As far as my own design philosophy goes, the Operation Barbarossa TO&E is probably closest to what I would actually put in the unit if it were my scenario. Directive 21 gives the infantry too much firepower, Russian War makes some basic mistakes with the equipment of the division, while both Typhoon and Soviet Union 1941 have far more combat squads than I would put in the division.

_____________________________

"Event 902: Bob Cross slays dragons!"

http://www.savemstateathletics.com/tdg/

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 15
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 12:58:45 AM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
What follows are some source documents...

_____________________________


(in reply to golden delicious)
Post #: 16
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 1:07:21 AM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
This is taken from the Handbook on German Military Forces (a generic, "standard" German infantry division):






Attachment (1)

_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 17
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 1:08:56 AM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
This is taken from theeasternfront(dot)co(dot)uk:

The German Infantry Division between 1939 and 1942 was comprised from a Divisional HQ, which was formed from a Divisional staff Company and a mapping Platoon. The Division itself was comprised of three Infantry Regiments and various integral support elements. These included a reconnaissance Battalion consisting of a mounted Squadron, a bicycle Squadron, an armoured Section, equipped with 2 SdKfz 221 armoured cars and a heavy Squadron, formed from an anti-tank Platoon equipped with 3 x 37mm Pak 36 and an infantry gun Platoon equipped with 2 x 75mm leIG 18 guns. Other Divisional support elements included an artillery Regiment which comprised of a Regimental staff, an observation Battalion, three medium Battalions each consisting of three batteries, equipped with 4 x 105mm leFH 18 guns and a heavy Battalion consisting of three batteries equipped with 4 x 150mm sFH 18 guns. All guns were usually horse drawn, as towing vehicles were reserved for Panzer and Motorized Divisions. The Divisions engineer Battalion consisted of an HQ platoon, three pioneer Companies and a motorized bridging Column. The final support element within the Division was the anti-tank Battalion, which was formed by an HQ Platoon, a heavy machine gun Company, equipped with 12 x 20mm AA guns and three anti-tank gun Companies, each equipped with 12 x 37mm Pak 36 guns.
The infantry Regiments within the Division were comprised of three infantry Battalions, each formed from three rifle Companies and their integral support elements. These consisted of a machine gun Company equipped with 8 x MG's on sustained fire mounts and 6 x 81mm mortars and an infantry gun Company equipped with 2 x 150mm sIG 33 and 6 x 75mm leIG 18 guns.
Each infantry Battalion consisted of an HQ Platoon of 30 men and three rifle Companies. Support elements within the Battalion were provided by a support Company consisting of three Platoons. These were an HQ Platoon of 8 men, an MG Platoon of 30 men, equipped with 6 x MG's on sustained fire mounts and a mortar Platoon of 30 men with 6 x 81mm mortars. Each of the rifle Companies was comprised of an HQ section of 12 men and 3 rifle platoons. These were in turn each formed from an HQ section of 6 men and 3 rifle sections, each of 10 men. Support elements within the Company consisted of a heavy weapons Platoon with an HQ section of 4 men, a mortar Section of 9 men, equipped with 3 x 50mm mortars and an MG section with 12 men, equipped with 3 x MG's on sustained fire mounts.


_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 18
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 1:10:34 AM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
This is taken from dasheer(dot)org(dot)uk

The following figures and statistics are only a general guide as they do vary depending on the source used.
The Infantry division in 1939-41 averaged 16,860 men. This was made up of the following:
Officers NCOs Other ranks Beamte (Officials)
518 2,573 13,667 102
However, only about 64% of these were actually combat troops – the rest were support elements that the division could not function without. On the ‘march’ the division took up 40 kilometres of road space. As the war turned in the Allies’ favour and German losses rose the number of men in a division was reduced.
Combat elements (men that would normally close with the enemy):
Three infantry regiments comprising of:
Officers NCOs Other ranks Beamte
75 493 2,474 7
  (Also included in this were staff and intelligence units)
Reconnaissance (Aufklarungs) Battalion 623 Officers and men
Anti-tank (Panzerjager) Battalion 550 Officers and men
Engineer (Pionier) Battalion 520 Officers and men
 
Between the front and rear lines:
Artillery (Artillerie) Regiment 2,872 Officers and men
Light (Leichte) infantry ‘column’ 30 men
Signal (Nachrichten) Battalion 474 Officers and men

Rear or logistical support elements:
Supply services (Versrgungsdienste)   226 Officers and men
The above included the rations platoon, baker company, butcher platoon, Military Police and Feldpost platoon
         Logistics column / supply ‘train’         (3 motorised, 3 horse drawn) 180 Officers and men
Petrol, oil and lubricants column 35 Officers and men
Workshop company (Mechanics, carpenters etc) 102 Officers and men
Transport company 245 Officers and men
Veterinary company 235 Officers and men , 890 horses
Medical contingent* 616 Officers and men
*This consisted of 2 Medical Companies, 1 Field Hospital and 2 medical transport platoons.
Weapons:
Below is a table showing various weapons (apart from rifles, submachine guns etc) that equipped a 1939 infantry division.
Light machine guns 378
Heavy machine guns 138
Anti-tank rifles 90
50mm mortars 93
81mm mortars 54
20mm AA guns 12
37mm Anti-tank guns 75
75mm Infantry guns 20
105mm howitzers 36
150mm howitzers 18

EDIT: There is a typo concerning the strength of the pionier battalion above. The strength is given as 520, but should actually be 820 (you can crosscheck this with the Handbook on German Military Forces data). This raises the overal strength of a generic "standard" division to 17,000+ men, thus bringing it more in line with the Handbook.

