miral
Posts: 170
Joined: 12/20/2007 Status: offline
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Pzb, thanks for the suggestion. chezDaJez, there are certainly many who agree with you but, consider...the Japanese had the same psychological problem as the Germans; they sacrificed everything to the operational, even grand strategy. A man as intelligent as Yamamoto, with personal experience of the U.S., should surely have known that the best way to destroy Japan's strategy of a limited war and then a negociated treaty, would be the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. But politics and strategy had to give way to the chance of a brilliant operational victory. Like the Germans, the Japanese confused the operational and the strategic levels of war. Pearl Harbor was like the Schiflin Plan of 1914; Germany brought into the war against her a world wide empire and the greatest naval power in the world because the generals needed to invade Belgium to make their elegant operational play work. Second - Midway. Yamamoto's plan was not just bad; it was one of the worst naval plans of operation ever conceived. As Willmott points out in The Barrier and The Javelin, Yamamoto brought the entire strength of the Combined Fleet, the strongest fleet in the world at the time, against the Americans, carriers, BB's, Ca's, everything, and what did he accomplish? He managed to attack one American ship (or two, if you count the DD that took a torpedo meant for the Yorktown). Now, that is downright pitiful. As to the American's foreknowledge of the attack; this would not have mattered had Yamamoto not frittered away 2 CVs at Coral Sea and kept his huge fleet together rather than scatter it all over the north Pacific. And it was typical Japanese samurai arrogance that it was impossible for the Americans to break their codes anyway. And after Midway he went the other way, from being over aggressive to being over defensive. The only way to have beaten the Americans at Guadalcanal would have been sustained naval bombardment of Henderson Field. But Y did this only sporatically; he committted naval forces to the battle in the waters around Guadalcanal in fits and starts rather than as part of any coherent operational plan. And his failures cannot be viewed as simply part of a Japanese mindset; I was wrong to speak in such a general way. The Japanese were not all as obtuse as he, though he was quite representative of the majority mindset. The Imperial Naval Staff strongly opposed Midway with many coherent and logical arguments (again see Willmott and also Shattered Sword). The wargames played before the operation showed that the japanese would lose but Admiral Ogaki, one of Y's close collaborators, arbitrarily changed the outcome. And the final comment on Y's brilliant Pearl Harbor attack is this; in 1945 every American BB 'sunk' at Pearl was off the coast of Japan, shelling the hell out of the Japanese homeland. Should not Y have known that you cannot sink ships in shallow water, unless you destroy them almost completly? But, is it not interesting that so little is said or written about Yamamoto after Midway? Historians, too, have little to say. It is as though Y, the dominant figure of the war until Midway, suddenly shrinks out of sight, into relative insignificance. Most strange.
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