Revisionist History-OT

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Locarno represented the best opportunity for a lasting settlement.

I have centred on the 30's. Fair enough you are taking this back a step - and logically so - to the 20's.

I think the problem was that is that the Locarno Treaty came too early. If there was going to be a huge change to Versailles - and remember it would have needed a big compromise - then the French were just not going to agree only seven years after the end of the war. The wounds that caused them - and it was not just the French - to insist on Versailles in the first place, were still too raw.

Again, real world, I just think it was too big an ask to get the victor powers to shift to the extent needed that would satisfy both them and Germany and - importantly - stop the rise of an Adolf Hitler character.

But this in itself still does not mean Versailles MUST EQUAL WWII. There was no guarantee that Hitler was going to win power despite everything that had happened. There was plenty more elections, treaties, depressions, etc etc to play out before we get there. Once we get there - you cannot ignore what Hitler wanted - for the simple reason that Lebensraum was non-negotiable.

I agree, Locarno was premature, and simply didn't do enough to settle the issue.

There was no certainty that a Hitler-type figure would get to power, but it was THE goal of German foreign policy in the 20's and 30's to undo Versailles. Stresemann made some good success at first.

The real question is if Versailles could have been undone without it coming to a shooting war.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
It's "The Soviets have invaded and the wheels have came off the car!"

I can't believe that having a 'diplomatic door' slammed in the face of the Japanese leadership was the cause of their surrender. Sorry. I just don't see their ignorance towards their nation burning from the inside out at the expense of the big, bad nasty Red invasion.

http://japanfocus.org/site/view/2501

Read for yourself. That's from a Japanese historian.

To use your words above, mind_messing, there's a difference between "a" cause and "the" cause. I don't argue that the Japanese decision to surrender included consideration of the Soviets as hostiles. But I believe that the two atomic bombs (particularly Nagasaki, interestingly enough) and-more importantly-the string of military disasters endured by Japan for 3+ years held more sway.

From the Emperor's surrender speech on the radio:

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Note-no mention of the Reds.

The Emperor himself detailed his thoughts on the matter accordingly during a fateful meeting with the war cabinet at 2am August 10th, 1945:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [at Kujūkuri Beach, east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujūkuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.

Note-no mention of the Reds, but some commentary about poor military conditions for the home islands and-tellingly-the bomb itself.

As the author of these lines remains the only one whose opinion really matters, I'd say that he (the Emperor) was impressed with the poor condition of his military, the suffering of his people (and the spectre of much worse to come) and the game-changing nature of the atomic bomb. Perhaps he felt equally strongly about the Soviet entry into the war, but I've not seen quotes attributable to him regarding that issue.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Locarno represented the best opportunity for a lasting settlement.

I have centred on the 30's. Fair enough you are taking this back a step - and logically so - to the 20's.

I think the problem was that is that the Locarno Treaty came too early. If there was going to be a huge change to Versailles - and remember it would have needed a big compromise - then the French were just not going to agree only seven years after the end of the war. The wounds that caused them - and it was not just the French - to insist on Versailles in the first place, were still too raw.

Again, real world, I just think it was too big an ask to get the victor powers to shift to the extent needed that would satisfy both them and Germany and - importantly - stop the rise of an Adolf Hitler character.

But this in itself still does not mean Versailles MUST EQUAL WWII. There was no guarantee that Hitler was going to win power despite everything that had happened. There was plenty more elections, treaties, depressions, etc etc to play out before we get there. Once we get there - you cannot ignore what Hitler wanted - for the simple reason that Lebensraum was non-negotiable.

I agree, Locarno was premature, and simply didn't do enough to settle the issue.

There was no certainty that a Hitler-type figure would get to power, but it was THE goal of German foreign policy in the 20's and 30's to undo Versailles. Stresemann made some good success at first.

The real question is if Versailles could have been undone without it coming to a shooting war.

warspite1

But Versailles pretty much was undone before September 1939 - certainly in terms of territory. The point is once Hitler comes to power there is no compromise, there is no chance of a peaceful solution. It is THAT that poor Chamberlain and Daladier - and the German people - did not understand.

Hitler wanted Germany to never be in the position she was in in WWI whereby she could be blockaded into submission. He wanted a Germany like the US - self sufficient - and there was only one place he was going to get the oil and wheat and other precious resources to enable that outcome; The Soviet Union.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy





I can't believe that having a 'diplomatic door' slammed in the face of the Japanese leadership was the cause of their surrender. Sorry. I just don't see their ignorance towards their nation burning from the inside out at the expense of the big, bad nasty Red invasion.

http://japanfocus.org/site/view/2501

Read for yourself. That's from a Japanese historian.

