Hypothetical Dec 7th

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warspite1
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: US87891
...where the Philippines would issue a declaration of neutrality, be granted immediate independence under Japanese auspices and protection, with the proviso that the she demand the withdrawal of ‘foreign’ troops from her soil.
warspite1
I know nothing of the Philippine political situation other than I understand the US had outlined a timetable for their withdrawal.

What was the political set-up? Were there any Filipinos that would want to join the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? Preferably Filipinos that are actually in a position to declare this?

Given that the US have given them a timetable for independence why would they want to get into bed with the Japanese?

What time is envisaged for this scenario 1940, 41, earlier?

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US87891
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by US87891 »

ORIGINAL: warspite1
ORIGINAL: US87891
...where the Philippines would issue a declaration of neutrality, be granted immediate independence under Japanese auspices and protection, with the proviso that the she demand the withdrawal of ‘foreign’ troops from her soil.
warspite1
I know nothing of the Philippine political situation other than I understand the US had outlined a timetable for their withdrawal.

What was the political set-up? Were there any Filipinos that would want to join the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? Preferably Filipinos that are actually in a position to declare this?

Given that the US have given them a timetable for independence why would they want to get into bed with the Japanese?

What time is envisaged for this scenario 1940, 41, earlier?
I doubt there were any Filipinos at all. I remarked that Japan seemed to function within a Japano-centric vacuum. This is illustrative. The proposal likely represented more of a facet of the infighting between Army, Navy and the remnants of the Civil government than anything meant to be taken seriously. At the time, even Konoye remarked about how he was 'sick of being an Army robot'.

However, it should also illustrate that everyone 'knew' that the Philippines were 'something' that needed to be dealt with. The only argument was as to the 'how'. The civilian proposal was so naïve as to be puerile, but they too recognized the requirements.

This is not a scenario, it actually happened. It is an attempted look at the Japanese views of the playing field before the conflict began and some additional context for the Malaya and DEI operations. It is obviously brief and misses many nuances, but I believe it is substantially correct.

The Greater East Asia Protective Association is a tongue-in-cheek reference to protection rackets everywhere.

Matt
Big B
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by Big B »

My idea was based on a logical progression to original War in the Pacific's "Infield Option", where the US pulls out of harm's way most of their vulnerable forces prior to hostilities.

There has been much interesting discussion, but I hold to the main point I made early:
The Embargo was enacted (fact), Japanese assets were frozen (fact) in late July 1941. The result: Japan lost access to three-fourths of its overseas trade and 88 percent of its imported oil. Japan’s oil reserves were only sufficient to last three years, and only half that time if it went to war and consumed fuel at a more frenzied pace (also fact).

This really happened, and did not involve any military action - but a deadly count down had now begun.

Prior to the Embargo, no serious thought by the War Department had been made on turning the Philippines into a fortress - via massive reinforcements... but all the decision makers in the USA knew war was now inevitable (everyone understood the unacceptable loss of face this meant to Japan).

So my proposition was simply to revisit a version of the "Infield Option".

It's still Dec 1941, but what if the US had played it smart and did not rush men to doom in the Philippines, and pulled the Pacific Fleet back to California where they would not be vulnerable to a sudden attack (everyone in the White House and War Department knew keeping the Fleet at Pearl accepted that risk, because of Toronto 1940, our own fleet exercises, and the known size of Japan's carrier forces).

Japan still must act - but without a fat juicy target to help them get started - what does the KB get assigned to do?

Ultimately, I don't see it anymore complicated than that.
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oldman45
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by oldman45 »

Well fine B reign everybody in [;)]

Ok, my simple revised idea based on all the posts, Japan is going to war to get what it needs, if the US will not play fair and put the fleet in Hawaii then they will make it come to them. The attacks on PI, and Malaysia go as planned (ie historical). The Navy attacks Guam and Wake using them as bait to draw the US fleet to the decisive battle.
US87891
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by US87891 »

ORIGINAL: Big B
...
Japan still must act - but without a fat juicy target to help them get started - what does the KB get assigned to do?

Ultimately, I don't see it anymore complicated than that.
I believe a reasonable starting point is what I put up a while back. Japan could use the carriers as she originally intended prior to approving the PH operation.

