Dereliction of Duty

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Ian R
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Dereliction of Duty

Post by Ian R »

Just watching, on this infamous date (this side of the international date line), a very interesting program on the history channel, on the justifiability of Kimmel and Short carrying the national sh*t-can for Pearl Harbor. Came out last year so must have missed it then.

"Pearl Harbor: The Truth"

Link to review page: "Pearl Harbor: The Truth"

The usual conspiracy theories are duly trotted out and debunked, but more interesting is the role of Kimmel's supposed friend Harold Stark.

The producers have rolled out both sides of the debate so you can decide, but they don't give us their own verdict.

Still watching it, so don't know if anyone points out that it would have been, at the least, a good idea for Kimmel to order the fleet to scrape off those multiple coats of inflammable white peacetime paint.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by BBfanboy »

I'm not sure anyone in the USN appreciated the fire danger from oil-based paint at this stage. The USN virtually never fought a battle in WWI, and I don't know if the British were sharing damage control info at the start of WWII.

And even for the British, my impression is that most of their early war ship losses/damage were old ships that suffered catastrophic damage and sank quickly or newer ships that did not have so many coats of paint and thus less fire to battle. Exeter at the River Plate might have had enough paint to be a problem as it was several years old by then. Old merchant ships on fire after bomb or shell hits would be dismissed as bad damage control capability (equipment and crew training).
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by mrchuck »

It was obvious to many even at the time, that the oil embargo would most likely provoke the Japanese to war. The conditions for removing the embargo were not likely to be acceptable to any sovereign power of the day, never mind the japanese specifically.

What was far less obvious was how very successful they would be at the start. Bear in mind the extreme racism at the time-I don't think anyone believed the little yellow monkeys as they called them, could pull off anything like it. Failure to prepare for this possibility was at all levels from top to bottom and driven by an almost universal contempt for non-whites. They soon learned better.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by Chernobyl »

Not so sure racism played a decisive factor. It was, after all, objectively suicidal in the long term to attack the USA, even if the PH strike had sunk several CV. There also was little historical precedent for a war between civilized nations with mainland territory so distant.

But it also seems to me that very little note was made of the Japanese diplomatic proposals for a compromise. They were simply dismissed. The Japanese considered this an insult and the last straw. There is little evidence that Hull or any American official realized how critical the situation was.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by Chernobyl »

From Wikipedia:

Acheson implemented the Lend-Lease policy that helped re-arm Great Britain and the American/British/Dutch oil embargo that cut off 95 percent of Japanese oil supplies and escalated the crisis with Japan in 1941.[9] Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets merely to disconcert them. He did not intend the flow of oil to Japan to cease. The president then departed Washington for Newfoundland to meet with Churchill. While he was gone Acheson used those frozen assets to deny Japan oil. Upon the president's return, he decided it would appear weak and appeasing to reverse the de facto oil embargo.[10]

So apparently it was all Acheson's fault!!
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: Liebestod

Not so sure racism played a decisive factor.
warspite1

I completely agree. Similar to the recent discussion thread on the Italian navy and British 'contempt' toward them, racism toward the Japanese is a good headline grabber if one wants to sell books. Yes of course there was an element of racism - that can't be denied - but it was not a decisive factor. People make mistakes. Under-estimating the strength/audacity/stupidity! of one's opponent has been a factor throughout time.

The French did not believe the Germans could achieve what they did in 1940. They had evidence in Poland and Norway that the German Army was not fighting to a World War I timetable anymore, but the evidence was ignored and plans were made based on totally out-moded assumptions. Were the French racist or did they just get it wrong? The British had two years of war - two years of bitter experience - to understand what was possible with air power - and air power delivered by a strong navy, but they mis-judged the Japanese capability in 1941 - as did the US. Racism or just a lack of belief that the Japanese would be so stupid to declare war on the US?

Blaming rosy cheeked, colonel blimps and their racist views as being the reason for defeat is hyperbole that sells books but doesn't stand up to close scrutiny in my view.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by Ian R »

Thing is, Kimmel was a rising star and may well have proven to be a been a great wartime leader.

