ORIGINAL: Bif1961
The bombardment affect other elements of Col Von Lucks' Kampf Group, His 1st, 2nd Infantry Battalion were heavily affected and all contact was cutoff, though he doesn't give exact casualty figures it was clear that major portions of his Kampf Group were heavily hit and major portions were combat ineffective. This from a well dug in and dispersed target and in this game the units were not dug in or prepared for the attack.
Issue is here u start to make assumption based on the writtings that are subjective. That in it self is nothing unusual and very human, i do that too.
My question is. Is it really so clear cut. Im not doubting that this is the heavies bombardment that the soldiers in question has been exposed too. Hench if u wanted to find an example of where the feeling among the soldiers feelt the weight of carpet bombings this is where u go.
To make it pefectly clear when it comes to carpet bombings i in no way dispute the disruption they caused and the temporary reduced combat ability. Also casulties DO occure, no doubt. My question is. Are casulties produced by air bombings(Note i use the word air bombing as its a general issue) verifibly in line with what the game gives you within certain amount of belivebility. Or are they skewer and if so by what magnitude and what does that impact wise do to the land campaigns/engine.
Ill repreat it again im looking at the casulties produced im not questioning the other effects. One might keep bringing up other effects but it only clouds the issue.
1. What kinda casulties do KG Von Luck actually take? (one can look at the divisonal/regimental records and compare the strength pre 18th july and the day after or days after. What does that tell you?
2. U say his kampf gruppe was heavily hit and major portions were combat ineffective. (not saying they are per say wrong compared to other experiences the soldiers had. these are undoubtbly the worst experiences they had when it comes to bombardment). My point is, was KG Luck, overun after the bombings, and or how did the actually perform in the combats of the 2 days of the Goodwood operation?
What evidence is there that they preform any where on a scale from very badly to exceptionally well, which we then can attribuate to at leased in some manner from the effects of the bombings. How does that compare too being combat ineffective?
3. "This from a well dug in and dispersed target and in this game the units were not dug in or prepared for the attack".
What does well dug-in mean. Again this is subjective. Case in point when comparing to AE, how many days/time(to dig forts in AE) had the frontlines and area behind as the advance is some 6 7km been prepared?
What is teh difference of being dug in in the sense u can do in a evening and is common for military units to to at the end of a day if they had made an advance into new postion.(or during a day for that matter)
Was i in this case more than just daily digging in, absolutly, but how so to a degree more than that?
Further the german postions tended to be based in villages, Woods other natural covers. The area in which Goodwood occures are in mnay places totally flat. The ability to hide was limited. There were more living hedge in 1944 than there is today, but not remotely bocage. In the sense that the density of troops tended to gravitate higher to those areas and was the main strongpoints. Those are also the most identifiable target when bombing from the air, more so than random field X. Hench they recieved the greatest proportion of bombs. The convergence of these 2 factors actually causes the greatest casulties in the most fortified postions. Do i then say forts creates more casulties or that they are irrelevant, no.
Just pointing out the use of "This from a well dug in and dispersed target" is a subjective statement doesnt necesarrily means less casulty empericially. The most fortified area of the bomb area doesnt seem to corrospond directly into lower casulties. The human and military desire for safety of Woods, villages and the like produce here a counter effect in that those are also the most bombed features.
4. "in this game the units were not dug in or prepared for the attack."
Well in a sense that is correct, but also produce a evidential problem of what can u prove by using empirical data and creates a game vs simulator issue. How many historical examples do we have of 4E bombers being used to interdict/ground moving troops/troops not in the and imidate and "static" frontline?
Does that mean u couldnt do it, no. I just suspect that hitting moving targets and the willingness of those targets not to take counter meassures, avoid discovery being a great negator. Creates a set of problem that the AE engine doesnt take into account.
The closest u haveof 4E being used on target in an interdictive role the cases where the explicity purpose of the rubbling cities that was roadhubs behind the frontline. To slow the pace of advance/retreat and reinforcements. In a number of cases troops "accidently" happens to be in those cities at the time and casulties occur but this is collateral damage that is unintended in the sense of purpose of mission but ofcourse real enough in themselfs.
St. Vith, Houffalize, St Lo comes to mind as examples. St Vith being the example of most casulties actually occuring, but again the purpose of the mission was never to cause casulties but impeed movement.
What u do have. Are a tons of examples of 2E bombers and 1E figther being used in interdiction roles. Normandy again comes to mind as a prime example, but its far from the only one.
Again this is an example of history that up until about 1990 seemed to collectively thought of as german formation being ravaged as they approched the battlefield. Again Old Fritz B. plays his role here too.
This one of the many thing that since has been looked into since. The Zetterling book mentioned in above post has a whole chapter on this. Other have since looked more into this is Nigel Askey, Christopher A Lawrence on the Eastern front/Kursk. Zetterling and Anderson has written several works including a statical analysis on the parts of the Eastern front. When one start to look at actual numbers the numbers they are supprising very low for the day these division advances to the battlefield. The day the arrive the number as they come into contact with the enemy naturally rises. U cant differ in what exactly through this metode what causes what casulty, but u can for the day where they arent in contact enemy troop and casulties would come from enemy air and from accidents/non combat related issues. Then u start by making qualified judgements from that.
If 1E figthers and 2E bombers didnt produce the casulty of unentrenched unit moving to the battlefield that was believed for many years. What is the reasoning behind thinking that 4E bombers trying to do this would have caused excessive casulties. As 4E was never used in this role, neither I nor any one have any data to make conclusion what effect it might or might not have had. Its any one guess.
Just pointing out when other types was used in those roles they didnt create those kinda casulties, so why would 4E. They might have more bombs, but were also were less precise. One can argue ,but that then a game vs simulator question. Was the reason they werent used in that role historicly was because it wasnt feaseble/effective. When u consider the amount of planning it to toke to hit these static targets, what does that say about the ability to moving or newly moved targets. Was it the the reason u never used them in that role.
Could it through training / doctrine have becomed more feasible. Its possible. How ever if casulty rates are skewer for arguments sake by a factor of 100 in AE. Then i can certaintly understand why u would try develop this further in AE. The likelyhood is around 100 times greater. If in AE the casulties for doing this was 1% of current, what are the chances ppl would use them in this role? in that case what is the incentive to develop these doctrines.
Here is a link to Nigel Askeys page, in particular a page about planes caused tank losses.
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/comb ... r-in-wwii/
With one quote as an appeticer: Thus on a single day in August 1944 the RAF claimed 35% more tanks destroyed than the total number of German tanks lost directly to air attack in the entire campaign!
Kind regards,
Rasmus