Just food for thought...
Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
Just food for thought...
Reading about the Tunisian Campaign got me interested in commitment of US troops in 1942/43. One thing lead to another, and I found this bit.
I think it's interesting to note the heavy level of US troop and resource commitment to the Pacific during the first two years of war - greater than to Europe, despite the Europe First Policy.
Consider below the force levels deployed to both theaters as of Dec 1943 - after the conquest of North Africa, the conquest of Sicily, the landings at Salerno, and the US 5th Army on the Winter Line in front of Monte Cassino.... US forces deployed to Europe were only then gaining parity with those already deployed to the Pacific.
It seems only in the 1944-45 period did Europe First become a reality.
From wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europe_first
The American people favored early action against Japan, In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war, in February 1943, 53 percent of Americans said that Japan was the "chief enemy" compared to 34 percent choosing Germany. A later poll showed that 82 percent of Americans believed that the Japanese were more "cruel at heart" than Germans.[10] As a consequence, American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe. In the first six months the U.S. was in the war, the U.S. army deployed more than 300,000 soldiers overseas to the Pacific while less than 100,000 were sent to Europe.[11] The U.S.'s first major offensive during World War II was in the Pacific: Guadalcanal in August 1942. Concurrently, Australian forces attacked and pushed back the Japanese in the Kokoda Track Campaign in New Guinea.
The inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U.S. to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany during the first two years the U.S. was in the war. As late as December 1943, the balance was nearly even. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships.[12] In early 1944, the military buildup of American forces for the invasion of France shifted the balance of American resources toward the European theater and made Europe First a reality. However, despite the majority of American resources going into Europe in 1944, the U.S. still had sufficient resources to mount several major military operations in the Pacific that year: Saipan (June 1944); Guam (July 1944); Peleliu (September 1944); and the invasion of the Philippines at Leyte in October 1944.
In 1944 and 1945 the balance of U.S. resources shifted heavily toward Europe as the Europe First strategy became a reality rather than just a stated objective. At war's end in Europe, the U.S. Army had 47 divisions in Europe and 21 divisions, plus 6 Marine Corps divisions, in the Pacific. Seventy-eight percent of Army and Army airforce manpower was deployed against Germany versus 22 percent deployed in the Pacific. The plan to invade Japan envisioned that 15 of the European divisions would be transferred to the Pacific.[13]
The uncritical view that "Europe First" dictated the allocation of resources throughout the war has caused many scholars to underestimate the resources required to defeat Japan. For example, historian H. P. Willmott stated that the United States "allocated little more than one-quarter of her total war effort to the struggle against Japan."[14] That may be an underestimate which does not take into account that, according to official U.S. statistics, 70 percent of the U.S. Navy and all the Marine Corps were deployed in the Pacific as well as the 22 percent of the Army deployed to the Pacific at the time of Germany's surrender in May 1945.
I think it's interesting to note the heavy level of US troop and resource commitment to the Pacific during the first two years of war - greater than to Europe, despite the Europe First Policy.
Consider below the force levels deployed to both theaters as of Dec 1943 - after the conquest of North Africa, the conquest of Sicily, the landings at Salerno, and the US 5th Army on the Winter Line in front of Monte Cassino.... US forces deployed to Europe were only then gaining parity with those already deployed to the Pacific.
It seems only in the 1944-45 period did Europe First become a reality.
From wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europe_first
The American people favored early action against Japan, In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war, in February 1943, 53 percent of Americans said that Japan was the "chief enemy" compared to 34 percent choosing Germany. A later poll showed that 82 percent of Americans believed that the Japanese were more "cruel at heart" than Germans.[10] As a consequence, American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe. In the first six months the U.S. was in the war, the U.S. army deployed more than 300,000 soldiers overseas to the Pacific while less than 100,000 were sent to Europe.[11] The U.S.'s first major offensive during World War II was in the Pacific: Guadalcanal in August 1942. Concurrently, Australian forces attacked and pushed back the Japanese in the Kokoda Track Campaign in New Guinea.
The inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U.S. to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany during the first two years the U.S. was in the war. As late as December 1943, the balance was nearly even. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships.[12] In early 1944, the military buildup of American forces for the invasion of France shifted the balance of American resources toward the European theater and made Europe First a reality. However, despite the majority of American resources going into Europe in 1944, the U.S. still had sufficient resources to mount several major military operations in the Pacific that year: Saipan (June 1944); Guam (July 1944); Peleliu (September 1944); and the invasion of the Philippines at Leyte in October 1944.
In 1944 and 1945 the balance of U.S. resources shifted heavily toward Europe as the Europe First strategy became a reality rather than just a stated objective. At war's end in Europe, the U.S. Army had 47 divisions in Europe and 21 divisions, plus 6 Marine Corps divisions, in the Pacific. Seventy-eight percent of Army and Army airforce manpower was deployed against Germany versus 22 percent deployed in the Pacific. The plan to invade Japan envisioned that 15 of the European divisions would be transferred to the Pacific.[13]
The uncritical view that "Europe First" dictated the allocation of resources throughout the war has caused many scholars to underestimate the resources required to defeat Japan. For example, historian H. P. Willmott stated that the United States "allocated little more than one-quarter of her total war effort to the struggle against Japan."[14] That may be an underestimate which does not take into account that, according to official U.S. statistics, 70 percent of the U.S. Navy and all the Marine Corps were deployed in the Pacific as well as the 22 percent of the Army deployed to the Pacific at the time of Germany's surrender in May 1945.
- Jorge_Stanbury
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RE: Just food for thought...
For the US Army, it might had been more a matter of quality vs. quantity.. all "famous" US Army divisions, thus, likely the most experienced, went to Africa
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RE: Just food for thought...
Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships.
The real question is how many of those deployed were frontline troops, and how many were sent to rear-area duties?
RE: Just food for thought...
The American people favored early action against Japan, In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war, in February 1943, 53 percent of Americans said that Japan was the "chief enemy" compared to 34 percent choosing Germany. A later poll showed that 82 percent of Americans believed that the Japanese were more "cruel at heart" than Germans.[10] As a consequence, American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe.
The Wiki article is wrong with that "As a consequence..." assertion. There were other reasons that it was done. In fact, the Wiki article cites the poll in 2/43 and a "later poll" yet notes deployments in '42 as a consequence of them.
Intel Monkey: https://sites.google.com/view/staffmonkeys/home
RE: Just food for thought...
ORIGINAL: witpqs
The American people favored early action against Japan, In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war, in February 1943, 53 percent of Americans said that Japan was the "chief enemy" compared to 34 percent choosing Germany. A later poll showed that 82 percent of Americans believed that the Japanese were more "cruel at heart" than Germans.[10] As a consequence, American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe.
The Wiki article is wrong with that "As a consequence..." assertion. There were other reasons that it was done. In fact, the Wiki article cites the poll in 2/43 and a "later poll" yet notes deployments in '42 as a consequence of them.
I fixed the Wiki article.
Ryan Opel
RE: Just food for thought...
ORIGINAL: mind_messing
Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships.
The real question is how many of those deployed were frontline troops, and how many were sent to rear-area duties?
As best I count up:
US Army Divisions, In combat - or - Overseas, between Dec 1941 - Dec 1943
PTO___________________________________MTO/ETO
12th Div (Philippine)-41_________________1st Arm Div - Nov 42
25th Div - 41_________________________2nd ArmDiv - Nov 42
24th Div - 41_________________________1st Div - Nov 42
32nd Div - Sep 42_____________________3rd Div - Nov 42
Americal - Oct 42______________________9th Div - Nov 42
27th Div - Mar 42______________________34th Div - Nov 42
41st Div - Apr 42______________________36th Div - Apr 43
7th Div - May 43______________________45th Div - Jul 43
1st Cav Jul 43________________________2nd Div - (Oct 43…Ireland)
43rd Div - Jul 43______________________28th Div - (Oct 43..UK)
37th Div - Jul 43______________________29th Div (Oct 42…UK)
33rd Div (Jul 43 …Hawaii)_______________82nd AB Div - Apr 43
6th Div (Aug 43 …Hawaii)_______________85th Div (Dec 43 shipping out)
40th Div - Dec 43 _____________________88th Div (Dec 43 shipping out)
USMC - PTO
1st Mar Div - 42
2nd Mar Div - 42
3rd Mar Div - Jul 43
RE: Just food for thought...
