Really? What's your 'first hand experience' -- and what range of conditions and scales does it cover?
Yes, really. Nam, 70-71, Co/Bn. There were three of us called Rhino . . . I was the Bones. And no, I was not a medic. The Navy provided the medics.
Point being that OPART covers a wide range of scales, unit capabilities, etc. Obviously, a mechanized battalion deployed over a 2 km front might be able to pull up stakes pretty quick when it gets the word -- but whether the same applies to a 1916 Russian infantry corps dug in across 20 kilometers is another question.
You’re making a problem where there isn’t any. A variable can be defined that calculates how any MPs a unit needs to both move and entrench based on the designer’s input.
In general, though, it seems a tad odd to me that a unit could be simultaneously entrenched to hold a given sector and ready to move out at a moments' notice.
Besides you, who said it was at a moments notice? Moving takes time and that is all part of the usage of MPs by a unit in reserve. The number of movement points required is function of the unit’s readiness and experience. I don’t see a big difference between an entrenched unit moving out as opposed to a unit milling about in “reserve” status and moving out.
Your position implies that units are either tasked 100% to move out or 100% to entrench and that switching from one mode to another take some kind of extraordinary effort. This is just not the case no matter how absurd you try to frame your argument.
Certainly, it's not a change I think would necessarily improve the game.
As is, a unit will move from the back line to reinforce the front line and has absolutely no ability to defend itself by digging in (the current TOAW model). You evidently find this more realistic than a unit that moves up to the front line and, provided time is available, entrenches before the next assault.
A unit does take time to deploy, and if it is already deployed, it takes time to assemble in march order and move off. Unlike you, for example, Patton did not regard it as routine when his army was able to disengage, promptly move north, and go into the attack to relieve Bastogne. He actually thought it was quite a feat.
You try to cavalierly dismiss my point that depending upon the scale and so on, it can indeed be impractical for a unit to be simultaneously deployed in a defensive posture and ready to serve as a rapid-reaction force -- but you should be able to see my point.
If you choose not to, that's your affair.
I am not Charlie Hebdo