Struggling in the East - SigUp vs. loki
Moderators: Joel Billings, Sabre21
RE: The Road to Blau
I really appreciate your detail in planning for both the real op and various alternative proposals.
RE: The Road to Blau
Very nicely written. I like your clear strategic thinking.
It would be a great advantage to you if you can seize a bridgehead across the Don in the first week. Is the Don just South of Boguchar vulnerable to a coup de main? It's probably feasible if there's nothing ZOC'ing the East bank.
It would be a great advantage to you if you can seize a bridgehead across the Don in the first week. Is the Don just South of Boguchar vulnerable to a coup de main? It's probably feasible if there's nothing ZOC'ing the East bank.
RE: The Road to Blau
ORIGINAL: rrbill
If haven't yet said, WOW your graphics & commentary.
ORIGINAL: jwolf
I really appreciate your detail in planning for both the real op and various alternative proposals.
Thanks!
Will come up in the next AAR post, but indeed it was possible. The Don situation was as indicated by the recon only with a single rifle division in Boguchar itself.ORIGINAL: timmyab
Very nicely written. I like your clear strategic thinking.
It would be a great advantage to you if you can seize a bridgehead across the Don in the first week. Is the Don just South of Boguchar vulnerable to a coup de main? It's probably feasible if there's nothing ZOC'ing the East bank.
Turn 54: 25th June 1942 - 1st July 1942
Turn 54: 25th June 1942 - 1st July 1942
In the early morning hours of 25th June 1942 the great German summer offensive of 1942 was initiated by punishing Luftwaffe ground attacks. To support the attacks by the Heer the entire Luftflotte 4 was committed to the area. Army Group B's operations were supported by von Greim's V. Fliegerkorps with 587 combat aircraft, while Army Group A was backed by von Richthofen's IV. Fliegerkorps with 361 combat aircraft. Furthermore if necessary Army Group B could count on long range bombardments conducted by Luftflotte 2's II. Fliegerkorps. Soviet divisions at the front and in the rear of the breakthrough areas Rovenki and Kamensk were subjected to incessant bombardment with Luftwaffe enjoying complete dominance over the air. With the VVS mainly concentrated in the Moscow - Tula - Voronezh area the Germans on occasions could even afford unescorted bomber operations.
Ground operations were initiated on both fronts by infantry assaults spearheaded by the redesignated elite corps of Model and Weiss. [1] Having achieved the element of surprise the divisions near Rovenki quickly breached the Soviet lines and Weiss XXVII. AK pushed the retreating Soviets east in the direction of their rear guard divisions around Kantemirovka. Meanwhile 6th Army's LV. AK and 17th Army's LII. AK secured the base of the developing corridor between Chernaya Kalitva and Markovka. Having achieved a clean breakthrough Guderian and von Kleist's panzers swarmed out and on 27th June XXXXVII. PzK engaged the dug-in 38th Army at Kantemirovka. The Soviet resistance was quickly broken and the Germans pushed east in a pace not seen since the summer of 1941. In the evening hours of 28th June one division each of XIV., XXIV. and XXXXVI. PzK stood in front of Boguchar, which was taken by a surprise attack the following day. With Boguchar cleared III. and XXXXVIII. PzK crossed the Don east of the city on the same day and established a 50 miles wide and 40 miles deep bridgehead over the river. The rest of XIV. PzK in the meantime swung south into the rear of the Soviet divisions at the Derkul and by 1st July 1942 stood at Millerovo where they linked up with von Manstein's 3rd Panzer Army.
Army Group A's assault was complicated by the fact that the Soviet divisions stood behind fortifications along the major river line of the Donets. Furthermore the two breakthrough spots opposite Kamensk were held by two rile divisions each of 61st Army. Von Manstein therefore assigned nearly 70.000 men supported by 813 guns to achieve the initial breakthrough that would give the Germans a foothold over the Donets. Led by the elite 21st Infantry Division and 22nd Airlanding Division the Germans crossed the river under heavy artillery and Luftwaffe cover, but were nevertheless pinned on the banks of the Donets by Soviet fire. It wasn't until the committment of StuGs that the two elite divisions managed to expand the bridgehead, enabling more troops to cross the river and push aside the Soviets. Having gotten over the initial obstacle Model's 11th Infantry Division, working together with 5th Jäger Division, expanded the bridgehead to the east and north and on 28th June von Manstein sent his two panzer corps over the Donets on pontoon bridges to exploit the breach. Overcoming 61st Army's reserves the following day the German armoured troops reached the outskirts of Millerovo and the Kalitva on 30th June and with XIV. PzK joining from the north sealed a pocket with about 20 Soviet divisions.