Well, you need only look a the pitiful Allied device pools to see where most of the better equipment (US Army) were going. The marines fought at the canal with springfields. The Navy was in the Pacific as the British fleet was sufficient for the Atlantic and aside from the submarines, the German fleet was neutered. Likewise the Allies had a sizeable commitment of troops in Europe already. Including many Anzac and Indian troops. The US was just filling out the big gaps in the Pacific as a defensive priority. Later on the Americans started to gain wins in the Pacific the flow of equipment shifted to build on that success. It was an Europe first policy but not inflexible to meet the needs and conditions of the war.
I am the Holy Roman Emperor and am above grammar.
Sigismund of Luxemburg
Sigismund of Luxemburg
- Jorge_Stanbury
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RE: Just food for thought...
I don't know if a troop count is a good representation of priorities; how much material, supplies went to Europe vs the Pacific? and not only to the US Army, but to the UK, USSR and other allies
RE: Just food for thought...
[:D]ORIGINAL: rjopel
ORIGINAL: witpqs
The American people favored early action against Japan, In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war, in February 1943, 53 percent of Americans said that Japan was the "chief enemy" compared to 34 percent choosing Germany. A later poll showed that 82 percent of Americans believed that the Japanese were more "cruel at heart" than Germans.[10] As a consequence, American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe.
The Wiki article is wrong with that "As a consequence..." assertion. There were other reasons that it was done. In fact, the Wiki article cites the poll in 2/43 and a "later poll" yet notes deployments in '42 as a consequence of them.
I fixed the Wiki article.
I wonder how long before someone changes it back!
Intel Monkey: https://sites.google.com/view/staffmonkeys/home
RE: Just food for thought...
witpqs, It's just amazing to stare at the monkey while you correct the books. [:D]
RE: Just food for thought...
One GAME consequence of the game's allocation towards the Europe First Strategy seems to be the allocation of the production of what is practically the only bomber which can hit and damage an IJN CV: the SBD-3. The allocation of all US Navy aircraft is easily available online month by month and clearly shows that practically no SBD airframes were allocated to the Atlantic Fleet more than a month prior to the invasion of North Africa. By that time the SBD-4 had come on line (with nothing other than a voltage adjustment to distinguish it from the SBD-3).
I'll admit that I have never done a airframe by airframe count of which SBD-3s ended up in the Pacific but it seems that the replacement/production of SBD-3s has been stretched over an extra 6-7 months without the addition of any of the SBD-4 version which was a fairly significant number (to preempt the IJN fanboys every single one of the SBD-3s that ended up in New Zealand service were full of patched bulletholes dating from their prior service with the USMC).
When one rolls the SBD-3 and SBD-4 production into one (since the differences don't really matter at the level of the game) and applies the combined production over the course of both aircraft's actual production the monthly production/replacement figure jumps to over 50 airframes per month. If some sort of proportion is applied to SBD-3s in the game where did all those extra bombers end up: from the returns on aircraft it was not in the Atlantic Fleet.
(perhaps in Lunstrom's First Team one reads pretty consistently about the shortage of carrier fighters yet every US carrier showed up at every carrier battle in 1942 with a full complement of SBDs - it was the Japanese who showed up for "The Decisive Battle" with fewer airframes than they could carry.)
