Documentary operation Bagration (Full Version)

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Jakerson -> Documentary operation Bagration (9/25/2012 5:54:15 AM)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HuV_wUHRv9s

After watching this you could really say that 1944 Soviets were as skilled as Germans and in many areas more skilled than German.

On the other hand 1944 Germans were as unable to deal with armored encirclements and breakthroughs as bad as 1941 Soviets. German intelligence was as bad as Soviet intelligence at 1941 detecting coming attack.

German fortified city tactic was flawed and were about as good as what tactics Soviet used at 1941. Only leading to total destruction of whole army group center and almost compile destruction of army group north it stuns me that 1944 Germans choose as bad doctrine to repulse armored breakthroughs as 1941 Soviets. Largest difference was that it took Soviet one year to learn how to deal with armored breakthrough as 42 Soviets learned how important it is prevent enemy to pocket large number of troops and not allow enemy encircle all your whole army groups while Germans never learn the trick not even after 5 war years not after Stalingrad not after anything.




morvael -> RE: Documentary operation Bagration (9/25/2012 9:46:08 AM)

It all comes down to the boss on the top that was unwilling to allow for tactical withdrawals instead of aggressive counterattack (Soviet'41) or static defense (German'44) in face of superior enemy forces attacking.




turtlefang -> RE: Documentary operation Bagration (9/26/2012 1:55:16 AM)

In mid 44, the skill level of the German infantry, NCOs and jr Officers was finally "worn out" by the war. Too many losses and most replacements just weren't up to the same level as the Germans in the prior years.

The other thing that happened was that the Germans actually became less mobile as the war went on, truck losses increases, and transport concentrated in the Panzer/Mot divisions.

Add the increasing tactical skill, strategic skill, technology, manpower advantage, and air advantage of the Soviets who were fielding a more mobile army than earlier in the war. Then you have Hitler's increasing strategic shortsightnesses, tactical inflexiblity and paranoia (maybe its not parnoia as people were out to get him) and you have a perfect storm for the Germans.

Result is less skilled, less mobile, tactically inflexible German infantry with limited or no air support against a more skilled, more mobile, better trained than before Soviet force that outnumbered them with massive air support.

The outcome - the Destruction of Army Group Center.

About as perfect an operation as could have been launched by the Soviets at the time.





juret -> RE: Documentary operation Bagration (9/26/2012 9:50:16 AM)

counting the numbers of the troops explains bagrations why it succeded more then the skill of the troops.

the number game should been at least 3:1 in manpower and 5:1 in tanks and arty.

Moving all units in italy norrway france and holland would mean the 44 offensive on east front would never happened as the big b reakthroughs would been plugged by armoured spearheads of german army easy.




turtlefang -> RE: Documentary operation Bagration (9/26/2012 4:38:36 PM)

Sorry, but I don't buy it.

If you read the tactical reports, look at the overall strategic positioning, and the way the German infantry simply reacted; they fell apart.

Plus you can look at the experience level of the NCOs and jr Officers. While the German army continued to have first rate Generals, the experience of its NCOs and jr Officers was below that of earlier in the war. Both in service life and combat experience. You can easily look this up in many of the units that served against the Soviets in the offensive.

After Stalingrad, the quality of the German infantry decline. Period. It just never recovered - and after the losses in 43, it was in even worse shape.

And earlier in the war, the Germans were outnumbered by 3:1 in troops and 5:1 in tanks and didn't fall apart. In fact, they advanced.

Then look at how the Soviet's plan and operational executed this battle. Multiple opening in the front, deep armor penetrations, disruption of C&C, artillery lines, rapid follow up by infantry, and creating multiple mini-pockets rather than one large pocket. The Soviets weren't as good as the Germans in 41, but they a damn site better than the Germans in 43.

So something changed - either the Germans got worse, the Soviets got better, or both. And the numbers show it:

Exact German losses are unknown, but newer research indicates around 400,000 KIA or captured. Soviet losses were also substantial, with 180,000 killed and missing, 591,000 wounded. Of the wounded, approximately 40% return to service within 90 days, another 30% in 6 months and no information on the remaining 30%.

That loss ratio is one of the best in the war for an Allied attacking force.

Strategically, Germany totally misread the situation. The Germans believed, despite intelligence to the difference, that the attack would be in Army Group South. And they placed their best and largest concentration of mech troops there. So when the attack came, the German's literally had minimum mech reserves - the primary mech forces neutralized by Soviet misdirection to the south - and had move to a horse drawn army - as the 44 infantry division was less mobile than the 41 division. And even if Hitler had the mobile forces from the West, there is no reason to believe he would have placed them behind AGC.

And even if you could have some of the units from Italy, Norway, Holland, and France, you could never have moved all of them even if the Allied invasion didn't happen in France.

The Germans estimated that they would need at least 20-30 divisions to garrison Italy after it surrendered even if the Allies hadn't invaded - which was about what they committed in Italy.

In France, while most of the infantry division were second class - and immobile for the most part - German planning believed it needed at 60-70 division just to garrison the country. Even without an invasion.

I haven't seen studies on Holland, Belgium or Lux so can't comment.

Norway required between five and ten divisions - and even then, the resistance caused major problems especially with resource shipments south.

So your looking, at best, in transferring 10-15 divisions, and most of those wouldn't have been mobile. And, as pointed out earlier, there is no reason to believe that Hitler would not concentrated these in the south with the rest of the armor. AGC was regarded as a low priority until it fell.

Finally, Germany didn't have much of a gas stockpile at that time. Fighting a long mobile battle would be a major issue. Contingency planning in the south was extremely pessimistic for the reason. Even with the armor, no gas.

So no, even without the Allied landing, the Soviets has taken charge of the East Front. And they were going to roll into Berlin at stage of the war.




76mm -> RE: Documentary operation Bagration (9/26/2012 5:00:49 PM)

quote:

Moving all units in italy norrway france and holland would mean the 44 offensive on east front would never happened as the big b reakthroughs would been plugged by armoured spearheads of german army easy.


Thus leaving the Western Front completely undefended? Doesn't that present its own issues?




turtlefang -> RE: Documentary operation Bagration (9/27/2012 3:34:54 PM)

I just assumed the France and Italy hadn't been invaded. Even without the invasion, Germany had to occupy those countries just to keep the population in line and the "supplies" flowing.

It wouldn't have freed up the proposed force to redeploy to the East Front.




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