The Truth About Force Z?

[MakeeLearn]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn


Having more aircraft in theater may not have helped Task force Z, for what was really lacking was experience in air to ship cooperation.

warspite1

.....just look at how many aircraft actually attacked!

Iam reading "Sea Warfare 1939-1945"(John Croswell,RN) He brings up a lack of experience in air and ship cooperation and then asks why Phillips did not call for help (11 fighters at Singapore- maintaining a 5-6 CAP), which he claims may have been due to his wanting to keep radio silence. The distance at which Japanese aircraft could attack naval targets became clearer after TF Z. Out distancing that of the German/Italian experiences.

And he claims Admiral Phillips was of the Naval Staff school of thought that "the aircraft menace should not be overrated."

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Revthought
It appears in Battleship: The Sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. I am at work and do not have the work on hand, so I do not know what Middlebrook and Mahoney cite as support of this, so there is that. Frankly, I doubt I still have this book at all, as I lost a bunch of books to an accidentally unpaid storage unit after I left grad school. I will have to look.

I wouldn't bother as I have the most recent edition of the book but I never recalled seeing any reference to this issue, either in the narrative,
concluding analysis or in the appendices where they have a copy of the original gunnery officer's report. It's possible I missed it when I last read
the book but I'll do a more thorough check when I get time.

However, if you just compare the Italian losses in Operation Halberd, where we know the British HACS radars were working, with the Japanese losses on Force Z, I think the data heavily implies that PoWs HAC radar may have been non-functional. In the case of Operation Halberd, if I recall correctly, the Italians lost somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 to 25 aircraft to British ship borne HACS directed AAA fire; whereas during the sinking of the Repulse and Prince of Wales, the British ships only managed to shoot down 4 aircraft.

They do go through a Halberd/Force Z result comparison in the book's concluding analysis.

[JeffroK]

[quote]ORIGINAL: Buckrock

Now if the British had put this extra time to good use with a serious attempt at creating a fighter defence organization with appropriate
infrastructure and plans for Singapore/Malaya that in some way replicated their efforts at home, then you may well have seen a significant
difference in the Japanese air losses for the campaign and perhaps even an impact on the ground war.

The British seemed to put in as much effort as the US did in installing a RADAR system and creating an efficient control organization.
Simply put, Malaya was only higher than Hong Kong in the long list of urgent requirements, cant think of any other reason to have the Vildebeeste as front line aircraft.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

I wasn't suggesting the book for that but I can tell you in early December, the US, Dutch and Australians all had air reinforcements slated to arrive
in the Far East within 4-8 weeks. The British, not so much.

warspite1

Out of interest what Australians are you talking about - because they were building Beauforts designed for Malaya, and what happened to the US aircraft (Buffaloes aside) that were also designated for that theatre?

Not Beauforts, local production had only just started.

The Australians were preparing to effectively double their current two squadron Hudson commitment in Malaya by early Feb '42. Some 24 aircraft of the
latest shipment received from US (Nov '41) were planned to be sent once the RAAF had accepted them.

As to "what happened to the US aircraft...designated for that theatre", I'm not sure what exactly you wish to know. The US aircraft I was referring to
were those intended for FEAF in the Philippines. Due to the rapid collapse of the US air defence in the Philippines within days of the war's start,
these planned US reinforcements (some already enroute) almost all ended up being sent to Australia and the DEI.

[JeffroK]

Local production of the Beaufort had just begun, with the first Australian built aircraft flying on 22 August 1941. The first 58 were part of a contract to supply the RAF (and had RAF serial numbers) 5 of these were delivered to Singapore to equip 100 Sqn RAF, but due to lack of crew experience on the type (plus I thought combat worthiness of the aircraft) they were withdrawn within a few days of arriving. A 6th crashed during delivery. 1 aircraft T9547, remained in a photo-recce role.

Late News from ADF Serials
Of the eight prepared RAF Beauforts, sixarrived in Malaya were: T9542, T9543, T9544, T9545, T9546 and T9547. All of these six, except one, T9543, were returned to 1AD by the 24/12/41.
The other two,T9541 and T9549(Batchelor) never left Australia.
Of the remaining two of ten,T9540 was at DAP and T9550, was held at Nhill.

Due to the need for modern aircraft in Australia the contract was cancelled and all aircraft remained in RAAF service. It took until 6/42 to get this batch into service.

Beaufort, Beaufighter & Mosquito in Australian service by Stewart Wilson.
This book is an interesting insight into what the Australian aircraft industry (nonexistant prewar) had to achieve the manufacture of modern combat aircraft.