I'll admit that I have never done a airframe by airframe count of which SBD-3s ended up in the Pacific but it seems that the replacement/production of SBD-3s has been stretched over an extra 6-7 months without the addition of any of the SBD-4 version which was a fairly significant number (to preempt the IJN fanboys every single one of the SBD-3s that ended up in New Zealand service were full of patched bulletholes dating from their prior service with the USMC).
When one rolls the SBD-3 and SBD-4 production into one (since the differences don't really matter at the level of the game) and applies the combined production over the course of both aircraft's actual production the monthly production/replacement figure jumps to over 50 airframes per month. If some sort of proportion is applied to SBD-3s in the game where did all those extra bombers end up: from the returns on aircraft it was not in the Atlantic Fleet.
(perhaps in Lunstrom's First Team one reads pretty consistently about the shortage of carrier fighters yet every US carrier showed up at every carrier battle in 1942 with a full complement of SBDs - it was the Japanese who showed up for "The Decisive Battle" with fewer airframes than they could carry.)
RE: Just food for thought...
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
For the US Army, it might had been more a matter of quality vs. quantity.. all "famous" US Army divisions, thus, likely the most experienced, went to Africa
No unit with experience in Africa, Africa was precisely the way to get it.
RE: Just food for thought...
By the numbers -ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
I don't know if a troop count is a good representation of priorities; how much material, supplies went to Europe vs the Pacific? and not only to the US Army, but to the UK, USSR and other allies
Seeing how 9 US Army Divisions participated in active combat in the MTO/ETO by Dec 1943 (out of a total of 14 Divisions shipped overseas to that theater); while 9 US Army Infantry Divisions and 3 USMC Infantry Divisions actively participated in combat in the PTO by Dec 1943 - a total 12 Infantry Divisions(out of 17 Divisions shipped overseas to the PTO), ....not to mention at least 27 naval engagements in the Pacific between Dec 1941 and Dec 1943, and a very active air campaign waged by the USA against Japan (from Midway to China).... I think given the totals originally stated above, it is logical to assume that if the United States was more heavily engaged against Japan than Germany in 42 & 43 - the amount of war material shipped and consumed in the PTO would also be commensurately greater than that sent to Europe in that time frame. Indeed, it would be hard to conceive the situation being otherwise....Lend-Lease not withstanding.
Europe First is engraved on our minds, but the actual numbers tell a different story for the first two years of the USA's war.
- Jorge_Stanbury
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RE: Just food for thought...
ORIGINAL: Dili
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
For the US Army, it might had been more a matter of quality vs. quantity.. all "famous" US Army divisions, thus, likely the most experienced, went to Africa
No unit with experience in Africa, Africa was precisely the way to get it.
Not battle experience, but they had been training for some time, and/ or had been part of the "Louisiana" or "Carolina" Maneuvers. They were not raw conscripts.
RE: Just food for thought...
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
ORIGINAL: Dili
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
For the US Army, it might had been more a matter of quality vs. quantity.. all "famous" US Army divisions, thus, likely the most experienced, went to Africa
No unit with experience in Africa, Africa was precisely the way to get it.
Not battle experience, but they had been training for some time, and/ or had been part of the "Louisiana" or "Carolina" Maneuvers. They were not raw conscripts.
You are correct - Infantry Divisions 1 through 9 were Regular Army and in active service before Pearl Harbor (as were Armored Divisions 1 through 3), while Infantry Divisions 24 through 45 were National Guard. It is noteworthy that the latter (NG) were all in active service in 1940 & 1941, all had extensive training before deployment overseas, and even before Pearl Harbor. However, all divisions named above had draftees to fill ranks beginning in 1940.
It was the divisions numbered above 60 that were wartime creations and hence none saw combat before 1944.
RE: Just food for thought...
ORIGINAL: Big B
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
ORIGINAL: Dili
No unit with experience in Africa, Africa was precisely the way to get it.
Not battle experience, but they had been training for some time, and/ or had been part of the "Louisiana" or "Carolina" Maneuvers. They were not raw conscripts.
