ORIGINAL: Leandros
Warspite wrote: Bill it was not so much not knowing who Clay Blair was - it was the "Did he work for Donitz" comment. Essentially, if he did not work for
Donitz his research cannot have been correct....
Well, it wasn’t…[;)]...(better…?.) What it cooks down to is that it was Admiral Dönitz who decided how his U-boat force should be used – not Clay Blair. “Correct”
research would have been to use the parameters stated by the Admiral. Blair either didn’t research those parameters - or preferred to use his own.
Donitz’s parameters? Do your research….[:)]
Warspite wrote: But as I say, it is clearly pointless. Anyway, I am off the find where these destroyers and other small craft were. I suspect I will not
find them as that information clearly can only be known by people working for Admiral Forbes or indeed Leandros himself.... …
Good luck with that – I recommend naval-history.net
Please remember to use September 27th 1940 as S-day (the landings) as that would have been the latest practical one before the operation was postponed indefinitely.
Fred
P.S.: Back to “Saving MacArthur” – he needs me – desperately…
warspite1
I was simply trying to understand the numbers initially. You quoted 44. Once I am certain on the numbers, and where those boats come from (and thus the impact of using them) then the analysis can be done. By the way, even if Blair is wrong about the boats not fit for service at the start of September (cannot imagine that is the case), to get to the 44 you state, the Germans would have had to have every single ocean-going u-boat serviceable and ready (not likely is it?), used the Type IX's despite being unsuitable, and used every available training boat. But you say you did this analysis and so no doubt this is all explained in your book.
But first off, let's get real here, it was NOT for Donitz to decide - as the conduct of the u-boat war proved. He was constantly battling both Hitler - and sometimes even Raeder - for where the u-boats were best employed.
A couple of things spring to mind though. Firstly, when would the order to have u-boats withdrawn from other duties need to be given? Bearing in mind the time taken to travel from the patrol lines back to Germany and then be prepared / repaired etc (and then travel to their starting positions for the operation) that order would have to have been given pretty early in the process (early August?) if the Germans were to have anything approaching even 30 u-boats available.
So if Hitler is serious about Sealion he has to order the recall of the u-boats well ahead of knowing whether or not Goering can achieve the air superiority that the operation needs; it is not the work of a moment - even if Goering can deliver. So the u-boat war needs to be severely compromised for an operation that may or may not work. The problem is not just the immediate cessation of the attack on merchant shipping during August and September, but also the knock-on effects of no crews being trained during that time. Not saying that is not a decision the Germans would take, only that it has major consequences and those consequences would all be part of the decision making process. Clearly with a very high degree of confidence in the operation the Germans would not care about the consequences on the trade war - after all the UK would be conquered. But this is yet another example of why Sealion really is a monumental gamble of the highest order.
So Hitler wants every available u-boat to cover RN movement. He must not only drag the training boats (Type II ducks) away from their training duty to be prepared for this operation, he also needs to get the ocean-going boats back to Germany to be prepared (those that can be in time) - remember what Donitz promises may not tally with the final numbers as damage and breakdown would have happened to some boats subsequently). This movement takes considerable time and the sudden absence of u-boat activity in the Western Approaches and the North Sea is going to tell the Admiralty something is afoot. Afterall, the last time u-boats were taken away from their fundamental task was for the Norwegian operation in April.
So the Admiralty suddenly finds that once again, u-boat attacks fall off a cliff. a) that tells them the Germans are up to something and b) that means some of the destroyers and escorts in the Western Approaches can now be used for other purposes - even more ships available to counter Sealion.
By the way naval-history is a very good site but I have noticed many errors on that site in the past so I would not use that as the primary source - or at least, would want to verify elsewhere too. I trust this was not your sole point of reference.
