Ideas for limiting early SEAC Offensives

Ideas for limiting early SEAC Offensives (Full Version)

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vettim89 -> Ideas for limiting early SEAC Offensives (7/13/2011 5:36:42 PM)
Playing a DBB GC campaign game against the AI while waiting for the patch. I have always had a problem with what I perceived as too much striking power being in India for the Allies to mount an offensive into Burma at a date far earlier than the RL model. As I play this game I now see why the Allies are able to undertake such a venture. I am now in July 1942. Like many Allied players I did not send the 18th UK nor the Rangoon reinforcements to be slaughtered in Malaya/Burma. Instead they went to India. Like many Allied players, I only put up token resistance in Burma and pulled most of the troops out as soon as the IJA committed. So I now have the 18th UK, just got the 2nd UK, one full strength Indian ID, one near full strength Indian ID, plus one Indian ID at about 1/3 strength. By the time Monsoon ends that should give me nearly five full strength divisions to counter attack in late 1942. Add in some armor, arty, and plenty of Av support and you can see why just such a move is not only possible but also likely to cause some problems for the IJA. So the question becomes is there a way to impose limits on the British/Commonwealth troops to bring it in line with RL? Or is the problem simply that by saving the Malaya/Burma units from distruction that AE players are able to use their historical hind sight to better lay out the SEAC forces for an early counteroffensive? Was some of the RL hesitancy based on concern of an uprising in India thus requiring more troops in garrison role? I know the US was putting pressure on the Brits to get moving into Burma sooner - was the lack of offensive operations based on strategic inertia in the SEAC command more than lack of capability? Some idea I had were to beef up garrison requirements in India. Then I would add some faux security units that arrive in 1943 to take up those positions. That way the Allied player could still defned India if Japan attacked but not be able to go south before the historical timeline. Maybe things are as they should be and the wise Allied player just benefits from not sending his troops to their deaths early in the war. Thoughts?

Nikademus -> RE: Ideas for limiting early SEAC Offensives (7/13/2011 6:08:30 PM)
There was a reason why the orig stock scenario had these wayward units appear in their historical locations vs. having them appear either off map or in a "convoy" Restricted commands won't help as the units can just cross over into Burma via the mountains. The model was never up to simulating the supply difficulties that this entails. In my past games, Player 2 doesn't even bother abandoning Burma but digs in along the Mandalay line, Burma Road be darned and sits tight. Only real way to counter is to attack Burma as quickly as possible.....not always easy to do. One thing i do in my mod(s) to tone down this area is to reduce all frontier airbases in India to level 0. This allows a max of level 3 overbuild. Historically, due to logistical constraints, 2E and in particular, 4E bomber ops had to be centered around Calcutta....the forward airbases were used mainly by transports and fighter, fighter-bombers. In game there's not really a surgical way the real logistical and organizational situation can be represented in India in the first half of the war.

Gary D -> RE: Ideas for limiting early SEAC Offensives (7/14/2011 12:47:25 AM)
Vet; I am also enjoying a BB GC Campaign vs. the AI. Currently up to August 1942. I do not see the “premature Burma” in the same light you do. It most likely is a difference in our outlooks and expectations I surmise. I tend to play conservatively early and especially against my friend the AI, I do not want to upset him too much. :) In my game I see the 18th UK as my strategic reserve. I tend to ship them to Perth and wait for an indication of where the IJA is heading rather than committing them to the front lines ASAP. Against the AI taking the initiative to do a Fortress Palembang or other significant deployment with the 18th UK is a bit much for my own subjective view of the war. However with the 18th UK enjoying Australian hospitality both the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions are on the front lines at Chittagong and Imphal. Their mates on the frontlines though are not of the same stern stuff these Aussie gentlemen are made of. I see the lack of British infantry squads and support devices as a large issue in any early prolonged offensive use of the 2nd or 70th UK. The Burma division will lose over 200 Burmese squads (TOE downgrade) in the fall of 1942 and likewise the 17th Indian has a TOE “downgrade” to become a light infantry formation. Together these two new formations are about equal to a division. The other Indian divisions are restricted and I have not used PPs to release them. How one allocates ones PPs could make a large difference here I would suppose. Once the Indian Divisions start to flesh out they would be expensive but had one planned on an early Burma buying them early or restricting their growth until after one had purchased them may indeed give the allies a big hammer early. I tend to focus releasing US units as early as practical given their large replacement pools and like to get them in action soonest. As far as armor in India I may be misplaying but it is August and have yet to field one fully combat ready Indian armor formation. My best unit (255th Arm Brigade) has 52 Stuarts and 52 Lee’s but still has 52 improvised AFV’s. The October convoys should fill them out. The Desert Rats are available and the 3rd Carabiniers . If one would undertake the offensive with improvised AFVs’ I am not confident it would be very successful . As far as airpower in India I kept two of the Clark Field B-17 units and shipped them off to Calcutta. The dozens of Blenhiem’s have been relegated to night bombing and nuisance raids. The Hurricanes are fine but their short range rather limits their ability to project offensive power at the moment. Sorry for getting long winded! Your post got me thinking on the commute home from work this evening and it is a long commute! Best of luck with your campaign.

inqistor -> RE: Ideas for limiting early SEAC Offensives (7/16/2011 7:49:36 AM)
I have heard recording of Slim during one of Army Universities visits, and he recalled his talk with Churchill, when he told PM that "You never gave me enough", for which answer was "You did your job, so obviously that was enough". So maybe it is possible, that there is too much supply in whole India theater?

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