Single Ship TF Dispersion of Large Vulnerable TFs in danger

[Cap Mandrake]

In that case, captain actuary make back to base arive but head stir rearry smarr

[Mike McCreery]

What does 'gamey' mean really?

The object of war is to win. All combatants use deception, tricks and other means to make it as unfair for the other side as possible. In real life the more gamey the better!!

Picket ships are easily swept by destroyers. The only factor is the time it takes to deploy these ships and the delay it causes the attacker.

It is important to remember that this is a game and not a simulation. It departs from reality in so many ways that it could never be a simulation. If it was, it would be a simulation of sitting in on committee meetings and other political bullshit and be so boring no one would play it.

Learn what tactics your opponent likes to use and adjust accordingly.

And dont forget to have fun ;]

[Cap Mandrake]

Probably the most famous example of scattering a convoy is PQ-17 where the escorts were drawn off by a German surface force (Scharnhorst?) and the poor merchies had to split up and try to reach Murmansk.

If you are sending a medium size convoy with a couple of crappy escorts and enemy carriers or a superior surface force shows up there is not much choice. Ditto for ships trapped in port when that port is in imminent danger of falling to ground attack.

Merchies as pickets does seem gamey. Any combatant as a picket seems reasonable and has historical precedent

[wdolson]

Gamey means to take advantage of a quirk in the game engine or 20/20 hindsight to do something that nobody would have ever done in the real world.

In the Battle of the Eastern Solomons the Japanese sent the Ryujo in a TF ahead of the other carriers to act as bait and the US bit. In a later battle they had a surface force out in front of the carriers to draw attacks (the US didn't really bite that time, though a couple of straggler attacks were made). At the Battle of the Philippine Sea the US did it with a large surface force out 40 miles ahead of the carriers. Very few Japanese aircraft went after the carriers.

So setting up decoy TFs is not gamey in and of itself. It might be in a some conditions, I'd have to think about it to come up with an example though.

Bill

[Symon]

The Japanese had identified picket boats, called Tokusetsu-kanshitei (auxiliary special patrol boats). The role of Tokusetsu-kanshitei was to patrol on the picket line, roughly 2-300 nm offshore. 393 fishing boats and 15 government vessels (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry) were used as Tokusetsu-kanshitei between 1937 and 1945. They ranged from 75’ to 110’, mostly wood, roughly 50 – 150 HP hot bulb diesels, 8/9 knots on smooth seas, were issued a MG and a radio. They would fish while patrolling. See http://www.geocities.jp/tokusetsukansen/E/index.html click on Tokusetsukansen, then under Tokusetsu Tokumutei, click on Tokusetsu Kanshitei. There’s data on each one of the little things and pics of many.

Babes small map scenarios (BBSM) have specific classes of Toku Kan’tei. They, and only they, are allowed to establish a picket line. If you are playing BBB then only Ha’chi or Ku’dai vessels, and only those ‘converted’ to PB configuration, can do that. Yeah, yeah, house rules I know, but they allow the function in the proper form without going to extremes.

Ciao, JWE

[Anthropoid]

Very cool Symon. A relatively unknown but fascinating part of the war. Makes me want to start using Babes! [:)]

[Cap Mandrake]

Yes, very interesting. I wonder if Nito Maru, which sighted the Hornet TF in the Doolittle raid was one of these?

[Symon]

Yes indeed, the very one. There were 4 Nitto Marus listed, #1, #2, #23, and #24. The one who spotted the TF was Nitto Maru #23, Steel, 26.5m (87’), 90 GT, 130 HP Diesel: “Enlisted”, 10 Dec. ’41, Lost, 18 April ’42. Officially, Pa-198.
Here's a pic of a model, and a photo insert of her from the tokusetsukansen site.

One of a class of 21 very similar longline/seine net boats built by Nitto Gyogyo and Nippon Suisen, K.K.. Most all photos show them with their gear still in place. “Enlisted” just means they were picked and “listed” on the Navy Register.

Japanese fishing boats normally went out in “pods” (best word), with a mother/processing boat. They had the equivalent of CB radios and often communicated by waving flags. The mother boat took care of any necessary long range commo.

When IJN snagged and ‘listed’ a boat as kanshitei, it got a real radio and an official call sign. It also got a real live machine gun on top of the deckhouse. Crews were totally civilian and while it wouldn’t be too hard to train up the RO, one can imagine a bunch of longliners trying to run an MG. This is wonderful grist for a Cap Mandrake vignette.

