Creating HMG unit

[Rommel3]

(I'm poor at english.)
In th CHS 2.05, HMG unit(T92HMG) is squad unit. But IMHO it should be Army weapon unit. Because HMG is defensive weapon.

More important thing is How to define its Anti-soft value.
In th WITP there is no HMG. So estimating it(HMG's Anti-soft value) from similar weapon that is included in the WITP is only way not to harm WITP system.

I do not have enough knowledge about weapons, But I think AAMG that is included in the WITP device could be a clue about this. (I know AAMG and HMG is deferent.)

.303 Bren AAMG; anti soft - 9.
12.7mm AAMG; 18.

.303 Bren AAMG and Type 92 HMG almost same caliber. but I think anti soft 9 is too small value for HMG.

You Know, HMG is deadly weapon against infantry without supporting armor.

[el cid again]

Legally - believe it or not - no HMG is used on troops!!! Against the conventions!

They exist only to fire on airplanes - and equipment. [In US Army it is traditional to call in fire on "helmits and web gear" because you can only target 'equipment'- not men! - so when aiming at men you just aim at the 'equipment'!]

WITP has technical problems with definitions - and what works for code is not always what works for us being logical. Turns out in this case WITP and the law are in sync - HMGs are best rated as AAA weapons. If you do NOT do this your HMGs will NOT work against planes - their intended target! And they certainly to matter in that role. To achieve this you need to rate them as AA weapon and give them a ceiling. I give the .30 cal class HMGs a ceiling of 2000 feet and the .50s a ceiling of 4000 feet.
This permits both to round to a range = 1, which is best for simulating infantry combat anyway. While a rifle or mg has more range than that, it is not the statistically significant range in combat.

Note that the SAME weapons (e.g. Browning M2) used on aircraft get DIFFERENT numbers than when on the ground. This is because of different scales used by the code for different kinds of combat.

Also note that ships and boats have AAMGs too. IF you don't rate the land ones IDENTICALLY then effects will not be comparable for use in several different kinds of combat - AA - anti-ship and land.

A Browning M2 12.7 mm HMG should have a range = 1, ROF = 750,
effect = 10, ceiling = 4000, penetration and anti-armor values = 15,
anti-soft value = 3 and a load cost = 4.

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Rommel3

(I'm poor at english.)
In th CHS 2.05, HMG unit(T92HMG) is squad unit. But IMHO it should be Army weapon unit. Because HMG is defensive weapon.

More important thing is How to define its Anti-soft value.
In th WITP there is no HMG. So estimating it(HMG's Anti-soft value) from similar weapon that is included in the WITP is only way not to harm WITP system.

I do not have enough knowledge about weapons, But I think AAMG that is included in the WITP device could be a clue about this. (I know AAMG and HMG is deferent.)

.303 Bren AAMG; anti soft - 9.
12.7mm AAMG; 18.

.303 Bren AAMG and Type 92 HMG almost same caliber. but I think anti soft 9 is too small value for HMG.

You Know, HMG is deadly weapon against infantry without supporting armor.

Also note that while the T92 is "called" a Heavy Machinegun, I think this designation refers more to its weight than its firepower. Weight including tripod is 122 pounds,but it is a 7.7mm Hotchkiss style weapon, firing the wonderful old strips (30 rounds).

The real IJA Heavy machinegun would be the T93 13mm weapon and this is represented in the game as an AAA weapon.

[Lemurs!]

The HMGs should be labeled MMGs in the Japanese order of battle. Also, these squads also contained 45 and 50mm mortars, more or less a heavy weapons squad.

Mike

[Rommel3]

Most important thing is to estimate HMG units's anti -soft value. But look like it's a game designer's top sceret. [:D]

[jwilkerson]

ORIGINAL: Rommel3

Most important thing is to estimate HMG units's anti -soft value. But look like it's a game designer's top sceret. [:D]

The original designers, Gary and Joel, don't much frequent this forum any more, so we're pretty much on our own now. So be your own desiger ! That's what modding is all about !

