Tank and afv attrition

[BrianG]

Tanks should attrite based on miles driven on the map.

More they go, the higher they should break down.

I doubt this is happening in my game versus silly.

The weekly 'refresh' based on Morale is way too lenient. Tanks have no morale.
Only mechanics and the laws of friction.

[Michael T]

Losses in tanks and men is way too low for both sides.

[sillyflower]

agreed

[morvael]

Tanks break down when moving.

But maybe the repair at the end of turn is too generous, no problem to bring it down a few points for next patch.

[Der Kuenstler]

I'm currently reading a book called "The Last Panther" in which the author, who actually fought on the East front, said that they needed to completely pull and replace their panther's engine and transmission every 800 kilometers (about 500 miles)! Apparently the road wear was astronomical.

[Great_Ajax]

Repair rate needs to be tied to the Supply% on hand. That's really how the German tank force dwindled in 1941 and the winter of 1942. Lack of repair parts making it to the front forced cannibalization of aircraft and ground vehicles.

Trey

ORIGINAL: morvael

Tanks break down when moving.

But maybe the repair at the end of turn is too generous, no problem to bring it down a few points for next patch.

[Walloc]

ORIGINAL: el hefe

Repair rate needs to be tied to the Supply% on hand. That's really how the German tank force dwindled in 1941 and the winter of 1942. Lack of repair parts making it to the front forced cannibalization of aircraft and ground vehicles.

Trey

ORIGINAL: morvael

Tanks break down when moving.

But maybe the repair at the end of turn is too generous, no problem to bring it down a few points for next patch.

While i understand ur reasoning Trey. i dont think its the whole story or should be. As u retreat either as russian or germans later on u by the nature of it. You retreat on to repaired rail lines and there for better supply compared to offensive opearions going far from supply lines.

If u tie supply and repair rates to tightly in WiTE1, WiTE2 it has to be determained, u end up with 43 44 germans retreating on to own supply lines having "perfect" conditions for repairs.
That isnt really in line with history. What is lost during for example the retreat of fall 43 compaired to march 43 through july, there is a very sharp decline in the repair state in the german panzerwaffen.

By mid 43 and the evidence is in the % repair rates past Kursk that the russian repair system has surpassed the german in efficiency. One of the things that has wondered historians is how 5 GTA for example after Kursk is reconstituded so fast. One reason is ofc replacement vehicles, but often overlooked is the ability with a month and half of rest for the army to repair its many damaged/"lost" vehicles.

Ofc the as the russians generally hold the territory unlike the germans it plays a part, but as retreat losses has generally been nerfed there isnt really a way other than time to show in WiTE1 the increased tank losses during retreats and highly mobile operations other than show a difference in repair abilities based on time.


So its not ur reasoning doesnt have merit one just have to agknowledge is that if all that matters for repair rates is supply, u dont really get the full flow of historic changes represented IMO. As the game engine functions. As it it alrdy seems to have to low tank losses in later periodes of the game.


Kind regards,
Rasmus

[Michael T]

I think combat losses in men is too low. I see combats involving 100,000 men and only 200 casualties. Not right.

[Great_Ajax]

No, it doesn't tell the whole story but it is a significant part. There were huge bonefields of scavenged tanks and aircraft just to keep a portion of the fleet operating. Who retains the battlefield after the battle should also play a role in that. An attacker who fails in an assault, should not be able to recover his damaged tanks and they should roll over to destroyed. A defender that gets pushed out should have a chance to lose his damaged vehicles by the same reasoning.

ORIGINAL: Walloc

ORIGINAL: el hefe

Repair rate needs to be tied to the Supply% on hand. That's really how the German tank force dwindled in 1941 and the winter of 1942. Lack of repair parts making it to the front forced cannibalization of aircraft and ground vehicles.

Trey

ORIGINAL: morvael

Tanks break down when moving.

But maybe the repair at the end of turn is too generous, no problem to bring it down a few points for next patch.

While i understand ur reasoning Trey. i dont think its the whole story or should be. As u retreat either as russian or germans later on u by the nature of it. You retreat on to repaired rail lines and there for better supply compared to offensive opearions going far from supply lines.

If u tie supply and repair rates to tightly in WiTE1, WiTE2 it has to be determained, u end up with 43 44 germans retreating on to own supply lines having "perfect" conditions for repairs.
That isnt really in line with history. What is lost during for example the retreat of fall 43 compaired to march 43 through july, there is a very sharp decline in the repair state in the german panzerwaffen.

By mid 43 and the evidence is in the % repair rates past Kursk that the russian repair system has surpassed the german in efficiency. One of the things that has wondered historians is how 5 GTA for example after Kursk is reconstituded so fast. One reason is ofc replacement vehicles, but often overlooked is the ability with a month and half of rest for the army to repair its many damaged/"lost" vehicles.