To use your words above, mind_messing, there's a difference between "a" cause and "the" cause. I don't argue that the Japanese decision to surrender included consideration of the Soviets as hostiles. But I believe that the two atomic bombs (particularly Nagasaki, interestingly enough) and-more importantly-the string of military disasters endured by Japan for 3+ years held more sway.

From the Emperor's surrender speech on the radio:

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Note-no mention of the Reds.

The Emperor himself detailed his thoughts on the matter accordingly during a fateful meeting with the war cabinet at 2am August 10th, 1945:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [at Kujūkuri Beach, east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujūkuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.

Note-no mention of the Reds, but some commentary about poor military conditions for the home islands and-tellingly-the bomb itself.

From the link I posted:

6. Conclusions

The argument presented by Asada and Frank that the atomic bombs rather than Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender cannot be supported. The Hiroshima bomb, although it heightened the sense of urgency to seek the termination of the war, did not prompt the Japanese government to take any immediate action that repudiated the previous policy of seeking Moscow’s mediation. Contrary to the contention advanced by Asada and Frank, there is no evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb led either Togo or the emperor to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo’s urgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicates that, despite the Hiroshima bomb, they continued to stay the previous course. The effect of the Nagasaki bomb was negligible. It did not change the political alignment one way or the other. Even Anami’s fantastic suggestion that the United States had more than 100 atomic bombs and planned to bomb Tokyo next did not change the opinions of either the peace party or the war party at all.

Rather, what decisively changed the views of the Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entry into the war. It catapulted the Japanese government into taking immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government squarely to confront the issue of whether it should accept the Potsdam terms. In the tortuous discussions from August 9 through August 14, the peace party, motivated by a profound sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the “emperor’s sacred decision” and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances surrendering to the United States would best assure the preservation of the imperial house and save the emperor.

This is, of course, not to deny completely the effect of the atomic bomb on Japan’s policymakers. It certainly injected a sense of urgency in finding an acceptable end to the war. Kido stated that while the peace party and the war party had previously been equally balanced in the scale, the atomic bomb helped to tip the balance in favor of the peace party.[100] It would be more accurate to say that the Soviet entry into the war, adding to that tipped scale, then completely toppled the scale itself.

Emphasis mine.

As the author of these lines remains the only one whose opinion really matters, I'd say that he (the Emperor) was impressed with the poor condition of his military, the suffering of his people (and the spectre of much worse to come) and the game-changing nature of the atomic bomb. Perhaps he felt equally strongly about the Soviet entry into the war, but I've not seen quotes attributable to him regarding that issue.

Evidently so. In his rescript to his soldiers, there's not one mention of the bomb, but instead to the Soviets.

In all likelyhood, Hirohito was just saying what would go down best with his audience. The mettle of his cabinet and the rank-and-file were drastically different.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: mind_messing




http://japanfocus.org/site/view/2501

Read for yourself. That's from a Japanese historian.

To use your words above, mind_messing, there's a difference between "a" cause and "the" cause. I don't argue that the Japanese decision to surrender included consideration of the Soviets as hostiles. But I believe that the two atomic bombs (particularly Nagasaki, interestingly enough) and-more importantly-the string of military disasters endured by Japan for 3+ years held more sway.

From the Emperor's surrender speech on the radio:

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Note-no mention of the Reds.

The Emperor himself detailed his thoughts on the matter accordingly during a fateful meeting with the war cabinet at 2am August 10th, 1945:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [at Kujūkuri Beach, east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujūkuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.

Note-no mention of the Reds, but some commentary about poor military conditions for the home islands and-tellingly-the bomb itself.

From the link I posted:

6. Conclusions

The argument presented by Asada and Frank that the atomic bombs rather than Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender cannot be supported. The Hiroshima bomb, although it heightened the sense of urgency to seek the termination of the war, did not prompt the Japanese government to take any immediate action that repudiated the previous policy of seeking Moscow’s mediation. Contrary to the contention advanced by Asada and Frank, there is no evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb led either Togo or the emperor to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo’s urgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicates that, despite the Hiroshima bomb, they continued to stay the previous course. The effect of the Nagasaki bomb was negligible. It did not change the political alignment one way or the other. Even Anami’s fantastic suggestion that the United States had more than 100 atomic bombs and planned to bomb Tokyo next did not change the opinions of either the peace party or the war party at all.

Rather, what decisively changed the views of the Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entry into the war. It catapulted the Japanese government into taking immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government squarely to confront the issue of whether it should accept the Potsdam terms. In the tortuous discussions from August 9 through August 14, the peace party, motivated by a profound sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the “emperor’s sacred decision” and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances surrendering to the United States would best assure the preservation of the imperial house and save the emperor.