Ciao. JWE

[pontiouspilot]

In tight locations eg. Java Sea I have a multitude of small vessel TFs running all over, albeit most with more than 1 vessel: PTs, minesweepers, M-layers, ASW etc. They attract a lot of silly air attacks but they are there to perform a legitimate job, although I think my 1 PBEM opponent may be skeptical. I also use a multitude of low value AK/AKls to run supplies all over. I lose lots but get lots through. I know my 1 opponent doesn't like these and thinks either they should need to have multiple ships or that he should get more points for sinking loaded ships. I wouldn't oppose the latter but how?? My general view is tough tittie but I did warn him to put up better air search...now he sinks more, c'est la vie.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Agree with all of this. To jwolf's question, my answer is it sounds wacky. Put the ships in a TF and have them patrol. Circumstances vary, yes - ships too
dissimilar, three avenues of approach to defend and only three ships, any number of situations we could dream up. But the way the question is worded - putting
a ship in every hex, just doesn't sound like much taste of something realistic unless there is some very special situation.

Now there is also a distinction to be made here that maybe needs to be articulated again. Some situations where 'sacrifices' are thrown to the wolves are
realistic (happened IRL AFAIK), but breaking things out to all singles to work the game engine - that is the issue. Sending singles on supply or other small
runs can be very realistic, and so can doing so to take advantage of the IRL issues of spotting and successfully targeting single ships. Singles to game
the ops points or air targeting routines (I mean over loading them, not the IRL issue of difficulty finding the single ship again) is a different matter.

The air targeting issue is, thankfully, far less an issue. By intent, single ships are harder to spot and harder to target (which means a different Group
of aircraft finding the same ship again). But the old issue of just one or two or three huge air strikes on tiny targets was programmed out a long time ago.
Now many small strikes can be sent against many small targets. Also, air strikes against any TF in a hex can find and target any ships in that hex, regardless
of what TF they are in. That also reduces this problem because it automatically reduces the effect of singletons on air strike allocation.

Edit to add: I mean that no longer are ONLY a few large strikes possible even against small targets. A large strike on a small target can still happen,
especially if it does not find its intended target but does find the small target instead.

This reminds me of the discussions I participated in when researching Operation Sea Lion - the planned German invasion of UK September 1940. Apart from the
fact that the Royal Navy had very little presence in the Channel, their destroyers had been chased away by The Luftwaffe, their small-boat fleet, like
the Japanese depicted here, had their normal working chores, guarding or minesweeping the various ports along the Channel coast. Often armed with a sole Lewis
machine gun.

At one time I put forth that the sheer numbers of the German vessel concentration, large and small, on the first day could result in a total saturation of the
British defense, if they at all showed up.

The numbers? Apart from the 1.150 (350-750 tons displacement) barges assigned to Day 1 - towed by 450 tugs (to assure a predictable progress) and 150 transports
(averaging 4.000 tons displacement) there was also 300 coastal yachts and motor fishing vessels equipped with outboard-driven storm-boats and dinghies.
In addition, 1.200 motor boats for convoy control and assistance in the maneuvering of the barges during the landings.

That was the transport fleet. Even the tugs and barges were armed to some degree.

The immediate escort for this fleet was about 200 so-called Vorposten-boote, refurbished trawlers and whalers, some armed with 8.8 cm. guns, many with 20 mm
automatic cannons and all with a multiplicity of machine guns. Outside that 30-some R-boote, fast coastal minesweepers, 25 S-boote (PT's), 25 so-called artillery
ships, rebuilt merchants with 7,5 to 15 cm. guns, 19 of the modern Type 35 minesweeper - two 10,5 cm. guns with modern fire-direction and excellent optics, 20
T-Boote, really light destroyers and, finally 9 of the Heavy German destroyers. The 10th arrived back in the Channel from Germany in the beginning of October.

Not to mention that Dönitz declared that he would use everything he had on both sides of the Channel. In a briefing end of August for the German Army leadership
(Generals Halder and Brauchitsch) he listed 44 boats, exclusive of those requiring immediate service or repairs.

