USN/RN Carrier Operations: Operating Procedures

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

If I recall correctly didn't the RN have several light CV's sent to the Pacific simply to keep up with the aircraft repairs that the fleet CV's couldn't handle? HMS Unicorn was one I believe. Were there any others? [&:]

warspite1

In December 1944 within TF117 (the Fleet Train) HMS Unicorn was a purpose-built maintenance carrier used for that purpose. There were also two repair ships - Resource and Artifex

A number of CVE were used as ferries, taking replacement aircraft to and from Australia/ the fleet and to provide CAP to the Fleet Train. There were 8 in the Pacific by VJ day - 4 of which sailed to Australia at the start of 1945 - Slinger, Speaker, Striker and Fencer.

4 Light Fleet carriers were also in the Pacific by the end of the war - but I think none of them saw any action.

[armouredcarriers]

Hi there
Very civilised thread.

RN carrier doctrine sought to remove heavy maintenance and repair from its armoured carriers.

It envisaged the construction of three dedicated 'aircraft auxiliaries, or aircraft tenders' - one for every three armoured carriers - to do that job, as well as act as a spare flight deck with some defensive support: The Unicorn class.

In essence they were the carrier equivalent to destroyer tenders, submarine tenders etc.

Only one Unicorn was built (war changed priorities), but two Colossus class light fleet carriers were completed with that purpose in mind.

It was a very different doctrine to the USN which always envisaged fighting in the broad expanse of the Pacific.

The RN was gearing up to fight while under a constant umbrella of land-based aircraft in the Med and North Sea. The Unicorn was a 'nod' for the need for deployable support facilities in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

[armouredcarriers]

A quick note on the Fulmar

It wasn't a derivative of the Fairy Battle, though you will often read this in books.
It was a derivative of a much lighter and faster prototype built by Fairy for a RAF requirement for a fast bomber (which it abandoned).

The RAF had thought the Skua dive bomber would be enough of a fighter, given the outcome of wargames showing carrier fighters to be almost useless in the 1930s. They simply could not respond fast enough given the visual detection ranges against modern fast bombers. The bombers always finished their attack runs before the fighters could do anything about it.

In 1938 the RN vetoed this and initiated an 'emergency' fleet fighter program. They wanted a long range escort fighter to protect their bombers with a secondary reconnaissance role (not interceptor). Long range meant the need for a navigator in an era before effective homing beacons (and in the weather of the North Atlantic - something most Pacific minded commentators tend to forget)
The Fairy prototype offered a fast track to a heavily armed, well protected and heavily gunned (for the time) escort fighter.

When the Fulmar entered service in 1940 it was the most advanced carrier aircraft in the world. It had folding wings, pilot armour and self-sealing fuel tanks. But it also had a poor climb rate and barely adequate speed.
Radar meant it was suddenly pressed into a role it was not designed for: Interception.
The advantages of radar fighter direction overcame most of the Fulmar's deficiencies in 1940/41, making it the FAA fighter with the most kills for WW2. By 1942, however, it was falling behind.
In 1940 the USN still had the F3F 'flying barrel' biplane - because the Buffalo was a failure and the Wildcat was still being developed. The USN at this stage was also grappling with the problem of making carrier fighters worth the space they occupied.


Eventually the Wildcat was brought up to RN specifications with pilot armour, folding wings and self-sealing tanks (earlier versions were relegated to training units as they were deemed unsuitable for combat).
As the Wildcat had better development potential, the Fulmar emergency program was deemed to have done its job and the RN's hopes placed in the upcoming Firebrand and Firefly.
Development of both these aircraft was severely curtailed due to the Battle of Britain fighter emergency program (where all resources were diverted to building and developing just a few aircraft types - FAA aircraft not among them).
Also, the major FAA facility at Coventry was flattened by the Luftwaffe, another major setback for the FAA.

[armouredcarriers]

A quick note on fighter direction

The RN had a handful of cruisers with new air warning radars when war broke out in September 1939.
The old cruiser HMS Curlew had been converted as an AA cruiser. She immediately proved how effective radar could be, offering early warning to ships at sea in the North Sea as well as the base of Scapa Flow.

Soon HMS Sheffield was unofficially passing on its radar detections to HMS Ark Royal (via semaphore and flags, radio silence orders were still in effect).
Aboard HMS Ark Royal was Lieutenant Commander Charles Coke.
Using his own initiative, he took over a corner of the wireless office with a portable plot board.
He would calculate intercepts and transmit the details to the carrier's fighters via morse code (only if the captain gave him permission to break radio silence).
It proved so effective other carriers and ships began 'unofficially' using this technique.

The idea very rapidly evolved and improved.
Coke was quickly promoted and sent to the FAA airfield of Yeovilton to set up a new 'fighter direction school' to explore and teach the new technique.
By 1941 carriers such as HMS Victorious were being fitted out with rudimentary "Fighter direction offices". These would later evolve into the CIC (USN) and AIO (RN).

