Russian replacements... ~150k per turn?

[RKhan]

WW2 re-fought in a blog.

Will there be books and diagrams one day? Will historians debate the real motives and possibilities? Will there be simulations to decide if one camp could have won out over the other, if only one post had gone the other way?

Will MichaelT and Pelton write memoirs defending their choices once WITE1 is over? Who will care write the counter argument as to why RFC was bound to win anyway?

[:)]

[Michael T]

Just another day at the front [:)]

[RedLancer]

ORIGINAL: morvael

ORIGINAL: Red Lancer
My post was not an implied criticism of WitE but rather to highlight differences between the systems.

No offence was taken, I never thought about yout post as criticism [:)]

By the way, I wonder if completely different disabled return rates allow higher casualties per battle in WitE2. In WitE1 a man is basically lost if he becomes disabled. As you know from the books we both read it's more realistic when losses AND returns are higher, leading to quick exhaustion of units that fight a lot, but they should eventually rebound if given some pause. As loki100's end-of-turn total losses comparison revealed difference between the two games is much smaller than in the battle example you have provided. So both games may be closer in total losses than per-battle losses, of which greater part in WitE2 must be temporary.

I think that they are even more different than we might yet suspect. As Loki100 has posted (and we both have seen the AARs first hand) he is avoiding combat to maintain prep points and reduce logistic drag so his losses will be lower. Any comparison may need to include a number of battles factor.

We both know that the current disabled / loss system is difficult to compare to historical evidence. I agree that changes in this area could be beneficial but worry that balancing without a full test team could frustrate the community.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: Red Lancer
...

I think that they are even more different than we might yet suspect. As Loki100 has posted (and we both have seen the AARs first hand) he is avoiding combat to maintain prep points and reduce logistic drag so his losses will be lower. Any comparison may need to include a number of battles factor.

..

I don't have the saves from my game with Stef any more but on the WiTE2 test the T6 losses were generated off a total of 28 combats (5 were Soviet attacks). Some of these were trivial such as brushing aside a fortified zone. For various reasons (incl the prep point issue) I am finding that WiTE2 has less actual combat - not least there is a real cost to making a non-essential attack that I think will have a large impact on gameplay.

But a good eg of the differences was an attack by a German infantry division on a surrounded (and cut off) Soviet rifle division. As expected the Soviets were beaten and surrendered - I lost >1,000 men. Unusual in that similar battles usually cost the attacker 4-500 but indicative of the way things are changing

ORIGINAL: Michael T

Giving the Russians the German/English/Americans logistics system is simply not historical in the least

But this is every Red Fanboi's dream and reality in WITE 1.0

It would be simply outrageous to suggest WITE 2.0 should reflect realistic logistical constraints for the Soviets, why those kind of rules should only hinder the Germans...

I fully agree with you, the two armies should face different (and realistic) logistical challenges. At the moment, we've only really seen 1941 and the issue is the Germans have plenty of supply (but its in Poland and the battlelines are east of the Dneipr), the Soviets have a global shortage so need to prioritise. Thats a good start, sure it will be refined, tested and developed.

There are already logical reasons to hold sectors steady while you attack elsewhere. Again I agree with you this has been a weakness in WiTE (and as the game moves forward has been something that benefits both sides unrealistically at different phases of the game).

I also fully agree with you that both sides tend to field ahistoric armies (over-strength combat formations, disbands etc). Two partial solutions are already in WiTE2 - combat costs (even if you win) and replacements are hard to gain near the front (as they compete with supply/ammo/fuel). This should see more ground down formations if you keep them locked into the front line and a need to prioritise the allocation of scarce resources.

I'm indifferent about your argument for a historical Soviet OOB. The indifference is not a matter of thinking either is better/worse (never mind right or wrong) but simply that the optimising in WiTE1 has come out of emerging gameplay norms (for both sides). Eg German players over-prepare (compared to reality) fortified fall back lines, the Soviet player over-recruits sapper style SUs to compensate. I'd like to see more of a reason to raise and use the full range of SUs and at that stage the debate between locking the Soviets into a historical OOB or not becomes less important. What then matters is variable industrial and manpower capacity to fill out those shells.