Basically the producers' (it was a British Channel 4 production) assessment was that somebody needed to be sacrificed on the alter of public opinion, and they hint that Stark made sure it was Kimmel (as opposed to Stark), with FDR's at least tacit approval.

Worse is the report that someone sent Kimmel a pistol in the mail and suggested what he should do with it.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by LeeChard »

I think Kimmel and Short were treated shabbily for being taken by surprise while the staff people in Washington
pretended, with perfect hindsight, they would not have been so negligent.
So hours later the Japanese hand MacArthur a decisive clobbering and they give him command of southeast Asia.
Good old politics [8|]
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by BBfanboy »

ORIGINAL: warspite1
ORIGINAL: Liebestod

Not so sure racism played a decisive factor.
warspite1

I completely agree. Similar to the recent discussion thread on the Italian navy and British 'contempt' toward them, racism toward the Japanese is a good headline grabber if one wants to sell books. Yes of course there was an element of racism - that can't be denied - but it was not a decisive factor. People make mistakes. Under-estimating the strength/audacity/stupidity! of one's opponent has been a factor throughout time.

The French did not believe the Germans could achieve what they did in 1940. They had evidence in Poland and Norway that the German Army was not fighting to a World War I timetable anymore, but the evidence was ignored and plans were made based on totally out-moded assumptions. Were the French racist or did they just get it wrong? The British had two years of war - two years of bitter experience - to understand what was possible with air power - and air power delivered by a strong navy, but they mis-judged the Japanese capability in 1941 - as did the US. Racism or just a lack of belief that the Japanese would be so stupid to declare war on the US?

Blaming rosy cheeked, colonel blimps and their racist views as being the reason for defeat is hyperbole that sells books but doesn't stand up to close scrutiny in my view.

I think the racism was more subtle. Almost everyone in the west assumed the Japanese could only make poor copies of western weapons and could not come up with anything new on their own. The efficiency of their torpedoes was a huge surprise (both naval and aerial) that led Adm. Phillips to take Force Z into danger without air cover because he assumed his AA could handle any Japanese "paper planes" that came along. The "paper planes" phrase comes directly from a Force Z survivor being interviewed about the disaster years later - and most seamen parrot what their leaders were saying.

Similarly, the USN assumed that the Japanese could not develop a torpedo that could be dropped in shallow water like PH port. Midget subs were also a new idea that Britain was just starting to develop and no one though Japan could produce, much less deploy to a target thousands of miles away.

I don't think anyone doubted the courage of Japanese soldiers/sailors/airmen, but the suicidal fanaticism was a shock because few westerners ever studied Japanese philosophy.

I am not saying I could have done better, but hindsight sure shows some shortcomings and opportunities that were missed. I agree with the documentary that showed Kimmel was not given key information that might have changed his preparation level. But if he had sortied the fleet he likely would have lost a lot more ships!
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by John 3rd »

ORIGINAL: Ranger5355

I think Kimmel and Short were treated shabbily for being taken by surprise while the staff people in Washington
pretended, with perfect hindsight, they would not have been so negligent.
So hours later the Japanese hand MacArthur a decisive clobbering and they give him command of southeast Asia.
Good old politics [8|]

Negligent was Dugout DOUG! He is the one that should have been sacrificed in my opinion...
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by spence »

Kimmel was not given key information that might have changed his preparation level. But if he had sortied the fleet he likely would have lost a lot more ships!

I believe that you or confusing the game abilities of IJN torpedo bombers with their real life abilities. At Pearl Harbor the 40 torpedo bombers scored only about 50% of the time against targets which were un-moving and not firing at them. Over the course of the 4 carrier battles of 1942 the torpedo bombers of the KB scored only 7 torpedo hits on capital ships (Lexington, Yorktown and Hornet) with a two more on DDs. That is way less than the rates that the Kates generally achieve in the game (In game at PH they generally score with about 5/6th of however many torpedoes they carry - there are too many variables for measurement to be fruitful vis a vis "at-sea" attacks).