[Jorge_Stanbury]

Hemingway also did some picket duty in his yatch "Pilar" on Cuban waters.

http://www.amazon.com/The-Hemingway-Pat ... 1416597875

I bet these were fun

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Agree with all of this. To jwolf's question, my answer is it sounds wacky. Put the ships in a TF and have them patrol. Circumstances vary, yes - ships too
dissimilar, three avenues of approach to defend and only three ships, any number of situations we could dream up. But the way the question is worded - putting
a ship in every hex, just doesn't sound like much taste of something realistic unless there is some very special situation.

Now there is also a distinction to be made here that maybe needs to be articulated again. Some situations where 'sacrifices' are thrown to the wolves are
realistic (happened IRL AFAIK), but breaking things out to all singles to work the game engine - that is the issue. Sending singles on supply or other small
runs can be very realistic, and so can doing so to take advantage of the IRL issues of spotting and successfully targeting single ships. Singles to game
the ops points or air targeting routines (I mean over loading them, not the IRL issue of difficulty finding the single ship again) is a different matter.

The air targeting issue is, thankfully, far less an issue. By intent, single ships are harder to spot and harder to target (which means a different Group
of aircraft finding the same ship again). But the old issue of just one or two or three huge air strikes on tiny targets was programmed out a long time ago.
Now many small strikes can be sent against many small targets. Also, air strikes against any TF in a hex can find and target any ships in that hex, regardless
of what TF they are in. That also reduces this problem because it automatically reduces the effect of singletons on air strike allocation.

Edit to add: I mean that no longer are ONLY a few large strikes possible even against small targets. A large strike on a small target can still happen,
especially if it does not find its intended target but does find the small target instead.

This reminds me of the discussions I participated in when researching Operation Sea Lion - the planned German invasion of UK September 1940. Apart from the
fact that the Royal Navy had very little presence in the Channel, their destroyers had been chased away by The Luftwaffe, their small-boat fleet, like
the Japanese depicted here, had their normal working chores, guarding or minesweeping the various ports along the Channel coast. Often armed with a sole Lewis
machine gun.

At one time I put forth that the sheer numbers of the German vessel concentration, large and small, on the first day could result in a total saturation of the
British defense, if they at all showed up.

The numbers? Apart from the 1.150 (350-750 tons displacement) barges assigned to Day 1 - towed by 450 tugs (to assure a predictable progress) and 150 transports
(averaging 4.000 tons displacement) there was also 300 coastal yachts and motor fishing vessels equipped with outboard-driven storm-boats and dinghies.
In addition, 1.200 motor boats for convoy control and assistance in the maneuvering of the barges during the landings.

That was the transport fleet. Even the tugs and barges were armed to some degree.

The immediate escort for this fleet was about 200 so-called Vorposten-boote, refurbished trawlers and whalers, some armed with 8.8 cm. guns, many with 20 mm
automatic cannons and all with a multiplicity of machine guns. Outside that 30-some R-boote, fast coastal minesweepers, 25 S-boote (PT's), 25 so-called artillery
ships, rebuilt merchants with 7,5 to 15 cm. guns, 19 of the modern Type 35 minesweeper - two 10,5 cm. guns with modern fire-direction and excellent optics, 20
T-Boote, really light destroyers and, finally 9 of the Heavy German destroyers. The 10th arrived back in the Channel from Germany in the beginning of October.

Not to mention that Dönitz declared that he would use everything he had on both sides of the Channel. In a briefing end of August for the German Army leadership
(Generals Halder and Brauchitsch) he listed 44 boats, exclusive of those requiring immediate service or repairs.

I think it both useful and properly truth-seeking to look at things that way and actually try a little analysis rather than dismiss the notion out of hand or presume it would succeed - kudos!

In spite of those numbers, it's clear to me that the issue would have been very much in doubt for the German invaders. Perfect coordination of convoys and covering forces of course was impossible, so I think that your approach to look at the possibility of saturating the defenses is sensible. The biggest issue, the 800 pound gorilla in the room, is that as we are talking about an invasion of the island of Britain itself, all RN assets in range would be brought to bear. Those out of range would be repositioned and brought to bear when they arrived. The two perspectives to look at, IMO, are the saturation of the invasion convoys' defenses and the ability of warships which penetrated those defenses to destroy or turn back many, many such smaller vessels. Battleships carry a lot of ammo. All warships do, compared to what it takes to smoke those sizes of troop carriers. Especially given the air power situation of that time, the matter would have been very bloody for the RN too. The Channel would have been red. But I don't see the RN being saved for any later day - that would have a 'this is IT' battle for the RN, total commitment.