This is, of course, not to deny completely the effect of the atomic bomb on Japan’s policymakers. It certainly injected a sense of urgency in finding an acceptable end to the war. Kido stated that while the peace party and the war party had previously been equally balanced in the scale, the atomic bomb helped to tip the balance in favor of the peace party.[100] It would be more accurate to say that the Soviet entry into the war, adding to that tipped scale, then completely toppled the scale itself.

Emphasis mine.

That's unacceptably parsimonious. "There is no evidence that the Hiroshima bomb led...to accept the Potsdam terms." Of course not. Know why? Because they didn't accept the Potsdam terms in the three days between Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By that same logical extension, there's no evidence that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war on August 8 led the military leadership to accept the Potsdam terms. Know why? Because they didn't then. It was later.

The assertions about neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki being meaningful or impressive upon the only Imperial leadership that mattered are also bunk. Witness the Emperor's words himself. Pivotal speeches and decisions wherein the bombs were noted as causal. No mention of the Soviets.

[DD696]

Perhaps you need to look at it from a different perspective.

If the bombs had not been dropped on Japan, would Japan still have surrendered when it did? Or would there have had to have been the unthinkable causalities that would have been sustained had Japan had to be invaded? What was the less costly in terms of human life?

Again I say, thank you Harry S. Truman for doing what you did and ending that war.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy




To use your words above, mind_messing, there's a difference between "a" cause and "the" cause. I don't argue that the Japanese decision to surrender included consideration of the Soviets as hostiles. But I believe that the two atomic bombs (particularly Nagasaki, interestingly enough) and-more importantly-the string of military disasters endured by Japan for 3+ years held more sway.

From the Emperor's surrender speech on the radio:

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Note-no mention of the Reds.

The Emperor himself detailed his thoughts on the matter accordingly during a fateful meeting with the war cabinet at 2am August 10th, 1945:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [at Kujūkuri Beach, east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujūkuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.

Note-no mention of the Reds, but some commentary about poor military conditions for the home islands and-tellingly-the bomb itself.

From the link I posted:

6. Conclusions

The argument presented by Asada and Frank that the atomic bombs rather than Soviet entry into the war had a more decisive effect on Japan’s decision to surrender cannot be supported. The Hiroshima bomb, although it heightened the sense of urgency to seek the termination of the war, did not prompt the Japanese government to take any immediate action that repudiated the previous policy of seeking Moscow’s mediation. Contrary to the contention advanced by Asada and Frank, there is no evidence to show that the Hiroshima bomb led either Togo or the emperor to accept the Potsdam terms. On the contrary, Togo’s urgent telegram to Sato on August 7 indicates that, despite the Hiroshima bomb, they continued to stay the previous course. The effect of the Nagasaki bomb was negligible. It did not change the political alignment one way or the other. Even Anami’s fantastic suggestion that the United States had more than 100 atomic bombs and planned to bomb Tokyo next did not change the opinions of either the peace party or the war party at all.

Rather, what decisively changed the views of the Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entry into the war. It catapulted the Japanese government into taking immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government squarely to confront the issue of whether it should accept the Potsdam terms. In the tortuous discussions from August 9 through August 14, the peace party, motivated by a profound sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the “emperor’s sacred decision” and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances surrendering to the United States would best assure the preservation of the imperial house and save the emperor.

This is, of course, not to deny completely the effect of the atomic bomb on Japan’s policymakers. It certainly injected a sense of urgency in finding an acceptable end to the war. Kido stated that while the peace party and the war party had previously been equally balanced in the scale, the atomic bomb helped to tip the balance in favor of the peace party.[100] It would be more accurate to say that the Soviet entry into the war, adding to that tipped scale, then completely toppled the scale itself.

Emphasis mine.

That's unacceptably parsimonious. "There is no evidence that the Hiroshima bomb led...to accept the Potsdam terms." Of course not. Know why? Because they didn't accept the Potsdam terms in the three days between Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By that same logical extension, there's no evidence that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war on August 8 led the military leadership to accept the Potsdam terms. Know why? Because they didn't then. It was later.

The assertions about neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki being meaningful or impressive upon the only Imperial leadership that mattered are also bunk. Witness the Emperor's words himself. Pivotal speeches and decisions wherein the bombs were noted as causal. No mention of the Soviets.

Read the essay.

He doesn't even mention the atomic bomb in his rescript to the soldiers. Yet he mentions the Soviet invasion.