The first big test of radar fighter direction was Operation Pedestal. The air groups of three fleet carriers were sucessfully coordinated over the course of several days against some 784 German and Italian aircraft, with only one merchant damaged (Yes, HMS Eagle was torpedoed and HMS Indomitable was bombed, but it was still a dramatically under-sung fighter success).
Only after Force H withdrew under the shadow of Sicily was the convoy decimated.

[armouredcarriers]

The point is, the USN was keen to learn from Britain's lessons of war
More than keen, it largely bypassed bureaucracy and 'sticks in the mud' to implement many of these lessons before having to re-learn them itself.

From September 1939 to December 1941, the RN was the only carrier fleet gaining real world experience versus the wargaming of the 1930s.
Many classified RN reports were handed over to the USN - such as HMS Illustrious' gunnery report for what was one of the very first mass dive bomber attacks on a major warship in January 1941.
Japan received similar reports from the Germans and Italians. They even sent delegations to Italy to learn about RN carrier activities.
The USN went so far as to illegally (under the neutrality act) place observers aboard ships such as HMS Illustrious to observe developments through the eyes of people trained in their own doctrine.

The result was that, by December 1941, the USN had already learnt from RN experience that it needed bigger, better AA guns. So it chose the Bofors.
It knew radar was a game-changer. So it took what it could from the British and urgently improved and developed the technology.
The USN also had the vibrant US industry to back it.
Britain, however, was still under submarine and air blockade: The Battle of the Atlantic had not been won. So mass production of just about anything was difficult.
And often the RN had the radar sets and new AA guns - but the ships were so urgently needed fighting in the Arctic, North Atlantic, North Sea, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean that these would sit in dockyards for months waiting for a cruiser to return for an unavoidable refit (or battle damage repair) before it could be fitted.

By the time the BPF was being formed, most of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's fastest and best oilers etc had been lost fighting in the Med and North Atlantic.
After five years of war they had to make do with what they had - a ragtag fleet of whatever they could scrounge from around the empire and European allies.
It proved sufficient. But by no means easy.

[geofflambert]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

Hi there
Very civilised thread.

Who you calling civilized? I'm a frigging gorn.

[Buckrock]

If you're THE armouredcarriers of that website,

then thank you for such a superb online resource on the RN's carrier force.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

The result was that, by December 1941, the USN had already learnt from RN experience that it needed bigger, better AA guns. So it chose the Bofors.

warspite1

Just started reading the chapter on Iceberg II. The 20mm Oerlikons were not up to the job when it came to Kamikazes. They could not break up the attacking aircraft like the 40mm bofors - as Formidable and Victorious found out....

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

After five years of war they had to make do with what they had - a ragtag fleet of whatever they could scrounge from around the empire and European allies.
It proved sufficient. But by no means easy.

warspite1

Yes Hobbs brings this out very clearly and they still relied on a healthy dose of help from the USN in certain areas.

But given the circumstances, I think what was achieved in getting the BPF to the Pacific in the time they did was pretty damn impressive - Nimitz and Spruance were certainly grateful for the small but effective contribution, regardless of what King might have thought.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

Development of both these aircraft was severely curtailed due to the Battle of Britain fighter emergency program (where all resources were diverted to building and developing just a few aircraft types - FAA aircraft not among them).

Also, the major FAA facility at Coventry was flattened by the Luftwaffe, another major setback for the FAA.

warspite1

Yes, its these kind of things that are easily forgotten or not realised. The FAA was small in 1939. New carriers were coming down the track, but the much needed expansion of the FAA was not helped by the life and death struggle that was the Battle of Britain. Work on the last two of the six armoured carriers then had to be halted because other work took priority.

[armouredcarriers]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

If you're THE armouredcarriers of that website,

then thank you for such a superb online resource on the RN's carrier force.

Yeah, thanks

Squarespace shows up some of the sites my articles are being linked from.
If it's a forum with a worthwhile discussion, I sometimes dip in.

I got frustrated at never finding more than two or three sentences on any of these events or issues in even the most lauded naval history tomes.
Regrettably, even this was often copied from an earlier book that got it wrong.
The winner gets to write the history books. The loser doesn't. Those that got 2nd place simply get ignored.

So I dug up some of the archival material, scrounged up as many first-person accounts as I could and did it myself.

I strongly recommend reading the transcripts of those original damage / action reports.
Much more revealing than any interpretation.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

I strongly recommend reading the transcripts of those original damage / action reports.
Much more revealing than any interpretation.

After witnessing in the past several online bun-fights (elsewhere) over the worth of the Brit armored flight decks, I found your site and read the Med and Kamikaze reports. And I agree, those primary documents make an excellent study.

Still haven't picked a side yet for the next bun-fight though.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

If you're THE armouredcarriers of that website,

then thank you for such a superb online resource on the RN's carrier force.

