If a large majority of the forum really wants me to shut down any thread that strays from the game and/or the PTO in WW II, I can, but I strongly doubt that a majority of the forum would want that. Personally I think that would do a lot of harm to the forum as a whole. The easiest thing to do is just quit reading a thread when it wanders off into territory that you aren't interested in.
Bill
Well spoken, Bill!
I have not felt comfortable discussing “our” subject on this thread. Actually, I have tried to lay smoke and pull out on a couple of occasions. I have stated my reason for this. Which makes Steve’s accusation of me stepping in here to peddle my book unfounded. If he meant my next book project, which I have also mentioned, I’m not sure that shall ever be finished. Anyway, it’s far off. But, I had hoped to have some use of the WitP in that connection. That is why I have joined up with this Forum in the first place.
It is true that I have a “pet theory”, if so it can be called after some years of study with a resulting book to put the theory in context. Anyway, this discussion has turned out exactly as “normal”, with the usual influx of debaters that know very little on the subject, constantly quoting others who knows equally little. Very few have studied German sources. And, I am as surprised as always of the unwillingness of many to accept contemporary events as part of the basis for the discussion. As one reviewer of my book wrote: “The author has used many contemporary events to underline his reasoning”.
As much as I have now installed the WitP and started on the work to adapt it to my purpose, with the expected problems in soft- and hardware, I really don’t have time for his. I also agree in general to some here that OT discussions are a nuisance. However, how much is for the moderator to evaluate, and moderate….
To better have you understand my background for venturing into the subject of Sealion in the first place, I am quoting the “Introduction” chapter of my book here. Enjoy!
[center]Introduction[/center]
Unternehmen Seelöwe – Operation Sea Lion – was the name of the planned German invasion of the United Kingdom scheduled for fall 1940. It never happened. Despite the fact that the invasion did not take place, Operation Sea Lion is one of the most discussed items on the special web-sites devoted to topics from the Second World War. This what-if-scenario engages as many people as the actual great operations of the same period – the invasion of the Soviet Union, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the landings in Normandy or the question if Montgomery and Eisenhower were heroes or no more than average leaders of armies.
The subject of Sea Lion is popular, but the debate is often so heated that reason quickly goes overboard. The topic obviously touches on powerful sentiments. As I have experienced the debates, cemented fronts are quickly created, a powerful Allied and a much weaker German one. Quickly the German side will be called Krauts or Nazis and the conclusion of the discussion is rapidly reached. Those advocating the German side are perceived as somebody who really wanted the (eventual) invasion to succeed, even if that person only wants to evaluate certain historic points. Because my conclusions about Sea Lion are somewhat different than the popular ones, I have found myself on the receiving side of this treatment many times.
I was astonished by the ridiculing of this operation that was discussed so often and enthusiastically on the web. Could the German military leaders at that time really have been as amateurish as they were described? It did not fit in with the contemporary events. As my interest was awakened I discovered an operation that was fascinating in concept and planned execution and of which I, in spite of my lifelong interest in military history, knew so little about. The victors – read: the British side – readily forget that it was not they who contributed the most to the final Allied victory – and that fall 1940 everything was totally uncertain.
It is obviously painful for the proponents of the British side to admit that the Germans could very well have succeeded with the planned invasion, this in spite of the remarkable performance of German arms in the period preceding it. If they had, the result could have been a bitter British defeat. However, the final Allied victory is portrayed as a guarantor that the result was given. German failure!
Looking closer, and using many German sources, I have found many overlooked facts on which, in my opinion, faulty conclusions on Operation Sea Lion have been drawn. There are also questions around the British defence and its leadership, particularly that of the Royal Navy, that indicates that its reaction to a German invasion would have turned out to be different than the popular opinion. Churchill, among others, hints at this in his memoirs. I shall revert to this.
I shall treat the subject from a somewhat revisionist perspective (an ugly word these days!) and with reference to present discussions on the web as I have experienced them. My arguments shall be based on published literature and research. It is not my intention to prove that Sea Lion had to succeed, but rather to examine many items which I have found to be unfairly subdued or not considered at all. The reader can then decide for himself. There are many cemented myths to consider. More than twenty books have been written on this operation that never was executed. Most of them judge it harshly. On most discussions on the web the negative aspects of these sources on Sea Lion are amplified, while the positive are downgraded. Facts that suggest the possibility of a successful operation are minimized. This is not strange as there are usually a multitude of British proponents. The result is a double minus for the theoretical prospects of Sea Lion.
It is a paradox that there is much more information to be found on the German preparations for the invasion than the actual defence of England or the British leadership’s view on the actual conditions, even if Churchill writes a lot about it. This stems from the fact that after the war German files and papers for a large part remained open, while British records from the same period still are subject to a degree of secrecy – The Official Secrets Act. This must be seen in the light of the Second World War transitioning into the Cold War. Because of this much information issued by the British in the years after the war, true or propagandistic, has fastened itself as facts.
First and foremost, Operation Sea Lion was never carried out because Hitler did not want it. He had other priorities. He blamed the lack of air supremacy (the actual words used were air superiority) but this did not stop him from executing other equally or more risky operations such as Weserübung (Scandinavia), Barbarossa (the Soviet Union) or Merkur (Crete). In the middle of September all preparations had been made. The German forces waited only for the final order. Why Hitler didn’t issue this order is not important. That particular subject is a book all by itself. What is important is that if Hitler had really wanted to go ahead with it, like he did with Weiss, Grün, Gelb, Weserübung and Barbarossa, he would have focused and followed it up in a very different manner. History shows that when Hitler engaged himself seriously in a subject or operation he never let it drift as he did with Seelöwe. On the contrary, he usually intervened too much, to the despair of his staff. He was not a professional military man as they were. Before Weserübung, the invasion of Scandinavia, he called the various leaders repeatedly before him and grilled them on plan and execution. This did not happen with Sea Lion. An activist Hitler would probably have been an advantage as his operational directives were not followed up by the Luftwaffe Commander – Field Marshall Gøring. In spite of this the order to prepare for an invasion was given and the staffs went to work with characteristic German élan and thoroughness. What was achieved in the following three short months is quite stunning. Particularly when considering the half-hearted attitude of Hitler and his closest associates.
I find it meaningless to discuss the theoretical outcome of an executed Sea Lion without the condition that Hitler really wanted to go through with it and that his directives for it were adhered to. This would have given the German forces an even better base than what was the case in September 1940. At the same time one must project the events which were planned for the 10-day period between the day go-ahead was given (S-10), and the day of the first landings (S-day). I have used much space on describing the German plans and resources. There are good reasons for this. It is quite obvious that most debaters on the subject have used too little time on studies of that side and therefore often come to the wrong conclusions as to the German combat potential. I would like to correct this. The ability to see many German orders translated directly should underline the reality of the project. Enjoy it!
End
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Well, you are free to discuss the reasoning behind what I wrote here but I am not going to use more time on it – not on this thread, anyway…I am off “Saving MacArthur”. That I would like to discusss, but not here…[;)]
Fred