CarDiv-1 keeps the home fires burning.
CarDiv-2 provides long range cover for southern PI operations.
CarDiv-4 (Ryujo) provides direct support to the capture of Davao.
CarDiv-5 hangs loose for 10 days till the South Seas Force captures Guam, then accompanies them to the invasion and occupation of Rabaul; thereby initiating the unfolding of Japanese destiny in the deep, dank, fetid, and malarial jungles of New Britain, the Solomons, and New Guinea.[:)]

Matt
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Jorge_Stanbury
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by Jorge_Stanbury »

No CarDiv to cover Malaya landings?
US87891
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by US87891 »

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
No CarDiv to cover Malaya landings?
Not in the original Japanese plan. The waters were deemed too restrictive and the danger from opposition LBA was thought to impose undue risk. Malaya cover air and Naval interdiction was to be handled by Naval LBA out of south Indochina (as happened). The same conditions applied to northern PI, except although the waters were more open, the risk of opposition air was deemed greater. Again cover and Naval interdiction was assigned to Naval LBA, this time out of Taiwan (as also happened).

But hey, the suggestion was only as a starting point. One need not do, or think, as the Japanese.

Matt
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by Buckrock »

ORIGINAL: Big B
It's still Dec 1941, but what if the US had played it smart and did not rush men to doom in the Philippines, and pulled the Pacific Fleet back to California where they would not be vulnerable to a sudden attack (everyone in the White House and War Department knew keeping the Fleet at Pearl accepted that risk, because of Toronto 1940, our own fleet exercises, and the known size of Japan's carrier forces).

Japan still must act - but without a fat juicy target to help them get started - what does the KB get assigned to do?

Ultimately, I don't see it anymore complicated than that.
It's always more complicated.

So for a potential (something to do) KB strike target in the Philippines, the "no reinforcements" option means Manila now has likely only half
the US fighter coverage than before (and no P-40E's?) but the number of vulnerable subs in port would have dropped from the historical
26 to an unreinforced 11?

Just asking because some players love the idea of killing US subs en masse before they become dangerous.
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spence
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by spence »

Every one of all these alternative history ideas is predicated on the IJ Player having sure knowledge that his forces are all but invulnerable to any Allied response for at least 6 months and in these situations much, much longer. So I'm an AFB. Why do I want to play this game given that 9 out of 10 times the IJ Player will disappear when his "fun time" ends.

Once again if the IJ Player wants to explore "historical alternatives" he should do so without sure knowledge of his relative invulnerability...along the line of alternative AI scripts maybe British pilots all turn out to be aces from the Battle of Britain or American sub torpedoes work right from the beginning or since the KB had no experience whatever in carrier battles, maybe the Americans turn out to be better at it(or the Brits since they actually did have real wartime experience with carriers). After all, the real Japanese ONLY had experience fighting a 4th world country in the midst of its own civil war in Dec 1941 and they had been bogged down doing that. Declaring war on the USA and/or (reputably) 1st rate European powers was not something Japanese leaders could do with the certain foreknowledge that they would suffer negligible losses for their efforts (even if it was only in the beginning).



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pontiouspilot
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by pontiouspilot »

I completely agree that the Japanese could not and would not ignore the Philippines indefinitely. It is an issue in timing. My view is that could have had a free hand to eliminate the DEI and British before they made their move on Manila....perhaps in spring of '42. The USA would not have declared war until the move on Philippines, of course absent Pearl. In the interim the Phil had reinforcements scheduled. All this would have meant was more prisoners.

All said...where is our new scenario??!!
Big B
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by Big B »

This has been (I think) a very interesting thread - and I got A LOT more response (and all of it very well stated and argued) than I ever imagined I'd get, tossing out a lark of an idea [:)]

If there is genuine interest, I'll take stock scenario #1 Grand Campaign (I won't base it off of any mod) and put it together, I'll call it Infield.
The supposition will be:
1) Pacific Fleet is based on West Coast USA... previous fleet commanders concerns were payed attention to.
2) Philippines reflect the amount of US force commitment as of June 1941.

Regarding the US Forces stationed at PH, and Manila (Asiatic Fleet & submarines, aircraft stationed in Hawaii) - my initial assumption is that doesn't change - but before I post the scenario, I will research to see if anything should be adjusted based on (what I can find) of forces present in June 1941.

It will take me a while, but though I don't often post updates to my mod here, - I will certainly post when it's done and where you can download it.

Thanks to everyone for your enlightened input.

B
ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot

All said...where is our new scenario??!!
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oldman45
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by oldman45 »

Looking forward to this one, thanks
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TOMLABEL
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by TOMLABEL »

I'm in too. Thanks, B!!![&o]

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Sardaukar
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RE: Hypothetical Dec 7th

Post by Sardaukar »

Sounds good to me. [8D]
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