So on that basis, can we drop:

ORIGINAL: Michael T

There is a long history of animosity here between the Red Fanboi's and some others. It goes back years, it's like war now with a no prisoners approach. There is no chance for peace and to be honest I don't want it. They undermined any chance for making WITE 1.0 fair and balanced. They will attempt to pervert WITE 2.0 as well.

...

as a means to discuss the game developments?

[chaos45]

ICE- support to Soldier at the front was very different between armies and even changed somewhat as the war progressed.

Western Allies lots and lots of support troops per man at the front something like 4-6+:1

Germans at war start were something like 4-5:1 but as manpower shortages hit and they needed more riflemen think they got it down to like 3-4:1 for latewar.

Soviets were higher initially not sure as exact numbers but one thing most sources state is due to basically forcing more hardship on the standard infantryman the soviets averaged something like a 2:1 ratio....meaning that not only did they put more men in the field more of them were actually in the battle line than any other nation.

The Hardships the Soviet Soldier endured were much worse than those of any other nations infantrymen really, you can read many accounts of German officers and Soldiers commenting about how Soviet Soldiers held onto ground in terrible conditions that they didnt feel any other nations troops would stay in or cling to.

You also read those same German officers talking about how German Soldiers needed to be better trained to deal with hardship before being sent to the Eastern front as often times they would need to survive in very crappy conditions they weren't used to....which in turned caused more attrition from injuries and sickness---this is straight out of the reports coming from lessons learned by German general from the first year in Russia.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: chaos45

...

Soviets were higher initially not sure as exact numbers but one thing most sources state is due to basically forcing more hardship on the standard infantryman the soviets averaged something like a 2:1 ratio....meaning that not only did they put more men in the field more of them were actually in the battle line than any other nation.

The Hardships the Soviet Soldier endured were much worse than those of any other nations infantrymen really, you can read many accounts of German officers and Soldiers commenting about how Soviet Soldiers held onto ground in terrible conditions that they didnt feel any other nations troops would stay in or cling to.

....

There is a good eyewitness account of the Soviet logistical tail in 1944 from Fitzroy MacLean's Eastern Approaches. He had been the British military attache in Moscow in 1936-7 (ie a spy) and the first part of his book is a really good insight into the realities and idiocies of the Soviet show trails. In 1942 he was parachuted into Yugoslavia by the SOE and fought alongside Tito's partisans (post war he became the Conservative MP for Lancaster but that is really off the issue).

He recorded seeing the Soviets move up to the fighting around Belgrade and counting trucks/contents. He saw no trucks going to the front with food, they all carried ammo/fuel and all the ones that came back were full of the wounded. So in effect the Red Army was living off the land - he actually notes instances were Tito's troops shared food with the Soviets.

His point in the book is to contrast this with the western allies who he claims (and I guess its true) had landed 10 dentist chairs in Normandy within days of the main landings.

You can see his point but I think I know which army I'd rather been part of [;)]

[BrianG]

I am finding some very heavy Russian kia's in lost battles lately.

I think a couple of battles with over 10K between wounded and kia.

So I think later game is reflecting better weapons?

These are from my latest observations from my Pelton match.

[morvael]

Maybe the Germans counter-attacked after your failed attack?

[morvael]

ORIGINAL: loki100

You can see his point but I think I know which army I'd rather been part of [;)]

[:)]

In WitE Soviet men and Hiws eat less - 16 lbs vs 21 lbs (if I remember the numbers correctly). But perhaps this is way too much

[Flaviusx]

Go away on vacation for a few days and this forum goes to hell, lol.

MT, thing is, while I own up to my biases I do not believe you are seeing yours. And I ain't no stinking spiritual leader of nobody.