[el cid again]

The Type 92 is called a HMG because IJA called it a HMG. It is in the fine tradition of WWI era HMGs in the .30 caliber class - and no one disputes that a gigantic water cooled WWI HMG is indeed that, in spite of not being a .50

Joe should know about this unit - I believe he created it for CHS! Since it has AAA sights I "converted" it into a AAA weapon for RHS. But it is still a .30 - that is a 7.7 mm weapon. And yes, we do use the Type 92 AAMG as well. For land and sea use. In general, you will find more actual names in RHS. Thus a 15 cm Gun is a Type 89 15 cm gun, etc.

[Rommel3]

A Browning M2 12.7 mm HMG should have a range = 1, ROF = 750,
effect = 10, ceiling = 4000, penetration and anti-armor values = 15,
anti-soft value = 3 and a load cost = 4.

What is ROF? Rate of fire? But Editor do not have ROF something.
12.7mm AAMG Anti soft value =18. You said 12.7 MM' Anti soft should be 3. Does is mean AAMG anti soft value / 6 = HMG anti soft value?

[JWE]

I too have added MG squads to my LCUs; 2 gun sections per squad, giving 10-12 man squads (2 x 5-6 man gun sections) for the US & the Brits, 16-18 man squads (2 x 8-9 man gun sections) for the Japanese.

Doing this allows for additional firepower to be added to a LCU at the squad loading cost. It also enhances assault values, but I think this is a realistic compromise since a good high-cyclic weapon was often used to lay down a base of fire.

I have assigned arbitrary values for various infantry weapons (anti soft numbers), using rough effectivity numbers developed from the Pentagon planning study results during the AR-15/M-16 tests and the idiotic M-16 HB SAW analyses.

My values range from about 0.5 for a typical bolt action rifle (Arisaka, Enfield, Springfield), through about 7 for a BAR, 10 for a Bren (and other magazine fed equivalents), 12 for a belt fed .30, 15 for a water cooled, belt fed .30, and so on.

Surprisingly, these values give anti-soft numbers for typical national infantry squads that are very close to those pertaining in the original game.

So: I would give a Japanese "HMG" squad an anti soft of about 24. The british Vickers "MMG" squad would be a 30, as would the US M1917 "HMG". Hope this helps.

Ciao. JWE

[el cid again]

ORIGINAL: Rommel3

A Browning M2 12.7 mm HMG should have a range = 1, ROF = 750,
effect = 10, ceiling = 4000, penetration and anti-armor values = 15,
anti-soft value = 3 and a load cost = 4.

What is ROF? Rate of fire? But Editor do not have ROF something.
12.7mm AAMG Anti soft value =18. You said 12.7 MM' Anti soft should be 3. Does is mean AAMG anti soft value / 6 = HMG anti soft value?

The effect value is the weight of the shell in pounds. There was a review of this once on a thread, and the conclusion was that the effect on soft targets is proportional to the square root of explosives. So RHS uses square root values for soft effect. Anti-armor values should generally be the same as penetration for army weapons - although if the weapons shoot at planes a different system is used - the anti-armor value is STILL the actual penetration value at point blank range. And THAT is 1.75 times caliber for a high velocity round (900 meters/sec) - the normal case. In the case of machine guns there are strange things going on with the effect value - because we cannot really state effect in pounds - but on the other hand it is also correct to say a mg can be more spread out than a single shell hit can - so a slight exaggeration is in the correct direction.
Essentially the model is too simple - all simulations are if you get into them - and this is no exception. But we can come pretty close. In the case of mgs the penetration is 9 mm for .30s and 15mm for .50s - at the tactical range of interest. The 9mm is a nice value since 10mm is a popular armor thickness - and that makes it almost proof to .30s - which is correct. [If you get a lucky role you penetrate - which is also correct - a vehicle with 10mm on the front has less other places].

[el cid again]

I think there is some confusion about the WITP system design. If so, this is the fault of lack of documentation - which does not define very much.