< Message edited by vahauser -- 5/2/2009 1:40:42 AM >


_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 19
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 1:21:17 AM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
The following is taken from bayonetstrength(dot)150m(dot)com

While the above organisation was officially in use from February 1941 until the end of 1943, the realities of war, especially on the Eastern Front, brought about many changes.  No hard and fast rules can be applied to units amending their authorised establishment in the light of circumstance, but some general observations can be made.
Weapons such as the 5-cm mortar and the anti-tank rifle quickly proved to be more of an encumbrance than a valuable means of fire support, and were often discarded. [My italics.]

_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 20
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 1:28:50 AM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
Here is a more lengthy and involved article from bayonetstrength(dot)150m(dot)com

A while ago, I got into a debate on the www.feldgrau.net forum.  I had been scrolling through, looking for a subject I hoped I could offer some insight on, only to find most were too eclectic even for my tastes, when I saw one that seemed right up my street.
Someone asked what was the rifle strength of a 1941 German Infantry Division.  There were a couple of offers of around 17,000, based on the personnel strengths and the number of rifles issued.  Both options are technically valid.  I offered a slightly lower figure: 3240.  My total was based on the number of men in the actual Rifle Squads of the Division, not simply the establishment strength.  It lead to a couple more posts between myself and another contributor who I think reckoned my total was 'absurd'.  Still, I had good reason to defend my position, and the Rag Bag seems an excellent place to argue my case more fully.

What makes a combatant?
Every army, both today and during World War Two, divides its numbers between combat and service elements.  The combat arms, infantry, armour, artillery, reconnaissance and engineer, are often referred to collectively as the 'teeth'.  The service elements, transport, supply, medical, maintenance and training to name a few, are likewise referred to as the 'tail'.  The number of men in the combat arms to those in the service elements is known as the 'tooth to tail' ratio. 
It is a particularly important calculation as it dictates the scope of operations the entire army involved will be able to carry out.  World War Two was arguably the first major conflict in which the tail achieved greater proportions than the teeth, as more men were drawn into the service elements needed to sustain the increasing levels of mechanisation.
This throws up the thorny issue of how many men could actually be described as combatants.  It is difficult because it is entirely subjective.  There are several ways to attempt to qualify a man as a combatant.  He carried a rifle; he served in a unit which actively engaged the enemy; he served on the frontline; he actually saw the enemy.  Any and all of these descriptions are valid.  Yet the reality was that only a fraction of the men in an infantry division would normally be expected to engage the enemy directly.
But that cosy reality could disappear in an instant.  If the enemy broke through into the rear areas the men in the supply and services units could not wait around for the infantry to turn up and repel them, they would have to do the job themselves.  This was exemplified in actions such as the 'Admin Box' in Burma, where cut off rear echelon troops conducted their own defence.  Likewise at Bastogne, all hands were needed to plug the gaps in the frontline.  Still, these and other similar episodes were the exception to the norm.  When a commander was forced to bolster his lines with rear echelon troops it was a sign of desperate times.  Such men were not organised or armed for the task, and in some instances lacked the basic skills of field craft and marksmanship required.  The German Army in particular made an attempt to address these problems mid-war, as the attrition of the Eastern Front thinned the ranks of their reliable infantrymen.  

Battalion Bayonet strengths
Bayonet strength is an old fashioned description of the number of men found in the rifle squads and platoons.  Foxhole strength is a more modern alternative, but I prefer the Napoleonic terminology.  When attempting to offer comparisons between various armies it is important to be consistent, therefore the calculations below are based on the same formula.

Combat Infantry
The leading edge of any unit was provided by the men of its Rifle Platoons.  Every man among its ranks was in a position where he was likely to engage the enemy at anywhere from a couple of hundred yards to point blank.  Uniquely, the German Army deployed both medics and wagon drivers in its Platoon HQs.  The former carried a pistol for self defence but cannot be counted as combatants.  The latter apparently were held back with the Company transport under a 'vehicle leader', so are excluded from this exercise.

Combat Support
The increasing numbers of crew served weapons diverted further men from the rifle troops.  While mortars were ideally held back, machine guns and anti-tank weapons needed to be pressed forward to engage.  However, as their contribution was based on the weapons they served rather than their small arms, it seems reasonable to count them separately.  All support platoons inevitably contained personnel who may be more properly counted in the following category, but for simplicities sake they are treated as complete entities here.

