A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
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RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
What did you think of the last program?
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
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Speedysteve
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RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
Haven't had time to watch it yet so it's still on my sky box! Any good?
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RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
warspite1ORIGINAL: Speedy
Haven't had time to watch it yet so it's still on my sky box! Any good?
Its worth a watch certainly - if only to finally find out what happened to the tragic HMS Indefatigable.
But as with many such programs, it couldn't quite deliver what it promised. If you knew nothing about the battle, I suspect you would come away totally and utterly confused because they made a big thing about finding Harper's original maps - and that the underwater survey proved the maps were accurate.... but gave no clue whatsoever as to what the hell all that actually meant.
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
"Even Nelson could not have done better at Jutland than my grandfather"
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/thinking ... my-grandf/
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/thinking ... my-grandf/
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
The clash of the battlecruisers
And our next talking point.
4. Why didn't Beatty open fire earlier?
As seen in the tables in posts 25 and 28 and the table below, the British battlecruisers were, ship for ship, markedly superior in terms of size of gun and thus range. This presented Beatty with a huge advantage and Hipper with a potentially fatal disadvantage. But this advantage was not utilsed by Beatty.
Later in the story of the Jutland battle Jellicoe is criticised in some quarters for deploying too close to the enemy. I do not think I have seen that accusation levelled at Beatty (although I may as I read further) but surely he was similarly guilty here? Was there good reason for the 1 and 2 BCS to be steaming separately after Galatea had sighted what was almost certainly the smoke of capital ships? Performing the manoeuvre to bring the two squadrons together and then to turn at a time when the main armament of at least some of the ships should have been opening up, was sub-optimal. I love the description by Derfflinger's gunnery commander Georg von Hase, witnessing this manoeuvre:
How menacing they appeared, magnified 15 times...it was a stimulating, majestic spectacle as the dark-grey giants approached like fate itself. The six ships, which had at first proceeded in two columns, formed one line ahead. Like a herd of prehistoric monsters, they closed on one another, spectre-like, irresistible.
Staff in Skagerrak states:
It was a complicated double manoeuvre which was highly undesirable at such a critical moment and meant that the British ships were still manoeuvring into line when the Germans opened fire at 1548hrs.
With the range closing rapidly - more so thanks to Hipper's 2-point turn, the British guns remained silent. Indeed in echoes of Lindemann/Lutjens at the Battle of the Denmark Strait 25-years later, it was not Beatty who ordered fire to be opened, it was HMS Lion's captain Ernle Chatfield. According to Massie, Castles of Steel, apparently at 20,000 yards Chatfield tried to get a message to Beatty (who was on his own bridge below Chatfield) but the Vice-Admiral was in communication with Jellicoe. Eventually with the range-finders showing 16,000 yards Chatfield felt he could wait no more. The actual range that each ship opened up varies (as does so much of the ship records from the battle on both sides).
The table below gives the maximum range of the various guns fitted to Beatty's and Hipper's ships.
Ship for ship the British had a significant range advantage compared to their German opponents
The sad thing is I don't even think that the latter technical detail was in Beatty's thinking. From everything I have read about the man I think it was more to do with the fact that, for all his bravery, he simply wasn't fit to command a squadron (let alone a fleet). Looking at this dispassionately and giving the man as much credit as possible, how can we sum up his tactical decision making so far (ignoring higher level questions like not firing Seymour, the poor magazine and cordite handling procedures and the poor firing accuracy of the ships under his command)?
- He's gone to sea and deployed the 5BS as though he's on a Sunday afternoon jaunt i.e. he does not expect to find any Germans unexpectedly.
- Let's give him the benefit of the doubt here and assume that he is confident (not unreasonably) that his six better armed and faster BC's can deal with Hipper's five ships. However there is a problem. He doesn't know he's going to find only Hipper and five battlecruisers...
- When the enemy is found he goes charging off. Let's say that the communication problems were not his fault. Okay. But they still happened and suddenly the 5BS in a matter of minutes were 10 miles behind his BCF. There is no urgency for him to go tearing off to the southeast. He does not know at this stage who the enemy is or where he is (apart from what may be the advance screen of a bigger fleet). Why not wait for the 5BS to catch up?
- In fairness to Beatty, maybe he feared that whatever enemy was out there was, even now, running for home and he had to engage as quickly as possible. But if that is true - the folly of his initial disposition of the 5BS is brought sharply into focus.
- In addition, all the testimony from the time seems to confirm that he got unlucky with the weather. In the words of Lutzow's gunnery officer "I could already see with certainty battleships behind the battlecruisers which were at least 26 kilometres distant, evidence of the excellent visability to the west".
- Okay he got unlucky with the weather, and came across the enemy before he had deployed (that was not bad luck - Hipper managed it). So should he have used his speed advantage to keep his distance pending being in position?
- According to Lion's captain he is communicating with Jellicoe (a rare event) at precisely the time his full thought should have been on the battle that is literally about to commence.
So you may well be right Capt. - certainly with the first part of your comment. I think it is likely that he has simply gone off like a bull in a china shop and hasn't thought about tactics (making use of his advantages in numbers, range and speed) other than get in there and start firing as quickly as possible.....
It matters if the Germans cannot hit the British and the British are effectively getting free hits. Shooting when under fire is massively different from shooting without such distractions. To that extent it does not matter so much how bad the British shooting is as they are hitting the enemy without reply.
In fairness to Beatty for the moment, maybe (not unreasonably) he wasn't expecting Hipper to want to engage and he thought that if he kept his distance then Hipper would be able to break-off and head home - and Beatty had seen Hipper get away on at least two occasions already. How would history judge Beatty in THAT scenario?
On the 31st May 1916 six battlecruisers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral David Beatty, came upon five battlecruisers of Vice-Admiral Franz von Hipper's I Aufklarungsgruppe. In a sorry tale of what might have been that would have Lord Horatio Nelson turning in his grave, Beatty inexplicably decided to keep his distance rather than go in for the kill. The canny Hipper (making use of the weather conditions which heavily favoured the Germans) managed to disappear into the gloom.
Churchill sacked Beatty the next day.
Vice-Admiral Franz von Hipper. Hipper's handling of his Aufklarungsgruppen in the opening stages of the battle was text book. His ships met Beatty's fleet fully deployed and he was quick to close the range by turning onto an enemy that out-numbered, out-ranged, out-gunned and could out-run him. He had a job to do - deliver Beatty onto the guns of Admiral Scheer's Hochseeflotte (High Seas Fleet) and Hipper duly delivered his part of the deal.
And our next talking point.
4. Why didn't Beatty open fire earlier?
As seen in the tables in posts 25 and 28 and the table below, the British battlecruisers were, ship for ship, markedly superior in terms of size of gun and thus range. This presented Beatty with a huge advantage and Hipper with a potentially fatal disadvantage. But this advantage was not utilsed by Beatty.
Later in the story of the Jutland battle Jellicoe is criticised in some quarters for deploying too close to the enemy. I do not think I have seen that accusation levelled at Beatty (although I may as I read further) but surely he was similarly guilty here? Was there good reason for the 1 and 2 BCS to be steaming separately after Galatea had sighted what was almost certainly the smoke of capital ships? Performing the manoeuvre to bring the two squadrons together and then to turn at a time when the main armament of at least some of the ships should have been opening up, was sub-optimal. I love the description by Derfflinger's gunnery commander Georg von Hase, witnessing this manoeuvre:
How menacing they appeared, magnified 15 times...it was a stimulating, majestic spectacle as the dark-grey giants approached like fate itself. The six ships, which had at first proceeded in two columns, formed one line ahead. Like a herd of prehistoric monsters, they closed on one another, spectre-like, irresistible.