Look, if you're really worried about Red Army fanboys wrecking the game, the solution is simple enough: join the testing team. Bring your own views into play. Personally, I would welcome variety here and believe the game could only improve. At the very least, this helps combat groupthink. (Which I think is a real thing, unlike your alleged Red Army conspiracy theory of game design.)

Yeah, this is harder work than this peanut gallery stuff you're doing here, but that's why they pay testers the big bucks!

[RedLancer]

MT's on the list now I know that he is interested in joining the team. Not sure when we'll be adding more testers though.

[Michael T]

I will be there. I was cranky yesterday.

[Icier]

Maybe you should read this....

Joseph Stalin supposedly claimed that “quantity has a quality all its own,” justifying a cannon-fodder mentality and immense casualties. The problem is, Stalin never actually said that, but it fits our stereotype about the Russian military so neatly that everyone believes he did.

When it comes to war, Russia is commonly perceived as favoring quantity over quality and winning mainly by overwhelming its opponents with hordes of poorly trained soldiers. You can hardly find any account of Russia’s wars that does not use terms like “hordes,” “masses,” and even “Neolithic swarms.” Quantity, it is believed, made quality almost irrelevant.

German generals propagated the myth of a Red Army comprised of faceless masses of troops, motivated only by NKVD rifles at their backs and winning only through sheer force of numbers. Many Western histories accept this view, and it is standard fare in Hollywood, notably in the 2001 Enemy at the Gates. The story was also standard fare during the Cold War, when the intelligence community frequently overestimated the quantitative side of Soviet capabilities while belittling its quality.

True, some analysts argued for a more nuanced approach. For instance, Michael Handel in 1981 wrote that “To claim that the USSR is emphasizing quantity over quality in military equipment is to foster a dangerous misconception” [emphasis in the original]. We also know that the “missile gap” and “bomber gap” were artifacts of faulty intelligence analysis.

However, when you crunch the numbers, it turns out that Russian superiority has not been as great as most people believe. In fact during World War II, the U.S. Army often had about the same numerical advantage over its enemies as did the Red Army. A better understanding of the past might shift our perceptions of the present.

Force Ratios

Some German sources and popular histories claim that the Red Army outnumbered the Wehrmacht by ten to one or even twenty to one. The numbers do not support those claims. In When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, David Glantz and Jonathan House provide authoritative data on ratios of active forces on the Eastern Front. This table offers a sample of that data:

Comparative-Strengths1

The Red Army was outnumbered by Axis forces in 1941 at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. Soviet mobilization efforts and steady German losses began to change the force ratios in 1942, but the Red Army only had a roughly 2:1 advantage from February 1943 until mid-1944 before maxing out at a little over 4: 1 at the very end of the war.

Here’s another way of looking at the force ratios. The Red Army in the field actually peaked in size in mid-1943, but the ratios continued to shift in its favor due to Germany’s inability to replace losses. The Red Army didn’t keep getting bigger, but it maintained its size while the Wehrmacht steadily lost ground, literally and figuratively.

Pennington1

A 2:1 advantage is significant, but falls short of the 3:1 force ratio that is generally regarded as necessary for attacking forces, and it’s a long way from the double-digit advantage that is often claimed. Both sides were able to temporarily achieve greater numerical advantages in certain times and places by concentrating forces.

What about force ratios at the Battle of Stalingrad, which has been the focus of so much attention? It turns out there are some surprises here, too. During the defensive phase of urban warfare (August through mid-November 1942), the Red Army was outnumbered about 1.6:1. The Red Army reversed the odds in its counteroffensive in November 1942, achieving about a 2:1 advantage during Operation Uranus.

Military Manpower

What’s interesting is that the Soviet Union was not able to draw on a bottomless well of recruits to achieve these ratios. The Soviet Union had a larger population than Germany in 1939 — about twice as large. But the Soviet Union that fought World War II was not the Soviet Union of 1939. In 1941 the Axis occupied about a third of Soviet territory where 45 percent of its population lived — nearly 90 million people out of 190 million. Some refugees fled the occupied zones. The best estimate is that 110 to 120 million people remained in the unoccupied areas of the Soviet Union. For nearly two years, the Soviets actually fought with a lower population base than the United States.