My suspicion is that the invasion would have failed, but chance could have favored it too. It was worth a better look at the details as you've done.

[Leandros]

Oh, well - don't get me started. It was off-topic, anyway....[:)]

Fred

[mind_messing]

Well, we're off topic again...

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: witpqs

Agree with all of this. To jwolf's question, my answer is it sounds wacky. Put the ships in a TF and have them patrol. Circumstances vary, yes - ships too
dissimilar, three avenues of approach to defend and only three ships, any number of situations we could dream up. But the way the question is worded - putting
a ship in every hex, just doesn't sound like much taste of something realistic unless there is some very special situation.

Now there is also a distinction to be made here that maybe needs to be articulated again. Some situations where 'sacrifices' are thrown to the wolves are
realistic (happened IRL AFAIK), but breaking things out to all singles to work the game engine - that is the issue. Sending singles on supply or other small
runs can be very realistic, and so can doing so to take advantage of the IRL issues of spotting and successfully targeting single ships. Singles to game
the ops points or air targeting routines (I mean over loading them, not the IRL issue of difficulty finding the single ship again) is a different matter.

The air targeting issue is, thankfully, far less an issue. By intent, single ships are harder to spot and harder to target (which means a different Group
of aircraft finding the same ship again). But the old issue of just one or two or three huge air strikes on tiny targets was programmed out a long time ago.
Now many small strikes can be sent against many small targets. Also, air strikes against any TF in a hex can find and target any ships in that hex, regardless
of what TF they are in. That also reduces this problem because it automatically reduces the effect of singletons on air strike allocation.

Edit to add: I mean that no longer are ONLY a few large strikes possible even against small targets. A large strike on a small target can still happen,
especially if it does not find its intended target but does find the small target instead.

This reminds me of the discussions I participated in when researching Operation Sea Lion - the planned German invasion of UK September 1940. Apart from the
fact that the Royal Navy had very little presence in the Channel, their destroyers had been chased away by The Luftwaffe, their small-boat fleet, like
the Japanese depicted here, had their normal working chores, guarding or minesweeping the various ports along the Channel coast. Often armed with a sole Lewis
machine gun.

At one time I put forth that the sheer numbers of the German vessel concentration, large and small, on the first day could result in a total saturation of the
British defense, if they at all showed up.

The numbers? Apart from the 1.150 (350-750 tons displacement) barges assigned to Day 1 - towed by 450 tugs (to assure a predictable progress) and 150 transports
(averaging 4.000 tons displacement) there was also 300 coastal yachts and motor fishing vessels equipped with outboard-driven storm-boats and dinghies.
In addition, 1.200 motor boats for convoy control and assistance in the maneuvering of the barges during the landings.

That was the transport fleet. Even the tugs and barges were armed to some degree.

The immediate escort for this fleet was about 200 so-called Vorposten-boote, refurbished trawlers and whalers, some armed with 8.8 cm. guns, many with 20 mm
automatic cannons and all with a multiplicity of machine guns. Outside that 30-some R-boote, fast coastal minesweepers, 25 S-boote (PT's), 25 so-called artillery
ships, rebuilt merchants with 7,5 to 15 cm. guns, 19 of the modern Type 35 minesweeper - two 10,5 cm. guns with modern fire-direction and excellent optics, 20
T-Boote, really light destroyers and, finally 9 of the Heavy German destroyers. The 10th arrived back in the Channel from Germany in the beginning of October.

Not to mention that Dönitz declared that he would use everything he had on both sides of the Channel. In a briefing end of August for the German Army leadership
(Generals Halder and Brauchitsch) he listed 44 boats, exclusive of those requiring immediate service or repairs.

But I don't see the RN being saved for any later day - that would have a 'this is IT' battle for the RN, total commitment.

Was it really?

The behavior of the RN really doesn't support that sort of logic. Surely if Sealion is the battle to end them all, they'd have deployed more expendable assets far closer to the action than at Scapa Flow. The Firth of Forth, for example, or bases further south.

Plus, there's the consideration that Germany isn't the only enemy the UK is facing. The Italians still have a navy that needed to be opposed, and the Japanese had been causing some concern in the Far East for some time. The capital ships needed to oppose these powers aren't easily replaceable.

