Philipine Leadership (Full Version)

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Heeward -> Philipine Leadership (3/15/2012 9:09:30 PM)

For their Brigadier and Major Generals, why do they have such abysmal values?

After re-reading MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines, and The US Army in WWII The War in the Pacific - The Fall of the Philippines (link below isn't hyperwar nice).

Overall these units did not fall apart upon first contact and performed reasonably well defensively given their level of training (poor) and equipment (not a lot).

Hyperwar link to he US Army in WWII The War in the Pacific - The Fall of the Philippines
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/






jmalter -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/15/2012 11:00:07 PM)

if the PA LCUs live long enough, they'll fill out w/ replacements, & they get quite a few reinforcement LCUs. iow, they can be rather a nasty jaw-breaker for the IJA. but since their function in the game is to die or surrender 'early & often', perhaps the poor leadership values are meant to ensure that they do so?




crsutton -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 1:11:26 AM)

I suspect that like a lot of 3rd world countries there was a lot of cronyism and nepotism within the Army. This did not necessarily lead to the cream rising to the top. Just speculating.




JeffK -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 3:38:32 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Heeward

For their Brigadier and Major Generals, why do they have such abysmal values?

After re-reading MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines, and The US Army in WWII The War in the Pacific - The Fall of the Philippines (link below isn't hyperwar nice).

Overall these units did not fall apart upon first contact and performed reasonably well defensively given their level of training (poor) and equipment (not a lot).

Hyperwar link to he US Army in WWII The War in the Pacific - The Fall of the Philippines
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/





Why would their leaders rate highly, the performance of the units is based on their morale, experience and combat strength.

I believe they are rated pretty accurately considering their training and equipment as explained in the book you quote.

Dont forget at the time that Bataan was an almost roadless jungle, definate defensive advatage.




Blackhorse -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 4:33:11 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Heeward

For their Brigadier and Major Generals, why do they have such abysmal values?

After re-reading MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines, and The US Army in WWII The War in the Pacific - The Fall of the Philippines (link below isn't hyperwar nice).

Overall these units did not fall apart upon first contact and performed reasonably well defensively given their level of training (poor) and equipment (not a lot).

Hyperwar link to he US Army in WWII The War in the Pacific - The Fall of the Philippines
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-PI/



Like the troops they led, the Filipino leaders were generally untrained. The low ratings mostly reflect poor training, even by peacetime American standards. The Filipino Generals mostly had never led a division-sized unit on maneuvers. And division staffs had few trained experts in the non-glamorous but essential fields of maintenance, supply and logistics, communications and intelligence.

As a point of comparison, a US unit has an experience level of '50' if it has been fully mobilized for over a year. Broadly speaking, when the war starts 1/3 of each Filipino division has been mobilized for 3-6 months, another 1/3 has been mobilized for 1-3 months, and the last 1/3 was still mobilizing when the war started. The Generals were as inexperienced as the troops they led. In several cases, actual control of particular Filipino divisions were exercised by attached American advisors.

But as poorly equipped, trained and led as the Filipino troops are, they should easily hold out until their supplies are exhausted, if the Japanese commit only the historic forces against them.

If the Japanese do not conquer the Philippines, the Filipino divisions will upgrade to US-standard artillery, mortars and machineguns beginning in 1943.




Heeward -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 4:59:41 AM)

Thanks Blackhorse.

Would not the division leadership also improve in mid 1943, with on the job training and american advisers, or would they be like 1968 Vietnam with only some being effective and others still in-effective?





Blackhorse -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 5:44:33 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Heeward

Thanks Blackhorse.

Would not the division leadership also improve in mid 1943, with on the job training and american advisers, or would they be like 1968 Vietnam with only some being effective and others still in-effective?



It should improve. But we never got around to implementing "improved leader stats through combat experience" for LCUs. It was one of those 'nice to do' features that didn't make the cut when the powers-that-be decided that they wanted to release AE in this Millenium.

. . . twisted priorities, if you ask me [:)]

Also on my LCU leader wish list was:
1. Promotions
2. Leaders sent out of theater and recalled back ("Lightning Joe" Collins, fx)
3. Leader casualties
4. Scrapping the small unit / large unit / HQ model, and have leaders assigned to LCUs by rank, within a narrow range. For example, A US Division could be commanded by any USA two-star General. A one-star could be assigned, but with a significant PP penalty. A Corps HQ could be commanded by a three-star (or a two-star with penalty). And so on. Coupled with promotions, this would allow Generals to rise through the ranks from division to corps to army command.
5. (way, way down on the list) Leaders activated upon invasion. If you look in the database, you'll find Generals Patton and Fredenhall assigned to HQs that activate if the US West Coast is invaded. But the leaders are 9999ed, and will never arrive -- they will be replaced with random leaders if the units activate.