Comparative-Strengths2

Brute Force: Not Just RussiaBy the end of the war, the United States and the Soviet Union actually had just about the same size total military forces (12 million) and the same size armies (6 million). However, the Soviets mobilized more troops during the course of the war, nearly twice as many. They fought longer and had to replace far more casualties. They did it by stripping the civilian and agricultural workforces, which dropped by 40 to 60 percent.

Americans and their British comrades like to believe that while they won World War II in Europe with finesse, while the Soviets won with overwhelming brute force, but that simply is not true. In 1990, John Ellis wrote Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War in which he suggested that American, Russian, and British commanders alike “seemed unable to impose their will upon the enemy except by slowly and persistently battering him to death with a blunt instrument.”

Ellis detailed the advantages of the Allies. For example: once American troops began landing in North Africa in late 1942, the Allies quickly achieved rough parity with Axis forces, and by March 1943 had a 3:1 overall advantage in divisions in North Africa. The Allies had more divisions in Italy than the Axis from July 1943 until the end of the war, at times achieving a ratio there of 1.5:1.

The Allies achieved parity with Germany in number of divisions in Northwest Europe by September 1944. The ratio changed steadily in the Allies’ favor in 1945 to 2:1. At the Battle of the Bulge, the Allies were initially outnumbered nearly 1.8:1, but in less than ten days gained the upper hand in troops and a 4:1 advantage in tanks. Within the span of four weeks, the Allies reversed the troop ratio and attained an 11:1 advantage in tanks. The Allies also had quantitative superiority in the Pacific, where they had more divisions than the Japanese from late 1942 until the end of the war, achieving advantages of 1.5:1 in 1943, 2:1 in 1944, and 2.6:1 in mid-1945.

In short, the United States and the United Kingdom often had numerical superiority in World War II — and often in a similar ratio to that enjoyed by the Soviet Union.

Conclusions

Soviet numerical advantages in World War II were significant but not overwhelming. It rarely demonstrated the steamroller superiority of German myth and Hollywood hyperbole. When you crunch the numbers, it turns out that Russian superiority was not so great as is commonly believed.

The Red Army did attain numerical superiority on the Eastern Front. Slowly and at great cost, drawing on a smaller available population than that of the United States, it was able to gain a 2:1 advantage over the Axis by 1943 and a 4:1 edge in 1945. That’s a significant quantitative advantage, but not exactly a steamroller — and not much different from the brute force advantage the western Allies also enjoyed.

World War II has much to teach us. Debunking the myths of this war can improve our understanding of the military situation today. We might even avoid generating new myths based on old stereotypes.



Reina Pennington, PhD, teaches military and Russian history at Norwich University in Vermont. She is a former Air Force intelligence officer and Soviet analyst, and is presently working on a book entitled What Russia Can Teach Us About War.

The missing charts you will find on WAR ON THE ROCKS

[chaos45]

Your comments and finding are both right and wrong......

Casualties are why the Soviets never approached massive odds over the Germans. The exchange rate of German per Soviet killed/captured was very high in both 1941/1942. Even as the war ground on the exchange rate stayed in the Germans favor clear up till the end.

In all reality the exchange rate almost never fell below 2:1 in favor of the Germans and that was when everything was starting to tip in the Soviets favor at the very end year/months of the war.

So yes the Soviets barely maintained a 2:1 superiority overall because masses of their men were dying all the time is why.....the flip side of that coin though is they werent dying in vain because they were also taking Germans with them that the German Army had a much harder time replacing over the long term. Also helps that the Soviets used Women in many positions including some frontline combat posts which the Germans did not--thus increasing effective available manpower to the Soviet army.

Even at Stalingrad where the Germans supposedly outnumbered the soviets in stalingrad proper---at the same time massive and wasteful in lives Soviet counterattacks were hitting the north flank of the penetration to the city repeatedly over that time- Read Glantz's books on Stalingrad-- I know four massive tomes but very informative tomes on the battle IMO.