Yeah, thanks

warspite1

Well - these are great sites. Why not try and get a book published?

[armouredcarriers]

The problem with such 'bun-fights' is that they're usually based on commonly propagated factually incorrect information (Slade and Worth's essays at Navweaps for example - and it's not entirely their fault: They used published books that copied each other's mistakes for the basis of their conclusions)

The bulk of such fights is based on speculation - which is largely pointless.
To remove some of that speculation, I am building my site. People can read it and make up their own minds.

The rest is just flag waving. I'm not from the UK or US. So that doesn't interest me much.

The fact is the only point of direct comparison is the Pacific as the RN armoured carriers fought there alongside the USN carriers.
The USN fleet carriers did not participate in actual fighting in the Arctic, North Atlantic or Mediterranean.
So their performance under those unique conditions can only be speculation.

IMHO each navy built the right ship for the job they needed them to do.
Those jobs happened to be very different.
And their war records demonstrate this.

[sstevens06]

To armouredcarriers: I want to echo Buckrock's compliment for your fine website. It is clearly well researched and a pleasure to read.

[Anachro]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

I got frustrated at never finding more than two or three sentences on any of these events or issues in even the most lauded naval history tomes.

I eagerly await your research on the Taiho...and will read the rest of the site thanks to this thread.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

The problem with such 'bun-fights' is that they're usually based on commonly propagated factually incorrect information (Slade and Worth's essays at Navweaps for example - and it's not entirely their fault: They used published books that copied each other's mistakes for the basis of their conclusions)

The bulk of such fights is based on speculation - which is largely pointless.
To remove some of that speculation, I am building my site. People can read it and make up their own minds.

The rest is just flag waving. I'm not from the UK or US. So that doesn't interest me much.

The fact is the only point of direct comparison is the Pacific as the RN armoured carriers fought there alongside the USN carriers.
The USN fleet carriers did not participate in actual fighting in the Arctic, North Atlantic or Mediterranean.
So their performance under those unique conditions can only be speculation.

IMHO each navy built the right ship for the job they needed them to do.
Those jobs happened to be very different.
And their war records demonstrate this.

warspite1

I 100% agree on the 'bun-fight' aspect. Sure, most(?) people have a pride in their country and take a degree of comfort in knowing that they were the best, fastest, strongest or whatever - or at least weren't the 'bad guys'. And that can be fine to a point - so long as it doesn't blind people to the truth, stop them being objective and get in the way of a rounded understanding.

Personally, I am not a very technically minded person. The technical details of British armoured carriers vs USN non-armoured is interesting to me - only to a point, the minutiae I can live without.

Of far more interest - and this is where this thread came in - is the understanding of the development of carriers (not just the armoured type) and their aircraft and the roles expected of them in each navy. This interest stems from looking at the carrier forces engaged at Midway in 1942 (by both sides) and the use of British carriers in the Mediterranean from 1940. Two years apart - Calabria to Midway - but seemingly a world away in terms of hardware and operating procedures (doctrine).

Its only when looking at the big picture - the economies, the world position, the onset of war in 1939 - does the story even begin to make sense. And like just about everything in World War II, the subject is fascinating.

[warspite1]

So there are at least two excellent books that concentrate on the British Pacific Fleet. Does the USN 3rd and 5th Fleets have something similar?

To be clear I am looking for something that concentrates solely on USN carrier operations in the Pacific - ideally from 1943-45 and that describes not just the combat operations but also the build up of the support services and how the USN got on top of the logistics of taking the war to Japan over the vast expanse of the Pacific.

In short I am looking for The Forgotten Fleet or The British Pacific Fleet US-stylee.

Do/does such tome(s) exist?

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: armouredcarriers

The fact is the only point of direct comparison is the Pacific as the RN armoured carriers fought there alongside the USN carriers.

And I've seen that used somewhat unfairly in online discussions, particularly late war when the USN was at its peak and with the right tools for that particular job while the BPF was at full stretch while using tools better suited for elsewhere. But as you said, it is the only real point of comparison.

Unless it's been added already and I've missed it, do you have any plans in the near future to do an account of TF 37? The BPF AC TF operations directly alongside those of TF 38 would allow a really good comparison of where RN and USN carrier task force operations were at by the war's close.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

So there are at least two excellent books that concentrate on the British Pacific Fleet. Does the USN 3rd and 5th Fleets have something similar?

To be clear I am looking for something that concentrates solely on USN carrier operations in the Pacific - ideally from 1943-45 and that describes not just the combat operations but also the build up of the support services and how the USN got on top of the logistics of taking the war to Japan over the vast expanse of the Pacific.

In short I am looking for The Forgotten Fleet or The British Pacific Fleet US-stylee.

Do/does such tome(s) exist?

warspite1

No one heard of anything like this? I looked on Amazon and couldn't see anything either. That's a real shame - there's a gap in the market and a great story to be told here.