Command & Administration
Every level of unit from Platoon up had some form of Headquarters, encompassing officers, signallers and messengers.  While still drawn into the frontline, their role was more in directing the efforts of the combatants rather than adding to the fire.
Likewise, with anywhere from 500 to 1000 men found in various types of Battalion, specialists were needed to sustain the fighting groups.  Clerks, mechanics, medics, repairmen and drivers were found along the length of a Battalion's lines of communication.

Comparisons

The numerical figure shows the numbers of officers and men who fall into the categories described above, the percentage figure being given in brackets.  Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole.  For a detailed description of the battalions examined here, please refer to the Index page and the Example TOE pages.
Infantry Btn Combat Infantry Combat Support Command & Admin

British (1944) 444 - (52%) 183 - (22%) 218 - (26%)
American (1944) 369 - (42%) 297 - (34%) 205 - (24%)
Russian (1943) 360 - (59%) 184 - (30%) 68 - (11%)
German (1941) 432 - (50%) 150 - (17%) 278 - (33%)
German (1944) 270 - (38%) 222 - (32%) 216 - (30%)

Points of note
There are some interesting points that emerge.
The British Battalion placed half of its manpower directly into its twelve Rifle Platoons.  Anyone who has read even a few accounts of British actions will know the riflemen carried the burden of the advance.  The combat support elements served quite a number of weapons, six mortars, six anti-tank guns and a dozen carriers excluding numerous HQ vehicles.  A full quarter strength deployed in command and admin seems excessive perhaps, but Battalions were self contained and had no Regimental service assets to call upon as did other nations.
The United States Battalion had the lowest allied percentage in its nine Rifle Platoons, quite surprising really.  The larger percentage in combat support is partly due to the inclusion of a Weapons Platoon in each Rifle Company.  I was in two minds as to whether they should be counted as combat infantry given their proximity to the action.  If so, the level is increased to 50%, perhaps a fairer indication?  They served nine light and six medium mortars, six light and eight heavy machine guns and three antitank guns.  The command and admin figures are swelled by the 'Basics', unallocated riflemen included in each Company HQ, seemingly to replace losses in the platoons.  Their numbers were reduced mid 1944, as noted elsewhere on the site.
The Russian Rifle Battalion is striking.  Only around one in ten men not serving in a direct combat capacity and well over half the strength in the nine Rifle Platoons.  The combat support served six light and nine medium mortars, twelve heavy machine guns and two antitank guns.  These figures are based on the final modifications of the December 1942 tables.  During mid 1943 the reduced strength savings detailed in The Red Army pages began to bite.  Oddly, these reductions actually increased bayonet strength while reducing weapon crews.  However, the subsequent reductions began to whittle away at the rifle squads while maintaining the lowered number of support weapons (six medium mortars, nine heavy machine guns and two AT Guns).
The German Battalions are the most revealing.  I thought it worthwhile showing both their versions to demonstrate how savage the mid-war reductions were.  The 1941 model placed great emphasis on the men of the nine Rifle Platoons, with half the strength of the entire Battalion.  Support weapons of twelve machine guns and six mortars had the lowest allocation of personnel in this amateur study.  The command and admin group is by far the largest, and the Germans still held considerable service elements at Regimental level.  The 1944 model shows dramatic changes.  Rifle strength had fallen by over a third, an immense drop.  Weapons crew had increased by half in comparison, but only served an additional four heavy mortars.  The command and admin groups remained practically unaltered.  The 150 man reduction between the 1941 and the 1944 models was borne entirely by the Rifle Platoons, the men released by pruning the Train elements all going to the crew served weapons.

Divisional implications
Infantry Divisions are notoriously elastic formations.  I wanted to offer some more specific figures than those below, but given the variations, in German units in particular, opted for approximations instead.

Infantry Div Combat Infantry Div total (approx) Bayonet %
British (1944) 3996 18,500 22%
American (1944) 3321 14,500 23%
Russian (1943) 3240 9,500 34%
German (1941) 3888 17,000 23%
German (1944) 1890 12,500 15%
Accurate comparisons between divisions are particularly difficult.
US Divisions operated with supporting arms such as Tank Destroyer and Anti Aircraft Battalions routinely attached, but they were not included in the establishment strength.  A US Division was nearer the size of a British one when these men were counted.
The German 1944 model is the only one not based on nine Infantry Battalions.  Each Regiment had lost its third Battalion, but the Fusilier Battalion is included as this helped alleviate the reductions.

Points of note
Generally speaking, only one man in four was likely to be placed in a unit whose primary mission was to engage the enemy on foot and with small arms.  Three quarters of the Division were tasked with the operation of crew served weapons or command, control and administration duties.  The reformed Soviet Divisions increased their bayonet strength to one in three, the highest of any combatant in the European theatre.
The real shocker is the 1944 German Grenadier Division.  The much vaunted reforms of 1943 were supposedly aimed at reducing the tail to reinforce the weakened teeth arms.  Instead, they reduced bayonet strength from one in four to just one in six.  The numbers of crew served weapons were mostly maintained, and in some areas increased.  The Germans plainly believed that superior firepower was the best defence against the allied onslaught.  The intriguing thing is that the percentage is not too dissimilar from modern day units (a 1990's era US Army Heavy Division posted 16% foxhole strength). 

