A look at The Battle of Jutland 100 years on

[warspite1]

Whoops [8|] - posted in the wrong place....

[Speedysteve]

Great topic warspite. I may be able to help with deck armour thickness for HSF ships. I have a few books around. Let me have a look. If any joy I'll PM you

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Speedy

Great topic warspite. I may be able to help with deck armour thickness for HSF ships. I have a few books around. Let me have a look. If any joy I'll PM you

warspite1

Thank-you! Not sure why Conways does not have this stat for the German ships.

[Orm]

c) the Germans were far better armoured.

Was there a difference in armour quality as well?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Orm

c) the Germans were far better armoured.

Was there a difference in armour quality as well?

warspite1

I read a line in Rules of The Game that British armour was in some respects better - no other details and that was something I've not heard before.

On a related point, of course what simple numbers don't say is that the internals of the German ships were better compartmentalised to further aid survive-ability in the event of flooding*.

See later - this has been disproven.....

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm

c) the Germans were far better armoured.

Was there a difference in armour quality as well?

warspite1

I read a line in Rules of The Game that British armour was in some respects better - no other details and that was something I've not heard before.

On a related point, of course what simple numbers don't say is that the internals of the German ships were better compartmentalised to further aid survivability in the event of flooding.

Thank you. [&o] [:)]

[Speedysteve]

Agreed. I think it was (upon analysis) agreed that the German ships were generally better designed in terms of structural integrity (let alone the lessons learned at Dogger regarding explosions and the actions/upgrades taken because of it)

[warspite1]

The Opening Moves

In post 31 we saw how the Germans, if they were going to mount an operation prior to the U-boats having to return home, needed to do so by the end of May.

An order was thus put out on the morning of the 30th for the High Seas Fleet to prepare to sail. As also seen in post 31, the British were ahead of the Germans in regard to signals intelligence, and as a result of the Admiralty's Room 40 reading this message, Jellicoe was ordered to put the Grand Fleet sea and a position 100 miles east of Aberdeen.

One source states Jellicoe was given this information by mid-afternoon, another states late afternoon. However it seems the timing here is not important. The Admiralty - and Jellicoe - were aware of the heavy U-boat presence. Jellicoe's fear was that if he left other than at night his force would be sighted by the enemy submarines and Scheer would recall his fleet. For this reason he would need to sail a night.

The problem with sailing at night however was that if he were to get his fleet to the Horns Reef (likely German route home), and in between the Germans and their base, he would likely only arrive late in the afternoon and probably too late to give battle. But those considerations would have to wait as first he would have to sail and then see how things panned out.

At some time around 1730hrs the Admiralty ordered Jellicoe to make steam - and this order was passed onto both Jerram at Cromarty and Beatty further south at Rosyth. In the last hours of the 30th May the ships of the Grand Fleet (GF) and the Battlecruiser Fleet (BCF) left their bases - some for what would be the last time - and headed in a roughly easterly direction. The ships totalled 151 in all, although the seaplane carrier Campania was not amongst them as apparently she was not given orders to sail - and when this was noticed Jellicoe decided he couldn't provide the destroyer escort at a time he was so short of such ships.


The plan called for the two British fleets to rendezvous, whereupon the 5th Battle Squadron and the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron would swap positions and rejoin their respective fleets. Events overtook this plan however....



The German fleets - headed by Vice-Admiral Hipper's reconnaissance forces - left the Jade in the early hours of the 31st May for their journey north. The distance between the fleets was 60 miles.

[Speedysteve]

Hi All,

Has anyone read and can recommend Andrew Gordon's book: "The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command"?

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Speedy

Hi All,

Has anyone read and can recommend Andrew Gordon's book: "The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command"?

warspite1

Hi Speedy - I'm doing a review now - should be in the book thread this morning.

[Speedysteve]

Thanks[8D]

[altipueri]

Churchill's "The World Crisis" has quite a bit on it.

"The ponderous, poignant responsibilities borne successfully, if not triumphantly, by Sir John Jellicoe during two years of faithful command, constitute unanswerable claims to the lasting respect of the nation."


