OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

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heliodorus04
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OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by heliodorus04 »

I'm not the historian some of you are (my bookshelf is mainly tank-related).
I'm re-playing a game based on Crete 41, and wondering: Did the Italian Navy do anything of impact in its brief period in the war?
I suppose the answer is no, but why not?

I know radar was a factor, but how is it that Malta couldn't be starved (I know about the aborted invasion plans)? How is it that Crete couldn't be supported by the Navy?

I know they made good planes and had some decent pilots. I know their equipment for ground combat was terrible and their officer corps likewise.

How was the Navy that bad?
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by KWG »

Bad leadership all around.
Rommel thought they had good light infantry.

As a kid I always thought they had the coolest camouflaged planes.[:)]

"Some modern Italian historians and writers claim that the Italian Navy actually won the Mediterranean naval war as they maintained the supply lines to Libya till the end of the land fighting and that they only surrender because their government ordered them too!"

mmmm..... maybe not WON but did not LOSE.
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by Q-Ball »

I am not a naval expert by any means, but the Regia Marina was hampered by a few things IIRC:

--Fuel was critically low
--Coordination between the navy and air force was overall very poor, and largely negated the effectiveness of the Italian torpedo bombers
--Radar was a problem, and RN had big advantage there
--Overall naval leadership and training was not up to RN standards

That's basically the list; the RM nevertheless did manage to keep supply lines open to Libya, and as a force in being did tie down a lot of RN assets

I also think the Italians just overall had a morale problem, in that the general population was not particularly behind the war effort, especially after the US entered
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by warspite1 »

How was the Navy that bad?

Well first off you won’t get agreement for that statement from all quarters. The naval historian O’Hara is a firm supporter of the Regia Marina’s performance in World War II.

He argues that the navy had a job to do – first and foremost to protect and supply the colony of Libya and also Albania – and by and large they did it. He also makes great play of the fact that, unlike the Kriegsmarine and the Imperial Japanese Navy, the RM was largely intact by the end of the war.

Whether you subscribe to this view depends on your point of view I guess. Certainly the RM could (and in my view) should have been more aggressive, but of course in so doing, they may have suffered an irreversible defeat early on that doomed their North African Empire. But to my mind it is difficult seeing the keeping of the fleet intact as a positive when your country has suffered seaborne invasion after invasion and your country defeated.

There is so much to discuss here, so much of interest (and one of the reasons that wargame makers ignoring the Med 1940-1943 is criminal) but here are a few points:

You mention Crete. It’s a valid point as the RM could have wreaked havoc on top of the mayhem already caused by the Luftwaffe, but the main reason that the Italians did not sortie was the fear that difficulties with co-operation between the Luftwaffe and the naval units meant that ‘blue on blue’ was too much of a risk.

Malta was not starved because of the herculean – and costly – efforts of the Royal Navy (and Royal Air Force). The RN suffered considerable losses in keeping Malta in the war – hence my view that a concerted effort by the RM against a ridiculously over-stretched RN could have paid dividends for the Italians.

The idea that the RM had no fuel – as some on these forums have said recently – is simply wrong. It has to be remembered that Mussolini declared war because he thought it was over – it was already won. Oil expenditure by the RM in the first 12 months paid no heed to what was perhaps to come. That the oil situation became gradually worse is not in dispute, but the Italians were still able to field battleships into 1942.

Radar? Yes radar could be important e.g. Matapan, but it was not the reason for that British success alone. Admiral Cunningham had to make the gutsy decision to send his ships into waters that would make them vulnerable to aircraft in the morning. The easy option would have been not to – and the option Supermarina would have made. But the RN mindset was different.

There is no doubt that the Italians were fighting the RN’s reputation in WWII. The RM had faster, more modern and better armed ships (the British had nothing like the Littorios and the Italian heavy cruiser force out-gunned the British light cruisers). Great play is made of the Italians not having an aircraft carrier, but a) they had the carriers ‘Calabria’ and ‘Sicily’ (albeit with notorious co-operation difficulties) and b) the RN were lucky if they could always provide one carrier – and that carrier was often HMS Eagle……

Swap Campioni for Cunningham and allow Supermarina to give Cunningham full control and the RM is one of the great what-ifs of WWII – and a wargame that desperately needs making.
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by aspqrz02 »

There were a number of reasons for the Regia Marina's poor showing, the top three being ...

1) Fuel
2) Fuel
3) Fuel

When Musso declared war, something like 60% of Italy's Merchant Marine were overseas and were captured or sunk or interned pretty much right away. Piss poor planning (no planning for Il Duce, as it happens).

She had few tankers in any case, and, anyway, imported something like 90+% of her oil needs ... in foreign tankers from foreign controlled sources (yes, there is oil in Libya ... but, back in the day, it wasn't known to exist and, in any case, the deposits were too deep for the drilling technology of the day ... it was another 15-20 years before they were able to be tapped).