Exceptions to the rule
Mention should be made of the infantry who served in two other important Divisions; the Armoured and the Airborne.
Armoured Infantry commonly deployed fewer men in the foot assault role than walking units.  A US Armored Infantry Battalion for example was 1001 all ranks in early 1944.  Of that total 504 men were in the nine Rifle Platoons.  But with just three Armored Infantry Battalions there were only some 1500 men from a strength of over 10,000 men.  
In the Airborne Divisions things were very different.  While organised into fighting and admin groups, the propensity for parachute troops to be scattered upon landing meant every man in the Battalion had to be considered a frontline soldier.  When drawn into the more traditional role of infantry later in the war for the allies, much earlier for the German, the distribution of troops took on a more usual appearance.  However, Airborne troops still retained the ability to mobilise their tail units into effective teeth formations.

Summary
The figures above are by no means an attempt to exclude certain types of troops from their role in combat.  The Reconnaissance Regiment of every British Infantry Division was always to be found leading the way, probing routes of advance and often undertaking 'reconnaissance by fire' - a terminological disguise for saying 'if anyone shoots at us we'll know there is someone there!'.  The Reconnaissance units of all armies often operated on foot, fulfilling the same role as Infantry.
Likewise, the Engineers were to be found at the front, repairing bridges or blowing them up as necessary.  Anti-tank guns and machine gun crews, while able to engage at distance, could be found dug in among the rifle pits and trenches.  Their contribution cannot be ignored.
But if there is one thing this exercise has confirmed for my mind, it is this.  I have been reading accounts of wars and battles since I was at school.  Repeatedly, you come across the phrase 'the attack was repulsed with heavy losses inflicted' or such like.  Very rarely does an author attribute an actual number to those losses.  When they do, a total of say 150 men killed and wounded for a single Battalion during a contested offensive, it's easy to think those losses were incurred from a body of some 800 men.  But when looking at the number of infantrymen usually committed, you are talking of those casualties being taken by perhaps 400 men, less if a company was held in reserve.  In this imagined example that is a casualty rate of around one in three.  It is quite a sobering thought. 
It was the responsibility of the men of the Rifle Platoons of an Infantry Division to maintain the integrity of the frontline and keep contact with the enemy.  They required both mundane material support as well as cannon, guns and mortars.  Practically all the other elements of the Division were geared to keeping the riflemen in combat.  When Divisions were pulled back to rest and refit, make good their losses, it was primarily the infantrymen they needed to replace.  A constant flow of men went into their ranks and came out normally only as casualties.  If the infantry component of a unit was savaged, it compromised the ability of the whole to remain in the field.  When you read about Divisions being pulled out to recuperate, it was rarely because of exceptional events such as artillery batteries being overrun, or Headquarters troops being captured.  It was more due to the fact that their bayonet strength had been so depleted by constant exertions the basic squads and sections could no longer function.  
There is tremendous scope for argument as to what truly constituted bayonet strength, this is just my version and does not disagree too much with those of more accredited commentators.  But it is no coincidence that offensives began to stutter and stall as the casualties in the frontline troops began to mount.  Commanders could pour as much fire down as they wanted on the enemy positions, but as in every war before and since exploitation by foot soldiers was the deciding factor.  It was all too easy for a reckless General to burn out his precious reserves of flesh and blood in a foolhardy attack, and then wonder why he could not hold onto the gains they had made.
The riflemen were the lifeblood of every infantry division.  Once drained, it was particularly hard to replenish.  The Second World War was a true 'all arms' conflict, but the burden of attack and defence was carried by a relatively small proportion of the troops involved.


_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 21
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 2:12:43 AM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
Based on the above data and commentary in the previous five posts, I’m prepared to make some preliminary observations regarding the 269th Infantry Division during the summer/autumn, 1941.

1 – The antitank rifles and 50mm mortars were quickly found to be ineffective on the Eastern Front and those men were probably converted into extra riflemen/machinegunners.

2 – The combined total number of “rifle squads” (light rifle, rifle, heavy rifle, SMG, etc.) in the division should not exceed 390 (plus or minus).  This will be augmented by engineer and recon squads.

3 – The superior firepower of the MG34 (both as a light and heavy MG) needs to be accounted for.  The MG34 is about 10% more lethal/effective than other rifle-caliber machineguns used by the Soviets/Allies.  [Note: The TOAW “Heavy MG” refers to 12.7mm (.50-caliber) machineguns and not to rifle-caliber machineguns (8mm and smaller) such as the MG34.  The “military” definition of a heavy machinegun is one which has a sturdier mount, more ammunition, and replacement barrels by which fire can be sustained for longer periods.  Thus, an MG34 in a ‘heavy’ configuration has a larger crew (most of whom are dealing with the larger ammunition allotment), a steady tripod mount, and several replacement barrels.  So, the TOAW definition and the “military” definition of a ‘heavy’ machinegun are different and should not be confused.]