The fact that the RN could be committed to the Channel and win the battle, but lose enough major ships to lose the war was certainly a factor in British planning.

At the end of the day, the RN existed to defend the empire. The UK was the single most important part of the empire, but it was not the entirety of the empire.

[witpqs]

They only needed to be close on the eve of battle, and I doubt anyone, including the Germans, ever judged the Germans to be mere dozens of hours away from launching an invasion that could overwhelm defenses already in place. As far as saving the RN for something after the island of Britain fell, I don't see it.

[Anthropoid]

London is sooo close to the coast, and if London fell, or got turned into a Stalingrad, it is difficult to imagine the Empire retaining even the proportion of itself that it did retain by 1946.

Just out of gut instinct about British national character and the way nations behave in war, I'd very much have to lean with witpqs. The Brits would've done almost anything they could to avert a successful Sea Lion, including expending so much of their might that they may well had to agree to peace.

That is some grist for a good Harry Turtledove-esque book!

[Leandros]

Was it really?

The behavior of the RN really doesn't support that sort of logic. Surely if Sealion is the battle to end them all, they'd have deployed more expendable assets far closer to the action than at Scapa Flow. The Firth of Forth, for example, or bases further south.

Plus, there's the consideration that Germany isn't the only enemy the UK is facing. The Italians still have a navy that needed to be opposed, and the Japanese had been causing some concern in the Far East for some time. The capital ships needed to oppose these powers aren't easily replaceable.

The fact that the RN could be committed to the Channel and win the battle, but lose enough major ships to lose the war was certainly a factor in British planning.

At the end of the day, the RN existed to defend the empire. The UK was the single most important part of the empire, but it was not the entirety of the empire.

Well, if you insist…...[;)]

My input on “saturation” was only to illustrate one of the difficulties the RN and the RAF and Coastal Command would experience. The Germans didn’t see it as such. Unlike the impression I get when reading postings on the matter, the Germans were intending to fire back, not just be sitting ducks.

A point that surprised me when studying Sea Lion was the lack of immediate RN resources in (the vicinity of) the Channel. And this wasn’t necessarily because of their basing policy, even if there was a standing order issued that summer not to venture into the Channel in daylight without fighter escort - this was in effect till 1944. As we know, at the time, such cooperation between the Navy and Air Force was less than satisfactory.

The main reason was their lack of immediate resources. I went through the story of every RN destroyer based in the UK - it would have taken several days to assemble anything like the German destroyer/T-boote fleet. Were the RN destroyers more proficient than those? In night-fighting? Not to talk about the German S-boot (MTB) fleet. Statistics show (before radar on RN destroyers) a decisive advantage in favor of the S-boote.

Good examples are what happened during the invasion scare in the beginning of September and the Channel Dash. During the first, a small detachment of RN destroyers, all that was immediately available, was sent out in the night to check out what was going on. The RN feared an invasion due to the heavy traffic of tugs and barges observed on their way from Germany to their assembly points in French ports. They found nothing but were chased away by the German radar-directed coastal artillery on the French side. Peter Smith describes this vividly in one of his books. These radars covered the area all the way up to the Thames Estuary. If I remember correctly, only a few days later an RN cruiser covering a couple of destroyers on a nocturnal mission was torpedoed by a Type 35 T-boot (light destroyer) in the same area.

The Channel Dash was very much expected, and planned for, by the British. Even then they were able to do very little about it. What they could assemble in short time - MTB’s which weren’t able to handle the seas and engine break-downs, Swordfish planes and a group of five destroyers at the end of the run, were all rejected by the close escort. As the German flotilla advanced up the Channel in broad daylight an intricate, pre-planned mine-sweeping and escort operation was put in effect, planned by Vice-Admiral Friedrich Ruge and his small staff. Secrecy was important. Only after having passed out of Ruge’s area of responsibility, the Kriegsmarine Western Command, did one of the German cruisers hit a mine. It held it up for half an hour.

The Luftwaffe organized a similar escort operation by about 200 fighters. Bomber and Coastal Command flew more than 200 missions, only about 25 made contact with the enemy fleet and a similar number of planes were shot down by German ships and aircraft.