The first phase of Fall Blau was a stunning success, invoking memories of June 1941. In seven days the leading elements of 1st and 2nd Panzer Army had advanced some 140 miles and stood in a line from the Khoper to the Chir and Kalitva, annihilating the Soviet lines in between in the process. The Soviets reacted to this development by railing in massive reinforcements to reestablish a front between Svoboda and Khoper. With the divisions in the Don bridgehead between Chernaya Kalitva and Tikhaya Sosna outflanked Stavka furthermore pulled all of them across the Don to defend the critical rail junction of Svoboda.
However, the Soviets were not inactive. In the week prior to the 25th June the Red Army launched a powerful assault at the Lama front north of Moscow. Nearly 200.000 men and 2.200 artillery pieces of 4th Shock Army and 55th Army, supported by numerous sapper regiments stormed the trenches of 268th Infantry Division. Not even the intervention of two regiments of 5th Panzer Division was able to stem the tide. Army Group Centre's high command in accordance with Army Group North (under whose command 9th Army was placed in the meantime), now led by von Leeb, quickly ordered Hoth's 4th Panzer Army to send its XXXXI. PzK to the region to bolster the defenses. Furthermore 9th Army's 2nd Panzer Division was hastily recalled from its feint duties in the Tula region.
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[1] I don't know whether it was the effort, but I transferred all assets of I. and XX. AK to the two corps HQs the Germans receive as reinforcements in 1941. The remaining corps HQ of I. and XX. AK were then filled up with weakened divisions swapped out from the southern armies and sent to the Tula region where they supported mid-June diversionary attacks in the hope of convincing loki that the attack will come there.
In the early morning hours of 25th June 1942 the great German summer offensive of 1942 was initiated by punishing Luftwaffe ground attacks. To support the attacks by the Heer the entire Luftflotte 4 was committed to the area. Army Group B's operations were supported by von Greim's V. Fliegerkorps with 587 combat aircraft, while Army Group A was backed by von Richthofen's IV. Fliegerkorps with 361 combat aircraft. Furthermore if necessary Army Group B could count on long range bombardments conducted by Luftflotte 2's II. Fliegerkorps. Soviet divisions at the front and in the rear of the breakthrough areas Rovenki and Kamensk were subjected to incessant bombardment with Luftwaffe enjoying complete dominance over the air. With the VVS mainly concentrated in the Moscow - Tula - Voronezh area the Germans on occasions could even afford unescorted bomber operations.
Ground operations were initiated on both fronts by infantry assaults spearheaded by the redesignated elite corps of Model and Weiss. [1] Having achieved the element of surprise the divisions near Rovenki quickly breached the Soviet lines and Weiss XXVII. AK pushed the retreating Soviets east in the direction of their rear guard divisions around Kantemirovka. Meanwhile 6th Army's LV. AK and 17th Army's LII. AK secured the base of the developing corridor between Chernaya Kalitva and Markovka. Having achieved a clean breakthrough Guderian and von Kleist's panzers swarmed out and on 27th June XXXXVII. PzK engaged the dug-in 38th Army at Kantemirovka. The Soviet resistance was quickly broken and the Germans pushed east in a pace not seen since the summer of 1941. In the evening hours of 28th June one division each of XIV., XXIV. and XXXXVI. PzK stood in front of Boguchar, which was taken by a surprise attack the following day. With Boguchar cleared III. and XXXXVIII. PzK crossed the Don east of the city on the same day and established a 50 miles wide and 40 miles deep bridgehead over the river. The rest of XIV. PzK in the meantime swung south into the rear of the Soviet divisions at the Derkul and by 1st July 1942 stood at Millerovo where they linked up with von Manstein's 3rd Panzer Army.
Army Group A's assault was complicated by the fact that the Soviet divisions stood behind fortifications along the major river line of the Donets. Furthermore the two breakthrough spots opposite Kamensk were held by two rile divisions each of 61st Army. Von Manstein therefore assigned nearly 70.000 men supported by 813 guns to achieve the initial breakthrough that would give the Germans a foothold over the Donets. Led by the elite 21st Infantry Division and 22nd Airlanding Division the Germans crossed the river under heavy artillery and Luftwaffe cover, but were nevertheless pinned on the banks of the Donets by Soviet fire. It wasn't until the committment of StuGs that the two elite divisions managed to expand the bridgehead, enabling more troops to cross the river and push aside the Soviets. Having gotten over the initial obstacle Model's 11th Infantry Division, working together with 5th Jäger Division, expanded the bridgehead to the east and north and on 28th June von Manstein sent his two panzer corps over the Donets on pontoon bridges to exploit the breach. Overcoming 61st Army's reserves the following day the German armoured troops reached the outskirts of Millerovo and the Kalitva on 30th June and with XIV. PzK joining from the north sealed a pocket with about 20 Soviet divisions.