Staff in Skagerrak states:
It was a complicated double manoeuvre which was highly undesirable at such a critical moment and meant that the British ships were still manoeuvring into line when the Germans opened fire at 1548hrs.
With the range closing rapidly - more so thanks to Hipper's 2-point turn, the British guns remained silent. Indeed in echoes of Lindemann/Lutjens at the Battle of the Denmark Strait 25-years later, it was not Beatty who ordered fire to be opened, it was HMS Lion's captain Ernle Chatfield. According to Massie, Castles of Steel, apparently at 20,000 yards Chatfield tried to get a message to Beatty (who was on his own bridge below Chatfield) but the Vice-Admiral was in communication with Jellicoe. Eventually with the range-finders showing 16,000 yards Chatfield felt he could wait no more. The actual range that each ship opened up varies (as does so much of the ship records from the battle on both sides).
The table below gives the maximum range of the various guns fitted to Beatty's and Hipper's ships.
Ship for ship the British had a significant range advantage compared to their German opponents
Capt. Harlock
IMHO, Nelson's dictum about laying one's ship alongside that of the enemy was still affecting tactics in the Royal Navy. American battleship captains remarked during WWII that their British counterparts always seemed to want to go to "knife-fighting range" rather than stand off. Possibly the idea was that at close range with a flat trajectory, gun elevation did not matter as much; if you missed the hull you could still hit the superstructure. At longer range with a plunging trajectory, correct ranging was essential, and the German optics were generally superior to the British ones.
The sad thing is I don't even think that the latter technical detail was in Beatty's thinking. From everything I have read about the man I think it was more to do with the fact that, for all his bravery, he simply wasn't fit to command a squadron (let alone a fleet). Looking at this dispassionately and giving the man as much credit as possible, how can we sum up his tactical decision making so far (ignoring higher level questions like not firing Seymour, the poor magazine and cordite handling procedures and the poor firing accuracy of the ships under his command)?
- He's gone to sea and deployed the 5BS as though he's on a Sunday afternoon jaunt i.e. he does not expect to find any Germans unexpectedly.
- Let's give him the benefit of the doubt here and assume that he is confident (not unreasonably) that his six better armed and faster BC's can deal with Hipper's five ships. However there is a problem. He doesn't know he's going to find only Hipper and five battlecruisers...
- When the enemy is found he goes charging off. Let's say that the communication problems were not his fault. Okay. But they still happened and suddenly the 5BS in a matter of minutes were 10 miles behind his BCF. There is no urgency for him to go tearing off to the southeast. He does not know at this stage who the enemy is or where he is (apart from what may be the advance screen of a bigger fleet). Why not wait for the 5BS to catch up?
- In fairness to Beatty, maybe he feared that whatever enemy was out there was, even now, running for home and he had to engage as quickly as possible. But if that is true - the folly of his initial disposition of the 5BS is brought sharply into focus.
- In addition, all the testimony from the time seems to confirm that he got unlucky with the weather. In the words of Lutzow's gunnery officer "I could already see with certainty battleships behind the battlecruisers which were at least 26 kilometres distant, evidence of the excellent visability to the west".
- Okay he got unlucky with the weather, and came across the enemy before he had deployed (that was not bad luck - Hipper managed it). So should he have used his speed advantage to keep his distance pending being in position?
- According to Lion's captain he is communicating with Jellicoe (a rare event) at precisely the time his full thought should have been on the battle that is literally about to commence.
So you may well be right Capt. - certainly with the first part of your comment. I think it is likely that he has simply gone off like a bull in a china shop and hasn't thought about tactics (making use of his advantages in numbers, range and speed) other than get in there and start firing as quickly as possible.....
Zorch
Perhaps...but it may not have mattered if Beatty opened fire earlier because British range finders were less accurate than German ones. This is especially true for the British ships with 9 foot rangefinders. Beatty's ships were badly in need of gunnery practice, too.
It matters if the Germans cannot hit the British and the British are effectively getting free hits. Shooting when under fire is massively different from shooting without such distractions. To that extent it does not matter so much how bad the British shooting is as they are hitting the enemy without reply.
In fairness to Beatty for the moment, maybe (not unreasonably) he wasn't expecting Hipper to want to engage and he thought that if he kept his distance then Hipper would be able to break-off and head home - and Beatty had seen Hipper get away on at least two occasions already. How would history judge Beatty in THAT scenario?
On the 31st May 1916 six battlecruisers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral David Beatty, came upon five battlecruisers of Vice-Admiral Franz von Hipper's I Aufklarungsgruppe. In a sorry tale of what might have been that would have Lord Horatio Nelson turning in his grave, Beatty inexplicably decided to keep his distance rather than go in for the kill. The canny Hipper (making use of the weather conditions which heavily favoured the Germans) managed to disappear into the gloom.
Churchill sacked Beatty the next day.
Vice-Admiral Franz von Hipper. Hipper's handling of his Aufklarungsgruppen in the opening stages of the battle was text book. His ships met Beatty's fleet fully deployed and he was quick to close the range by turning onto an enemy that out-numbered, out-ranged, out-gunned and could out-run him. He had a job to do - deliver Beatty onto the guns of Admiral Scheer's Hochseeflotte (High Seas Fleet) and Hipper duly delivered his part of the deal.
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Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
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Capt. Harlock
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RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
4. Why didn't Beatty open fire earlier?
As seen in the tables in posts 25 and 28, the British battlecruisers were, ship for ship, markedly superior in terms of size of gun and thus range. This presented Beatty with a huge advantage and Hipper with a potentially fatal disadvantage.
IMHO, Nelson's dictum about laying one's ship alongside that of the enemy was still affecting tactics in the Royal Navy. American battleship captains remarked during WWII that their British counterparts always seemed to want to go to "knife-fighting range" rather than stand off. Possibly the idea was that at close range with a flat trajectory, gun elevation did not matter as much; if you missed the hull you could still hit the superstructure. At longer range with a plunging trajectory, correct ranging was essential, and the German optics were generally superior to the British ones.
Civil war? What does that mean? Is there any foreign war? Isn't every war fought between men, between brothers?
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RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
Perhaps...but it may not have mattered if Beatty opened fire earlier because British range finders were less accurate than German ones. This is especially true for the British ships with 9 foot rangefinders. Beatty's ships were badly in need of gunnery practice, too.ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock
4. Why didn't Beatty open fire earlier?
As seen in the tables in posts 25 and 28, the British battlecruisers were, ship for ship, markedly superior in terms of size of gun and thus range. This presented Beatty with a huge advantage and Hipper with a potentially fatal disadvantage.
IMHO, Nelson's dictum about laying one's ship alongside that of the enemy was still affecting tactics in the Royal Navy. American battleship captains remarked during WWII that their British counterparts always seemed to want to go to "knife-fighting range" rather than stand off. Possibly the idea was that at close range with a flat trajectory, gun elevation did not matter as much; if you missed the hull you could still hit the superstructure. At longer range with a plunging trajectory, correct ranging was essential, and the German optics were generally superior to the British ones.
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
Does anyone know a reliable source for the maximum range of the battlecruisers (and 5BS) ships please? I have set out a table in post 85 but am not sure these are necessarily correct. Different sources quote the 13.5-inch of Queen Mary and Tiger as being either slightly more or slightly less than the similarly gunned Lion and Princess Royal for example. Equally Moltke may not have had the elevation at Jutland that would enable her to fire the same distance as Seydlitz.
Any help would be appreciated. Guns, calibres, elevations and sights are not my specialist subject!
Any help would be appreciated. Guns, calibres, elevations and sights are not my specialist subject!