A standing CAP and scrambling fighters over PH or the fleet may also impacted raiders' attack effectiveness. Same goes for having AA guns manned and ready. I have experimented with NO HISTORICAL FIRST TURN/SURPRISE purposefully setting up the US BB fleet to ambush the KB in a night battle, the subs all ambush the KB, the KBs raid being met by 100 or so airborne CAP and every bomber set to Naval Attack (incl Enterprise group) at optimum altitude (escorted by every thing else that is flyable). The BBs score a couple of hits on various IJN ships (not preventing airops), the raid on PH sinks a bunch of auxiliaries, the bombers get 1-2 hits on IJN ships. Even with everything set as the worst possible situation for the IJN there is little loss. I am not convinced that the game is a good predictor of how the battle would have panned out had the US been more prepared at PH.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by Skyros »

ORIGINAL: spence

I believe that you or confusing the game abilities of IJN torpedo bombers with their real life abilities. At Pearl Harbor the 40 torpedo bombers scored only about 50% of the time against targets which were un-moving and not firing at them. Over the course of the 4 carrier battles of 1942 the torpedo bombers of the KB scored only 7 torpedo hits on capital ships (Lexington, Yorktown and Hornet) with a two more on DDs. That is way less than the rates that the Kates generally achieve in the game (In game at PH they generally score with about 5/6th of however many torpedoes they carry - there are too many variables for measurement to be fruitful vis a vis "at-sea" attacks).

I don't know Spence, seems my Kates have missed your ships a lot and my Vals seem to be lucky to hit the ocean let alone your ships.[:D]
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by anarchyintheuk »

Imo Kimmel was treated pretty well for a guy who was given a war warning a few days before the attack and, literally, made no changes to PacFleet orders (other than Lex and Enterprise ferrying fighters and dive-bombers). How Bloch wasn't canned is beyond me.

As far as Doug and his airforce, it would have been nice not to lose 40% of his bombers and 50% of his fighters on day 1. It was also had no effect on the campaign. As soon as Japan attacked that airforce was a dead man walking.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by BBfanboy »

ORIGINAL: spence
Kimmel was not given key information that might have changed his preparation level. But if he had sortied the fleet he likely would have lost a lot more ships!

I believe that you or confusing the game abilities of IJN torpedo bombers with their real life abilities. At Pearl Harbor the 40 torpedo bombers scored only about 50% of the time against targets which were un-moving and not firing at them. Over the course of the 4 carrier battles of 1942 the torpedo bombers of the KB scored only 7 torpedo hits on capital ships (Lexington, Yorktown and Hornet) with a two more on DDs. That is way less than the rates that the Kates generally achieve in the game (In game at PH they generally score with about 5/6th of however many torpedoes they carry - there are too many variables for measurement to be fruitful vis a vis "at-sea" attacks).

A standing CAP and scrambling fighters over PH or the fleet may also impacted raiders' attack effectiveness. Same goes for having AA guns manned and ready. I have experimented with NO HISTORICAL FIRST TURN/SURPRISE purposefully setting up the US BB fleet to ambush the KB in a night battle, the subs all ambush the KB, the KBs raid being met by 100 or so airborne CAP and every bomber set to Naval Attack (incl Enterprise group) at optimum altitude (escorted by every thing else that is flyable). The BBs score a couple of hits on various IJN ships (not preventing airops), the raid on PH sinks a bunch of auxiliaries, the bombers get 1-2 hits on IJN ships. Even with everything set as the worst possible situation for the IJN there is little loss. I am not convinced that the game is a good predictor of how the battle would have panned out had the US been more prepared at PH.

I was thinking of the Nells sinking PoW and Repulse, and the long range torpedo hits on several ships in Adm. Doorman's ABDA TF at the battle of Java Sea.
And I think you overlooked the hits on Hermes, Cornwall and Dorsetshire.

As for the US fleet, since there was no Intel on the whereabouts of the KB there is little likelihood they would have charged north to engage, but if KB found PH empty on the day it would have still struck the airfields and probably the oil tanks that made operations at PH possible. Then KB would have started searching for the US fleet, likely found them by day two and moved close enough for at least two air strikes per plane. The old BBs would not have a shallow harbour bottom to save them. The faster ships might have dodged most of the torps but not the bombs, and there would be no firefighting help from the port. I think US losses would have been heavy and KB would have lost a good chunk of its aircraft.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: spence
Kimmel was not given key information that might have changed his preparation level. But if he had sortied the fleet he likely would have lost a lot more ships!