JeffK -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 6:14:16 AM)

Blackhorse, your point 4.

Rather than a PP penalty, a multipier so, fo example, a 1 star commands a Division with a ""10%"" penalty and so on up.

I thought everything else already happened!




jmalter -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 6:16:46 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Blackhorse
Also on my LCU leader wish list was:
<snip>

dang, Blackhorse, it's a shame these couldn't be implemented - no doubt there's a lot of other things that share their 'coulda, woulda, shoulda' status - but it's still a pert' great game w/o them.




Heeward -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 7:26:26 AM)

Well I do try to stay reasonable so no Col or below commanding these units (Divisions) even though this is at the level where Philippine leaders become effective.
Perhaps I will mod the game adding new leaders in June of 43 with the same name. I think I will have the to look at the Thai units also.

I suspect the Thai Army Leadership may have became more effective over during the war. Anyone have any ideas on them.




Blackhorse -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 11:11:04 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: jmalter

- no doubt there's a lot of other things that share their 'coulda, woulda, shoulda' status - but it's still a pert' great game w/o them.



No argument there! [8D]




Blackhorse -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 11:14:28 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Blackhorse, your point 4.

Rather than a PP penalty, a multipier so, fo example, a 1 star commands a Division with a ""10%"" penalty and so on up.



That's a worthwhile idea.




crsutton -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 3:49:14 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Heeward

Thanks Blackhorse.

Would not the division leadership also improve in mid 1943, with on the job training and american advisers, or would they be like 1968 Vietnam with only some being effective and others still in-effective?





In both Vietnam in the 60s and China in the 40s, the situation with top army officers was very similar. The only thing that really mattered was loyality to the regime. Both Chaing and the multiple South Vietnamese leaders rewarded absolute loyalty over military capability-sometimes with disasterous results. Both regimes were rife with political intrigue and every army officer was suspect. A independent and aggressive commander was usually viewed with suspicion and as a potential threat, they were often removed or shunted to a lessor post. Family ties were critical as family members were considered to be much more reliable. Many capable dedicated officers exsisted but they tended to be at the middle rank level. Couple of good books Shehan's "Bright Shining Lie" and Jay Taylor's "Chaing Kai Shek and the Struggle for Modern China."




Heeward -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 4:42:12 PM)

My guess is the early top Philippine Army Leaders are also political appointments, selected more more connections and power.




Don Bowen -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 5:20:33 PM)

Some of the Philippine Army officers were very good. Vincinte Lim (41st Division) and M. Capinpin (21st Division) were experienced ex-Philippine Scout Officers and West Point Graduates. Most of the other original (1936) senior and company grade officers were from the Philippine Constabulary - an organization that was indeed rife with political appointees and general corruption. I forget the exact numbers buy Trotta Jose (The Philippine Army) gives disturbingly high numbers for annual courts martial of PC officers.

It is, in my opinion, very unfortunate that Douglas MacArthur was selected as Field Marshal of the Philippine Army. The pre-war Commandant, Basilio Valdez (a man my father met) seemed to be a yes-man to MacArthur. Experienced officers (Lim, others) in the PA were not happy with the policies of these men and attempted to convince President Quezon to alter them. There was apparently considerable rancor.

The Philippine Army did set up a very workable officer training program, but it was overwhelmed by the rapid expansion of the army as war approached and the majority of the company and field grade officers were under trained and complelely inexperienced - as were their men.

US Army (and especially Philippine Scouts) were attached to PA organizations at all levels. As many as 10% of the NCOs and Junior Officers from these units were detached for training and advisor duty. Senior advisiors (frequently listed as unit commanders) sometimes advised and sometimes commanded. Philippine Army officers were actually in command at all levels below Corps. Some did well, some did not.

It would probably be correct to say that the "quality" of Philippine Army Officers was generally rather low, but with many bright spots. A little more time and the officer corps would have undergone the same "weeding out" process as the US Army (especially National Guard and long-serving "desk" officers).

It is well worth pointing out that the Philippine Army units generally performed well on Bataan. Certainly not up the Philippine Scouts, but a few months combat experience and some turnover in the officer ranks greatly improved the overall quality of the PA units.




Empire101 -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/16/2012 7:18:41 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen

The pre-war Commandant, Basilio Valdez (a man my father met) seemed to be a yes-man to MacArthur


Fascinating. Did your father ever discuss Valdez with you?