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
Loads of stuff here: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/index_w ... Naval_Guns
By the way my thoughts on Jutland can be summed up by two quotes:
Nelson - England expects.... much was expected from the RN in 1916 and was not delivered. This failure to meet expectation has led to much of the debate.
von Moltke - in the long run luck/fortune favours the efficient/capable (alternate meanings dependent on translation)...the RN were not 'suitably prepared' and throughout the battle luck was not in their favour.
By the way my thoughts on Jutland can be summed up by two quotes:
Nelson - England expects.... much was expected from the RN in 1916 and was not delivered. This failure to meet expectation has led to much of the debate.
von Moltke - in the long run luck/fortune favours the efficient/capable (alternate meanings dependent on translation)...the RN were not 'suitably prepared' and throughout the battle luck was not in their favour.
John
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RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
warspite1ORIGINAL: Red Lancer
Loads of stuff here: http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/index_w ... Naval_Guns
By the way my thoughts on Jutland can be summed up by two quotes:
Nelson - England expects.... much was expected from the RN in 1916 and was not delivered. This failure to meet expectation has led to much of the debate.
von Moltke - in the long run luck/fortune favours the efficient/capable (alternate meanings dependent on translation)...the RN were not 'suitably prepared' and throughout the battle luck was not in their favour.
Thanks I'll have a look.
As to the quotes:
Nelson - England expects.... much was expected from the RN in 1916 and was not delivered. This failure to meet expectation has led to much of the debate.
Well quite, one side has history, tradition, ship nos., speed, weight of broadside, intelligence - you name it, they had it - but then didn't make it count. In any walk of life, in any subject, THAT fact alone is going to raise questions and rightly and understandably so!!
von Moltke - in the long run luck/fortune favours the efficient/capable (alternate meanings dependent on translation)...the RN were not 'suitably prepared' and throughout the battle luck was not in their favour.
Yes and plenty of similar quotes apply equally. Only thing here though is the idea (held by some) that the British made all the mistakes and the Germans were faultless. The truth is very different - although sadly for over 6,000 RN sailors, the biggest and most costly mistakes were on the British side.
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
The Run to the South
This opening phase of the battlecruiser clash is known as the Run to the South. Each fleet headed in a rough southeasterly direction line astern on a parallel course. The Germans were trying to deliver Beatty to Scheer, while Beatty probably started out believing he could destroy Hipper on his own, but when Scheer made his presence known, it became Beatty's turn to try and deliver both German fleets to Jellicoe (the Run to the North). Ultimately it may well have been the case that Beatty would have had to break off the engagement even if Scheer wasn't at sea due to the punishment his ships took in this opening phase. This was because, in that scenario, so long as Hipper kept Evan-Thomas and his 5BS at a distance, then he could control events until it was time to leave.
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today"
At 1548hrs Hipper ordered the signal JD "Jot Dora" the signal for fire to commence. It took just three salvoes for Lutzow's shells to begin straddling her opposite number and within minutes, Lion had been hit - more than once. Elsewhere, German gunnery was not much better than the British, but the Germans found the range much quicker no doubt aided by the following (from von Hase again and as detailed in Rules of the Game):
"The English battlecruisers had a decidedly unfavourable tactical position".
1. The visibility facing east was inferior to that facing west
2. Whereas the Germans' gun smoke was quickly driven by wind way over the ship, the westerly breeze was blowing the smoke from the English guns between them and us. As a result of this their view was often hampered.
3. At the same time British smoke hardly inconvenienced the Germans, for their precise stereoscopic range-finders could produce a result from the smallest speck of a masthead
Another breakdown in communication for the British... The plan was for both Lion and Princess Royal to target Lutzow, the German flagship, and all subsequent ships in the line would take the next one along - counting from the rear - thus all German ships would come under fire from at least one battlecruiser. Both Tiger and Queen Mary counted from the front and so targeted Seydlitz and Moltke, leaving Derfflinger unmolested by enemy shells for 10 minutes. Once again this was a mistake that had been made previously - by Tiger at Dogger Bank. It seems almost as if there was no de-brief after previous battles to ensure problems encountered were not eradicated for the next time......
Range-finding equipment
The British used two types of range-finders - the 9ft FQ2 and the 15ft FT24, with the latter being better suited to the longer ranges that naval battles were to be fought at as guns increased in size. All five Queen Elizabeth's had this version but by 1916 only one ship in the Grand Fleet had the FT24, HMS Orion.
One can only imagine what using one of these hand held coincidence range-finders must have been like in battle conditions and exposed to the elements. The German stereoscopic sight built by Karl Zeiss of Jena was a better instrument - certainly for finding the target in less than ideal conditions - although apparently was hard on the user's eyesight over time and less robust than its opposite number. For testing the ranges the Germans had a superior "ladder" system to the British - indeed the British adopted a variation on this shortly after the battle.
All in all there does not seem to be a huge difference in the sights used by each navy themselves, but as the British version was not as good in difficult conditions - and that is exactly what they faced in this opening part of the battle - the German accuracy was accordingly much better. When you factor in the magazine and cordite handling issues (potentially) then the result is as per below.....
The loss of HMS Indefatigable
Unless otherwise stated the source for these statements comes from Skagerrak.
1548hrs
Lutzow opens fire
1549hrs
The British began to return fire a minute after Lutzow's opening salvo. Staff states that the British ships at first could only fire from their forward guns - further evidence that the deployment and the turn to the eastsoutheast was left far, far too late.
1550hrs
The first in a series of hits is achieved against HMS Tiger by Moltke (although apparently the first hit the German crew records is not until 1606hrs)
1551hrs
Lutzow scores a hit near Lion's bridge with her fourth salvo.
Moltke finds her target once again, although again causes no serious damage to Tiger.
1552hrs
An armour piercing (AP) shell from Lutzow hits the base of Lion's funnel
Strangely, given that Derfflinger was not targeted in the first ten minutes, her shooting was initially disappointing. Only now does she achieve her first straddle against Princess Royal
A third hit for Molke. Fortunately for Tiger, at this stage the hits have not been serious
1553hrs
Moltke again strikes the unfortunate Tiger
1554hrs
A fifth shell from Moltke finds its target. This hits A-turret's barbette, although the turret continues firing. Note: Jellicoe Jutland The Unfinished Battle refers to this hit as being on Q-turret, although he too states that the three turrets A, Q and X were hit around this time.
1555hrs
Queen Mary lands a shell in Seydlitz's starboard switch room and turbo-dynamo room
Tiger receives a sixth hit from the remarkably accurate Moltke - what is particularly remarkable here is that Moltke remember is under fire from two British ships. A seventh shell then strikes Tiger and more serious damage is caused. Q-turret is temporarily put out of action and the turret was to fire only intermittently for the rest of the battle
Beatty now gives the order "Increase the rate of fire"....
1556hrs
Moltke hits Tiger's X-turret putting this out of action - like Q-turret the effect was temporary, but when repaired, the turret subsequently fired 19 degrees off target
1557hrs
Beatty orders a 2-point turn to starboard to increase the range. Apparently at least some of the German ships (Seydlitz amongst them) are able to make use of their secondary armament. There is no mention of the British using theirs at this time. This causes some of the destroyers to fall out of position and, in an attempt to get back into the van, they sail up the engaged side of Beatty's ships further compounded the visibility issues that have hampered the British.
Seydlitz is hit for the second time by Queen Mary - this time the shell penetrated Caesar turret, burning it out completely. The order is given to flood the magazine
1558hrs
It took Lion 9 minutes before she straddled Hipper's flagship, but then scored two hits in quick succession, neither of which caused the much damage
Derfflinger obtains her first hits, striking Princess Royal with AP shells twice. These temporarily put the fire control tower out of action, with one detonating in a coal bunker.