It's going to be the hardline elements of the Army and Navy that MUST accept the surrender to end the war. Hirohito needs to persuade them. If he fails, he'll end up being overthrown - or at least taken into "protective custody". Yet Hirohito makes no mention of the atomic bomb in his rescript to his soldiers.

Is that because Soviet involvement is a far more persuasive argument to end the war than the atomic bomb? I think so.

Regarding the Emperor in a leadership capacity, he was, by 1945, an expert at going with the flow. He was but one figure in the government. In theory, the foremost figure, but that wasn't the reality of his position. He was smart enough to know that going against the wishes of his cabinet was a surefire way to see himself isolated away as his father was. The Emperor's thoughts on the issues of the atomic bombs and Soviet involvement mattered a great deal less than those of his cabinet when it came to the actual decision to end the war.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I agree, Locarno was premature, and simply didn't do enough to settle the issue.

There was no certainty that a Hitler-type figure would get to power, but it was THE goal of German foreign policy in the 20's and 30's to undo Versailles. Stresemann made some good success at first.

The real question is if Versailles could have been undone without it coming to a shooting war.

You need to go back much earlier than Locarno. Austria, Hungary, and Turkey were released from reparations duties, essentially. Bulgaria as well. Germany was not. How much they would pay was in flux all through the 20s: The London Schedule, the Dawes Plan, the other Plan I can't recall now. A, B, and C bonds, where the C bonds were a fiction for British public consumption. The occupation of the Ruhr by France and Italy (!) when Germany didn't deliver coal they were ordered to deliver, even as some of their best coal fields in Silesia had been given to Poland. The hyperinflation of the Weimar period. The vast loans Germany took out in the war and during the Weimar period to try to buy social peace. It goes on and on.

Could Germany have paid the London Schedule? Economists then and now disagree. They didn't though. But they did pay billions of gold marks in the 1920s and that helped generate the conditions that applied when the banks crashed in 1931. Hitler gained power through this morass of bad decisions, no decisions, and vengeance. And over a war Germany certainly didn't "start" on its own, and GB and France didn't end on theirs.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: DD696

Perhaps you need to look at it from a different perspective.

If the bombs had not been dropped on Japan, would Japan still have surrendered when it did? Or would there have had to have been the unthinkable causalities that would have been sustained had Japan had to be invaded? What was the less costly in terms of human life?

Again I say, thank you Harry S. Truman for doing what you did and ending that war.

November 1945 was the date the Americans established as the point that Japan would have surrendered, without the atomic bombs being dropped and without the Soviets being involved.

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I agree, Locarno was premature, and simply didn't do enough to settle the issue.

There was no certainty that a Hitler-type figure would get to power, but it was THE goal of German foreign policy in the 20's and 30's to undo Versailles. Stresemann made some good success at first.

The real question is if Versailles could have been undone without it coming to a shooting war.

You need to go back much earlier than Locarno. Austria, Hungary, and Turkey were released from reparations duties, essentially. Bulgaria as well. Germany was not. How much they would pay was in flux all through the 20s: The London Schedule, the Dawes Plan, the other Plan I can't recall now. A, B, and C bonds, where the C bonds were a fiction for British public consumption. The occupation of the Ruhr by France and Italy (!) when Germany didn't deliver coal they were ordered to deliver, even as some of their best coal fields in Silesia had been given to Poland. The hyperinflation of the Weimar period. The vast loans Germany took out in the war and during the Weimar period to try to buy social peace. It goes on and on.

Could Germany have paid the London Schedule? Economists then and now disagree. They didn't though. But they did pay billions of gold marks in the 1920s and that helped generate the conditions that applied when the banks crashed in 1931. Hitler gained power through this morass of bad decisions, no decisions, and vengeance. And over a war Germany certainly didn't "start" on its own, and GB and France didn't end on theirs.

warspite1

Which kind of misses the point entirely. If Locarno was too soon then there's little point going back further and expecting a different outcome........

As for who started WWI and who finished it - that is of course totally irrelevant to the conversation. It's not rocket-science - history is written by the winners....

Banging on about whether Versailles was just also misses where the conversation is at. I don't think anyone agrees it was a good idea - and for obvious reasons. The point is, it was written - for better or worse - and the poor politicians of the 20's (and in particular the 30's) were tasked with making the best of it - while negotiating with someone who simply wasn't interested in anything other than what he wanted - Lebensraum. It's easy to slaughter those politicians with the benefit of hindsight isn't it? - but a bit off considering what we now know of Hitler's ultimate appetite.