Essentially, a true infantry "squad" is a body of men with several weapons NONE OF WHICH should be defined in the game. That is, you may use definitions of what is in the squad to get your firepower, but you don't put in any MG the squad may have. IF a "fire team" (a term not yet invented in WWII) is built around an LMG, then in general

a US Army (and most other) squads have two such teams
a USMC squad has three such teams
an IJA squad has one such team (but ALSO has a team with light mortars and almost always a third team that hunts tanks).

Now you do not get to add these LMGs to the game - nor the Japanese 50mm light mortars (the best in the world in their class by consensus).
Nor do you add SMGs when these are present. ALL squad weapons just add to the firepower of the squad. And the "load cost" of a squad is properly understood as one man per point - although CHS has gone over to using 2 for cavalry - the other one representing a horse - a valid concept.

HMGs (and MMGs called HMGs by IJA) come in TINY units - at company or battalion level. In IJN a "heavy weapons platoon" is TWO mg or TWO mortars or TWO AT guns. IJA sometimes uses that - or sometimes 3 - but an entire heavy weapons "company" in Japan is typically 4 heavy weapons - often of two different kinds. By Western standards these are paltry allocations - but this is history - and we don't get to make their choices. On the other hand, NOTHING in Japan is EVER simple. Fifth division went in with MORE LMGs than any division in any country in any war in history!!!! EVERY line infantry man had BOTH a rifle and an LMG!
How you gonna represent that? Make special squads for 5 division? So far all mods have ignored this - including RHS. [One reason is there are no slots for squads] According to their ops officer, at every tactical action, troops would decide who gets what? However many "fire teams" they needed, they had that many LMGs, and these guys were backed up by guys with nice light rifles - short versions of the army weapons designed for cavalrymen. Very flexable - and very effective - and practical in Malaya because the troops had bikes and all the roads were paved - so they could carry the weight. But no easy way to represent this in the game.

[Monter_Trismegistos]

Well you cannot blame IJN for using other standards than US. Sorry to tell you (I don't want to start any war with you, I have great respect to your enormously big knowledge) but it seems that you are often taking US standards as world-wide standards. In some countries MGs are divided by not the calliber, but by the way of using, and number of crew attached and possibly system of cooling .

For example similliar weapon with exact the same barrel can be a LMG, HMG, Heaviest MG (term used in Poland) - simply some has bipod attached, some tripod, some wheels, and some are vehicle mounted. So distinguishes them function, their weight and men needed to carry them, not calliber.

[el cid again]

Fear not, I am on your side on this one. I think one needs to be aware of different terminology in different institutions. I was writing to the people in the thread who seem to think in US terms. I was trying to explain that allocations like he used for Imperial J forces are way too big. And I am not at all sure that a water cooled thing that has a big crew and needs a truck to carry any distance isn't a HMG - even if it is .30 caliber. There is a very famous one of European origins - and no one ever mistook it for a "light" mg. But the idea of classification by caliber has some merits too.

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I think there is some confusion about the WITP system design. If so, this is the fault of lack of documentation - which does not define very much.

Essentially, a true infantry "squad" is a body of men with several weapons NONE OF WHICH should be defined in the game. That is, you may use definitions of what is in the squad to get your firepower, but you don't put in any MG the squad may have. IF a "fire team" (a term not yet invented in WWII) is built around an LMG, then in general

a US Army (and most other) squads have two such teams
a USMC squad has three such teams
an IJA squad has one such team (but ALSO has a team with light mortars and almost always a third team that hunts tanks).

Now you do not get to add these LMGs to the game - nor the Japanese 50mm light mortars (the best in the world in their class by consensus).
Nor do you add SMGs when these are present. ALL squad weapons just add to the firepower of the squad. And the "load cost" of a squad is properly understood as one man per point - although CHS has gone over to using 2 for cavalry - the other one representing a horse - a valid concept.

Oh, no, no, no. I don’t add LMGs or anything else. I’ve been dinking with the model with some buddies at Pendleton and what we did was choose the platoon organization as the effectivity basis. Here’s what we did.