I believe that you or confusing the game abilities of IJN torpedo bombers with their real life abilities. At Pearl Harbor the 40 torpedo bombers scored only about 50% of the time against targets which were un-moving and not firing at them. Over the course of the 4 carrier battles of 1942 the torpedo bombers of the KB scored only 7 torpedo hits on capital ships (Lexington, Yorktown and Hornet) with a two more on DDs. That is way less than the rates that the Kates generally achieve in the game (In game at PH they generally score with about 5/6th of however many torpedoes they carry - there are too many variables for measurement to be fruitful vis a vis "at-sea" attacks).

A standing CAP and scrambling fighters over PH or the fleet may also impacted raiders' attack effectiveness. Same goes for having AA guns manned and ready. I have experimented with NO HISTORICAL FIRST TURN/SURPRISE purposefully setting up the US BB fleet to ambush the KB in a night battle, the subs all ambush the KB, the KBs raid being met by 100 or so airborne CAP and every bomber set to Naval Attack (incl Enterprise group) at optimum altitude (escorted by every thing else that is flyable). The BBs score a couple of hits on various IJN ships (not preventing airops), the raid on PH sinks a bunch of auxiliaries, the bombers get 1-2 hits on IJN ships. Even with everything set as the worst possible situation for the IJN there is little loss. I am not convinced that the game is a good predictor of how the battle would have panned out had the US been more prepared at PH.

As for the US fleet, since there was no Intel on the whereabouts of the KB there is little likelihood they would have charged north to engage, but if KB found PH empty on the day it would have still struck the airfields and probably the oil tanks that made operations at PH possible. Then KB would have started searching for the US fleet, likely found them by day two and moved close enough for at least two air strikes per plane. The old BBs would not have a shallow harbour bottom to save them. The faster ships might have dodged most of the torps but not the bombs, and there would be no firefighting help from the port. I think US losses would have been heavy and KB would have lost a good chunk of its aircraft.
warspite1

There was a thread on this forum some time ago where it was argued iirc that the Japanese aircraft (or more accurately their ordnance) at Pearl did not have the capability to take out the oil tanks.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by crsutton »

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: spence
Kimmel was not given key information that might have changed his preparation level. But if he had sortied the fleet he likely would have lost a lot more ships!

I believe that you or confusing the game abilities of IJN torpedo bombers with their real life abilities. At Pearl Harbor the 40 torpedo bombers scored only about 50% of the time against targets which were un-moving and not firing at them. Over the course of the 4 carrier battles of 1942 the torpedo bombers of the KB scored only 7 torpedo hits on capital ships (Lexington, Yorktown and Hornet) with a two more on DDs. That is way less than the rates that the Kates generally achieve in the game (In game at PH they generally score with about 5/6th of however many torpedoes they carry - there are too many variables for measurement to be fruitful vis a vis "at-sea" attacks).

A standing CAP and scrambling fighters over PH or the fleet may also impacted raiders' attack effectiveness. Same goes for having AA guns manned and ready. I have experimented with NO HISTORICAL FIRST TURN/SURPRISE purposefully setting up the US BB fleet to ambush the KB in a night battle, the subs all ambush the KB, the KBs raid being met by 100 or so airborne CAP and every bomber set to Naval Attack (incl Enterprise group) at optimum altitude (escorted by every thing else that is flyable). The BBs score a couple of hits on various IJN ships (not preventing airops), the raid on PH sinks a bunch of auxiliaries, the bombers get 1-2 hits on IJN ships. Even with everything set as the worst possible situation for the IJN there is little loss. I am not convinced that the game is a good predictor of how the battle would have panned out had the US been more prepared at PH.

I was thinking of the Nells sinking PoW and Repulse, and the long range torpedo hits on several ships in Adm. Doorman's ABDA TF at the battle of Java Sea.
And I think you overlooked the hits on Hermes, Cornwall and Dorsetshire.

