ORIGINAL: CaptBeefheart
ORIGINAL: obvert
ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
Yes, my mistake for being too terse. I meant shallow in anti-merchant ops. Sub/combatant encounters will be primarily in deep.
Tankers yes, but at some point he may pull back in a big way from Burma, and then it's troop convoys along the coasts, maybe from Bangkok, maybe Saigon. All under his air ASW blanket.
The game forces Allied players, by dint of the DL et al issues, to focus their subs on anti-combatant efforts. This is not what the USN sub force focused on. They did it quite successfully, and were there in nearly every major operation after Guadalcanal, but their role was to destroy the Japanese economy, which they did. The game would be far different if they were even half as effective at this as they were historically. But it's all been beaten to death before.
It'd be fun to play just one game as Japan with self-imposed historical parameters.
No ASW air training, and only using air for search, not ASW mission.
No ASW TFs, only escorts
No pilot training, so that both sides would simply have to use national starting experience and "play" the pilots up to train, and use TRACOM to increase starting experience. (I'd like to see what it would be like to have 35-40 exp pilots going at each other)
No cooperation between IJA/IJN. Make them use different bases for airfields and only their own support units. (Complicated, but it would be interesting).
PDU-off
No airframe R & D (none, so nothing ahead of it's historical date)
No air group resizing
No ground bombing of troops in China
No buying back of destroyed units or air groups
Anything else?
I like TRACOM pilots boosting skill and experience rather than numbers of graduates.
With all of those handicaps, something would have to give on the Allied side. Perhaps longer times to unload and refuel ships (they said Noumea harbor was a nightmare for some time), longer times for submarine crew R&R, slower airfield and port construction rates, etc.
Cheers,
CB
Well, I don't know. I think there are some things on the Allied side that can be done more quickly and easily in game, of course. I'm just more interested in the challenge of playing Japan with it's historical limitations, and the Allied player could decide how to proceed regardless of history. It would be my self-imposed limitations, not something thy'd have to follow.
ORIGINAL: RangerJoe
AVG:
in Burma and China only unless overrun.
only 99 air frames - no upgrading
only 99 pilots max, no replacements
after AVG disbands, then the pilots be like any other Army pilots
Chinese units:
no Red and White Chinese stacked together
Chinese units in Burma early but not in the open valley, no PPs spent
Chinese units in Burma cut off from China are allowed to go to India to fill out and train, no PPs spent
If used in the front lines, then PPs spent to release them to the unrestricted Chinese HQs, those HQs stay under China High Command.
No Marine units operating from Carriers until Kamikazes - unless the carrier comes with them.
Once kamikazes are used, the Marine fighters are allowed on carriers as carrier air units.
No using replacement air units as regular units, only for replacement and training since pilots might also be transferred.
No air units serving on other nations carriers. I do not think that it happened.
Except in the early days and in emergencies, like when a British CV served in the US Pacific fleet, no mixing of fleet units except that the ANZAC ships can go with either other Commonwealth ships of the American fleet. Merchants don't matter, combat vessels do. I think that any Dutch ships served with the British fleet.
No subs in the Sea of Japan until 1944 since the sonar was not developed until then. If the exact date is located, then from that date on.
Units stay in their Command and lower HQs Area of Operations (AO) except for short loaner periods. Being thousands of miles away from your higher HQ and being committed to battle really should not work. Being sent to a rear area for I and I is fine. So SoPac and SWPAC can work together on the fringes but you would have to change the bases and/or units Command if they go too far astray. Eastern Army and SE Asia in the Central/Northern Pacific is too far afield. New Guinea (sp?) can work in the DEI as the eastern part of New Guinea is secured and the front moves forward.
III Corps can retreat from Malaya into the DEI and thence to Australia and into SWPAC (even though MacArthur really did not think highly of Indian troops) since SWPAC early on can use all the help that it can get. The command of III Corps would then go to SWPAC. New Guinea can go to SWPAC if it needs to, but the I and II Corps can go earlier.
American troops mostly under American HQs except for such units as Merrils marauders that operated in the CBI theater. Most units would serve under their own nations HQs unless otherwise noted as reinforcements. Australian units into their New Guinea, I and II Corps and directly under SWPAC. New Zealand under SoPac.
Get SoPac and NoPac under CentPac so there is a unified Navy command.
Same for the Far East Command under SWPAC, then SWPAC comes in the Far East Command disbands.
Some great ideas for limiting Allies. As above, I'm just not that concerned with some of this following history as I think some of the limitations on the Allies historically are much more political in nature, not so much military.
Regardless, a lot of these things were more fluid for the Allies, and open to constant reappraisal as needs dictated. That was one of the great advantages the Allies had in the war. The adaptability of doctrine, practice and innovative solutions were present in all theatres and up and down the chain of command. This wasn't as possible in a the Imperial militaristic culture of Japan.
The other thing about limiting these things for Japan is that some of it takes away the endless clicking. No R & D? Ok. No pilot training? Wow, just saved several hours a week.
The only thing I'd want is that if Japan didn't use pilot training then neither would the Allies, but this has an inherent advantage for he Allies anyway.
"Success is the ability to go from one failure to another with no loss of enthusiasm." - Winston Churchill