"Hitler gained power through this morass of bad decisions, no decisions, and vengeance" is not in dispute (although of course you completely discount the good decisions that some politicians made in an effort to try and do the right thing - after all why try and be objective and fair about it?). The point is Hitler was not a direct product of Versailles - but was a result of the vacuum and the mess created by a nation that had just lost a hugely destructive war. The Versailles MUST EQUAL WWII idea is a solution for people who want to put history in nice neat little boxes with guys with white hats on the good side and guys with black hats on the bad. Well life is full of greys!!!

There was 20 years between Versailles and Poland 39. There was so much happened - so many ways history could have turned - to say WWII is directly the result of Versailles is just plain wrong. There was no guarantee Hitler would become leader, no guarantee the Nazis would gain power, no guarantee that the Nazi party would survive at at least one point.

It really doesn't take a huge leap of the imagination to visualise a German leader in charge in the 30's who, unlike Hitler, was prepared to take the west's offer and who didn't have Lebensraum as his raison d'etre - ergo no WWII.

[DD696]

My father's war diary -

August 7, 1945 - today a weapon was first put into use, which, if my opinion is correct, will have one hell of an effedt on the war, and also the world in general. The principle of atomic disintegration. One of our planes dropped an atomic bomb on the Jap army base of Hiroshima and pulverized the joint, Looks to me like we better invent something counteract the thing if we don't all want to get bust. Eventually the wrong gent may get ahold of it.

August 9, 1945 - a day of surprises, this is. We get the news that Russia had declared war on Japan on Aug 7. By good rights that should clean the Japs out of Manchuria pretty fast. Also more news on the Hiroshima blast, which probably killed around 300,000 Japs - 250,000 more people that the Krout air blitz on England in 1941. Another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki today.

Two of our carrier forces are side by side today - which ever way we look we see ships spread clean to the horizon and many beyond. All morning planes were going out to bomb Japan.

The destroyer "Borie 704" of our squadron was on 40 mile wide picket duty today. Which reminds me of a remark I made this morning. "We on the english have seen all the shootin' we're going to see in this war." Whereas a Jap sucicider hit the Borie's bridge and cleaned out the radio, radar and control rooms and left the engine out of the plane in the mess hall. 4 men knocked over the side were left to live or drown as the were best able to manage as two more Japs dived in on them. Although burning badly the Borie shot them both down in a hot fight and steamed back to our group. Only one radio man survived. Then from the handling room doors we saw a Jap plane coming in at a carrier. The carrier opened up. The Jap plane began his dive. Suddenly a puff of flames came from it's fuselage and it sheared off and made a long slanting dive into the sea.

Then the English opened up. As quickly as I was able I sent projectiles up. We fired perhaps 25 rounds 5". We missed, but that's good, for it was one of our own "Corsairs".

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
He doesn't even mention the atomic bomb in his rescript to the soldiers. Yet he mentions the Soviet invasion.

OK. But the opposite is true in the other discussions / speeches I cited. So an impasse.

It's going to be the hardline elements of the Army and Navy that MUST accept the surrender to end the war. Hirohito needs to persuade them. If he fails, he'll end up being overthrown - or at least taken into "protective custody". Yet Hirohito makes no mention of the atomic bomb in his rescript to his soldiers.

Hirohito didn't convince the hardest hardline elements of the Army and Navy. Hence the abortive coup efforts that (mercifully) failed. For everyone else, he *did* convince them to end the war. And, as I've said before-Hirohito makes no mention of the Soviets in his surrender speech (to civilians, government, soldiers and the world at large) or in the meeting minutes of that pivotal meeting on August 10.

Regarding the Emperor in a leadership capacity, he was, by 1945, an expert at going with the flow. He was but one figure in the government. In theory, the foremost figure, but that wasn't the reality of his position. He was smart enough to know that going against the wishes of his cabinet was a surefire way to see himself isolated away as his father was. The Emperor's thoughts on the issues of the atomic bombs and Soviet involvement mattered a great deal less than those of his cabinet when it came to the actual decision to end the war.

Except for when his words and his words alone settled the discussion. Like on August 10 when he broke the deadlock and instructed his cabinet to seek peace immediately. His decision was the indispensable one then and he exercised his foremost say in the matter directly and with telling effect. Without it, that third bomb probably would have popped off over Tokyo in another 3 weeks or so.

So, in other words, the Emperor was just riding along for most of the war. Except for when he exercised his will, when it was definitive and telling.

I'll also introduce another variable in the discussion. I've heard discussion of what caused the Japanese to surrender-the bombs or the Soviets. But I've not heard anyone sound off on the most obvious reason for the Japanese to surrender. And that was the repeated, grinding, devastating and ongoing military disasters they had fallen prey to over the previous three years. Nearly all maritime traffic, air power, naval power, goods, raw materials, food, etc. etc. destroyed. The depths of their defeat were stupefying. They were laid low on some of their home turf too-there was no escaping their inevitable defeat at the hands of the Americans and the British.