Ofc the as the russians generally hold the territory unlike the germans it plays a part, but as retreat losses has generally been nerfed there isnt really a way other than time to show in WiTE1 the increased tank losses during retreats and highly mobile operations other than show a difference in repair abilities based on time.


So its not ur reasoning doesnt have merit one just have to agknowledge is that if all that matters for repair rates is supply, u dont really get the full flow of historic changes represented IMO. As the game engine functions. As it it alrdy seems to have to low tank losses in later periodes of the game.


Kind regards,
Rasmus

[Great_Ajax]

This has already changed for WitE 2. Losses have definitely been increased.

Trey

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I think combat losses in men is too low. I see combats involving 100,000 men and only 200 casualties. Not right.

[Peltonx]

ORIGINAL: el hefe

Repair rate needs to be tied to the Supply% on hand. That's really how the German tank force dwindled in 1941 and the winter of 1942. Lack of repair parts making it to the front forced cannibalization of aircraft and ground vehicles.

Trey

ORIGINAL: morvael

Tanks break down when moving.

But maybe the repair at the end of turn is too generous, no problem to bring it down a few points for next patch.

Historically the fact of the matter is not logistics.

It was production, that crystal clear.

I agree with the periods of not enough supplies/fuel as per the facts on the ground aka CIA study.
But this is where allot of people miss the historical facts on the ground. By late July Germany simply had no replacements in
the pipe line to send east and Russia was equipping 5 million men all be it with not enough equipment, but still 5 million men.
The issue was not a lack of a logistics chain to get them to the front there simply were not enough parts or replacements being
produced.
Guardian asked for 450 Panzer engines by August 1st to fix broken down tanks for AGC and Hitler said you will have them, but
only 150 were shipped. Germany was still a peace time economy. The problem in 41 was not transportation is was production of
parts and training of men.

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... i4a07p.pdf

On paper the USSR had a total of 24,000 tanks on June 22 1941
10,650 were out of service for routine maintenance, 6,950 were undergoing major maintance (transmition/engine repairs)
leaving just 6,450 to face Germanys invasion.

That number fell quickly because Russia did not have a single armored recover vehicle do they were forced to leave behind 1000’s of vehicles.

Also Russian repair sucked as they lacked parts. How 2by3 can tie AFV repair
rates to Supply % when there are no parts ect seems Middle Earth.

[Peltonx]

Trey I have a few questions about 2.0

1. On paper the USSR had a total of 24,000 tanks on June 22.
10,650 were out of service for routine maintenance, 6,950 were undergoing major maintance (transmition/engine repairs) leaving just 6,450 to face Germanys invasion. That number fell quickly because Russia did not have a single armored recover vehicle do they were forced to leave behind 1000’s of vehicles. Will this be reflexed during turn 1-3?
2. 2.0 is centered around depots. Historiclly some 200+ depots were captured intact by the Germans by July 10th . Will there be any special rules that does not let the Russian player simply disband these depots during the first 3 weeks?
3. As I have stated as far as AGN goes will it reflex history? AGN captured a bridge over the Luga near Kinisepp on July 13th or turn 3 or 4 by game time. We also know supplies were being delivered by rail 40 miles east of Poskv. Directive 21 and other leading up to 22nd states Leningrad as the #1 objective of the operation.

[BrianG]

When sillyflower marches 2/3 of his tank army southeast to Baku from Rostov distance,
during March thru June 42, (I assume the tanks were not flatbedded),
then the distance should determine decline rates and repair separate.

If the tank's had never moved, the decline should be near nil.

Also tank movement mp in mud must be increased. Or fatigue really super increased for tank movement in mud

imo

[Great_Ajax]

I believe the problem is a combination of things to include logistics. You are correct in that Germany had not engaged in the wartime economy and so parts production was not up to task. The logistics supply chain was also at the breaking point both at the strategic level (trains) and at the operational level (trucks). Even the supplies that were getting stocked at Army Group depots had problems getting to the field due to the rapidly dwindling amount of trucks that were available to move freight from the depots to the units in the field. By August, the Wehrmacht had lost some 40% of its transport (trucking) capacity due to lack of spare parts and with the numerous makes and models used from throughout Europe.

Tying repair rates to supply on hand (representing replacement parts) is something that I have supported for some time now. I also feel that low % of trucks on hand in units should impact the resupply rate of the individual units even if they are "in supply".

To answer your other questions. I try to present the starting operational situation as closely to historical based the information that I have on hand. That means that Rifle Divisions are starting well below their established war time authorizations. Tank and Mech divisions will have their starting numbers adjusted as realistically as possible to show their operational versus damaged tanks. The Soviet units will also start with a very poor amount of trucks. I base much of my data on Nigel Askey's set of books and I am hoping that his Soviet set of books will be released soon as he provides an accounting of every division.

I don't know much about the depots as that isn't my area of expertise. The Soviets don't start with 200 depots but probably have around a dozen major depots stationed near the front. Most of them are going to be overrun quickly leaving the Soviets in some logistical chaos regardless of whether or not they disband them.