Don Bowen -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/17/2012 3:20:14 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Empire101

quote:

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen

The pre-war Commandant, Basilio Valdez (a man my father met) seemed to be a yes-man to MacArthur


Fascinating. Did your father ever discuss Valdez with you?



No, he never talked about the war. But...



[image]local://upfiles/757/7BF3069E926F46C88CE8FFA6CD9C05D2.jpg[/image]




Empire101 -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/17/2012 2:47:27 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen


quote:

ORIGINAL: Empire101

quote:

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen

The pre-war Commandant, Basilio Valdez (a man my father met) seemed to be a yes-man to MacArthur


Fascinating. Did your father ever discuss Valdez with you?





No, he never talked about the war. But...




OH WOW!! Your father must have been quite a guy!![&o]
They must have at least had a mutual respect for one another.




Blackhorse -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/17/2012 7:40:44 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Heeward

I think I will have the to look at the Thai units also.

I suspect the Thai Army Leadership may have became more effective over during the war. Anyone have any ideas on them.



It's hard to tell. There's not much about Thai military leadership on English-language websites. On the one hand, in a series of small-unit actions, the Thai Army drove French-led Indochinese forces from the west bank of the Mekong in Laos in the January, 1941 border war. In the only battle of any size, a division-sized Thai force blunted a Vichy attack near Sisyphon, in Cambodia. The Thai Air Force won particularly good reviews.

On the other hand, the Thai Army was very political. The Army overthrew the civilian government in a 1932 coup, and later forced the King into exile. Prime Minister / Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram led a fractured government of mutually-suspicious military factions, frustrated civilian democrats, and military and civilian conservativers plotting the return of the King. It is to be expected that the senior Army commanders were chosen primarily out of loyalty to Phibun.

Thai forces did not do much fighting in World War II. The government declared war against the Allies on January 25, 1942. On May 10th the Thais invaded the Shan States (in AE, the roadless patch of jungle in Burma between Chaing Mai and the Chinese border. Lieutenant General Jarun Rattanakuln Seriroengrit commanded three infantry divisions and a cavalry division against one Chinese division (the 93rd). After some skirmishing, the 93rd abandoned Kentung, the largest town in the area. The Thais occupied it on May 27th. By one account, General Pin Choonhavan led the infantry into the town.

That 17-day campaign was the only significant fighting that the Thai Army did during World War II. In 1943 the Thai government signed an armistice (with the 93rd Chinese Division commander!) that ended the fighting.

From a distance, the campaign does not appear well-managed. The cavalry division was broken up when many of the malnourished horses died. Alarmed by the death toll among his troops from malaria and dengue fever, Phibun visited Kentung in early 1943 and ordered 10 tons of quinine and "a hundred ox-carts of bananas" and other supplies sent there.





Mac Linehan -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/18/2012 1:03:44 AM)

Don -

That is a remarkable photograph. Obviously the flag has been well cared for and preserved - the ink calligraphy is unmarred. My respect to your Dad for his service, in a very difficult time.

Mac




Don Bowen -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/18/2012 2:17:52 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mac Linehan

Don -

That is a remarkable photograph. Obviously the flag has been well cared for and preserved - the ink calligraphy is unmarred. My respect to your Dad for his service, in a very difficult time.

Mac


Thank you.

The flag is now part of the collection of the Museum of Pacific War (part of the Nimitz Museum in Fredericksburg, TX). A very fine place and one well worth a visit.




dr.hal -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/18/2012 2:34:47 PM)

Blackhorse,

Do you think there is any possibility in future upgrades to take into consideration your four points about leadership promotion, casualties as well as the point about rank allowing for command of positions (this later point would not be much in relation to programing as it would simply filter out those that are not eligible)? This would be a fantastic improvement! Hal




Blackhorse -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/19/2012 11:26:32 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Blackhorse,

Do you think there is any possibility in future upgrades to take into consideration your four points about leadership promotion, casualties as well as the point about rank allowing for command of positions (this later point would not be much in relation to programing as it would simply filter out those that are not eligible)? This would be a fantastic improvement! Hal


Doctor,

Not until/unless they re-open the code to address other, bigger needs (ship AAA, Japanese late-war ASW, the 200-pass air-combat limit, etc.). These are changes, methinks, that would require players to restart a game, which is a big deal in a game like this. And once you open up to edits, where do you draw the line?





dr.hal -> RE: Philipine Leadership (3/19/2012 2:48:39 PM)

I see what you mean Blackhorse. That would be akin to opening Pandora's box. Although I think most players would readily interrupt their games for the added value of some of these changes, those that don't see the added value or have a really hot game going can hold off implementation until their game is done (although with the full game that could be years!).




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