Back to Tiger and a ninth shell strike that could have been fatal. As it was the hit caused the midships 6-inch magazine to be flooded, but it could have been worse as this shell just missed Tiger's main steam pipe - a hit on which would have disabled the ship. It's seems incredible that all during the run to the south and then the run to the north, none of the ships on either side were disabled or sufficiently slowed that they were "gobbled" up by the chasing pack.
1559hrs
Hipper orders a 1-point turn to port thus further increasing the range.
1600hrs
A shell from Lutzow finds Lion's Q turret, a hit that could easily have been the end for HMS Lion and David Beatty. A semi-AP shell struck Lion's Q-turret right between the face plate and the roof. The front of the roof plate was taken clean off. The occupants of the turret were killed as well as most of those in the chamber below. Only the quick thinking of the Royal Marine turret officer Major Francis Harvey saved the ship from a cataclysmic magazine explosion when he ordered the magazine doors closed and flooding of the magazine (see post 112). I think this eyewitness account says much to convey the picture:
....the armoured roof of Q-turret had been folded back like a sardine tin; thick yellow smoke was rolling up in clouds from the gaping hole, and the guns were cocked up in the air awkwardly. All this happened within yards of where Beatty was standing and none of us on the bridge heard the detonation. The destructive power was enormous but, oddly, in the maelstrom of the battle, completely unregistered on the bridge.
Derfflinger scores a hit on Princess Royal's B turret.
1601hrs
According to Staff two further hits were recorded against HMS Lion at this time
1602hrs
After dishing out so much punishment, Moltke is finally hurt - a shell near-missed and the damage caused some flooding forward on her starboard side
1603hrs
Another hit is recorded against Lion
At the rear of the two columns it seems that there is no individual record of the hits inflicted on HMS Indefatigable by Von der Tann. However, the fire ranged against the British battlecruiser was incredibly accurate and indeed was so intense that the Germans had trouble making out the ship at one point due to the maelstrom of smoke, water and battle damage. It was however at this time that the British suffered their first loss of the battle. According to observers, two or three shells hit Indefatigable in or around the rear turret and an explosion was seen (note: it has recently been shown by underwater mapping of the wreck that this was no small explosion (see below)). It was said that Indefatigable was seen to swing out of line - perhaps given the new evidence, this was not a voluntary movement, but was the blast from the hits on the turret that tore the ship in two. She then was seen to roll over as another series of shells hit her forward turret - followed by another huge explosion. Out of a crew of 1,019 just two survived. Von der Tann had not been hit once.
A recent underwater expedition located the wreck of all 25 ships lost at Jutland. The only one whose final resting place was appreciably different to that given in John Harper's (Chief Navigational Officer) charts (more of which anon) was Indefatigable. As a result of the expedition's findings they think they know why. The ships is recorded as being lost when she blew up (as in the picture). The eyewitness accounts assume she was whole at that time. But the stern of the ship was blown clean off some 5-6 minutes earlier, and a shock wave travelled through the remaining section of the ship likely killing almost everyone on board. The shell of the battlecruiser was then carried by her momentum alone before another huge explosion sent her to the bottom.
The loss of HMS Queen Mary and the arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron
The folly of Beatty's deployment had started to become apparent. Whatever the rights and wrongs and who was to blame for the delayed turn of the 5BS, Evan-Thomas had been sailing toward the battle at top speed ever since.
The lead ship, Barham, had been in position to fire, albeit at considerable distance, at the II AG as early as 1558hrs - although to no effect, and the II AG quickly turned away to the northeast under smokescreen. This however was not where their 15-inch shells were needed.
1605hrs
HMS Lion sheers out of line - no doubt while emergency work is carried out to deal with some of the fires and damage. Princess Royal assumes her place in the van.
Tiger is hit forward by a shell from her tormentor Moltke
Von der Tann is said to have been hit twice by Tiger here but no timing given or damage report
1606hrs
Too late by a matter of minutes (as a far as the Indefatigable is concerned) HMS Barham is finally in position to range her guns against Von der Tann. Very soon the whole squadron were able to fire and the lead two battleships - Barham and Valiant - turned their attention on Moltke, while Warspite and Malaya concentrated their efforts on Von der Tann.
1609hrs
Amazingly it is only now that Von der Tann is seriously hit for the first time and she is lucky that damage to her rudder, caused when a shell penetrated her armour aft and exploded sending shock waves through the area, freed itself. 600 tonnes of water enters the battlecruiser. Jellicoe states this took place at 1612hrs and was caused by a shell from the Barham.
1615hrs
Two shells hit the Lutzow in quick succession - both from Princess Royal. One of these lands between A and B turret wiping out the forward dressing station.
1616hrs
Moltke receives a 15-inch shell from Barham that destroys one of the casemated secondary guns and its crew and continues into a coal bunker where it explodes.
1618hrs (1617hrs)
Queen Mary hits the Seydlitz again, this time one of the starboard casemates is penetrated by a shell that kills the crew (less one crewman) of one of the secondary guns.
1620hrs
A shell from Moltke passes through one of Tiger's funnels
The crew of Von der Tann must have felt much as those of Indefatigable felt as she disappears in a hail of water. Her A-turret is hit and put out of action (I thought Germans called their turrets Anton, Bruno, Caesar and Dora but here the turret is called Alsen).
1621hrs
Queen Mary loses one gun in Q-turret courtesy of a shell from Seydlitz. She had previously taken a hit in the aft 4-inch battery, although no time for this is given.
1623hrs
Moltke is hit again, causing some limited flooding
Von der Tann loses another turret - Culm. The battlecruiser is now down to two working turrets - the two amid-ships. Even so she is still capable of causing trouble for the British and she delivers a shell on Barham against her belt armour.
1624hrs
Two further hits are taken by HMS Lion. Staff states that up to this time, nine shells hit HMS Lion since the start of the battle. Of these, no less than four had failed to explode. The British were not alone in having problems with their shells. Jellicoe states three shells are landed at this time - and this number would take Lion up to the nine hits recorded by Tarrant (see below).
1626hrs
At this time both Seydlitz and Derfflinger were targeting Queen Mary. Seven shells in two salvoes were seen to strike the British ship, following which she literally disappeared in a cloud of smoke. There were [20] survivors and [1,266] officers and men were killed. [Amazingly wide variance in the number of casualties]. To convey the scene I will quote from Derfflinger's gunnery officer Hase:
The Queen Mary was firing less rapidly than we were but usually full salvoes. I could see the shells coming and I had to admit that they were shooting superbly. As a rule, all eight shells fell together, but they were almost always over or short....but the poor Queen Mary was having a bad time. In addition to the Derfflinger, she was being engaged by the Seydlitz.... at 4.26 she met her doom...First a vivid red flame shot up from her forepart. Then came an explosion forward, followed by a much heavier explosion amidships. Black debris flew into the air and immediately afterwards the whole ship blew up with a terrific explosion. A gigantic cloud of smoke ros, the masts collapsed inwards, the smoke cloud hid everything and rose higher and higher. Finally nothing but a thick, black cloud of smoke remained where the ship had been. At it's base, the smoke column covered only a small area, but it widened toward the summit like a monstrous pine tree.
Moltke recieves the second of three hits that causes flooding
Von der Tann hits New Zealand, temporarily affecting her B-turret.
1627hrs
Princess Royal is hit near Q-turret (why always Q-turret?) but the turret remains operable.
A third hit on Moltke. The three hits in quick succession allow 1,000 tonnes of water into the ship and she takes on a 3 degree list. Counter-flooding is ordered to right the problem.
1628hrs
Aboard Beatty's flagship, in a frightening spectacle of the fate that would have befallen the battlecruiser had it not been for the quick thinking of Major Harvey, a cordite fire in Lion's Q-turret causes an explosion, and the huge fireball, taking the path of least resistance, flies up into the sky through the open turret roof.
