ORIGINAL: el cid again
I think there is some confusion about the WITP system design. If so, this is the fault of lack of documentation - which does not define very much.
Essentially, a true infantry "squad" is a body of men with several weapons NONE OF WHICH should be defined in the game. That is, you may use definitions of what is in the squad to get your firepower, but you don't put in any MG the squad may have. IF a "fire team" (a term not yet invented in WWII) is built around an LMG, then in general
a US Army (and most other) squads have two such teams
a USMC squad has three such teams
an IJA squad has one such team (but ALSO has a team with light mortars and almost always a third team that hunts tanks).
Now you do not get to add these LMGs to the game - nor the Japanese 50mm light mortars (the best in the world in their class by consensus).
Nor do you add SMGs when these are present. ALL squad weapons just add to the firepower of the squad. And the "load cost" of a squad is properly understood as one man per point - although CHS has gone over to using 2 for cavalry - the other one representing a horse - a valid concept.
Oh, no, no, no. I don’t add LMGs or anything else. I’ve been dinking with the model with some buddies at Pendleton and what we did was choose the platoon organization as the effectivity basis. Here’s what we did.
We understand the internal structure of individual infantry basic components and the weapons allocated thereto. We took every weapon and assigned it an effectivity value, using declassified US Army, DOD, USMC analysis results, along with some similar Korean War studies done by the Soviet GLA and the PRC. This resulted in a specific effectivity value that we normalized to a WiTP anti-soft number for each weapon. We then spread weapon numbers across a “nominal” platoon and applied division to achieve a numerical value for a nominal “squad”, both in size and content.
Thus, the IJA “squad” will have an LMG (T-96 perhaps) and an allocation of T-89 GDs along with an appropriate number of Arisaka T-98s (mostly rifles but a few carbines too); i.e., one third of the mortar squad is added to each of 3 infantry squads giving a “squad” size of 17.
Brits have a lot of puny (10 man) squads, but have a plethora of Brens at increasing echelons (think Pl and Coy HQs and the Carrier Platoon, but bag the carriers). So, simple math allows the effectivity value of a Bren team (3-4 men) to be spread across the Brit infantry component. Simple math also allows for incorporation of the 2” mortar teams into the infantry squad.
The US pushes “infantry” weapons all the way down. The M1919s are held at company echelon, along with the 60mm mortars. This one was a bitch; what to do with the M1919s. We chose to add the firepower component of the 60s into the squad, but retain the M1919s for inclusion into US MG squads, having a statistical average of M1919s and M1917s and a therefore greater number of “MG squads” in Army and MC divisions.
Because of “squad” size, we chose to include MGs as a “squad” of 2 gun “sections”. This will give a J MG squad of 2 guns and 18 men, a Brit Vickers squad of 2 guns and 10 men, and a US MG squad of 2 “equivalent” guns and 12 men; serendipity raises its head.
In doing this, we could create LCUs that conform to national doctrinal and tactical inclinations. An IJA division has a lot of large squads; just the thing for assaults; haku ichiu, banzai!! A Brit division has a lot of squads of small size but with compensating firepower; just the thing for insertion with orders to “hold until relieved”. A US division has fewer squads (respectively) of middling size (respectively), but with firepower up the wazoo!
The results were surprising. I think Grigsby is the reincarnation of a couple of brilliant op analysts who died the day before he was born. Our data for a Bren (normalized to WiTP constraints) gives an anti-soft of 10. Gary’s number is 9. Given all of our data, the 81mm mortar calcs out to 12; surprise, surprise.
Anyway, since the game is a “simulation” and the ground combat model is a higher-echelon model, we felt that “outcome” was more important than labeling or strict historical accuracy as to the numbers of pistols, submachine guns, or the like. So far, our results are quite satisfactory.
The only problems we have encountered are in early war Malaya. 5 tests have not yet produced a Japanese victory. Seems that the model can’t quite replicate the quality of being out-generaled. Poor Percival. We are evaluating morale and training factors for both sides along with leader bonuses. We hope to have this concluded in the next few weeks.
Anyway, the bottom line is: it works.