The first phase of Fall Blau was a stunning success, invoking memories of June 1941. In seven days the leading elements of 1st and 2nd Panzer Army had advanced some 140 miles and stood in a line from the Khoper to the Chir and Kalitva, annihilating the Soviet lines in between in the process. The Soviets reacted to this development by railing in massive reinforcements to reestablish a front between Svoboda and Khoper. With the divisions in the Don bridgehead between Chernaya Kalitva and Tikhaya Sosna outflanked Stavka furthermore pulled all of them across the Don to defend the critical rail junction of Svoboda.
However, the Soviets were not inactive. In the week prior to the 25th June the Red Army launched a powerful assault at the Lama front north of Moscow. Nearly 200.000 men and 2.200 artillery pieces of 4th Shock Army and 55th Army, supported by numerous sapper regiments stormed the trenches of 268th Infantry Division. Not even the intervention of two regiments of 5th Panzer Division was able to stem the tide. Army Group Centre's high command in accordance with Army Group North (under whose command 9th Army was placed in the meantime), now led by von Leeb, quickly ordered Hoth's 4th Panzer Army to send its XXXXI. PzK to the region to bolster the defenses. Furthermore 9th Army's 2nd Panzer Division was hastily recalled from its feint duties in the Tula region.
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[1] I don't know whether it was the effort, but I transferred all assets of I. and XX. AK to the two corps HQs the Germans receive as reinforcements in 1941. The remaining corps HQ of I. and XX. AK were then filled up with weakened divisions swapped out from the southern armies and sent to the Tula region where they supported mid-June diversionary attacks in the hope of convincing loki that the attack will come there.
RE: Yearly Review: 1941
Love it. Pretty much a perfect start to the Summer 42 campaign.
Great use of speed, surprise and deception coupled with strategic awareness and tactical know-how. In particular the enormous power of deception and surprise is often not exploited enough by players.
Great use of speed, surprise and deception coupled with strategic awareness and tactical know-how. In particular the enormous power of deception and surprise is often not exploited enough by players.
Turn 55: 2nd July 1942 - 8th July 1942
Turn 55: 2nd July 1942 - 8th July 1942
Still in relative proximity to their supply lines and aided by Luftwaffe aerial resupply the German offensive, now called Unternehmen Braunschweig, entered its second phase. After two days of rest, and with the first infantry elements crossing the Don at Boguchar III. and XXXXVIII. PzK broke through the Soviet lines near Vorobjevka on 3rd July 1942 and headed in the direction of Talovaya. The resistance posed by the Soviet 16th and 38th Army was swept aside and one day later forward elements of III. PzK's 13th Panzer Division had reached the outskirts of the town. With the area held by a dug-in Soviet Guards Rifle Corps, however, Guderian and von Kleist agreed on ignoring the rail line for now and drive west towards the Don near Bobrov.
By 6th July units of XIV. and XXXXVI. PzK had caught up to the spearheads of the XXXXVIII. PzK at the Bityug river and later that day the forwards divisions of all three corps (1st, 9th and 11th Panzer Division) crossed the river and after a day of heavy fighting established a firm foothold on the west side of the Bityug. With the Soviet units retreating 19th Panzer Division and the Slovak Mobile Division reached the Don on 8th July, closing the door on over 10 Soviet rifle divisions, since SS Wiking and elements of 6th Army had reached the other side of the Don two days earlier.
With this new setback the Soviet morale broke and several units flooded back from the advancing German troops, forcing Stavka between Voronezh and Svoboda. Additionally their units had to cope with a severe bout of desertions, that gravely reduced the combat effectiveness of the Soviet units. [1]
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[1] An effect of applying the 1.08 patch. With many swaps occuring the 60/80 rule was enforced quite harshly on the Soviets, dropping many of loki's units below 60% TOE. I offered him a one to two turn standoff, where I would do nothing other than clearing that pocket.
Still in relative proximity to their supply lines and aided by Luftwaffe aerial resupply the German offensive, now called Unternehmen Braunschweig, entered its second phase. After two days of rest, and with the first infantry elements crossing the Don at Boguchar III. and XXXXVIII. PzK broke through the Soviet lines near Vorobjevka on 3rd July 1942 and headed in the direction of Talovaya. The resistance posed by the Soviet 16th and 38th Army was swept aside and one day later forward elements of III. PzK's 13th Panzer Division had reached the outskirts of the town. With the area held by a dug-in Soviet Guards Rifle Corps, however, Guderian and von Kleist agreed on ignoring the rail line for now and drive west towards the Don near Bobrov.