[Buckrock]

The Australians seemed to be a very quick study in relation to weapon production once war in Europe began, particularly given they did not seem to have
any aircraft, vehicle or armament factories (other than small arms and ammunition) prior to 1939.

[Reg]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

The Australians seemed to be a very quick study in relation to weapon production once war in Europe began, particularly given they did not seem to have
any aircraft, vehicle or armament factories (other than small arms and ammunition) prior to 1939.

Were you aware that the very first motor car wasn't manufactured in Australia until 1947? [X(]

There was some assembly of imported kits and local body building before this time but it required the conversion of wartime aircraft factories before a car could be manufactured locally from scratch.

There were large workshops in all the major cities used to support the national railway network so the country wasn't completely devoid of heavy industry but there was certainly not an extensive manufacturing base.

[Revthought]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
warspite1

There were distinct differences though. Force Z was just two ships + 3 destroyers to put up an AA defence - and PoW and Repulse were quickly separated. Repulse's AA was hardly state of the art either.

The first torpedo to strike PoW was about as unlucky a spot to be hit as can be imagined. Much of the guns were put out of action from the resulting loss of power.

For Halberd there would have been more of a "wall of AA" put up by the much larger escort.

The bombers would also have been met by fighters and in some cases had their approaches disrupted.

Yes, you are correct, but I will point out that there were three capital ships on the British side during Operation Halberd, not all of which had HACS systems installed. Force Z had a single ship with a "modern" HACS system, as you point out Repulse and Prince of Wales were not the same in that regard.

In any case, with Force Z both ships were sunk literally hours into the attack. If my recollection serves Repulse was killed by literally the last torpedo dropped that day. If there was fault in the HACS radar on PoW, I think it is fair to say that the outcome of the air attack on Force Z may have been less than fatal.

Now both ships would have been caught by Japanese surface forces in very short order, which probably would not have ended well for the British; however, it may be that a working HACS radar would have had the same result as having a single small British carrier present--survival of Force Z so they could have at least "fought back" against surface ships.

Either way, working HACS or not, I think Pearl Harbor and Force Z were over played as far as "cementing" the dominance of carrier aircraft and naval aviation. Even Yamato's sinking... a single ship attacked by 400 planes is going to end poorly. The Japanese lost three carriers to less at Midway.

Given all of that, I think the armored Battleship (particularly the fast ones) had a valid sea denial role until the arrival of anti-ship missiles. Hell, I'd argue even now that the modern aircraft carrier centered navy is only good for force projection, and is probably spectacularly terrible at sea denial. The moment the USN faces a modern opponent whose navy is built entirely around sea denial, it would be in serious trouble.

[JeffroK]

As to "what happened to the US aircraft...designated for that theatre",

From http://www.adf-gallery.com.au/
Brewster Bermuda: “Almost in Australian Service”
In the RAAF context, desperately short of modern types in 1941, some 243 Brewster Bermudas were to
be initially ordered to equip several squadrons.
It was expected that the initial four would arrive during June 1941 and with subsequent monthly
deliveries would allow the following 11 squadrons to equip with 18 Bermudas each (12 IE & 6 IR):
• Establishing 27 Squadron RAAF July 1941 Hobart Tasmania
• Re-equipping 21 Squadron RAAF August 1941 Malaya from Wirraways.
• Establishing 28, 30 and 31 Squadrons RAAF at Richmond NSW September 1941
• Establishing 26 Squadron RAAF and re-equipping 12 Squadron RAAF from Wirraways at Darwin NT during October 1941
• Re-equipping 22 and 25 Squadrons RAAF in each capital City during November 1941 from Wirraways
• Re-equipping 4 Squadron RAAF Canberra during December 1941 from Wirraways.
• Re-equipping 5 Squadron RAAF with ex-30 Sqn Bermudas during January 1942 from Wirraways.
• Re-equipping 23 and 24 Squadrons RAAF in each capital City during February (with Ex-31Squadron Bermudas) and March 1942 respectively from Wirraways
• This would leave a pool of 45 aircraft for maintenance, training and normal attrition.
30 and 31 Squadrons RAAF, being based at Richmond NSW, would only use them initially as
transition trainers till they were re-equipped with twin-engine fighters allocated from some 54
Beaufighters ordered during May 1941. With 12 to arrive December 1941, followed by 14 monthly by
March 1942, thereby making a total of 54 Beaufighters.
Due to the lengthy delays, apparent un-resolved design and performance flaws with the Bermuda
aircraft, the RAAF during November 1941, decided to cancel and place orders for the Vultee
Vengeance dive-bombers instead.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Revthought

ORIGINAL: warspite1
warspite1

There were distinct differences though. Force Z was just two ships + 3 destroyers to put up an AA defence - and PoW and Repulse were quickly separated. Repulse's AA was hardly state of the art either.