Thus is the struggle of the game, how to keep things historical when most Soviet commanders arent as willing to waste their men and equipment as the real soviet commanders were in futile attacks. You can even see this in the winter of 1941/42 Stalin attacked everywhere when his generals thought it would be smarter to concentrate on attacks in some areas and stay defensive in others to prepare for the summer of 1942 German movements. One of the Reasons the Soviets failed so bad early 1942 in the south was they had greatly overextended and battered their units by failed attacks against german positions and were in very poor shape to deal with a fresh German offensive.

Its why its tough for me to debate people on here because many of you are just starting to hit the tip of the iceberg on real research into the eastern front when I have been reading about it since High School some 20+ years ago lol.

In all reality germany lost WW2 once they attacked the Soviet Union short of the Soviets sueing for peace. As long as stalin could stay in power and not surrender it was only a matter of time until the German defeat in WW2. Study and hypo all you want thats just the plain facts of the war. Numbers were to far in the allies favor for the Axis to have a chance after 1941 short of one more of the major allies just giving up. As well once lend lease kicked in and the British/US basically vowed to do whatever possible to keep the Soviets in the war the chance of a Soviet surrender was probably non-existent after 1941.

So for game rule effects if the Germans cant get an auto win in 1941---which in all reality is probably something like- Leningrad/moscow/stalingrad as far as advances to force a complete collapse of the Soviet system the only win a German player can really hope for is making the war take longer than historical. An even then Im not sure that would have toppled Stalin at that point- so in a game would only be a % chance roll IMO. The Soviets were already prepared to evacuate Moscow- not to mention the blood bath any assault on Moscow Proper would have been for the German army in 41/42.

This isnt even bringing the A-bomb into the picture either....if Germans is still in the war longer than normal--my guess is the first A-bomb is dropped on Germany instead and german research was much to far behind to get one before the allies. As Germans were killing more allies than the Japanese and thus the Allies wanting to knock them out first.

What many people forget is economics factor massively into WW2 and why the Axis lost. They simply didnt have as much economic power as the Allies and what they did have they used extremely poorly-- in effects most of the axis allies contributed far below what they should have.....not to mention how poorly administrated/integrated the conquered territory was to the German economy. Basically initially Germany had no plan to do anything other than pillage their allies/conquered lands and when they realized they couldnt win the war fast they had to design a plan from scratch to use them effectively--this after killing and deporting large portions of the population--made for extremely poor war economy choices. Thus another massive nail in the German war machines coffin.

[loki100]

be a wee bit cautious in your conclusion or you'll repeat the mistake of a couple of other regulars. You are, I think, absolutely right about the economics and the nature of the mid-20c warfare was that it was simply a trade off between capacity to produce or destroy industrial production. And, simply, there is no way could Germany have won that dynamic.

I do think the Soviet state came very close to collapse on two occasions. One was after the opening blows of Typhoon and the other was in early summer 1942 - note I say 'Soviet state' not Russia's capacity to resist.

At the first crisis point the Communist Party fell apart as an instrument of state control. Remember that the USSR was run partly as an administrative entity (committees, regional organisations, govt depts and so on) and partly by filtering all this through the CP. By Nov 41 something like 80% of party members were in the armed forces and that secondary (but key) state fell apart as a result. At the second crisis point there was a loss of belief - in particular a lot of people had made a pact with the devil in their approach to Stalin's regime. At its core, they accepted his assertion that all the cruelty etc was a consequence of the necessity for the state to survive. The second wave of defeats broke this unwritten pact - Grossman's novel Life and Fate captures this very well.

Now those who argue that Germany *could* have won need to convince that Germany could have done better at these two stages than it really did. Its not enough to say that Germany could have made all the gains it did and more - if it had made no mistakes. Which is fundamentally why I come back to a view that the war was unwinnable for the Germans. But that is not to say there weren't moments when the Soviet regime could have fallen.