As for the US fleet, since there was no Intel on the whereabouts of the KB there is little likelihood they would have charged north to engage, but if KB found PH empty on the day it would have still struck the airfields and probably the oil tanks that made operations at PH possible. Then KB would have started searching for the US fleet, likely found them by day two and moved close enough for at least two air strikes per plane. The old BBs would not have a shallow harbour bottom to save them. The faster ships might have dodged most of the torps but not the bombs, and there would be no firefighting help from the port. I think US losses would have been heavy and KB would have lost a good chunk of its aircraft.

Certainly not the torpedoes which were very reliable and worked. But the platform (Kate) was already pushing obsolesce. And by mid war virtually all Japanese platforms were obsolete. In fact WWII was the last real heyday of both dive bombers and torpedo bombers. Radar controlled AA and proximity fuses made sure of that. The low hit rate of all torpedo bombers probably was not surprise to any power. The trade of was that when they did hit and explode, it really had an impact so the missed rate was acceptable.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by spence »

I was thinking of the Nells sinking PoW and Repulse, and the long range torpedo hits on several ships in Adm. Doorman's ABDA TF at the battle of Java Sea.
And I think you overlooked the hits on Hermes, Cornwall and Dorsetshire.

In spite of the special training received by the Nells/Bettys which attacked the POW/Repulse it was the very first hit on POW that crippled the ship by dismounting two (IIRC) of the propellor shafts. Right off that ship was doomed. The Repulse dodged 19 torpedoes before being hit by any torpedoes.

The long range torpedo hits in the Battle of the Java Sea were not scored by IJN torpedo bombers. The Hermes, Dorsetshire and Cornwall were all sunk by dive-bombers (incidentally while the torpedo bombers of the KB "practiced" the "Midway Screw-up". In fact other than a hit or two scored by Ryujo's torpedo bombers on merchies I'm fairly certain that all of KB's torpedo bombers might as well have been left on the beach during the Indian Ocean Operation.

As to the 800 kg bombs which the KB used, they were sadly ineffective except for exactly one of the 10 hits scored (USS Arizona). Considering that they were aimed at un-moving targets 10 hits out of 50 bombs dropped was not too bad but otherwise nothing at all like rate that horizontal bombers scored on moving targets. The 250kg AP bombs proved to be largely ineffective against armored targets and at PH the IJN aviators demonstrated a penchant for using them (relatively ineffectively) against USS Nevada to the benefit of all the more lightly armored targets presented in PH.

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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by BBfanboy »

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: spence



I believe that you or confusing the game abilities of IJN torpedo bombers with their real life abilities. At Pearl Harbor the 40 torpedo bombers scored only about 50% of the time against targets which were un-moving and not firing at them. Over the course of the 4 carrier battles of 1942 the torpedo bombers of the KB scored only 7 torpedo hits on capital ships (Lexington, Yorktown and Hornet) with a two more on DDs. That is way less than the rates that the Kates generally achieve in the game (In game at PH they generally score with about 5/6th of however many torpedoes they carry - there are too many variables for measurement to be fruitful vis a vis "at-sea" attacks).

A standing CAP and scrambling fighters over PH or the fleet may also impacted raiders' attack effectiveness. Same goes for having AA guns manned and ready. I have experimented with NO HISTORICAL FIRST TURN/SURPRISE purposefully setting up the US BB fleet to ambush the KB in a night battle, the subs all ambush the KB, the KBs raid being met by 100 or so airborne CAP and every bomber set to Naval Attack (incl Enterprise group) at optimum altitude (escorted by every thing else that is flyable). The BBs score a couple of hits on various IJN ships (not preventing airops), the raid on PH sinks a bunch of auxiliaries, the bombers get 1-2 hits on IJN ships. Even with everything set as the worst possible situation for the IJN there is little loss. I am not convinced that the game is a good predictor of how the battle would have panned out had the US been more prepared at PH.