Il Duce's careful pre-war planning (ROTFL [:D]) meant that Italy had virtually no oil reserves (as Germany did).

The entire country would have ground to a halt (those parts that required oil, anyway ... the Navy, the Air Force, a significant chunk of industry) if Hitler hadn't authorised emergency supplies.

The supplies for the Regia Marina were stripped, against their wishes, from the Kriegsmarine's allocation of the German strategic oil reserves and overall production. And that amount was barely enough to keep the engines of the larger ships and, indeed, most Italian warships, at maintenance levels (shutting down a marine engine means that it can take days, perhaps longer, to start it up again, on big ships) ... and, therefore, sitting more or less immobile in port.

What fuel there was for the warships was mainly reserved for the lighter craft escorting convoys to North Africa ... and the few sorties by larger fleet units were usually done at the behest of the Germans, or after cajoling extra fuel out of them (or simply from extended periods of saving).

There were other problems, too ...

* Italian ships were designed for operations in the Mediterranean, a very different environment than the Atlantic ... and the few ships (including subs) that served outside the Med tended to suffer from those shortcomings (Italian subs were not notably successful compared to German subs).

* Il Duce didn't want his pretty toys broken ... and the Naval High Command got that message in spades. A lot of their battle decisions (or decisions to break off battles) are known to have been significantly, probably overly, influenced by that desire.

* The Navy reflected Italian society fairly closely (not as much as the Army, and more so than the airforce) in that the Officer class was very stratified, insular, and slow to accept new ideas and there was a considerable gulf between the officers and their men (less so than in the Army, though, as noted) ... and High Command and Ship captains reflected a peacetime promotion system based on class, social contacts, and political reliability ... and wasn't able to overcome those limits (unlike the RN or USN, where they were less severe to begin with and were overcome more quickly, though still taking several years).

Why couldn't Malta be taken.

Well, it probably could have been ... but there were limiting factors.

1) Lack of shipping (most of the Merchant Marine was lost and the rest was oversubscribed trying to supply the Aegean islands, North Africa, Albania, Greece etc.)

2) Lack of fuel. For all services.

3) The Italian Airforce showed itself to be marginally capable, and certainly incapable of supporting an invasion by itself. The Luftwaffe would have had to have been involved as it was the force that actually brought Malta to its knees with bombing ...

Unfortunately, the additional Luftflotte that enabled the Luftwaffe to do that and support Rommel in North Africa and operations in Greece and the Aegean was pre-allocated for Barbarossa, and had to eventually be withdrawn for such ... after that an already marginal operation was even more so.

The Italians had some Paras, but no one knew how well they would perform *as* Paras in an invasion. They would have had to have been supported by the German Paras, but Hitler was wary of committing them ... they had been savaged during the invasion of France and the Low Countries (something like half of all the Ju-52s available were lost during those operations) and their performance in the invasion of Crete was, well, marginal ... and losses so bad that Hitler was reluctant to ever commit them *as* Paras ever again (and losses of Ju-52s were horrific).

So, yes, it could have been attempted. Yes, it could well have succeeded, but losses would have been nasty ... and what would the gain have been?

It would have put an operational crimp in sub attacks vs Axis convoys to North Africa, but not as much as to make any real difference ... most of the reason for the success of Allied Sub attacks was Enigma not Malta.

Crete. Well, the Luftwaffe said it could take the place by air. It did, barely, but losses were so horrendous (men and equipment) that Hitler never allowed Paras to be used on the same scale again.

And it was a close run thing. A slightly more competent Allied commander, and slightly more competent Allied unit commanders and a little luck and the invasion would have failed. It was that close, if you care to read up on it.

The German sea-reinforcements were committed in commandeered coasters and fishing caiques and were savaged, and mostly destroyed, by the RN.

Phil
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by warspite1 »

I think you have overdone the fuel issue. Yes, it was a problem, yes it got worse as the war went on, but no, there were plenty of sorties by the larger fleet units (particularly in the first 12 months) - and thus the opportunity to hit the incredibly over-stretched Royal Navy had the will been there.

I am glad you mentioned other points because the fuel situation is too convenient a get out for the lack of urgency the RM showed in taking the war to the British.
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by carlkay58 »

Yes there was a fuel problem. It is/was also a great excuse. The reality is that admirals can lose the war in a single day (see Jutland) if they lose their ships while a 'fleet in being' is better than no fleet at all.

The RM's actions in WWII is a great 'what if'. After the Japanese attacks in the Pacific, the RN was stretched pretty thin and possibly vulnerable to being attacked by the RM in the Med. On the other hand you have the British naval mystique as the greatest navy at the time and Italian naval leadership that did not have sufficient motivation or initiative to do anything other than be a threat by its existence. You also had the effects of air power against naval ships that had begun to be VERY apparent to everyone and a RM that had little or no training in air and fleet coordination.