4 – The 20 flamethrowers need to be accounted for.

5 – A military police platoon is present in the division.

6 – A bridging column is present in the division.




< Message edited by vahauser -- 5/2/2009 2:13:18 AM >


_____________________________


(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 22
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 4:55:34 AM   
Silvanski


Posts: 2487
Joined: 1/23/2005
From: Belgium, residing in TX-USA
Status: offline
Check out this old thread on GS.. it gives TOE examples prepared by Jon Martina

http://forums.gamesquad.com/showthread.php?t=3401

< Message edited by Silvanski -- 5/2/2009 4:56:34 AM >


_____________________________

The TOAW Redux Dude

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 23
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 12:24:18 PM   
golden delicious


Posts: 4750
Joined: 9/5/2000
From: London, Surrey, United Kingdom
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

1 – The antitank rifles and 50mm mortars were quickly found to be ineffective on the Eastern Front and those men were probably converted into extra riflemen/machinegunners.


Probably replacing lost riflemen who could not immediately be replaced from Germany rather than simply adding to the rifle strength of the division.

quote:

4 – The 20 flamethrowers need to be accounted for.


This one is easy. An engineer squad has an AP value of five, because they are assumed to be armed with flamethrowers.

quote:

5 – A military police platoon is present in the division.


Yes but this is not really relevant at this scale. At regiment scale, I would include this platoon in the HQ.

quote:

6 – A bridging column is present in the division.


What were its capabilities? Would the division be able to use this column to cross the Dnepr? I'm assuming not. Therefore it would be inappropriate to include bridging teams. The engineer squads offer a limited amount of bridging capacity which probably get a lot closer to the actual abilities of the unit.

Anyway, all your sources deal with this mythical "generic German infantry division". The identity of 269. Infanterie isn't shrouded in mystery. In fact we know it was a 4. Welle Division. My link above to Niehorster's archive gives the specific structure of this type of division.

< Message edited by golden delicious -- 5/2/2009 12:37:08 PM >


_____________________________

"Event 902: Bob Cross slays dragons!"

http://www.savemstateathletics.com/tdg/

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 24
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 2:09:06 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

1 – The antitank rifles and 50mm mortars were quickly found to be ineffective on the Eastern Front and those men were probably converted into extra riflemen/machinegunners.


Probably replacing lost riflemen who could not immediately be replaced from Germany rather than simply adding to the rifle strength of the division.

quote:

4 – The 20 flamethrowers need to be accounted for.


This one is easy. An engineer squad has an AP value of five, because they are assumed to be armed with flamethrowers.

quote:

5 – A military police platoon is present in the division.


Yes but this is not really relevant at this scale. At regiment scale, I would include this platoon in the HQ.

quote:

6 – A bridging column is present in the division.


What were its capabilities? Would the division be able to use this column to cross the Dnepr? I'm assuming not. Therefore it would be inappropriate to include bridging teams. The engineer squads offer a limited amount of bridging capacity which probably get a lot closer to the actual abilities of the unit.

Anyway, all your sources deal with this mythical "generic German infantry division". The identity of 269. Infanterie isn't shrouded in mystery. In fact we know it was a 4. Welle Division. My link above to Niehorster's archive gives the specific structure of this type of division.


Yes, the 269th was a 4th wave division (formed in August 1939). But, by the summer of 1941 all of those 'early-wave' divisions had undergone transformations/reorganizations (in addition to two years' worth of experience/training/combat). Therefore, I have absolutely no problem with lumping all the pre-war 1939 divisions (regardless of wave) together into 'generic' divisions. And you'll notice that pretty much every East Front scenario does likewise.
EDIT: I realize that the 'First-Wave' divisions were "regular army" and that the later waves were not (sort of like the distinction between the Regular Army and National Guard divisions in the US Army in WW2). But I would depict that by simply giving the "Regular Army" divisions a slightly higher Proficiency rating.

The problem is with the 'Engineer' classification itself. I prefer the use of Assault squads (a la Directive 21) to depict those squads especially capable of assaulting. Further, flamethrowers (and satchel charges and antitank mines [aside: in this case, antitank mines refers not to mines planted into the ground but instead were magnetic hand-delivered shaped charges, sort of like hand-delivered panzerfausts, that brave men used to kill enemy AFVs]) are lethal in an antitank role. Thus, an Assault AT- squad would be a perfect representation of 1941 German assault teams. Unfortunately, there is no such thing in the standard TOAW III .eqp file. So, the nearest approximation is a Heavy Rifle AT- squad. This comes closest to representing German 1941 assault teams.

Regarding the divisional Military Police and Bridging Columns, all I'm saying is that all those divisional assets need to be accounted for somewhere (stripped out and given to higher HQ support units, for example).