So-what caused them to accept (to them) modestly onerous surrender terms? The atomic bombs? The Soviet threat? I think we have to acknowledge that it's not a 'two horse race'. The devastation wrought by the conventional war with the "western" Allies was a huge part of their impetus for surrender. And it was cited as a precondition by many in Japan at the time (including the Emperor).

So, would Japan have surrendered in the absence of the atomic bombs? Probably. After the Western Allies invaded Honshu and millions perished.

Would Japan have surrendered in the absence of the Soviet menace? Probably. After we popped off 2 (or more) bombs and (maybe) invaded Honshu and millions perished.

Let's say that there was no successful Okinawa or Iwo Jima campaign and that we weren't knocking on their front door, but delivered atomic bombs from Saipan without a likely American invasion being imminent. Let's also say that the Soviets declared war on the same date they historically did. Would there have been sufficient impetus to surrender without pressure of imminent American invasion? I say 'probably not'.

Other than a North:South crossing across Sakhalin and a Manchurian runover, I've not seen exhaustive and convincing evidence the Russians could have pulled off an amphibious landing worthy of the name with their organic amphibious lift capabilities. Other than the loss of southern Sakhalin and Manchuria-and the shock to go along with it-I've not seen any credible rationale for why the Japanese feared the Russians' homeland attack in a vacuum.

[Justus2]

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

[geofflambert]

We had a string of decisive Presidents; FDR, Truman and DDE. They didn't fool around much and the latter two didn't shy away from Scotch.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

warspite1

Hi Justus2. Sounds interesting! I've just had a look for the books on Amazon but sadly only one (top one) has any reviews. Would be good if you could post how the course is going (starts September?) and what the conclusions of the class are.

[swatter555]

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

That sounds like a very interesting course. Unfortunately, during my time in school the history department viewed military history as a bastard child and for the most part wouldn't soil themselves by teaching courses about it.

As for the topic at hand, I don't want to get too deep in the muck here except to say that certainly the Allies forged links in the chain of events that brought about WWII. At the same time, I would hope everyone could agree the moral responsibility for starting the wars lies with the Axis powers. After all, it was overt acts of aggression that kicked off the wars in both the east and the west. No doubt weakness emboldened Adolf Hitler in his aggression, but I don't begrudge world leaders who were hesitant to once again see the horrors of the Great War played out. And I certainly don't hold Roosevelt responsible for the Pacific war by withholding oil and other supplies that fueled Japanese aggression in the Pacific. The Japanese had a choice and they choose to hold onto the fruits of their aggression in China and attack the Allies.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: swatter555

ORIGINAL: Justus2

I am very interested in this debate, I've read some on the final days of the war, and recently signed up for a course at our local university on this topic (looked like an interesting elective):

History 440: WMD and Hiroshima in History and Memory
This course will examine the first and only use of what would later be called a “weapon of mass destruction,” namely the atomic bombs that President Harry S. Truman used to end the Second World War against Japan. Drawing on original source documents, and essays by a diverse assortment of leading scholars, we will examine the military and political context surrounding Truman’s decision to drop the bombs. We will also consider alternative strategies for ending the war, look at how historians have debated those strategies, and examine how Americans, and the Japanese, have remembered the atomic bombings in the years since the war ended. After reviewing and discussing the relevant literature, students will have a chance to put themselves in place of one of Truman’s colleagues in 1945, review all alternative strategies for the president, and give their own recommendation for the best way to bring the war to a conclusion.

I am hoping for an unbiased look, but I am interested in hearing the perspectives that the other students bring to the course. For those interested, here's the reading list:

Hiroshima in History and Memory by Michael J. Hogan (the instructor for the course)
Hiroshima by John Hersey
Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, Revised Edition by J. Samuel Walker

That sounds like a very interesting course. Unfortunately, during my time in school the history department viewed military history as a bastard child and for the most part wouldn't soil themselves by teaching courses about it.

As for the topic at hand, I don't want to get too deep in the muck here except to say that certainly the Allies forged links in the chain of events that brought about WWII. At the same time, I would hope everyone could agree the moral responsibility for starting the wars lies with the Axis powers. After all, it was overt acts of aggression that kicked off the wars in both the east and the west. No doubt weakness emboldened Adolf Hitler in his aggression, but I don't begrudge world leaders who were hesitant to once again see the horrors of the Great War played out. And I certainly don't hold Roosevelt responsible for the Pacific war by withholding oil and other supplies that fueled Japanese aggression in the Pacific. The Japanese had a choice and they choose to hold onto the fruits of their aggression in China and attack the Allies.

warspite1

It is interesting that those who believe that the US were guilty in that regard fail to address the issue and state what realistically FDR was supposed to do.