1629hrs
A shell passes through Princess Royal's second funnel but fails to explode
1630hrs
Two shells from Moltke land on Tiger in quick succession. The shells hit the side armour but fail to detonate.
1632hrs
Princess Royal receives a third hit in quick succession - this time A-turret is put out of action for about 11 hours
1635hrs
It's the turn of Seydlitz to hit Tiger, with another hit forward that does little damage
Von der Tann loses her last but one gun when turret Bautzen refuses to operate.
1638hrs Hipper orders a turn to SSE to open the range, before turning toward the British once more three minutes later.
During this period torpedoes were fired, with no effect, by Lion (two) and Moltke (four) and possibly others.
The Invincible and Indefatigable were older ships - amongst the first battlecruisers built. But HMS Queen Mary was only 3-years old and truly a front line vessel. She, like Lutzow for the Germans, was the most important ship lost on her side
Summary of the fighting during the Run to the South
In Jutland The Unfinished Battle Jellicoe quotes from Tarrant's Jutland The German Perspective and states that the hits received were:
British: 44
German: 17
Totalling the hits in Staff's Skagerrak and repeated above (ignoring the near-miss that damaged Moltke and taking Tarrant's 5 hits on Indefatigable) the totals are:
British: 43
German: 18
I will look through the other sources I have to see where the differences lie (if I can) but if not, then the hits produced by each side is not very different when comparing the two sources and gives a clear indication of the superiority held by the Germans at this stage. What we can not know is exactly why that was.
German (as well as British) sources have confirmed that visibility was in the Germans favour at this stage of battle and that the dark grey British ships were easier to see than the German light grey ones.
It also appears that the German range-finding equipment was better - at least in the early stages of a battle, before the greater strain on eyesight caused the German method to lose effectiveness. The Germans also had a better "ladder" method of measuring the fall of shot.
The loss of two battlecruisers can - as much as anything is certain about this battle - be put down to poor magazine and cordite handling.
The recent experiment carried out (mentioned in the book thread) that tested Queen Mary's hull against all the hits Seydlitz received during the entire battle, confirmed that she would not have sunk had it not been for the magazine explosion. Similarly HMS Tiger took 12-14 hits without being sunk. These facts support the naval historian Norman Friedman's assertion that without the magazine and cordite handling issue it is unlikely the British would have lost any battlecruisers at Jutland.
Of course in addition to receiving hits and being able to take them and the ability to land hits on the enemy, there is also the matter of the shells themselves and how effective they are. We will look at this after the battleships clash. At this time we will also look more closely into the faulty magazine and cordite handling process, what exactly that means and whose fault was it that it was in place.
This opening phase of the battlecruiser clash is known as the Run to the South. Each fleet headed in a rough southeasterly direction line astern on a parallel course. The Germans were trying to deliver Beatty to Scheer, while Beatty probably started out believing he could destroy Hipper on his own, but when Scheer made his presence known, it became Beatty's turn to try and deliver both German fleets to Jellicoe (the Run to the North). Ultimately it may well have been the case that Beatty would have had to break off the engagement even if Scheer wasn't at sea due to the punishment his ships took in this opening phase. This was because, in that scenario, so long as Hipper kept Evan-Thomas and his 5BS at a distance, then he could control events until it was time to leave.
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today"
At 1548hrs Hipper ordered the signal JD "Jot Dora" the signal for fire to commence. It took just three salvoes for Lutzow's shells to begin straddling her opposite number and within minutes, Lion had been hit - more than once. Elsewhere, German gunnery was not much better than the British, but the Germans found the range much quicker no doubt aided by the following (from von Hase again and as detailed in Rules of the Game):
"The English battlecruisers had a decidedly unfavourable tactical position".
1. The visibility facing east was inferior to that facing west
2. Whereas the Germans' gun smoke was quickly driven by wind way over the ship, the westerly breeze was blowing the smoke from the English guns between them and us. As a result of this their view was often hampered.
3. At the same time British smoke hardly inconvenienced the Germans, for their precise stereoscopic range-finders could produce a result from the smallest speck of a masthead
Another breakdown in communication for the British... The plan was for both Lion and Princess Royal to target Lutzow, the German flagship, and all subsequent ships in the line would take the next one along - counting from the rear - thus all German ships would come under fire from at least one battlecruiser. Both Tiger and Queen Mary counted from the front and so targeted Seydlitz and Moltke, leaving Derfflinger unmolested by enemy shells for 10 minutes. Once again this was a mistake that had been made previously - by Tiger at Dogger Bank. It seems almost as if there was no de-brief after previous battles to ensure problems encountered were not eradicated for the next time......
Range-finding equipment
The British used two types of range-finders - the 9ft FQ2 and the 15ft FT24, with the latter being better suited to the longer ranges that naval battles were to be fought at as guns increased in size. All five Queen Elizabeth's had this version but by 1916 only one ship in the Grand Fleet had the FT24, HMS Orion.
One can only imagine what using one of these hand held coincidence range-finders must have been like in battle conditions and exposed to the elements. The German stereoscopic sight built by Karl Zeiss of Jena was a better instrument - certainly for finding the target in less than ideal conditions - although apparently was hard on the user's eyesight over time and less robust than its opposite number. For testing the ranges the Germans had a superior "ladder" system to the British - indeed the British adopted a variation on this shortly after the battle.
All in all there does not seem to be a huge difference in the sights used by each navy themselves, but as the British version was not as good in difficult conditions - and that is exactly what they faced in this opening part of the battle - the German accuracy was accordingly much better. When you factor in the magazine and cordite handling issues (potentially) then the result is as per below.....
The loss of HMS Indefatigable
Unless otherwise stated the source for these statements comes from Skagerrak.
1548hrs
Lutzow opens fire
1549hrs
The British began to return fire a minute after Lutzow's opening salvo. Staff states that the British ships at first could only fire from their forward guns - further evidence that the deployment and the turn to the eastsoutheast was left far, far too late.
1550hrs
The first in a series of hits is achieved against HMS Tiger by Moltke (although apparently the first hit the German crew records is not until 1606hrs)
1551hrs
Lutzow scores a hit near Lion's bridge with her fourth salvo.
Moltke finds her target once again, although again causes no serious damage to Tiger.
1552hrs
An armour piercing (AP) shell from Lutzow hits the base of Lion's funnel
Strangely, given that Derfflinger was not targeted in the first ten minutes, her shooting was initially disappointing. Only now does she achieve her first straddle against Princess Royal
A third hit for Molke. Fortunately for Tiger, at this stage the hits have not been serious
1553hrs
Moltke again strikes the unfortunate Tiger
1554hrs
A fifth shell from Moltke finds its target. This hits A-turret's barbette, although the turret continues firing. Note: Jellicoe Jutland The Unfinished Battle refers to this hit as being on Q-turret, although he too states that the three turrets A, Q and X were hit around this time.
1555hrs
Queen Mary lands a shell in Seydlitz's starboard switch room and turbo-dynamo room
Tiger receives a sixth hit from the remarkably accurate Moltke - what is particularly remarkable here is that Moltke remember is under fire from two British ships. A seventh shell then strikes Tiger and more serious damage is caused. Q-turret is temporarily put out of action and the turret was to fire only intermittently for the rest of the battle
Beatty now gives the order "Increase the rate of fire"....
1556hrs
Moltke hits Tiger's X-turret putting this out of action - like Q-turret the effect was temporary, but when repaired, the turret subsequently fired 19 degrees off target
1557hrs
Beatty orders a 2-point turn to starboard to increase the range. Apparently at least some of the German ships (Seydlitz amongst them) are able to make use of their secondary armament. There is no mention of the British using theirs at this time. This causes some of the destroyers to fall out of position and, in an attempt to get back into the van, they sail up the engaged side of Beatty's ships further compounded the visibility issues that have hampered the British.