Regarding the obsolete/useless antitank rifles and 50mm mortars. This gets interesting. If you look at that equipment summary posted in Post #18 above (from the dasheer(dot)org webpage), you'll notice that it gives 378 light machineguns. Now, the standard rifle company has 12 rifle squads. There are 27 companies in the division. But, if you convert those antitank rifle and 50mm mortar crews into rifle squads, you get 14 squads per company instead of 12. And 27 times 14 equals? You guessed it. 378 rifle squads. Which exactly matches the 378 light machineguns listed on the dasheer(dot)org webpage.

Addendum: Here is why I'm basically unhappy with the 269th Infantry Division as depicted in the Soviet Union 1941 scenario. The 269th was a battle-tested combat-veteran division in the summer/autumn 1941. I would give it a proficiency of no lower than 80%. However, that 80% Proficiency rating depends on all the organic components of the division operating as a team. It also depends on all those divisional specialists (signals, artillery, maintenance, supply, veterinary, etc.) doing their jobs at that high level of proficiency. But, if all those specialists are stripped away from their specialties and forced to use their rifles, then you no longer have an 80% proficiency division. In fact, you don't have much of a division at all at that point. So, including all those specialists as 'emergency' riflemen defeats the very definition of an 80% proficiency division, since if they are ever used, then the division cannot be operating at 80% proficiency (maybe 50%, or even 40%). Thus, only the troops operating at the proficiency rating of the division (which by definition means doing the jobs they are most skilled at) should be represented.



< Message edited by vahauser -- 5/2/2009 2:37:39 PM >


_____________________________


(in reply to golden delicious)
Post #: 25
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 3:11:29 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 11047
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser
Addendum: Here is why I'm basically unhappy with the 269th Infantry Division as depicted in the Soviet Union 1941 scenario. The 269th was a battle-tested combat-veteran division in the summer/autumn 1941. I would give it a proficiency of no lower than 80%. However, that 80% Proficiency rating depends on all the organic components of the division operating as a team. It also depends on all those divisional specialists (signals, artillery, maintenance, supply, veterinary, etc.) doing their jobs at that high level of proficiency. But, if all those specialists are stripped away from their specialties and forced to use their rifles, then you no longer have an 80% proficiency division. In fact, you don't have much of a division at all at that point. So, including all those specialists as 'emergency' riflemen defeats the very definition of an 80% proficiency division, since if they are ever used, then the division cannot be operating at 80% proficiency (maybe 50%, or even 40%). Thus, only the troops operating at the proficiency rating of the division (which by definition means doing the jobs they are most skilled at) should be represented.


As I've pointed out elsewhere, the rear-area squads that are represented are already de-leveraged by the fact that only a fraction of them are modeled. In other words, of the 17,000 odd troops in the division, perhaps 5,000 were front-line combat troops, the rest in the rear - that leaves 12,000 or so. But I'm only modeling about 3,000 of them - effectively rating them at 1/4 proficiency or there abouts.

Also note that only a handful of divisions are independently modeled in the scenario. The bulk of the forces are in Corps. And those Corps are modeled in two parts - a frontline part and a rear-area part. That separates them so that they function independently. Also, in the case of the Germans, their rear-area parts are debilitated as combat elements. This was done by slashing their transport quantities. So if they are used in frontline combat they will tend to drop to 1 movement point.

< Message edited by Curtis Lemay -- 5/2/2009 3:19:19 PM >

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 26
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 4:31:13 PM   
golden delicious


Posts: 4750
Joined: 9/5/2000
From: London, Surrey, United Kingdom
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Yes, the 269th was a 4th wave division (formed in August 1939). But, by the summer of 1941 all of those 'early-wave' divisions had undergone transformations/reorganizations (in addition to two years' worth of experience/training/combat). Therefore, I have absolutely no problem with lumping all the pre-war 1939 divisions (regardless of wave) together into 'generic' divisions.


... that's neither here nor there. The German army had different organisations for the different divisions, and even as late as 1941 the later waves were being given different tasks on the battlefield. It's not like these TO&Es aren't available: Niehorster has published them on his website. Clearly, one should use the right organisation rather than just doing a copy-paste.

This is an example of something that's definitely wrong. If we know the division had x equipment, why should it be given y equipment?

quote:

And you'll notice that pretty much every East Front scenario does likewise.


Just because something is popular doesn't mean it is right.

quote:

Unfortunately, there is no such thing in the standard TOAW III .eqp file.


So make your own equipment types. It's never been easier. Again, why compromise when you can get it right?

quote:

Regarding the divisional Military Police and Bridging Columns, all I'm saying is that all those divisional assets need to be accounted for somewhere (stripped out and given to higher HQ support units, for example).