As said earlier the position that the US was in in the summer of 1941 was not overly pleasant - and had the potential to get a whole lot worse, and very quickly.

Western Europe was largely under the jackboot. France had been beaten and the UK, ejected from the continent. In the east, all considered military thinking was that the Soviets were beaten and her conquest was a matter of months if not weeks away. This would have given Germany rule over Europe – and, with the USSR defeated, the UK would have been next. Meanwhile in the US backyard, the Japanese, shortly to be free of threat from the USSR could turn the Kwantung army on China.

So, as can be seen, given the above it doesn’t take a huge leap of imagination to see that by sometime in 1942 the might of the Wehrmacht is to be thrust upon the UK and Egypt. French, Dutch and British possessions in the Far East are ripe for the taking and China is on the brink.

What is a president - whose job it is to ensure his country is safe from external threat - supposed to do about that situation? Why would the US have chosen to carry on as normal and allow Japan the resources it required to continue its brutal war in China (how does the Hiroshima and Nagasaki death toll combined tally with the Rape of Nanking?) and then likely expand that war - either alone or in conjunction with a soon to be victorious Germany - into Southeast Asia?

[Alfred]

This thread is dealing with two quite separate subjects.
 
Chickenboy is putting the position that the serious historians writing for their peers generally put.  Good academic historians take into account all relevant sources which usually have different nuanced emphases.  Very rarely is it a simple binary choice, human motivation is usually much more complex than that.  There is no single "smoking gun" which establishes "x" as being the reason why Japan surrendered on the day it did on the terms it surrendered on.  What can be said was the following factors were involved.
 
1.  The Soviet entry meant that the only offer on the table from its enemies was the Potsdam Declaration.
2.  The A-bomb meant that over time the entire Japanese race could be exterminated without the need for any enemy invasion of the Home Islands.
 
The entire point of continuing the war was the slim hope that better peace terms could be obtained than those contained in the Potsdam Declaration.  The means of achieving that was through military action.  The only meaningful military action available was a successful defence of the Home Islands.  For the Japanese, successful was defined as inflicting such a toll as to cause the Western Allies to blink at the cost to them of invading.
 
To the Japanese hardliners any cost, be it starvation from blockade or horrendous "militia" losses from opposing Home Island landings was acceptable provided it achieved something better than Potsdam which ipso facto meant the Emperor and the Japanese race remaining.  The two factors I listed above when combined completely removed that hope.  If only one of those factors existed Japanese resistance would almost certainly have continued.  In the meantime not only would more Japanese die from "conventional" bombing and the effects of the blockade, plans to execute all POWs were being put into effect and many civilians in the remaining occupied territories would have suffered.
 
 
 
The other subject is full of pet hobby horses but short on concrete evidence, as a result the discussion is somewhat superficial.  I'll try to inject some "facts".
 
1.  I read AJP Taylor's work on the outbreak of WWII many years ago.  Taylor was predominantly a diplomacy focussed historian, with a generally "progressive" viewpoint.  Accordingly he focussed on the diplomatic events in his publications which is why he came to the conclusion that it was the British March 1939 declaration to guarantee Poland which made WWII inevitable.  From that point in time there were two set in concrete forces in play and only if one completely backed down, which was completely inconceivable, could a future WWII be averted.
 
2.  "Lebensraum" is a term which usually gets thrown about far too loosely.  Hitler had a much more sophisticated view of what it meant.  Firstly, there was the recovery of the Versailles imposed lost eastern territories.  This objective was not really lebensraum to Hitler.  What Hitler initially really meant by the term was that Germany needed, for economic reasons, an equivalent of the C19th American western expansion and the benefits that brought to the American economy.  Due to geography and politics, for Germany this meant that the increase in market for German product was only possible to the east.
 
3.  Western opposition to Versailles was much less than is being presented.  There were some misgivings about elements of it from some of the elites but overall there was no opposition to it.  Lloyd George won an election on the slogan of making the Huns pay until the pips squeak.  Clemenceau and the French nation saw it as being the equivalent, in effect, of what they had suffered in 1871 at Bismarck's hands.  What fundamentally made the Germans so resentful of it was that it bore no resemblance to Wilson's 14 Points which was the basis upon which the October 1918 government of Prince Max had come to power seeking an armistice.  Whether the 1919 Versailles Treaty had been made harsher or more lenient  would not have made any difference to the German viewpoint.  To them Versailles was simply a traditional European power peace treaty, albeit harsher than many but not unusual.
 