Incidentally, if you are in the UK, I got my copy for £2 from The Works bookshop - new. 800 pages of brilliant writing even if you don't agree with everything Churchill says - and there's quite a bit on the Dardanelles.

[Speedysteve]

For those in the UK there's a program on Jutland on Channel 4 this Saturday at 8PM. No idea if it's going to be any good but thought I'd let you know![8D]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Speedy

For those in the UK there's a program on Jutland on Channel 4 this Saturday at 8PM. No idea if it's going to be any good but thought I'd let you know![8D]

warspite1

Cheers - record button set [:)]

[warspite1]

The Fleets are underway and the first talking points are not long in making themselves known.

1. Intelligence and Reconaissance

a) HMS Campania. This seaplane carrier (which could have been vital) was not given orders to sail. When she got underway Jellicoe sent her back as he felt he could not spare the escorts required. Does anyone know how such an important ship was not given orders? Was it just an oversight (if so presumably because it was not realised how important her presence could prove to be?).

b) Room 40 and call sign DK (the German Flagship call sign). Whose fault was it that the British believed that the German battleships were in the Jade? A number of sources to quote from:

In his book Skagerrak, the author suggests that one or more low level officers came up with a ruse specifically for this operation (maybe others but it was not a frequently used ploy). Quite simply the fleet flagship and the wireless station of the III Entrance at Wilhelmshaven would exchange call signs for the duration of the operation.

Staff goes on to say that after the Grand Fleet had sailed - around noon of the 31st - the Director of Operations, Captain Jackson visited Room 40 to ask for the location of call sign DK. He was given the answer "In Wilhelmshaven". With that he left the room and passed the information on that the flagship was still in the Jade.

In his book Jutland The Unfinished Battle Jellicoe suggests that not only was this ploy widely used - at least it was used during the Scarborough and Lowestoft raids, but that Room 40 personnel knew about it. He maintains that Captain Thomas Jackson was not a well-liked individual - being described as insufferable, blustering, ridiculous and a buffoon who treated the Room 40 personnel with disdain. He supposedly entered Room 40, asked them "where were they picking up call sign DK?" and the response was an equally perfunctory "In the Jade" - to which there was no further enquiry or comment.

Given how important this information was, it would be nice to think this was just a misunderstanding but based upon descriptions of Jackson (e.g. by Andrew Gordon in The Rules of The Game) it is easy to believe that it was more than that. According to Gordon, Jackson was someone who believed that the workings of Room 40 and its personnel couldn't possibly contribute anything to naval operations.

As to the effects of this mistake, Gordon provides a view different to the likes of Professor Marder and Robert Massie who give greater weight to its effects. We shall look at this again later, but in the meantime as a result of being given the information that Scheer was in port, Jellicoe continued at a leisurely 15 knots in order to conserve fuel.


HMS Campania was commissioned in April 1915. She underwent a conversion between November 1915 and April 1916, at the end of which she was capable of carrying seven Short 184 floatplanes and three or four fighters in hangars. These aircraft could have proved vital at Jutland

[Capt. Harlock]

as a result of being given the information that Scheer was in port, Jellicoe continued at a leisurely 15 knots in order to conserve fuel.

And of course, had the main fleet action begun an hour earlier . . .

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

as a result of being given the information that Scheer was in port, Jellicoe continued at a leisurely 15 knots in order to conserve fuel.

And of course, had the main fleet action begun an hour earlier . . .

warspite1

That was my thinking, although one of Gordon's arguments is that there would not be an extra hour. I will explore that and his thinking in due course.

[warspite1]

2. Vice-Admiral Beatty and the 5th Battle Squadron (5BS)

One of the biggest areas of controversy surrounds Beatty's use of the temporarily attached 5BS once the two battlecruiser fleets found each other. However I think it worth leaving the North Sea and quickly going back to the build up to the battle as this controversy starts a good deal earlier.

Vice-Admiral Beatty made very clear his wish for the 5BS to be attached to his Battlecruiser Fleet (BCF) - indeed he went too far in one episode, writing to Jellicoe on the subject and copying in the Admiralty - something that earned him a reprimand from Jellicoe and led to Beatty having to issue an apology.