The Home Fleet? They had no intention of venturing anywhere near the Channel in the case of a German invasion attempt. Field Marshall Alanbrooke mention this in his war-time diary, Churchill hints at it, too. With that the best part of the RN destroyer force was out of the game, too.

Of course, it was the Luftwaffe which had made the RN so wary. No wonder, during the 2-3 days of proper flying weather and the less than full attention of the Luftwaffe, about 230 Allied ships were sunk during the Dunkirk evacuation, most by bombing. About 80 were commissioned ships. This in spite of the RAF flying an equal number of fighter missions in the area as the Germans. Losses in the air were about equal. After that came the “Kanalkampf”, the British attempt to route convoys through the Channel in daylight. They lost four destroyers in short turn. These were the incidents that generated Churchill’s desperate cry for help to Roosevelt.

On this subject it is easy to get bogged down in all sort of details. The Germans had the same advantage as they (and the Japanese) used so well on many other occasions in that period – that of tactical, if not strategic, surprise. History shows that it isn’t necessarily what resources you have in total, but what you have in place – to win a battle. The Germans (and the Japanese) were very good at this. Kraftsammlung, Schwerpunkt. It should also be appreciated that the German invasion spearheads were not normal units. The best regiments were to land first, upgraded by extra engineer units. The first wave contained a complete panzer division. Their para division was to drop concentrated a few miles inland from the strongest landing force, not in bits and pieces like in Norway, Holland and Crete.

Have you considered this: As soon as the German forces were ashore the British Home Chain radar warning system would go down…It was situated quite close to the water.

Fred

[Anthropoid]

Some pretty chilling "phew, we just ducked that one" info there Leandros.

So what is your overall assessment? The Nazis just didn't realize they had what it took? Or Hitler's sense that the Anglo-Saxons were fellow Aryans and a peace settlement might be reached?

Given what you describe it is almost incredible the Nazis didn't launch Sea Lion at the earliest opportunity.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

They only needed to be close on the eve of battle, and I doubt anyone, including the Germans, ever judged the Germans to be mere dozens of hours away from launching an invasion that could overwhelm defenses already in place.

As far as saving the RN for something after the island of Britain fell, I don't see it.

These things tend to depend on what perspective you take. The RN leadership strikes me as the king to take the long, long view.

Consider the bigger picture. Worst case scenario - the UK falls:

- If the RN is reasonably intact, the war can be carried on from the imperial territories.
- If the RN is reasonably intact, the UK has a strong bargaining position if it wants to try to deal with Germany diplomatically.
- If the RN is reasonably intact, then the global balance of naval power is badly shaken, but preserved. Otherwise, Italy suddenly has it's only naval rival badly weakened, and Japan has one of it's rivals weakened.

Even moderate losses to the RN is a bad exchange in the long run - Germany could replace troops and equipment lost in the invasion far quicker than the British can capital ships lost trying to stop them.

Now, I'm not saying the RN wouldn't have opposed Sealion, merely that I don't think they wouldn't have been been sending anything that was armed and could float against the Germans. Think less of the Yamato sailing to it'd fate, and more of the Marine National following the Fall of France.

[Anthropoid]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: witpqs

They only needed to be close on the eve of battle, and I doubt anyone, including the Germans, ever judged the Germans to be mere dozens of hours away from launching an invasion that could overwhelm defenses already in place.

As far as saving the RN for something after the island of Britain fell, I don't see it.

These things tend to depend on what perspective you take. The RN leadership strikes me as the king to take the long, long view.

Consider the bigger picture. Worst case scenario - the UK falls:

- If the RN is reasonably intact, the war can be carried on from the imperial territories.
- If the RN is reasonably intact, the UK has a strong bargaining position if it wants to try to deal with Germany diplomatically.
- If the RN is reasonably intact, then the global balance of naval power is badly shaken, but preserved. Otherwise, Italy suddenly has it's only naval rival badly weakened, and Japan has one of it's rivals weakened.

Even moderate losses to the RN is a bad exchange in the long run - Germany could replace troops and equipment lost in the invasion far quicker than the British can capital ships lost trying to stop them.

Now, I'm not saying the RN wouldn't have opposed Sealion, merely that I don't think they wouldn't have been been sending anything that was armed and could float against the Germans. Think less of the Yamato sailing to it'd fate, and more of the Marine National following the Fall of France.

That double negative threw me for a loop![&:]

Are you disagreeing with witpqs or not? [:)]