Do they? That bridging column was presumably used to cross the sort of minor rivers that simply would not appear in a 15-50km/hex scenario. So those assets should be removed as well. By the same token, the military police platoon would be used to ensure that the elements of the division moved smoothly together. As they're all in one unit in this case, this function is not necessary in TOAW. Adding them at the corps or army level would be unrealistic; clearly, these units would remain with the division and continue to perform their tasks- not go off 100 miles away and assist some other division in crossing a major river.

quote:

Regarding the obsolete/useless antitank rifles and 50mm mortars. This gets interesting. If you look at that equipment summary posted in Post #18 above (from the dasheer(dot)org webpage), you'll notice that it gives 378 light machineguns. Now, the standard rifle company has 12 rifle squads. There are 27 companies in the division. But, if you convert those antitank rifle and 50mm mortar crews into rifle squads, you get 14 squads per company instead of 12. And 27 times 14 equals? You guessed it. 378 rifle squads. Which exactly matches the 378 light machineguns listed on the dasheer(dot)org webpage.


This is a coincidence. If you look at a couple of the sources above (such as the table in your post #17), you'll note that there are LMGs in various parts of the division. They weren't all up the front with the combat infantry.

quote:

I would give it a proficiency of no lower than 80%.


Proficiency again is a subjective value. Is there anything wrong with this division being at 75% if every other unit is also 5% lower than you would expect?

quote:

But, if all those specialists are stripped away from their specialties and forced to use their rifles, then you no longer have an 80% proficiency division. In fact, you don't have much of a division at all at that point. So, including all those specialists as 'emergency' riflemen defeats the very definition of an 80% proficiency division, since if they are ever used, then the division cannot be operating at 80% proficiency (maybe 50%, or even 40%). Thus, only the troops operating at the proficiency rating of the division (which by definition means doing the jobs they are most skilled at) should be represented.


It's an interesting point. I'd be more inclined to have these rear area troops as extra replacements for rifle squads. The unit has a lot of immediately available replacements- but that doesn't mean everyone is going to be up at the front from day 1.

_____________________________

"Event 902: Bob Cross slays dragons!"

http://www.savemstateathletics.com/tdg/

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 27
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 6:35:38 PM   
vahauser


Posts: 1644
Joined: 10/1/2002
From: Texas
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: golden delicious


quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Yes, the 269th was a 4th wave division (formed in August 1939). But, by the summer of 1941 all of those 'early-wave' divisions had undergone transformations/reorganizations (in addition to two years' worth of experience/training/combat). Therefore, I have absolutely no problem with lumping all the pre-war 1939 divisions (regardless of wave) together into 'generic' divisions.


... that's neither here nor there. The German army had different organisations for the different divisions, and even as late as 1941 the later waves were being given different tasks on the battlefield. It's not like these TO&Es aren't available: Niehorster has published them on his website. Clearly, one should use the right organisation rather than just doing a copy-paste.

This is an example of something that's definitely wrong. If we know the division had x equipment, why should it be given y equipment?

quote:

And you'll notice that pretty much every East Front scenario does likewise.


Just because something is popular doesn't mean it is right.

quote:

Unfortunately, there is no such thing in the standard TOAW III .eqp file.


So make your own equipment types. It's never been easier. Again, why compromise when you can get it right?

quote:

Regarding the divisional Military Police and Bridging Columns, all I'm saying is that all those divisional assets need to be accounted for somewhere (stripped out and given to higher HQ support units, for example).


Do they? That bridging column was presumably used to cross the sort of minor rivers that simply would not appear in a 15-50km/hex scenario. So those assets should be removed as well. By the same token, the military police platoon would be used to ensure that the elements of the division moved smoothly together. As they're all in one unit in this case, this function is not necessary in TOAW. Adding them at the corps or army level would be unrealistic; clearly, these units would remain with the division and continue to perform their tasks- not go off 100 miles away and assist some other division in crossing a major river.

quote:

Regarding the obsolete/useless antitank rifles and 50mm mortars. This gets interesting. If you look at that equipment summary posted in Post #18 above (from the dasheer(dot)org webpage), you'll notice that it gives 378 light machineguns. Now, the standard rifle company has 12 rifle squads. There are 27 companies in the division. But, if you convert those antitank rifle and 50mm mortar crews into rifle squads, you get 14 squads per company instead of 12. And 27 times 14 equals? You guessed it. 378 rifle squads. Which exactly matches the 378 light machineguns listed on the dasheer(dot)org webpage.


This is a coincidence. If you look at a couple of the sources above (such as the table in your post #17), you'll note that there are LMGs in various parts of the division. They weren't all up the front with the combat infantry.

quote:

I would give it a proficiency of no lower than 80%.


Proficiency again is a subjective value. Is there anything wrong with this division being at 75% if every other unit is also 5% lower than you would expect?

quote:

But, if all those specialists are stripped away from their specialties and forced to use their rifles, then you no longer have an 80% proficiency division. In fact, you don't have much of a division at all at that point. So, including all those specialists as 'emergency' riflemen defeats the very definition of an 80% proficiency division, since if they are ever used, then the division cannot be operating at 80% proficiency (maybe 50%, or even 40%). Thus, only the troops operating at the proficiency rating of the division (which by definition means doing the jobs they are most skilled at) should be represented.


It's an interesting point. I'd be more inclined to have these rear area troops as extra replacements for rifle squads. The unit has a lot of immediately available replacements- but that doesn't mean everyone is going to be up at the front from day 1.