Seydlitz is hit for the second time by Queen Mary - this time the shell penetrated Caesar turret, burning it out completely. The order is given to flood the magazine
1558hrs
It took Lion 9 minutes before she straddled Hipper's flagship, but then scored two hits in quick succession, neither of which caused the much damage
Derfflinger obtains her first hits, striking Princess Royal with AP shells twice. These temporarily put the fire control tower out of action, with one detonating in a coal bunker.
Back to Tiger and a ninth shell strike that could have been fatal. As it was the hit caused the midships 6-inch magazine to be flooded, but it could have been worse as this shell just missed Tiger's main steam pipe - a hit on which would have disabled the ship. It's seems incredible that all during the run to the south and then the run to the north, none of the ships on either side were disabled or sufficiently slowed that they were "gobbled" up by the chasing pack.
1559hrs
Hipper orders a 1-point turn to port thus further increasing the range.
1600hrs
A shell from Lutzow finds Lion's Q turret, a hit that could easily have been the end for HMS Lion and David Beatty. A semi-AP shell struck Lion's Q-turret right between the face plate and the roof. The front of the roof plate was taken clean off. The occupants of the turret were killed as well as most of those in the chamber below. Only the quick thinking of the Royal Marine turret officer Major Francis Harvey saved the ship from a cataclysmic magazine explosion when he ordered the magazine doors closed and flooding of the magazine (see post 112). I think this eyewitness account says much to convey the picture:
....the armoured roof of Q-turret had been folded back like a sardine tin; thick yellow smoke was rolling up in clouds from the gaping hole, and the guns were cocked up in the air awkwardly. All this happened within yards of where Beatty was standing and none of us on the bridge heard the detonation. The destructive power was enormous but, oddly, in the maelstrom of the battle, completely unregistered on the bridge.
Derfflinger scores a hit on Princess Royal's B turret.
1601hrs
According to Staff two further hits were recorded against HMS Lion at this time
1602hrs
After dishing out so much punishment, Moltke is finally hurt - a shell near-missed and the damage caused some flooding forward on her starboard side
1603hrs
Another hit is recorded against Lion
At the rear of the two columns it seems that there is no individual record of the hits inflicted on HMS Indefatigable by Von der Tann. However, the fire ranged against the British battlecruiser was incredibly accurate and indeed was so intense that the Germans had trouble making out the ship at one point due to the maelstrom of smoke, water and battle damage. It was however at this time that the British suffered their first loss of the battle. According to observers, two or three shells hit Indefatigable in or around the rear turret and an explosion was seen (note: it has recently been shown by underwater mapping of the wreck that this was no small explosion (see below)). It was said that Indefatigable was seen to swing out of line - perhaps given the new evidence, this was not a voluntary movement, but was the blast from the hits on the turret that tore the ship in two. She then was seen to roll over as another series of shells hit her forward turret - followed by another huge explosion. Out of a crew of 1,019 just two survived. Von der Tann had not been hit once.
A recent underwater expedition located the wreck of all 25 ships lost at Jutland. The only one whose final resting place was appreciably different to that given in John Harper's (Chief Navigational Officer) charts (more of which anon) was Indefatigable. As a result of the expedition's findings they think they know why. The ships is recorded as being lost when she blew up (as in the picture). The eyewitness accounts assume she was whole at that time. But the stern of the ship was blown clean off some 5-6 minutes earlier, and a shock wave travelled through the remaining section of the ship likely killing almost everyone on board. The shell of the battlecruiser was then carried by her momentum alone before another huge explosion sent her to the bottom.
The loss of HMS Queen Mary and the arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron
The folly of Beatty's deployment had started to become apparent. Whatever the rights and wrongs and who was to blame for the delayed turn of the 5BS, Evan-Thomas had been sailing toward the battle at top speed ever since.
The lead ship, Barham, had been in position to fire, albeit at considerable distance, at the II AG as early as 1558hrs - although to no effect, and the II AG quickly turned away to the northeast under smokescreen. This however was not where their 15-inch shells were needed.
1605hrs
HMS Lion sheers out of line - no doubt while emergency work is carried out to deal with some of the fires and damage. Princess Royal assumes her place in the van.
Tiger is hit forward by a shell from her tormentor Moltke
Von der Tann is said to have been hit twice by Tiger here but no timing given or damage report
1606hrs
Too late by a matter of minutes (as a far as the Indefatigable is concerned) HMS Barham is finally in position to range her guns against Von der Tann. Very soon the whole squadron were able to fire and the lead two battleships - Barham and Valiant - turned their attention on Moltke, while Warspite and Malaya concentrated their efforts on Von der Tann.
1609hrs
Amazingly it is only now that Von der Tann is seriously hit for the first time and she is lucky that damage to her rudder, caused when a shell penetrated her armour aft and exploded sending shock waves through the area, freed itself. 600 tonnes of water enters the battlecruiser. Jellicoe states this took place at 1612hrs and was caused by a shell from the Barham.
1615hrs
Two shells hit the Lutzow in quick succession - both from Princess Royal. One of these lands between A and B turret wiping out the forward dressing station.
1616hrs
Moltke receives a 15-inch shell from Barham that destroys one of the casemated secondary guns and its crew and continues into a coal bunker where it explodes.
1618hrs (1617hrs)
Queen Mary hits the Seydlitz again, this time one of the starboard casemates is penetrated by a shell that kills the crew (less one crewman) of one of the secondary guns.
1620hrs
A shell from Moltke passes through one of Tiger's funnels
The crew of Von der Tann must have felt much as those of Indefatigable felt as she disappears in a hail of water. Her A-turret is hit and put out of action (I thought Germans called their turrets Anton, Bruno, Caesar and Dora but here the turret is called Alsen).
1621hrs
Queen Mary loses one gun in Q-turret courtesy of a shell from Seydlitz. She had previously taken a hit in the aft 4-inch battery, although no time for this is given.
1623hrs
Moltke is hit again, causing some limited flooding
Von der Tann loses another turret - Culm. The battlecruiser is now down to two working turrets - the two amid-ships. Even so she is still capable of causing trouble for the British and she delivers a shell on Barham against her belt armour.
1624hrs
Two further hits are taken by HMS Lion. Staff states that up to this time, nine shells hit HMS Lion since the start of the battle. Of these, no less than four had failed to explode. The British were not alone in having problems with their shells. Jellicoe states three shells are landed at this time - and this number would take Lion up to the nine hits recorded by Tarrant (see below).
1626hrs
At this time both Seydlitz and Derfflinger were targeting Queen Mary. Seven shells in two salvoes were seen to strike the British ship, following which she literally disappeared in a cloud of smoke. There were [20] survivors and [1,266] officers and men were killed. [Amazingly wide variance in the number of casualties]. To convey the scene I will quote from Derfflinger's gunnery officer Hase:
The Queen Mary was firing less rapidly than we were but usually full salvoes. I could see the shells coming and I had to admit that they were shooting superbly. As a rule, all eight shells fell together, but they were almost always over or short....but the poor Queen Mary was having a bad time. In addition to the Derfflinger, she was being engaged by the Seydlitz.... at 4.26 she met her doom...First a vivid red flame shot up from her forepart. Then came an explosion forward, followed by a much heavier explosion amidships. Black debris flew into the air and immediately afterwards the whole ship blew up with a terrific explosion. A gigantic cloud of smoke ros, the masts collapsed inwards, the smoke cloud hid everything and rose higher and higher. Finally nothing but a thick, black cloud of smoke remained where the ship had been. At it's base, the smoke column covered only a small area, but it widened toward the summit like a monstrous pine tree.