The first torpedo to strike PoW was about as unlucky a spot to be hit as can be imagined. Much of the guns were put out of action from the resulting loss of power.

For Halberd there would have been more of a "wall of AA" put up by the much larger escort.

The bombers would also have been met by fighters and in some cases had their approaches disrupted.

In any case, with Force Z both ships were sunk literally hours into the attack. If my recollection serves Repulse was killed by literally the last torpedo dropped that day………If there was fault in the HACS radar on PoW, I think it is fair to say that the outcome of the air attack on Force Z may have been less than fatal……however, it may be that a working HACS radar would have had the same result as having a single small British carrier present….

warspite1

I do not think this is correct. I will use The Sinking of the Prince of Wales & Repulse (Middlebrook/Mahoney) as the source document here and appears in italics.

Firstly, and all things being equal, the timing of the sinking should be relevant. However it is not so here. As said in Post 58, Prince of Wales had the more modern AA weapons package, but the majority of her guns were put out of action with the first torpedo strike and the colossal damage caused by striking just about her most vulnerable point. Yes, as the more modern vessel, she remained afloat longer than the unmodernised Repulse, but for much of the time she was either impotent or a hulk waiting to sink. Repulse was in action and in fighting trim for longer, but her effect on the battle was less because as you say, she had no HACS and…. “but some of Repulse’s guns could not elevate to high level and others could not depress sufficiently to engage low flying aircraft. All these old guns had either old fashioned control systems or none at all, and many were not even power operated and had to be trained by hand”.

The problems were exacerbated by the following:

- For the first attack against Repulse, when the ships were still close, Admiral Philips got his tactics wrong, ordering the ships to operate in formation: ….What was happening was that both ships were swinging right in answer to the BT3 signal and the Control Officers’ corrections to the left were thus being counteracted. Even so, five aircraft were damaged, and two taken out of the battle.

- Phillips realised his error and changed his orders to allow freedom of manoeuvre, but then in the very next attack the Japanese struck the shaft and Prince of Wales was barely able to fight due to the loss of power….Although Prince of Wales had been grievously hurt, the position should have been by no means hopeless. Repair work could contain any further flooding; pumping and counter-flooding could correct the list. Two of the four boilers with their engines and shafts were still capable of driving the ship along. None of the guns had actually been damaged and the ship should still have been able to defend herself. All of this might have been achieved had Prince of Wales not suffered a further severe, and again, completely unexpected setback, right on the heels of the first. The electrical system of a KGV-class battleship had never been exposed to the stress of severe battle damage until this moment. As with the hull construction, the electrical arrangements were more sophisticated than in any previous ship. Unfortunately they simply failed to stand up to the strain imposed by the intense shock and vibration caused by the torpedo explosion and the subsequent inflow of a vast quantity of water……four of the eight dynamos failed immediately when…..flooded and a fifth dynamo went soon afterwards….PoW’s damage control organisation never managed to overcome the electrical failure.

- Anti-aircraft armament – the four 5.25-inch turrets in the after half of the ship…..were all without power and were too big and heavy to be trained manually. Two of the four forward turrets suffered temporary failures, but even while these were soon rectified, the list of the ship was so steep that none of the four forward turrets could swing its gun from side to side….some of the pom-poms suffered temporary power failures, but these mostly remained in action, though continually plagued with stoppages as a result of their faulty ammunition belts.

- A further difficulty was that many of the pom-poms were having problems with their ammunition; their small shells were becoming separated from their cartridges…..and were jamming the barrels. This malaise affected both ships.

- The authors also state that the British, used to the low speed of the lumbering Swordfish, were caught out by the speed and height of the Japanese aircraft. It is not clear to what extent that is being offered up as an excuse, but as shown above, Prince of Wales was not properly in the action for long enough to find out and Repulse’s antiquated equipment meant that this would have been only a contributory cause.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Even so, five aircraft were damaged, and two taken out of the battle.

And if Operation Halberd results are to be used as a comparison, the POW is only officially credited there with two Italian aircraft and both of these
kills were officially shared with another major ship and both aircraft had already been under fire while penetrating the destroyer screen. It probably
should be mentioned that POW's AA is also credited with bringing down a third aircraft but unfortunately it was a British Fulmar.