[chaos45]

As I said a % chance if area loss is catastrophic enough. Even then I think its unlikely due to the "Strong man" situation in Russia. The purge for all intense and purposes destroyed anyone that could replace Stalin and no War hero by that time had the umpf to yet. Maybe Zhukov later on but by then the war was going well.

Same problem the Germans had with trying to take down Hitler with the plot- not only did they need Hitler gone but someone popular enough to step in to the vacuum. Which is why I believe Rommel was probably involved as he was probably being set up to lead if it succeeded. Also doubt the Hitler would have had him killed without enough credible evidence from somewhere probably lost in the fires of the end of the war. As Rommel get to where he did due to his association with Hitler in the early years of war. Its one reason alot of his fellow generals didnt like him much as he wasnt one of "them"

Also in all realism the 1942 situation- was brought on by the Soviets themselves- it wasnt a miracle of German military might...they had simply Bled themselves out and primed their entire southern front for an easy German reversal that summer. Something a player wouldnt really do but the NM effects basically force into the game as has been discussed.

As I said its the balancing act of making the game playable and enjoyable for both sides yet being realistic and giving options to both players. In real life the Soviets basically did the worst job they possibly could and still won the war.....that to me says alot about the Germans chances if the soviets have even moderately better leadership at the top.

The game basically enforces soviet stupidity by making their units pathetically weak due to NM...and ease of defeat in combat allowing the germans to drive wherever they want more or less in the early years of the war. It kinda works once both players understand how the system works---

-basically Soviets in 41/42 are playing to only limit German movement and not lose to much instead of trying to actually fight the war.
-then NM changes in 43 and the Germans are playing the same game.

To me the NM changes swing the game to much in both sides favor- way to good for the Germans 41/42 esp when lack of losses are figured and the player knows how to play them.....then it gives the soviets super edge over historical from 43 on provided the soviet player knows how to use what they have.

[Aditia]

This is starting to get really off-topic, but I do remember reading in Anthony Beevor's excellent 'Stalingrad' that the Soviet regime was seriously considering a negotiated peace (in 1941?), but the person that they contacted to act as an intermediate refused, stating that they were convinced the Soviets would win. I don't remember what source Beevor used and I cannot look it up as the book is back home in Holland.

edit: removing politics

[EwaldvonKleist]

When you look how the war went on you have to look who made the biggest mistakes in organisation and strategy.
In the beginning the soviets made more of them, like the kiev encirclement or units being to big and complex for post-purge commanders. In a realistic game this means that a soviet player who avoids those mistakes will do better then history during barbarossa.
Later on, the germans (and especially Hitler) made the mistake-Stalingrad, Kursk, not shortening the fronts, the Stalingrad grinding, near-encirclements like Korsun etc.
So in a realistic game which starts in mid 1942, the german player will resist much longer then May 1945, maybe even to the point where soviets run dry on manpower to some extent.
This being said i don't believe in the possibility of German victory aka conquest of Leningrad Moscow Stalingrad Baku maybe Kubyshew. On the other hand I also believe that the germans could have hold out longer then historical without major strategic mistakes (I believe the possibility such a victory in case of total war in Germany since 1940 though).

To make it short: G doing better in 1941 is hard because even more soviet mistakes needed (like another kiev encirclement->400 000 less Red soldiers in the end of 1941 or so) while germany doing everything right. So vicory possible but only german expert vs soviet newbie.
G doing better 1943-1945 is easy without big mistakes like Stalingrad even if soviets do everything right.


@chaos45: According to GEO Epoche "Stalin", a germa historical magazine, there were moments when Stalin's subordinates had the chance to at least arrest/kill him after during the first weeks. If Stalin is dead somebody would have followed him, the question is whether he had the authority to kee the country under control.

@chaos: Agree with you on the losses/numerical superiority thing. They could have done better but if you have 4 to 1 replacements superiority you can have a 3 to 1 ratio and still win.

