Turn 131: 16 – 22 December 1943
(improvised river crossing south of Kiev)
On the morning of 16 December, the long lull in the war in the Ukraine was shattered. Even before the first Soviet guns roared into life, partisans blew key bridges and rail sections, isolating some sections of the front.
The Suvorov Offensive
The 16th saw the Soviet formations to the south of Kiev in action. The Germans had abandoned Dnepropetrovsk the previous week and elements of Trans-Caucasus Front struck at their retreating units, drawing their reserves away from the main threat.
The main attack saw 3 Fronts (1 Ukrainian, North-Caucasus and 4 Ukrainian) in action.
The infantry formations of 1 Ukrainian stormed Cherkassy catching the Germans by surprise. Initial reports confirmed the earlier guess that there were no German mobile reserves on this sector.
With four tank armies available (1,2, 4 and 6), and no German mobile units behind Cherkassy, the Front quickly expanded its bridgehead. Only a desperate defensive victory by the battered divisions of XXXIV Corps actually prevented the Soviets breaking through the final German defensive positions.
(opening attack of 1 Tank Army)
Even so, 1 Ukrainian had carved out a grip on the west bank that was 40 miles from north to south and up to 30 miles west of the river.
To the south, North Caucasus Front also made rapid progress. 41 and 50 Armies forced the river at Chigirin and Bagramyan's 3 Guard Army quickly broadened the bridgehead. Operating with 41 Army it was able to encircle elements of the German XXXXIX Corps and force them to fall back in disorder.
By the end of the week, the two fronts joined up on the west bank, given the Red Army control of a 60 mile long stretch of the river.
Finally 4 Ukrainian captured high ground over the river and threatened the rear of the axis units retreating in the Dneipr bend.
The original plan had called for 3 Ukrainian to be held back till the Germans had committed their reserves. However, the success of the partisan campaign in the region, and clear evidence that the Germans had no mobile reserves north of Cherkassy, led Stavka to order the front to attack on the 17th.
(partisan sabotage mission in the Chernobyl region)
Unlike further south, the German defence was weak enough that 4 and 5 Shock Armies created a 30 mile breach in their front line in the opening hours.
With that, 3 and 5 Tank Armies and the cavalry-mechanised group of 40 Army were able to exploit the confusion. By the end of the week, Soviet spearheads had reached the Pripyet around Chernobyl. The biggest obstacle was not German resistance but the poor roads and deep woods of this region.
The Kutuzov Offensive
North of the Pripyet, there was no immediate difference between the previous fighting east of Minsk and the new Soviet offensive. Western and 2 Baltic Fronts made some gains while 1 Baltic continued to pin down the bulk of the German armoured formations. The Dauga remained unfrozen, limiting the scope to broaden the offensive.
Now that the fighting was across the entire front from Dnepropetrovsk to the Dvina, losses escalated. The Axis lost 39,000 men (17,000 kia), 75 tanks and 225 planes for Soviet losses of 53,000 men (31,000 kia), 400 tanks and 210 planes.