In the first Japanese torpedo aircraft attack on POW on Dec 10th, she downed one and damaged three others of the nine that attempted to attack her.
That was the last torpedo attack she received while her AA outfit was fully functional. As a comparison, each of POW's official Halberd kills took place
in separate attacks on the day, so the first torpedo attack on her on Dec 10th could be seen as at least matching her AA performance during each of
the Italian torpedo bomber attacks on the 27th Sep '41.

The POW's official count comes from Somerville's despatch on the Halberd operation, the Force Z info from Middlebrook's clearly popular book.

Edited after I finally found Middlebrook again.[:)]

[MakeeLearn]

"Photograph taken from a Japanese aircraft during the initial high-level bombing attack. Repulse, near the bottom of the view, has just been hit by one bomb and near-missed by several more. Prince of Wales is near the top of the image, generating a considerable amount of smoke. Japanese writing in the lower right states that the photograph was reproduced by authorization of the Navy Ministry."

[Reg]

ORIGINAL: Reg

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

The Australians seemed to be a very quick study in relation to weapon production once war in Europe began, particularly given they did not seem to have
any aircraft, vehicle or armament factories (other than small arms and ammunition) prior to 1939.

Were you aware that the very first motor car wasn't manufactured in Australia until 1947? [X(]

There was some assembly of imported kits and local body building before this time but it required the conversion of wartime aircraft factories before a car could be manufactured locally from scratch.

And the last passenger car to be manufactured in Australia rolled off the production line on 20 October 2017... [:(]

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-19/holden-worker-farewell-final-car-ahead-of-plant-closure/9066328

The other local manufacturers Ford and Toyota had closed their plants several months earlier.

How times have changed......

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Reg

ORIGINAL: Reg

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

The Australians seemed to be a very quick study in relation to weapon production once war in Europe began, particularly given they did not seem to have
any aircraft, vehicle or armament factories (other than small arms and ammunition) prior to 1939.

Were you aware that the very first motor car wasn't manufactured in Australia until 1947? [X(]

There was some assembly of imported kits and local body building before this time but it required the conversion of wartime aircraft factories before a car could be manufactured locally from scratch.

And the last passenger car to be manufactured in Australia rolled off the production line on 20 October 2017... [:(]

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-19/holden-worker-farewell-final-car-ahead-of-plant-closure/9066328

The other local manufacturers Ford and Toyota had closed their plants several months earlier.

How times have changed......

warspite1

Wow! How times change indeed. We only make cars in the UK thanks to foreign manufacturers (specialist manufacturers aside). I wonder when we will be saying the same thing.

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Reg

ORIGINAL: Reg



Were you aware that the very first motor car wasn't manufactured in Australia until 1947? [X(]

There was some assembly of imported kits and local body building before this time but it required the conversion of wartime aircraft factories before a car could be manufactured locally from scratch.

And the last passenger car to be manufactured in Australia rolled off the production line on 20 October 2017... [:(]

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-19/holden-worker-farewell-final-car-ahead-of-plant-closure/9066328

The other local manufacturers Ford and Toyota had closed their plants several months earlier.

How times have changed......

warspite1

Wow! How times change indeed. We only make cars in the UK thanks to foreign manufacturers (specialist manufacturers aside). I wonder when we will be saying the same thing.

Soon. Very soon.

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

Interesting Japanese animation videos (very detailed in 3D) of the fateful attack...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buV7IuN8i9I

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ed4rh_NK70Q


Leo "Apollo11"

[fcooke]

So what is the thing to the far left of POW in the pic above? is it some sort of stamp? the rest of the photo is pretty clear so I would not be guessing 'aberration'.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: fcooke

So what is the thing to the far left of POW in the pic above? is it some sort of stamp? the rest of the photo is pretty clear so I would not be guessing 'aberration'.

Looks like a piece of scotch tape after some of it was removed but some was stuck on too hard to remove.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: fcooke

So what is the thing to the far left of POW in the pic above? is it some sort of stamp? the rest of the photo is pretty clear so I would not be guessing 'aberration'.

Looks like a piece of scotch tape after some of it was removed but some was stuck on too hard to remove.

Duct tape to repair torpedo hits? Yes!

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

Interesting Japanese animation videos (very detailed in 3D) of the fateful attack...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buV7IuN8i9I

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ed4rh_NK70Q


Leo "Apollo11"

Leo,

Thanks, those were really well done! [8D]

BTW, second one linked is first chronologically.