Moltke recieves the second of three hits that causes flooding
Von der Tann hits New Zealand, temporarily affecting her B-turret.
1627hrs
Princess Royal is hit near Q-turret (why always Q-turret?) but the turret remains operable.
A third hit on Moltke. The three hits in quick succession allow 1,000 tonnes of water into the ship and she takes on a 3 degree list. Counter-flooding is ordered to right the problem.
1628hrs
Aboard Beatty's flagship, in a frightening spectacle of the fate that would have befallen the battlecruiser had it not been for the quick thinking of Major Harvey, a cordite fire in Lion's Q-turret causes an explosion, and the huge fireball, taking the path of least resistance, flies up into the sky through the open turret roof.
1629hrs
A shell passes through Princess Royal's second funnel but fails to explode
1630hrs
Two shells from Moltke land on Tiger in quick succession. The shells hit the side armour but fail to detonate.
1632hrs
Princess Royal receives a third hit in quick succession - this time A-turret is put out of action for about 11 hours
1635hrs
It's the turn of Seydlitz to hit Tiger, with another hit forward that does little damage
Von der Tann loses her last but one gun when turret Bautzen refuses to operate.
1638hrs Hipper orders a turn to SSE to open the range, before turning toward the British once more three minutes later.
During this period torpedoes were fired, with no effect, by Lion (two) and Moltke (four) and possibly others.
The Invincible and Indefatigable were older ships - amongst the first battlecruisers built. But HMS Queen Mary was only 3-years old and truly a front line vessel. She, like Lutzow for the Germans, was the most important ship lost on her side
Summary of the fighting during the Run to the South
In Jutland The Unfinished Battle Jellicoe quotes from Tarrant's Jutland The German Perspective and states that the hits received were:
British: 44
German: 17
Totalling the hits in Staff's Skagerrak and repeated above (ignoring the near-miss that damaged Moltke and taking Tarrant's 5 hits on Indefatigable) the totals are:
British: 43
German: 18
I will look through the other sources I have to see where the differences lie (if I can) but if not, then the hits produced by each side is not very different when comparing the two sources and gives a clear indication of the superiority held by the Germans at this stage. What we can not know is exactly why that was.
German (as well as British) sources have confirmed that visibility was in the Germans favour at this stage of battle and that the dark grey British ships were easier to see than the German light grey ones.
It also appears that the German range-finding equipment was better - at least in the early stages of a battle, before the greater strain on eyesight caused the German method to lose effectiveness. The Germans also had a better "ladder" method of measuring the fall of shot.
The loss of two battlecruisers can - as much as anything is certain about this battle - be put down to poor magazine and cordite handling.
The recent experiment carried out (mentioned in the book thread) that tested Queen Mary's hull against all the hits Seydlitz received during the entire battle, confirmed that she would not have sunk had it not been for the magazine explosion. Similarly HMS Tiger took 12-14 hits without being sunk. These facts support the naval historian Norman Friedman's assertion that without the magazine and cordite handling issue it is unlikely the British would have lost any battlecruisers at Jutland.
Of course in addition to receiving hits and being able to take them and the ability to land hits on the enemy, there is also the matter of the shells themselves and how effective they are. We will look at this after the battleships clash. At this time we will also look more closely into the faulty magazine and cordite handling process, what exactly that means and whose fault was it that it was in place.
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Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
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Capt. Harlock
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RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
he table below gives the maximum range of the various guns fitted to Beatty's and Hipper's ships.
Ship for ship the British had a significant range advantage compared to their German opponents
Interesting. I had not realized that the 13.5-inchers on the "Splendid Cat" class had that much of a range advange over the British 12-inch mounts. Perhaps that was why Beatty waited to open fire -- he wanted all six of his big ships to fire at once?
Civil war? What does that mean? Is there any foreign war? Isn't every war fought between men, between brothers?
--Victor Hugo
--Victor Hugo
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
warspite1ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock
he table below gives the maximum range of the various guns fitted to Beatty's and Hipper's ships.
Ship for ship the British had a significant range advantage compared to their German opponents
Interesting. I had not realized that the 13.5-inchers on the "Splendid Cat" class had that much of a range advange over the British 12-inch mounts. Perhaps that was why Beatty waited to open fire -- he wanted all six of his big ships to fire at once?
I think that it would have been mentioned afterwards if it was a deliberate tactic. But in any case there does not seem to be any reason for adopting that approach though. Added to the fact that it would give Beatty no advantage, it would also mean waiting even longer to open fire as Indefatigable and New Zealand (the two with the shortest range) were bringing up the rear. I will mention these two, and how long it took them to fire, in post 91.
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
The Battle of Jutland/Skagerrak
100 Years Ago today.
In memory of ALL those who fought and died in the service of their country.
100 Years Ago today.
In memory of ALL those who fought and died in the service of their country.
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Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
The BBC has a story about the battle and memorial service, including the unfortunate phrase "The German fleet are deflected from bombarding the British coast by Admiral Beatty's battle cruiser squadron during the battle".
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-nor ... d-36390168
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-nor ... d-36390168
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
Draft incomplete - a lot more work required here
The first of the destroyer engagements, Hipper turns away and the torpedoeing of the Lutzow
Jutland was not just about the 'big ships'. Whilst the battlecruisers were engaged during the 'Run to the South', the first of the destroyer melee's began to develop.
Beatty had originally ordered his destroyers to prepare for an attack as early as 1555hrs - only seven minutes into the battle. Apparently a minute later he ordered the destroyers "to proceed with all speed". However, having seen no evidence of a reaction, he then signalled to the Flotilla Leader HMS Champion at 1609hrs to attack with torpedoes. By this time Indefatigable had just been lost, although Beatty may have been unaware of this.
However, the seeming lack of action was a function of how difficult it was for the destroyers to get into position, whilst not getting in each others way - or indeed that of the battlecruisers. For one thing, the British destroyers were divided with the 13th Flotilla, on Beatty’s starboard side, and the 9th/10th Flotillas + HMS Obdurate from the 13th on the BCF commander’s port (engaged) side.
Note: because of the confused state of the fighting the events described under each time, should not be taken necessarily as happening there and then. The timings indicate the commencement of various actions which then take place over a period of time.
1615hrs
The 13th Flotilla receives orders from their Flotilla Leader (HMS Champion) to attack. Note: finding reliable detail on this episode is proving difficult – Skagerrak and The Unfinished Battle state different ships being involved, although both state 12 destroyers.
But it appears that Captain Barrie Bingham (see post 112), aboard HMS Nestor, leads the following destroyers (a mix of 10th and 13th Flotillas) into action: Nicator, Petard, Nerissa, Nomad, Turbulent, Termagent, Moorsom, Obdurate, Morris, Narborough and Pelican. Note: Moresby and Onslow were not involved initially as they had provided the escort for Engadine.
As can be imagined the attack was difficult to co-ordinate with ships either side of the battlecruisers, the poor visability and the fact that the destroyers themselves were under fire from shorts and overs aimed at the battlecruisers and the secondary armament being fired at them directly.
According to Staff, Champion did not escort its flotilla in but HMS Nottingham, of the 2LCS, was ordered by Goodenough to assist. Unfortunately in so doing she got in the way of some of the destroyers and caused them to have to take urgent avoiding action.
1626hrs
Much – in fact a great deal - will be made of the fact that Admiral Jellicoe turned away from a German Torpedo attack later in the battle. However, this was a sensible and widely adopted practice…as we shall see.