You are correct - Infantry Divisions 1 through 9 were Regular Army and in active service before Pearl Harbor (as were Armored Divisions 1 through 3), while Infantry Divisions 24 through 45 were National Guard. It is noteworthy that the latter (NG) were all in active service in 1940 & 1941, all had extensive training before deployment overseas, and even before Pearl Harbor. However, all divisions named above had draftees to fill ranks beginning in 1940.
It was the divisions numbered above 60 that were wartime creations and hence none saw combat before 1944.
Err....The 82nd? 101st? [:D]
RE: Just food for thought...
Ahem, glad you asked. The 82nd Airborne wasn't activated until March 25th 1942 - from Regular Army and volunteer drafts; as was the 101st Airborne activated on August 16th 1942 also from Regular Army and volunteer drafts.
Neither existed on Dec 7th 1941 [;)][:D]
Neither existed on Dec 7th 1941 [;)][:D]
ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
ORIGINAL: Big B
ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury
Not battle experience, but they had been training for some time, and/ or had been part of the "Louisiana" or "Carolina" Maneuvers. They were not raw conscripts.
You are correct - Infantry Divisions 1 through 9 were Regular Army and in active service before Pearl Harbor (as were Armored Divisions 1 through 3), while Infantry Divisions 24 through 45 were National Guard. It is noteworthy that the latter (NG) were all in active service in 1940 & 1941, all had extensive training before deployment overseas, and even before Pearl Harbor. However, all divisions named above had draftees to fill ranks beginning in 1940.
It was the divisions numbered above 60 that were wartime creations and hence none saw combat before 1944.
Err....The 82nd? 101st? [:D]
RE: Just food for thought...
True...but both had existed in WW1 as regular "leg" infantry. [:D]ORIGINAL: Big B
Ahem, glad you asked. The 82nd Airborne wasn't activated until March 25th 1942 - from Regular Army and volunteer drafts; as was the 101st Airborne activated on August 16th 1942 also from Regular Army and volunteer drafts.
Neither existed on Dec 7th 1941 [;)][:D]
ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
ORIGINAL: Big B
You are correct - Infantry Divisions 1 through 9 were Regular Army and in active service before Pearl Harbor (as were Armored Divisions 1 through 3), while Infantry Divisions 24 through 45 were National Guard. It is noteworthy that the latter (NG) were all in active service in 1940 & 1941, all had extensive training before deployment overseas, and even before Pearl Harbor. However, all divisions named above had draftees to fill ranks beginning in 1940.
It was the divisions numbered above 60 that were wartime creations and hence none saw combat before 1944.
Err....The 82nd? 101st? [:D]
RE: Just food for thought...
ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
True...but both had existed in WW1 as regular "leg" infantry. [:D]
Well.... the 82nd did, it took part in the Meuse Argonne, and was the unit of Sgt Alvin York. The 101st on the other hand never left the States in the 1st war.
Both were deactivated after the First War, being National Army Divisions (as opposed to Regular or National Guard).
Smarty Pants[:)]
RE: Just food for thought...
ORIGINAL: Big B
You are correct - Infantry Divisions 1 through 9 were Regular Army and in active service before Pearl Harbor (as were Armored Divisions 1 through 3), while Infantry Divisions 24 through 45 were National Guard. It is noteworthy that the latter (NG) were all in active service in 1940 & 1941, all had extensive training before deployment overseas, and even before Pearl Harbor. However, all divisions named above had draftees to fill ranks beginning in 1940.
It was the divisions numbered above 60 that were wartime creations and hence none saw combat before 1944.
Not quite... Numbers 1-25 were reserved for regular army infantry division. National Guard began with 26.
An additional two unnumbered divisions existed in the regular army. These were the Philippine Division and the Hawaiian Division. The Hawaiian Division (which was square) was split to form the 24th and 25th divisions. The two regiments of the Hawaiian National Guard (298, 299) were attached after the National Guard had been federalized.