Considering US public opinion was to stay out of even the European War, I doubt the US would have gotten involved over the Japs doing anything to the Dutch. The Brits probably, but so what? They already had their hands full with the Germans.
Can you substantiate that assertion with an authoritative source that cites a, for example, Gallup poll? I can. See: http://www.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=9967
1940 Enactment of the first peacetime military draft in U.S. history enjoys overwhelming support, with 89% saying it is "a good thing."
1941 As union strike tactics appear on a collision course with government efforts at war readiness, 79% say government workers should not be allowed to go on strike.
There are numerous websites that make reference to other Gallup Polls. Their on-line summary is a quick n dirty thing and I'd be interested in determining whether the multiple and numerous sites that mention these are "just making it up."
June 1941 61% of Americans approved of sending US forces to patrol waters off of Iceland and Greenland and 4000 USMC troops to defend Reykjavik.
5 November 1941 When the Germans torpedoed the USS Ruben James, a Gallup poll (5 November 1941) indicated that 81 percent of Americans favored arming merchant ships and 61 percent favored American ships entering the war zones.
There is also a very interesting current MIT PolySci prof's summary available on-line at:
http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/michigan_2003.pdf
A 1939 Poll lending towards military isolationism and economic support for the Allies.
Roper August 1939
If England and France go to war against the dictator nations should we:
Sell Them Food? 17 [% saying "no"]
Sell them war supplies 38 ""
Send our army and navy abroad to help 73 ""
Should we tend strictly to our own business and go to war only to defend our own country from attack [88% say "yes"]
According to the same web site, in July 1940, 42% of men and 30% of women say the US should go to war to help the UK. However, according to a line-graph the 50-50 point for the populace in general (say we should go to war to help the Allies) is crossed in August-September 1940. By December 1940 it's around 60%, by July 1941 it is around 75%.
What this says to me is that the US public was "on the fence" through mid 1940, but that the Axis bombing of the UK decided the issue for the majority of Americans by December 1940. US isolationists were a substantial minority as a result of 1940, not Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
As to Japan, it's harder to track down specific information on polls. There are several polls on the mentioned websites, however, that indicate a higher degree of intrinsic hostility towards Japan than towards Germany, and a strong concern with Axis treatment in general of subject populations, even by 1940. In general, the claim that America was "isolationist" is at best, simplistic and in the most extreme presentations here, simply a fabrication offered up to bolster claims in advocacy of an inaccurate political model.
Without PH as an opening act, it becomes a lot tougher to justify what happened.
I do not think that is correct, given the aforementioned polls, and the US Government's admonition to the Japanese not to advance any further in SE Asia.
And Pearl Harbour was not supposed to happen that way. Bushido alone demands that you face a warrior in honourable battle.
The Bushido code made lots of claims about conduct but most Japanese soldiers failed the test. Rather like the medieval European knightly code. As to PH, it was quite clearly intended to "be that way." If the difference between "noble" war and "ignoble" war rests on such a thin technicality as whether or not war was declared 1/2 hour before the already-launched airstrikes arrived over the target, it simply makes plain the farce that the Bushido code really was when implemented by Japanese warriors.
If the War declaration had gone through when it was supposed to. Thus Pearl had been notified that there was a war on, and thus was at alert. And thus Pearl had been a bit more of a fight (although with only an hour or so notice, it wouldn't have been much different), would it still have been "a day that will live in infamy"?
Yes, it would still have been a "day of infamy." Nobody would have been fooled into thinking that Japan had not delivered a fine, backstabbing blow, given that negotiations were quite publically going on, even as Kido Butai sailed to the Hawaiian Islands to strike the first blow. In a way, it probably worked out better for the Japanese in American public opinion that the timing was screwed up. Americans might have been that much angrier if Japanese ambassadors had attempted, post PH, via some propaganda campaign, to pretend that the attack was not a premeditated backstab. They'd have been treated with more contempt than the average modern "ambulance chasing lawyer."
We don't drive other nations into wars!
The US did not "drive" anyone into WW2. Japan chose a pathway of aggression, expansion, genocide of subject nations, and war, when the alternate pathway was ALWAYS there. Blaming the US for Japan's conduct is the purest revisionist slimeball history. Might as well claim that serial killers and pedophiles are "driven" to their deeds because the public allows vulnerable people to walk the streets.
The really important targets at Pearl were not the battleships. They weren't even the planes. They were the fuel storage and the port facilities. If those had been significantly damaged (particularly the fuel), that would have put a real dent into the US war plan for a while. Fortunately the commander was timid, and ran off before he hit the really important targets.
Fortunately, that wholesale fabrication and trivial piece of mythmaking has been put to death with a stake in its heart. The arguments against, strategic, operational, and simply from considering the design of the targets (durable, easily rebuilt, enclosed in containment walls, extremely difficult to set alight, and not so easy to even hit using WW2 technology) are legion. The argument "for" such a move has so far not even received the benefit of a laundry list of things the Japanese might have required in order to make the attempt. In short, the "for" argument is a statement of opinion with no supporting facts.
And what if the commander of the carrier group at Midway - the same one as at Pearl - hadn't been a wishy washy twit?
The problem at Midway was an insufficiency of force to simultaneously accomplish all of the objectives assigned to the Japanese CV airgroups. The "Six CVs At Midway" alt history scenario is the only one that seems, to me, to plausibly lead to any other result than the historical result. Very little had to do with "indecision" and even less had to do with good "luck." At Midway, US luck could hardly have been worse than it historically was.
If Hitler had not declared war on the US, would they have gone to Europe, or just focused all their attention on Japan?
Yes the US would have gone to war with the Euroaxis. 1. There is no precedent, that I know of, for two powers being allies in one theater but not in another theater in the entire history of Renaissence and post-Renaissence nation-state warfare. 2. The Axis had already signed a well known and highly public Treaty that stipulated the existence of a state of war of all Axis powers against any power at war with any one Axis power. The Chancellor's declaration of war speech was simply a formality, just as the Japanese attempt to withdraw from negotiations 20 minutes before the PH strike would have been a mere, trivial, and transparent formality.
England was on the ropes during the Battle of Britain, but they managed to give the impression that they weren't. If the Germans had kept after the airfields just a little longer, they would have had ownership of the skies, and then Sealion would have been possible. And if Britain fell, then the US couldn't have even thought about invading Europe.
The Luftwaffe was even more on the ropes during the Battle of Britain than was the RAF. Germany exhausted herself, decimated her own pilot corps, and wasted her air assets in the effort. Like two giant punch drunk heavyweight fighters leaning on each other and the ropes were they. As to Sea Lion, there is not the slightest chance in summer 1940 that the Germans could have pulled it off. The Kriegsmarine was half ruined by the Norway campaign, the Germans did not have a modern BB in the line, and there were almost no transports up to the task of a channel crossing in force, even if you assume that the UK did not put it's navy in the way to stop such a force. What are you gonna use? Those 5 knot, 1 meter freeboard Rhine barges?
Hitler was a fool in the Soviet Union, over extending his armies and supply lines. Again, it is unlikely to believe that the Germans could have conquered all of the huge expanse of the Soviet Union, but bloodying them enough to agree to 'a bitter peace' was not unrealistic.
Yeah, it was unrealistic. By the way, the Soviet campaigns failure are incorrectly attributed all to Hitler. His general staff was giving advise and consent and more than willing to reap the laurels when things were going well. There was no "Hitler Mind Control Device" that made his generals stupid.