On seeing the British destroyers heading into the ‘no-man’s land’ between the battlecruiser lines, Hipper gave the order to turn away, first to the southeast and then to eastsoutheast. This order is not criticised and is not given anything more than a brief mention in most books on the subject. Only at 1641hrs did Hipper give the order to turn southwest once more.
But what of the British attack? The attack, which as said above, was somewhat piecemeal, broke up further as the Germans responded to the British move. Kommodore Heinrich, aboard the light cruiser Regensburg, ordered the eleven torpedo boats (TB) of the 9th Flotilla into action. Four ships of the 3rd Half-Flotilla also joined. What then ensued was essentially a destroyer vs TB battle (with support from the cruisers Regensburg (close support) and Nottingham (firing from ‘distance’)) with a few of the British destroyers deciding to ignore the TB’s and continue on with their original orders; attacking Hipper’s battlecruisers.
I have gathered the following from Skagerrak, although the German sources appear exaggerated (15-20 destroyers and 3 light cruisers):
Obdurate – hit twice
Nomad – hit once, a shell in the engine room brings her to a stop
V.27 – hit twice, including a shell rupturing the main steam pipe bringing her to a stop
V.29 – torpedoed by HMS Petard
S.36 – Splinter damage
From The Unfinished Battle the following can be ascertained:
1640hrs
Three British destroyers Nomad (Bingham), Nestor and Nicator ignore the TB’s and continue with their mission
1645hrs
The three small ships are targeted by heavy German secondary fire and from a light cruiser (possibly Wiesbaden). Nomad is badly hit and wheels away before coming to a dead stop and sinking. She avoids two torpedoes (that travel under her) and from her dead-duck position, manages to fire off three torpedoes. Nicator and Nestor also fire off two torpedoes each but none of these register a hit.
1650hrs
Petard torpedoes the Seydlitz
1700hrs
Nestor is hit twice (by whom it is not know) – like Nomad she too comes to a stop and both will soon sink after being plastered by gun-fire from German ships as the ‘Run to the North’ gets going.
In total the twelve British destroyers fired off twenty-one torpedoes, hitting the Seydlitz and sinking V.29.
The German TB’s launched eighteen torpedoes and while none of these hit, their presence did cause the 5BS to turn away by 2 points at one point in the battle.
The first of the destroyer engagements, Hipper turns away and the torpedoeing of the Lutzow
Jutland was not just about the 'big ships'. Whilst the battlecruisers were engaged during the 'Run to the South', the first of the destroyer melee's began to develop.
Beatty had originally ordered his destroyers to prepare for an attack as early as 1555hrs - only seven minutes into the battle. Apparently a minute later he ordered the destroyers "to proceed with all speed". However, having seen no evidence of a reaction, he then signalled to the Flotilla Leader HMS Champion at 1609hrs to attack with torpedoes. By this time Indefatigable had just been lost, although Beatty may have been unaware of this.
However, the seeming lack of action was a function of how difficult it was for the destroyers to get into position, whilst not getting in each others way - or indeed that of the battlecruisers. For one thing, the British destroyers were divided with the 13th Flotilla, on Beatty’s starboard side, and the 9th/10th Flotillas + HMS Obdurate from the 13th on the BCF commander’s port (engaged) side.
Note: because of the confused state of the fighting the events described under each time, should not be taken necessarily as happening there and then. The timings indicate the commencement of various actions which then take place over a period of time.
1615hrs
The 13th Flotilla receives orders from their Flotilla Leader (HMS Champion) to attack. Note: finding reliable detail on this episode is proving difficult – Skagerrak and The Unfinished Battle state different ships being involved, although both state 12 destroyers.
But it appears that Captain Barrie Bingham (see post 112), aboard HMS Nestor, leads the following destroyers (a mix of 10th and 13th Flotillas) into action: Nicator, Petard, Nerissa, Nomad, Turbulent, Termagent, Moorsom, Obdurate, Morris, Narborough and Pelican. Note: Moresby and Onslow were not involved initially as they had provided the escort for Engadine.
As can be imagined the attack was difficult to co-ordinate with ships either side of the battlecruisers, the poor visability and the fact that the destroyers themselves were under fire from shorts and overs aimed at the battlecruisers and the secondary armament being fired at them directly.
According to Staff, Champion did not escort its flotilla in but HMS Nottingham, of the 2LCS, was ordered by Goodenough to assist. Unfortunately in so doing she got in the way of some of the destroyers and caused them to have to take urgent avoiding action.
1626hrs
Much – in fact a great deal - will be made of the fact that Admiral Jellicoe turned away from a German Torpedo attack later in the battle. However, this was a sensible and widely adopted practice…as we shall see.
On seeing the British destroyers heading into the ‘no-man’s land’ between the battlecruiser lines, Hipper gave the order to turn away, first to the southeast and then to eastsoutheast. This order is not criticised and is not given anything more than a brief mention in most books on the subject. Only at 1641hrs did Hipper give the order to turn southwest once more.
But what of the British attack? The attack, which as said above, was somewhat piecemeal, broke up further as the Germans responded to the British move. Kommodore Heinrich, aboard the light cruiser Regensburg, ordered the eleven torpedo boats (TB) of the 9th Flotilla into action. Four ships of the 3rd Half-Flotilla also joined. What then ensued was essentially a destroyer vs TB battle (with support from the cruisers Regensburg (close support) and Nottingham (firing from ‘distance’)) with a few of the British destroyers deciding to ignore the TB’s and continue on with their original orders; attacking Hipper’s battlecruisers.
I have gathered the following from Skagerrak, although the German sources appear exaggerated (15-20 destroyers and 3 light cruisers):
Obdurate – hit twice
Nomad – hit once, a shell in the engine room brings her to a stop
V.27 – hit twice, including a shell rupturing the main steam pipe bringing her to a stop
V.29 – torpedoed by HMS Petard
S.36 – Splinter damage
From The Unfinished Battle the following can be ascertained:
1640hrs
Three British destroyers Nomad (Bingham), Nestor and Nicator ignore the TB’s and continue with their mission
1645hrs
The three small ships are targeted by heavy German secondary fire and from a light cruiser (possibly Wiesbaden). Nomad is badly hit and wheels away before coming to a dead stop and sinking. She avoids two torpedoes (that travel under her) and from her dead-duck position, manages to fire off three torpedoes. Nicator and Nestor also fire off two torpedoes each but none of these register a hit.
1650hrs
Petard torpedoes the Seydlitz
1700hrs
Nestor is hit twice (by whom it is not know) – like Nomad she too comes to a stop and both will soon sink after being plastered by gun-fire from German ships as the ‘Run to the North’ gets going.
In total the twelve British destroyers fired off twenty-one torpedoes, hitting the Seydlitz and sinking V.29.
The German TB’s launched eighteen torpedoes and while none of these hit, their presence did cause the 5BS to turn away by 2 points at one point in the battle.
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
The Independent has the same picture and untrue caption.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ho ... 57336.html
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ho ... 57336.html
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
My goodness - that's even worse!!! Apparently Beatty formed a protective screen....right......
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
My faith in British media is shattered. The Guardian has better coverage.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/m ... -in-orkney and
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/m ... ey-islands and
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/m ... ry-service and
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016 ... of-its-day
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/m ... -in-orkney and
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/m ... ey-islands and
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/m ... ry-service and
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016 ... of-its-day
RE: A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on
I've just read a few paragraphs of Michael White's article. Awful, just awful. Apparently in 1914 German U-boats sank allied shipping on a "prodigious scale" and the Imperial High Seas Fleet was commanded by Reinhard Scheer..... As for the battle, in the preliminary skirmishes all 25 ships were sunk....
Oh...
Oh...
Now Maitland, now's your time!
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815
Duke of Wellington to 1st Guards Brigade - Waterloo 18 June 1815