As for the US fleet, since there was no Intel on the whereabouts of the KB there is little likelihood they would have charged north to engage, but if KB found PH empty on the day it would have still struck the airfields and probably the oil tanks that made operations at PH possible. Then KB would have started searching for the US fleet, likely found them by day two and moved close enough for at least two air strikes per plane. The old BBs would not have a shallow harbour bottom to save them. The faster ships might have dodged most of the torps but not the bombs, and there would be no firefighting help from the port. I think US losses would have been heavy and KB would have lost a good chunk of its aircraft.
warspite1

There was a thread on this forum some time ago where it was argued iirc that the Japanese aircraft (or more accurately their ordnance) at Pearl did not have the capability to take out the oil tanks.
Yes, but half the Kates and all the Vals were armed with bombs.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by BBfanboy »

ORIGINAL: spence
I was thinking of the Nells sinking PoW and Repulse, and the long range torpedo hits on several ships in Adm. Doorman's ABDA TF at the battle of Java Sea.
And I think you overlooked the hits on Hermes, Cornwall and Dorsetshire.

In spite of the special training received by the Nells/Bettys which attacked the POW/Repulse it was the very first hit on POW that crippled the ship by dismounting two (IIRC) of the propellor shafts. Right off that ship was doomed. The Repulse dodged 19 torpedoes before being hit by any torpedoes.

The long range torpedo hits in the Battle of the Java Sea were not scored by IJN torpedo bombers. The Hermes, Dorsetshire and Cornwall were all sunk by dive-bombers (incidentally while the torpedo bombers of the KB "practiced" the "Midway Screw-up". In fact other than a hit or two scored by Ryujo's torpedo bombers on merchies I'm fairly certain that all of KB's torpedo bombers might as well have been left on the beach during the Indian Ocean Operation.

As to the 800 kg bombs which the KB used, they were sadly ineffective except for exactly one of the 10 hits scored (USS Arizona). Considering that they were aimed at un-moving targets 10 hits out of 50 bombs dropped was not too bad but otherwise nothing at all like rate that horizontal bombers scored on moving targets. The 250kg AP bombs proved to be largely ineffective against armored targets and at PH the IJN aviators demonstrated a penchant for using them (relatively ineffectively) against USS Nevada to the benefit of all the more lightly armored targets presented in PH.

At no time did I say that aircraft torpedoes were used at the Battle of Java Sea! My original statement was the Japanese torpedoes "(both naval and aerial)" were more effective than Allied authorities were prepared to estimate - because of their baseline supposition that the Japanese were inferior technologically.
You keep going back to the poor hit rate from TB at PH while I have been talking about torpedoes in the broader sense - all Japanese torps. Both of us have made some points, I think.

In the case of Force Z, survivors were astounded that the Japanese TBs ignored their heavy flak and flew in perfect formation toward their targets. The bravery is obvious but it also shows that the British sailors had a higher expectation that their flak would devastate the attackers than it actually did (very few Nells were shot down). Again, the danger from the Japanese was discounted because too much emphasis was placed on the light construction of Japanese aircraft. So I contend the British commanders believed the Japanese were unlikely to score any hits when in fact they scored enough hits to do the job. It does not matter that most of their torpedoes missed.

Similarly, I estimate that the slower and less maneuverable US BBs at sea near PH would have suffered just enough torpedo and bomb hits to be in serious jeopardy before they could return to PH. It's all speculation of course, but that is the line of my thinking.
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RE: Dereliction of Duty

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy




As for the US fleet, since there was no Intel on the whereabouts of the KB there is little likelihood they would have charged north to engage, but if KB found PH empty on the day it would have still struck the airfields and probably the oil tanks that made operations at PH possible. Then KB would have started searching for the US fleet, likely found them by day two and moved close enough for at least two air strikes per plane. The old BBs would not have a shallow harbour bottom to save them. The faster ships might have dodged most of the torps but not the bombs, and there would be no firefighting help from the port. I think US losses would have been heavy and KB would have lost a good chunk of its aircraft.
warspite1

There was a thread on this forum some time ago where it was argued iirc that the Japanese aircraft (or more accurately their ordnance) at Pearl did not have the capability to take out the oil tanks.
Yes, but half the Kates and all the Vals were armed with bombs.
warspite1

Yes I know they had bombs - the issue was whether those bombs were able to penetrate the storage tank facilities. It was a while ago but I'm fairly sure the considered thinking was that they couldn't. I may be wrong, but that was the impression I get.
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