Feinder
Posts: 6582
Joined: 9/4/2002 From: Land o' Lakes, FL Status: offline
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Well, obviously my sig will betray the further content of my post but... For the most part, the author is "in the ballpark". But he has certainly over-simplified and trivialized much of the BPF's contribution. And if I may say so, it's a very myopic American perspective (and yes, I'm an American). 1. As indicated, the RN was basically chased out of the Pacific after April 42. And due to commitments elsewhere (Europe), did not have the resources to commit to the Pacific until late 1944. 2. When the RN did arrive in force, the USN was already driving straight for Japan. Even contributing 16x RN flight decks, compared to the 50 or so flight decks the USN, the contrution -was- small in relation, but not in sacrifice (it represented everything they had). 3. The US wanted to concentrate operations on what would bring the war directly to Japan. Certainly a useful (and winning) strategy. Given the location of British bases, their contribution is necessarily limited to strikes against Malaya and Java (as the whole of the SRA stood between them and Japan). The BPF had to sailed all the way to Oz, and then up the staging base north of Rabaul (cant remember the name, starts with M, I think), in order to take part in the strikes on Okinawa. 4. The RN very much viewed the Pacific as their war as well. They had suffered many casualties, and taken with the thier current and former colonies of India, Australia were a major commitment to the Pacific. The US generally viewed the Pacic as "their war", as indeed they had been footing 90% of the bill for the last 3 years (and there many in the US that had wanted to focus primary resources on Japan, not Germany). 5. However, bearing in mind the physical location and logical targets for the RN, it became a Catch-22. The US did not want to be seen as propping up (or restoring colonial regimes). However, the only logical places that the RN could intitially strike, was vs. targets in their own and Dutch colonies. 6. While the RN was willing and eager to participate in the Pacific war by end of 1944, the USN was already very good at it's craft. There was certainly a lot of "Um. If you want to help, we can put you to good use, but stay out of our way" by the US. A lot politics went back forth. 7. Without a doubt, for the RN, there was some intent to restore the national prestige, esp forward thinking that post-war, a strong RN might serve to demonstrate strength to colonies that were already on the verge of separation before the war. But I do believe this be a fringe politcal benefit and not the primary goal of deploying the BPF in 1945. 8. The RN -was- short legged. It did have serious logicistical problems that the USN basically said that, if it was going to help in the Pacific, it was going to have to solve for itself (fair also, given the huge fleet train the USN required of itself). Fortunately, the RN borrowed a very resourcesful USN logistics Adm (forgot his name), and he helped to create the RN fleet train. But consider that that most of the RN ships were designed and built for operations in the Atlantic and Med. It took almost 6 months to "tropicalize" a ship for the rigors of the Pacfic (another reason in delays to RN in the Pacific). The main issue the RN ships had was ventilation. The Pacific is HOT compared to the Atlantic, and pumping in fresh air ended up being a major task in the refit process. 9. I strongly question the authors sources on his statistics that the RN suffered 50% casualites vs. the USN 20%. My sources show about 25% casualties, which is in-line with a navy that was learning the trade of large fleet carrier ops. And again, regards to the use of the American planes - they -were- better than the RN FAA. The FAA had always been the wayward step-child, and simply got toss-overs conversions from the RAF. However, given the US obvious experience (and production capabilities) it made sense to use US aircraft. GB did end up offering the Firefly, a very capably aircraft, but again, the suitability and availably of American aircraft, made their use a pragmatic choice.
< Message edited by Feinder -- 8/4/2008 4:42:11 AM >
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