@chaos: I agree about economic power and poor organisation of production, conquered territory and the people living there, army (OKH vs OKW as an example) etc. On the other hand they were extremely good on low level organisation and got better results with equal ressources then all of their allied counterparts (Sources: Dupuy, Martin van Crefeld). Therefore it was not impossible to win with the given basic ressources (men, land, industry and raw materials) in the beginning because it is possible to win with less if you use it better. But german strategic mistakes worked against this.

[No idea]

ORIGINAL: Michael T

Even though the problem affects both sides, its should be quite obvious, due to results shown in AAR's that the issue is more a problem on the Soviet side. Blind freddy can see that. Part of the problem, from day one is that the developers have been unduly influenced by impartial views. So, as predicted years ago by players like Pelton, myself and many others who left the scene we are left with a game inherently flawed. It has a massive bias toward Soviet only players.

For those who play both sides or German only we are left with a hiding to nothing post 42.

I surly hope for something better come WITE 2.0

We need some objective and impartial input. Not the constant Red eyed view we get here.

Keep that up and you will end up with more of the same. A walk over rather than a contest, and subsequently many less players willing to go the distance as German.

If you want a fully realistic operational game about the East Front there is nothing you can do about the soviets being stronger, especially in the long run.

Of course, I agree that always "losing" as Germany if confronted by a similar skill player is not fun.

To fix this "flaw" I think that high strategic level decisions should be something intoduced in wite 2. Example: what if Hitler hadnt dowed the usa? Perhaps then the soviets wouldnt have gotten so much lend lease. (Of course, every decision should have some drawbacks)
What if the attitude towards native population would have been friendlier? These and similar sort of decisions could level the disparity of forces a bit without artificially empowering Germany (or making the SU weaker) to give us a funnier game (a game where the german player has a chance to win even if playing against a similarly skilled opponent)

Just my two cents

[Aditia]

Going to try and make a positive contribution to this thread (Same as No idea who posted earlier[:)] )

- First of all, this is a game. From my experience, people playing games like these are often intelligent and like the competition of pitting brain against brain and are competitive with a desire to win
- So, to make the game successful as a game, rather than just a simulation, when 2 players of equal skill meet each other, the balance of winning or losing needs to be close and provide a certain measure of satisfaction/excitement.

IMHO, from reading AARs and playing the game, the game's core mechanics are mostly very sound and entertaining (the first engine that persuaded me to move away from John Tiller games); it is the win conditions and consequently scenario design that needs the most improvement.
Pelton's AARs provide a very good reference point as he plays so many games. The core issue seems to be:

Win condition for the Axis player seems to be that it is necessary to be against an opponent that cocks up the first campaigning season, otherwise it is a draw or a loss. Something seems fundamentally wrong there..
Pelton's AAR vs Smokindave is a very good example; he manages an advance that goes insanely far east, but the game still ends in a draw, with the last bunch of turns just a slow grind towards Berlin (@ Pelton/Smokindave: apart from the distinguished achievement of playing all the turns in the GC and playing all the way to the Urals and back to Berlin, was the end game fun? It didn't look fun...)

I am not a game designer, but the following should be valid considerations to make the feel of the game in the sense of winning/losing better:

- Make sure scenario design is such that events that unfold in 1942/1943 (which seems the most exciting period of the game) have a major impact on the game's outcome. One can think of (dynamic) auto victory conditions other than the VC260 campaign.
- As was discussed somewhere else, make morale/OOB changes more dynamic. It's going to be hard to get this right though, as so very few games go the distance.. I am not sure if there was already a change made to German TOE changes; I read something by Morvael but I forgot what it said.
- Give the German player that meets certain conditions in the game the option to create more divisions, especially foreign divisions. (which seems realistic to me; if the war is going very well, and armaments is keeping up, it would seem not overly unhistoric to me that more foreign SS divisions can be created: I don't know if there has been good historical research done into the reasons why Europeans joined the Waffen SS, but it seems clear to me that it is much easier to join a 'winner'; that is basic human psychology.). You could even make off-map manpower centres (Western European cities) dynamic based on the current ratio in victory points

My 2 Cents.