We understand the internal structure of individual infantry basic components and the weapons allocated thereto. We took every weapon and assigned it an effectivity value, using declassified US Army, DOD, USMC analysis results, along with some similar Korean War studies done by the Soviet GLA and the PRC. This resulted in a specific effectivity value that we normalized to a WiTP anti-soft number for each weapon. We then spread weapon numbers across a “nominal” platoon and applied division to achieve a numerical value for a nominal “squad”, both in size and content.

Thus, the IJA “squad” will have an LMG (T-96 perhaps) and an allocation of T-89 GDs along with an appropriate number of Arisaka T-98s (mostly rifles but a few carbines too); i.e., one third of the mortar squad is added to each of 3 infantry squads giving a “squad” size of 17.

Brits have a lot of puny (10 man) squads, but have a plethora of Brens at increasing echelons (think Pl and Coy HQs and the Carrier Platoon, but bag the carriers). So, simple math allows the effectivity value of a Bren team (3-4 men) to be spread across the Brit infantry component. Simple math also allows for incorporation of the 2” mortar teams into the infantry squad.

The US pushes “infantry” weapons all the way down. The M1919s are held at company echelon, along with the 60mm mortars. This one was a bitch; what to do with the M1919s. We chose to add the firepower component of the 60s into the squad, but retain the M1919s for inclusion into US MG squads, having a statistical average of M1919s and M1917s and a therefore greater number of “MG squads” in Army and MC divisions.

Because of “squad” size, we chose to include MGs as a “squad” of 2 gun “sections”. This will give a J MG squad of 2 guns and 18 men, a Brit Vickers squad of 2 guns and 10 men, and a US MG squad of 2 “equivalent” guns and 12 men; serendipity raises its head.

In doing this, we could create LCUs that conform to national doctrinal and tactical inclinations. An IJA division has a lot of large squads; just the thing for assaults; haku ichiu, banzai!! A Brit division has a lot of squads of small size but with compensating firepower; just the thing for insertion with orders to “hold until relieved”. A US division has fewer squads (respectively) of middling size (respectively), but with firepower up the wazoo!

The results were surprising. I think Grigsby is the reincarnation of a couple of brilliant op analysts who died the day before he was born. Our data for a Bren (normalized to WiTP constraints) gives an anti-soft of 10. Gary’s number is 9. Given all of our data, the 81mm mortar calcs out to 12; surprise, surprise.

Anyway, since the game is a “simulation” and the ground combat model is a higher-echelon model, we felt that “outcome” was more important than labeling or strict historical accuracy as to the numbers of pistols, submachine guns, or the like. So far, our results are quite satisfactory.

The only problems we have encountered are in early war Malaya. 5 tests have not yet produced a Japanese victory. Seems that the model can’t quite replicate the quality of being out-generaled. Poor Percival. We are evaluating morale and training factors for both sides along with leader bonuses. We hope to have this concluded in the next few weeks.

Anyway, the bottom line is: it works.

Ciao. JWE

[el cid again]

I think you are on the right track. I just didn't understand your brief statements in the context you meant them.

The game you are using has a supply problem: too many "free" supplies in Malaya. Try doing this in RHS. Don't feed the men - or isolate them - and they get hurt.

Japan had intel advantages in Malaya. Improvised but effective intel was done in the months prior to the invasion. Even an RAF officer with real time knowledge of ops and access to a radio helped out. How do you simulate that?

[Don Bowen]

John

I'm getting quite interested in your scenario. Please pop a copy over via email when you think it is ready. Not a hurry for me, as I am to my (insert name of organ) in programming right now.

Don

[JWE]

Whoah Cid!!! You have hit on the big magilla.

Our numerical values aren't that much different from those that Andrew and his CHS people developed. We just re-configured LCU structure, well within CHS boundaries, but with an arbitrary tilt towards individual "national technical" means. What IS different is how we allocate "support" within an LCU.

In this instance, we use the “nominal” TO&E of a unit to determine who (and how many) serve the guns (and threw the grenades) and who (and how many) humped ruck, prepped the demo blocks, ran the ammo, evaced the wounded, forwarded the rats, and inventoried the TP. Next, we analysed “support” staff inclusion into a combat echelon. To do this we researched AARs, diaries, letters home, and other practical indicia.