By the summer of 1941, no two German infantry divisions had the same organization. Even if there was an "ideal" TOE for 4th-Wave divisions in 1939, by the summer of 1941 none of those divisions matched that TOE. Every division deviated from the "ideal" TOE, and the farther away in time (and combat experience) the division was from its 'original' TOE, the greater the deviation. But here is the real problem: the TOE data for the other combatants is even more problematic than it is for the Germans. For instance, how many Soviet divisions were even close to their TOEs (and I'm not talking about full strength or not, I'm talking about basic things like how many battalions and what kind of battalions they were)? A scenario is only as strong as its weakest link. Generic German infantry divisions, based on better data than is likely to ever be available for the other combatants, is never going to be the weak link.

Yes, I've been designing my own WW2.eqp file for over a year now. A work in progress that is significantly helped by discussions like this one.

Agreed that the LMG thing was a coincidence. However, that 378 rifle squads seems to pass the smell test and some reality checks. As of today, I would build the 269th Division around a base of 378 rifle squads (minus the antitank rifles and 50mm mortars, which are converted to riflemen).

Regarding engineers. The pionier battalion had ~800 men in it. That is a large battalion! When you also consider the engineers floating around the division as parts of other units (e.g., each infantry regiment had some engineers organic to it), you are starting to look at a lot of engineers. How many engineer squads should be depicted in the division? That is a very good question. Note that the Soviet Union 1941 269th and the Russian War 1941-44 269th have organic bridging squads shown.

Regarding military police. From what I can tell, the 269th had one platoon of MPs (I'm not sure how many TOAW MP squads that translates into). Including the division's MPs or not might not matter, but considering the traffic jam penalties in TOAW, then the scenario designer had better be aware of how big a traffic nightmare he wants to make if he doesn't at least recognize that the 269th had an organic MP presence. Note that only the Directive 21 depiction of the 269th has organic MPs shown.

Regarding rifle 'replacements', I prefer to represent these using the Replacements Editor.


_____________________________


(in reply to golden delicious)
Post #: 28
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/2/2009 10:48:12 PM   
golden delicious


Posts: 4750
Joined: 9/5/2000
From: London, Surrey, United Kingdom
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: vahauser

By the summer of 1941, no two German infantry divisions had the same organization. Even if there was an "ideal" TOE for 4th-Wave divisions in 1939, by the summer of 1941 none of those divisions matched that TOE.


You'll notice if you go to Niehorsters page, he describes the deviations from standard TO&E for each division.

Your philosophy seems to be that because we can't fix everything, we should fix nothing. So what's the point in designing units at all? My argument would be that we should take advantage of quick wins: we know how these divisions were organised, so lets get them set up properly so as much as possible is correct.

quote:

Agreed that the LMG thing was a coincidence. However, that 378 rifle squads seems to pass the smell test and some reality checks. As of today, I would build the 269th Division around a base of 378 rifle squads (minus the antitank rifles and 50mm mortars, which are converted to riflemen).


I'd go for something in between. My guess is those AT rifles weren't actually scrapped. The Germans seem to have continued to use AT rifles to some extent at least into 1942.

quote:

Regarding engineers. The pionier battalion had ~800 men in it. That is a large battalion! When you also consider the engineers floating around the division as parts of other units (e.g., each infantry regiment had some engineers organic to it), you are starting to look at a lot of engineers. How many engineer squads should be depicted in the division?


Three companies of three platoons each in the battalion, three platoons in each regiment. Three squads per platoon. So that would make 36 squads. Thing about engineers is that they use a lot of auxiliary equipment which doesn't show up in a TOAW unit. That's probably what all those 800 men are doing.

quote:

Regarding military police. From what I can tell, the 269th had one platoon of MPs (I'm not sure how many TOAW MP squads that translates into). Including the division's MPs or not might not matter, but considering the traffic jam penalties in TOAW, then the scenario designer had better be aware of how big a traffic nightmare he wants to make if he doesn't at least recognize that the 269th had an organic MP presence.


I would think that would be factored into the units' proficiency etc.

quote:

Regarding rifle 'replacements', I prefer to represent these using the Replacements Editor.


Agree. That's what I was getting at.

_____________________________

"Event 902: Bob Cross slays dragons!"

http://www.savemstateathletics.com/tdg/

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 29
RE: Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summ... - 5/3/2009 1:44:34 AM   
Central Blue

 

Posts: 695
Joined: 8/20/2004
Status: offline
quote:

Regarding engineers. The pionier battalion had ~800 men in it. That is a large battalion!


The following source is from 1942, but it does provide some detail on large pioneer battalions:
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/docrepository/FME101_10.pdf

article on bridging here:http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/tme30/ch8sec5sub8.html




_____________________________

USS St. Louis firing on Guam, July 1944. The Cardinals and Browns faced each other in the World Series that year

(in reply to vahauser)
Post #: 30
Page:   [1] 2 3   next >   >>
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Norm Koger's The Operational Art Of War III >> Scenario Design >> Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summaries Page: [1] 2 3   next >   >>
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.184