When it takes years to replace a cruiser or battleship it fosters very conservative leadership. The RM was not the only navy that illustrated that. The IJN, USN, and RN all had top leadership that were very conservative in their use of their ships. Yes those navies also had leaders that were willing to accept the losses because they had to in order to fight the war and these are the leaders that bubbled to the top. The RM had leaders such as those too but they were not given the opportunity to 'bubble to the top' because of their leaderships.

The RM was to keep the sea lanes open to North Africa and Albania. Something it did by just existing for a long time. The Italian leadership - both political and naval - did not require the RM to be aggressive. Their war plans were, on the whole, completely satisfied with the RM being a fleet in being rather than an active participant in the fighting. The RN was conservative in response to the RM's potential threat and thus satisfied the Italian needs. So why fight if you can only lose the war and no real chance of winning it?
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by aspqrz02 »

There are always many reasons why a nation, or particular elements of a nation's armed forces, perform poorly ... and, indeed, there were a number of reasons why the Regia Marina performed poorly, which I indicated.

However, I think you underestimate the importance of the fuel shortage ... yes, the RM theoretically had oil reserves in 1940 believed to be sufficient for 1 1/2 years of wartime operations ... but, overall, Italy had made no such preparations ... so those fuel allocations were immediately and routinely raided by the Government to fuel industry (25% right off the mark) and the Regia Aeronautica (another 5% right off the mark) and further requisitioning reduced the initial stocks by 70% to perhaps 600,000 tons within the first year before you even consider the expenditure on naval operations ... and, by January 41, these were severely restricted as a result.

That's after Italy had been in the war for not quite 7 months.

Since the Italians were unable to take on the British ... losing to them badly ... and the war was almost over in the Western Desert by Dec 40, and was only salvaged in Feb 41 with the arrival of the DAK and since the invasion of Crete was staged in May 41, by which time Italian naval operations were severely restricted by fuel shortages, I think that the implications are far more significant than you seem to accept, though, as I noted, they are not the only issues that significantly affected Italian performance during the war.

There is an interesting summation of some of the issues here ...

http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text. ... =125&lid=1

Phil
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by heliodorus04 »

Enlightening. Thanks.
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by warspite1 »

No I do not underestimate the problem. I simply do not overestimate by stating:

There were a number of reasons for the Regia Marina's poor showing, the top three being ...

1) Fuel
2) Fuel
3) Fuel


In making your case that way, you suggest (and I suspect unintentionally) that if you solved Italy's fuel problems then the Regia Marina would have performed much better. Although you have repeated the point I made re the restrictive orders from Supermarina, this alone - even with a surplus of fuel - would by definition have countered the ability of the RM to give the RN the bloody nose they needed to give them.

Yes of course fuel is important - but given that fuel was available - otherwise how would Calabria, Spartivento, Matapan, Sirte etc etc have happened? - if the political and military leadership was there, then an opportunity - with Italy's commanding place in the Central Mediterranean and the RN's need to enter those waters, could surely have been fashioned.
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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by aspqrz02 »

Matapan and Sirte were fought towards the end of 1941, when the RM was suffering serious operational restrictions because of the accellerating fuel shortage ... however, as I noted, the Italians were able to stage occasional sorties of large warships by prioritising the limited fuel supplies available ... and note the gap between the first two battles and the last two ...

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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by zakblood »

Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Italian_Army_during_World_War_II

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RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2?

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Matapan and Sirte were fought towards the end of 1941, when the RM was suffering serious operational restrictions because of the accellerating fuel shortage ... however, as I noted, the Italians were able to stage occasional sorties of large warships by prioritising the limited fuel supplies available ... and note the gap between the first two battles and the last two ...

Phil
warspite1

Sorry I am not sure what the date has to do with Italy's ability to hurt the RN. Fortunes ebbed and flowed (e.g. for some months after Taranto, but then also for some time after the torpedoing of Valiant and Queen Elizabeth). Also you are incorrect about the end of 1941 for Matapan (although I see you were probably referring to Sirte I - I did not make clear which I was referring to). Matapan was March 1941. By the way the Second Battle of Sirte was March 1942 and involved a number of larger RM ships inc a battleship.

No one - certainly not me - is suggesting that the RM had fuel to spend as they pleased. They did have fuel to expend though, and that enabled them to put the fleet to sea (and later lesser no. of ships at a time). It was Supermarina's restrictive orders that was more the cause of the RM not engaging the British in the early months - not a lack of fuel. At Calabria the British cruisers were out-gunned, and Cunningham could only get Warspite into the battle (the Italians had speed advantage too) but the RM chose not to give battle. But it was not just Supermarina to blame - why was Admiral Campioni sacked for example?
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