We determined that a US division had an organic component of support that would allow it to operate, at a nominal capacity (calculated in USMC standard units of fire and supply), for a period of a week (actually 8 days). This is independent of all Corps or any other higher echelon. The Brits were dependant on higher echelon support for ammo and food. A typical Brit division had a load-out of 4 days of cat-1 supplies (ammo, but dry rats and nothing else, i.e., no soap, clean uniforms, or addl morphine).

Japan is a special case. The TO&E allows for a certain level of “support” within the organizational structure, but all of the apocryphal evidence indicates this was insufficient, to say the least. Let’s just think about the Japanese doughboy lying on the beach at Pt. Cruz or Kokumbona, who had his pal help him poop by using his fingers in his anus. All the Japanese diaries, letters, and “honest” AARs, from the Guad onward, talk about starvation and lack of ammunition as a way of life.

This was NOT an appreciable concern for US and Brit forces after 1942. What to do, what to do? We arbitrarily and substantially reduced the “support” available to IJA and IJN units, vis a vis US and British units (Whoah, maybe we could arbitrarily drop support for Brit Malayan units and arbitrarily raise IJA units for the Malaya campaign??? Hmmmmm).

Anyway, we’re using a differentiated “support” model for the allies and the Japanese. Let’s see what happens over time.

Ciao. JWE

[JWE]

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen


John

I'm getting quite interested in your scenario. Please pop a copy over via email when you think it is ready. Not a hurry for me, as I am to my (insert name of organ) in programming right now.

Don

Don,

We're just playing with bits and pieces. Steve (Lt. Col. Stephen Meuhelberger, USMC) kicked my a## and threw me off the Guad. I had a MarDiv, he had a fairly well trained US Army division. In other words, the mods are just playthings. We're just trying to have a bit of fun within the major scheme of things. We're close, within a cigarrillo.

What do you want? I can give you all of our internal data as to how we calculated individual national squad charicteristics (firepower, and the like) and where the data came from.

A real scenario mod is about 3 - 4 weeks away. I have to generate a statistically reasonable chance to take Malaya before I can say I have a real scenario that is functional throughout the war period. Wish me luck. I'm playing James Faustini, Capt. USMC, on this one. He's ops officer 3/4th Marines, between tours, and a real hellion; just like Yamashita. If he can do it, we're done. Anyhow, I can give you everything we have, just let me know a format.

Ciao. JWE

[JWE]

OOH - RAAAHHH.

There is (was) this Lance Corporal, Jeremy Quintan, USMC, that has consistently cleaned our clocks in the various scenarios. He has made an ex-DOD op-analyst, three USMC Captains, two Majors and a Lt. Col. look like pikers.

I am proud to say that Lance Corporal Quintan has been offered a slot in Officer's Training. I got an email from Lt. Col. Muehlberger, responding to my posts, who thinks that anyone who can show the degree of operational brilliance and tactical flexibility that Jeremy used to kick our butts, on numerous occasions, is definitely worthy of consideration for Officer status. Needless to say, I agreed wholeheartedly, and wish the Corps and Jeremy my best.

The interesting thing is that a young man, withour prior combat experience, can demonstrate a proclivity towards tactical innovation, that comes to the attention of his superiors, through use of this game.

Jeremy races with me on my performance sailboat, so I guess I have a vested interest in having him look good, but he is the one who kicked our asses, based solely on his take on ops. God go with you and keep you, Jeremy.

JWE

[akdreemer]

ORIGINAL: el cid again

A Browning M2 12.7 mm HMG should have a range = 1, ROF = 750,
effect = 10, ceiling = 4000, penetration and anti-armor values = 15,
anti-soft value = 3 and a load cost = 4.

The M2 Browning HMG came in three versions basic versions in WWII: Air cooled, water cooled, and aircraft mounted. All three had different rates of fire:
M2 HB was up to 450 rpm
M2 water cooled uo to 600 rpm
M2 aircraft mount 750 rpm

Which version is the above figures for?

With simple sights i doubt very seriously that anyone is going to hit an aircraft at an altitude over 1000 feet.