Interesting discussion, I'm going to stay on the theory side a bit. The question, for example, about massing the Luftwaffe shouldn't necessarily be should they from a recreation of historical events point of view, (could the Germans have done it, and would they, and should we let it happen in a game ... is the game historical or historical when it starts but allows exploration of other options) but to my mind whether massing that many bombers in one area should tax the logistics system more than it does? Perhaps the Allies could have done it, but could Germany have done it?
ie. are we asking for the correct component to be fixed?
And if they could then great; please focus on the my point that we must fix the disease not the symptom. Stay out of the weeds.
It's really this last comment that got me thinking. Does naval interdiction 'need' to be a player created air directive?
I've only played the WA up to the Battleground Italy scenario and you don't have the full weight of WA naval patrol aircraft. You won't see auto naval interdiction in the 7-9 range. But the Germans lose most of their aircraft early on to withdrawal, so it doesn't really matter. And it seems more 'right'.
If naval patrol were handled by the AI (you simply made the doctrine changes to determine which groups would or would not participate), the player could still influence concentration by placement of naval patrol assets, but I think we'd get a more balanced result.
Maybe it has been nerfed enough to be moot, I have a couple of Axis games going so I should know shortly, but the way it worked pre-.21 seemed to help the Axis and hurt the Allies, when I would think the preponderance of assets should lead things the other way.
The other thing that makes it hard for me to make judgements from the AARs of others is not knowing how efficaciously the air assets are being employed on either side.
I see 'WTF?' moments in AARs, and sometimes even from my opponents.