We try to obtain the realistic rates of advance. The ability of the 4th Panzer Gruppe making those bridgeheads was based on the decision to almost immobilize the 16th and 18th Army and prioritize all fuel to the Panzer Group. This allowed the 4th Panzer Group to rapidly reach the outskirts of Leningrad quickly but without much of the its infantry support. Once the 16th and 18th Armies reached the outskirts of Leningrad, supplying all of the armies for a general offensive was difficult and was postponed many times due to the logistical situation.

Trey

ORIGINAL: Pelton

ORIGINAL: el hefe

Repair rate needs to be tied to the Supply% on hand. That's really how the German tank force dwindled in 1941 and the winter of 1942. Lack of repair parts making it to the front forced cannibalization of aircraft and ground vehicles.

Trey

ORIGINAL: morvael

Tanks break down when moving.

But maybe the repair at the end of turn is too generous, no problem to bring it down a few points for next patch.

Historically the fact of the matter is not logistics.

It was production, that crystal clear.

I agree with the periods of not enough supplies/fuel as per the facts on the ground aka CIA study.
But this is where allot of people miss the historical facts on the ground. By late July Germany simply had no replacements in
the pipe line to send east and Russia was equipping 5 million men all be it with not enough equipment, but still 5 million men.
The issue was not a lack of a logistics chain to get them to the front there simply were not enough parts or replacements being
produced.
Guardian asked for 450 Panzer engines by August 1st to fix broken down tanks for AGC and Hitler said you will have them, but
only 150 were shipped. Germany was still a peace time economy. The problem in 41 was not transportation is was production of
parts and training of men.

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... i4a07p.pdf

On paper the USSR had a total of 24,000 tanks on June 22 1941
10,650 were out of service for routine maintenance, 6,950 were undergoing major maintance (transmition/engine repairs)
leaving just 6,450 to face Germanys invasion.

That number fell quickly because Russia did not have a single armored recover vehicle do they were forced to leave behind 1000’s of vehicles.

Also Russian repair sucked as they lacked parts. How 2by3 can tie AFV repair
rates to Supply % when there are no parts ect seems Middle Earth.

[Aurelian]

Historically, the fact of the matter is that it was.....logistics.

By June 24, 47th Panzer Corps was reporting fuel shortages among its furthermost elements, while the roads leading to and from the Bug crossings had deteriorated so much that it was difficult moving the traffic, with the wheeled transport carrying the fuel still lined up on the west side of the river.

The war diary of Hoth's Panzer Group shows that road conditions restricted movement to a single file column, which stretched even further when heavily loaded tracks became bogged. All routes marked as roads turned out to be unsealed, unmaintained sand tracks.

20th Panzer reported that the French trucks they used could only manage a few meters forward before having to be dug out. Over and over.

Ritter von Thoma reported that the 3rd Panzer Group would have only 70% of its panzer forces fit for service by July 2nd, with much of the missing 30% broken down.

The there's the horses.....

The invasion incorporated 650,000 horses. With the delay of converting Soviet rail, the horses had a lot of work to do. Thanks to operational time constraints and ever pressing demand for greater infantry support by the panzer commanders, the horses ended up with a punishing routine of exhausting marches that rapidly broke them down. The horses used by the Germans were not accustomed to the searing conditions and horrible roads of the east. Nor could they get the proper diet. (Oats was the preferred food, but what they usually got was green fodder or straw from peasant houses as the provisions could not keep pace.)

Bypassing Soviets led to other problems.

Kuntzen's 57th Panzer Corps: July 3rd "In the rear area there are unknown numbers of Russians lurking in the woods who cannot be captured by the corps with its present manpower, but who pose a serious threat to supply convoys." The German army was attempting to advance a major element of their supply apparatus *ahead* of the bulk of the army into what was still hostile territory.

Panzer Group 2's Quatermaster-General's war diary noted on July 2nd that panzer losses were beginning to mount due to shortage of spare parts of all kinds.

Panzer Group 3 reported on July 3rd that the roads and byways used were getting even worse the further east they went with the result of numerous losses in trucks.

Production would not solve any of that. Not the bad roads. Not the July rain that slowed things down. It wouldn't help soldiers who had to push heavy wagons to keep them moving. Or how after 13 days of action Hoth reported that he had only 50% combat ready tanks. that the heavy wagons were unsuited for what was called roads..

There's more , but I'd suggest reading "Operation Barbarossa and Germany'sDefeat in the East" by David Stahel.

Production doesn't mean much if you can't support its use or even get it to the battle

[sillyflower]

Production vs logistics is a false dichotomy

1 If you don't produce new kit inc. spares, you run out quickly

2 New kit needs to get to the right place in working order when needed

3 It needs to be kept in working order which is a combination of reliability (which partly depends on users being properly trained), capacity to repair (enough skilled people with right kit) and sometimes/often the ability to recover the broken item.