4.  It is just wrong to say that Versailles was not enforced.  Nor was Stresseman as innocent as he is often portrayed.  Versailles was enforced initially and it was never the Weimar Republic's intention of fully abiding by it.  All this well before Hitler came to power.  Consider the following facts.
 
(a) the Freikorps was an initial means of circumventing the Heer limits
(b) the design of the pocket battleships was a means to circumventing the tonnage limits
(c) the sporting "glider clubs" was a means to circumventing the absolute restriction on an airforce
(d) the banned General Staff institution was hidden away in a bureau
(e) the entire Weimar-Soviet military/technology cooperation was intended to be out of Anglo-Franco sight as it contravened Versailles
 
As to enforcement, there was the initial occupation up to the west bank of the Rhine.  This was a costly financial and manpower exercise to Britain and France which is why the troops were eventually withdrawn but there was no renouncing the right to march back in.  Which is exactly what the French did in 1923 due to an orchestrated campaign by Stressemann of non compliance with Versailles.  The subsequent hyper inflation was the result of the Germans continuing their anti-Versailles policy.  At the cost of ruining the German middle class and greatly strengthening both the German radical left and radical right, that German policy was successful for the French found that it cost them too much in economic and diplomatic terms to enforce those draconian terms of Versailles.  This didn't mean that other terms were not subsequently enforced.  The Saar plebiscite subsequently did proceed and it witnessed a determined French effort to win it.
 
Then there is the issue of whether the Weimar Republic really suffered the economic ills which a reading of the Versailles Treaty would suggest would ensue.  When Keynes wrote his book on the Treaty (which I read many years ago) his misgivings were that he could not see how Germany could pay the reparations which the treaty imposed.  In economic terms he was largely correct, particularly as the repayments were required in hard cash, but his view was not shared widely amongst the elites.  More importantly, Keynes made a fundamental albeit very understandable mistake in his economic analysis.  He did not foresee the degree of money recycling which occurred from 1924 and even more so from 1928.
 
In 1913 the USA was a net debtor country.  By 1920 the USA had become a net creditor nation.  Fifty years before the OPEC money recycling of post 1973, America engaged in a similar activity.  American bankers of the 1920s had huge positive cash flows but they could see that the extensive war debts incurred by Britain and France to them could only be repaid if those countries inturn had the debts owed to them paid.  Foremost in the debts to Britain and France were the German reparations imposed by Versailles.  Only by providing huge American loans to the Weimar Republic could the reparations be met.  This process was commenced in 1924 with the Young Plan and the Dawes Plan of 1928 made the lending conditions even more favourable to the Germans.  The net result was that the Germans were provided with the means (someone else's money) by which they could pay the reparations without wrecking their economy provided they had the will to do so.  That will did not survive into the three pre Hitler govern by emergency decree governments.
 
Then there is the issue of the rise of the Nazis.  All throughout the 1920s the Nazi party polled very poorly in elections.  The German Communist party polled much better and the Social Democratic Party, whose left wing was not that far away from the Communists, was a major force in the Reichstag.  It is only after the collapse of the agrarian market in 1928 that the Nazi party vote in affected Lander elections start to rise.  Looked at objectively, Hitler's vote in the Presidential election against Hiddenburg was not that good.  It was only as unemployment rose did the Nazi vote become significant and even then, the most the Nazi's ever achieved in a free vote ,was 43%.  Which is why when he became Chancellor in January 1933 of a coalition government, and even then only because Hiddenburg was assured he would be kept under control by his non Nazi partners.  That the Reichstag fire came so early in his coalition government and in his response to it he was able to out maneouver his coalition partners, can in no way at all be attributable to the Versailles Treaty.  Nor can the 1934 SA purge be similarly blamed on Versailles.
 
Alfred

[rogueusmc]

Conclusions are drawn dependent on where you stop in the backtracking of events...

In the Pacific, the oil embargo of Japan 1940 was in response to Japan's embargo of American goods to China...

The embargo of US goods to China was necessary to efficiency of operations of the IJA coming down into China from Manchuria...

How far back ya wanna go? Where you stop is where your own conclusions are derived...

[rogueusmc]

The Japanese took Manchuria. They had to take China to secure Manchuria. The Philippine Islands were necessary to secure China. To secure the Philippine Islands, the US Pacific Fleet had to be neutralized.

My question is: if Japan were to have taken China and the Philippines, they would have had to garrison them just like the had to Manchuria. How long could they have sustained that? I mean, that's ALOT of territory to have hostile rule over...