Jellicoe pointed out, not unreasonably, that the Queen Elizabeth's, which had not proved to be as fast as designed, would prove to be more of a hinderance than an asset to the BCF, whose main asset was its speed. It is fair to say too that it was not only Jellicoe - but also some on Beatty's own staff - that were worried about what the, far from cautious Beatty, would do if he had the power of the 5BS added to his fleet.

But as things turned out Beatty was to get his hands on the 5BS after all. The gunnery accuracy of the BCF had been causing concern for some time. There was no room for the ships of the BCF to practice in the confined waters around Rosyth and so it was agreed that the 3BCS (Invincible, Inflexible, Indomitable) would sail to Scapa Flow for 10 days in order to get some shooting practice in. Because of the recent damage to HMS Australia, that meant Beatty would be four ships down. For this reason Jellicoe agreed to transfer the 5BS to Beatty for that 10-day period and the squadrons would swap places again when they rendezvoused at the end of May (note Beatty would have the use of four ships: Barham, Valiant, Warspite and Malaya as the fifth vessel, Queen Elizabeth, would undergo a refit at that time).

What makes this story so relevant to the actual battle is what happened when the 5BS, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, arrived at Rosyth. I believe that what happened next is a serious black mark against Vice-Admiral Beatty. Beatty was to subsequently lay blame at Evan-Thomas's door for his perceived failings during the battle, but as can be seen below, Beatty, at the very least, did not exactly help matters.

From the time that Evan-Thomas arrived at his squadron's new temporary home, there was not one meeting between he and his new boss. Apart from the fact that it was a time of war and the fleet could be called to sea at any time, there was to be a known fleet sortie at the end of the month. Therefore the enemy could be encountered at any time. Despite this, Beatty who had said previously "one hour's conversation is worth a volume of correspondence" did not consider it worth his while. As Andrew Gordon says regarding the importance of such a meeting, this is especially the case since Beatty was not someone who acted by the book, but expected initiative from his subordinates. For those subordinates to be able to show appropriate initiative surely they would need to know what their commander was thinking and to get on their wave-length?

But the problems caused by Beatty do not end there. Gordon confirms that in correspondence with Jellicoe, in making the case for the 5BS to be permanently attached to the BCF, the Vice-Admiral stated that the speed differential would not be too much of a hinderance and said the following in support:

If at the start of the engagement the fleet travels say 75 miles (three hours) then the 5BS would only be some 4.5 miles behind the battlecruisers even at the end of that chase - and thus still able to provide effective support.

Well quite, provided the 5BS started the engagement close to the battlecruisers it was supposed to support..... This is not what happened at Jutland as we shall see. Beatty's cruising deployment of the fleet that day seems to discount any thought that they may encounter the enemy before the rendezvous with Jellicoe. It all seems slapdash.

[Speedysteve]

I find it hard not to pipe up now on Beatty. I make no excuses in saying I'm not his biggest fan. I find his actions compulsive, ill thought out (more so instinctive and route one) and I think one of his biggest failing is in his lack of communication and that others assume they know what he means or should do. This failed him at Dogger Bank (Goodenough and blaming him afterwards) and at Jutland (Evan-Thomas and blaming him also). I think 'Flags' has a large burden to share for not behaving as he should do (although I won't push this too much as Beatty laid into him in the future and ultimately he committed suicide in his early 30's which is tragic).

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Speedy

I think 'Flags' has a large burden to share for not behaving as he should do (although I won't push this too much as Beatty laid into him in the future and ultimately he committed suicide in his early 30's which is tragic).

warspite1

Indeed, the man came to a sad end - and Beatty did not help (quite the reverse) [:(]. I am a huge believer in the Peter Principle - we get promoted to our level of incompetence. Seymour reached that level and Beatty was too blind to realise it. I never let Napoleon off the hook at Waterloo - he was let down by subordinates but he himself was responsible for appointing them in the wrong positions. Well equally, Beatty cannot escape blame for having the wrong man in the key role of Flag-Lieutenant.