By 6th July units of XIV. and XXXXVI. PzK had caught up to the spearheads of the XXXXVIII. PzK at the Bityug river and later that day the forwards divisions of all three corps (1st, 9th and 11th Panzer Division) crossed the river and after a day of heavy fighting established a firm foothold on the west side of the Bityug. With the Soviet units retreating 19th Panzer Division and the Slovak Mobile Division reached the Don on 8th July, closing the door on over 10 Soviet rifle divisions, since SS Wiking and elements of 6th Army had reached the other side of the Don two days earlier.
With this new setback the Soviet morale broke and several units flooded back from the advancing German troops, forcing Stavka between Voronezh and Svoboda. Additionally their units had to cope with a severe bout of desertions, that gravely reduced the combat effectiveness of the Soviet units. [1]
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[1] An effect of applying the 1.08 patch. With many swaps occuring the 60/80 rule was enforced quite harshly on the Soviets, dropping many of loki's units below 60% TOE. I offered him a one to two turn standoff, where I would do nothing other than clearing that pocket.
Turn 56-57: 9th July 1942 - 22nd July 1942
Turn 56-57: 9th July 1942 - 22nd July 1942
After having successfully expand the bridgehead over the Don near Boguchar the Germans, fighting against logistical difficulties with getting freight over the river [1] rested for a week, giving the Soviets valuable time to restore their morale. By 15th July the German supply situation had eased up considerably and the following day 1st and 2nd Panzer Army resumed Dampfhammer, the second part of Unternehmen Braunschweig.
With the Red Army having retreated out of the immediate vicinity of the German positions, it wasn't until the armies had advanced some 40 miles before they encountered Soviet resistance, near the town of Ryshkova west of the Bityug river. The position was held by the Soviet 12th Army but it broke quickly under the armoured onslaught of XXIV. PzK. With XXIV. PzK pushing 12th Army north the lane was opened for III., XIV., XXXXVII. and XXXXVIII. PzK to swing west against Lipetsk. Brushing aside the resistance of 5th and 47th Army the German divisions reached the outskirts of the city on 19th July. With 2nd Army's XXXV. AK having reached the banks of the Voronezh river a day earlier, some 10 Soviet divisions were cut off near Voronezh.
However, in the meantime Stavka readied the Soviet reserves for a massive counterattack and on the same day the Germans reached Lipetsk 6th, 34th, 41st and 50th Army launched a counterattack, led by veteran (Guards) cavalry corps and freshly formed tank corps. XXIV. AK holding the eastern side of the German front was caught unprepared and quickly overwhelmed by the Soviet attack. Before the German army commanders could react, the Soviets had closed within 10 miles of the pocket. With a breakout attempt by 190th and 362nd Rifle Division thwarted by 1st SS Motorised Brigade Stavka decided to go safe and pull back the valuable counterattacking forces, before the Germans had regrouped.
With the Lipetsk - Tambov front demanding the reserves, however, Stavka decided to pull back from vicinity of Tula, only leaving a single rifle division with the task to hold the city till their last breath. Not realising the extent of the Soviet withdrawal it wasn't until 18th July that the Germans began to follow the retreating Red Army divisions. Reaching Tula on the 21st July Generaloberst Maximilian von Weichs, who temporarily took over commmand of Army Group Centre following von Leeb's arrest and execution because of alleged conspiration against Hitler, ordered the commanding officer of 4th Army, Georg von Sodenstern, to prepare storming the city the following week.
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[1] That's the standoff I offered loki. He took one turn.
After having successfully expand the bridgehead over the Don near Boguchar the Germans, fighting against logistical difficulties with getting freight over the river [1] rested for a week, giving the Soviets valuable time to restore their morale. By 15th July the German supply situation had eased up considerably and the following day 1st and 2nd Panzer Army resumed Dampfhammer, the second part of Unternehmen Braunschweig.
With the Red Army having retreated out of the immediate vicinity of the German positions, it wasn't until the armies had advanced some 40 miles before they encountered Soviet resistance, near the town of Ryshkova west of the Bityug river. The position was held by the Soviet 12th Army but it broke quickly under the armoured onslaught of XXIV. PzK. With XXIV. PzK pushing 12th Army north the lane was opened for III., XIV., XXXXVII. and XXXXVIII. PzK to swing west against Lipetsk. Brushing aside the resistance of 5th and 47th Army the German divisions reached the outskirts of the city on 19th July. With 2nd Army's XXXV. AK having reached the banks of the Voronezh river a day earlier, some 10 Soviet divisions were cut off near Voronezh.
However, in the meantime Stavka readied the Soviet reserves for a massive counterattack and on the same day the Germans reached Lipetsk 6th, 34th, 41st and 50th Army launched a counterattack, led by veteran (Guards) cavalry corps and freshly formed tank corps. XXIV. AK holding the eastern side of the German front was caught unprepared and quickly overwhelmed by the Soviet attack. Before the German army commanders could react, the Soviets had closed within 10 miles of the pocket. With a breakout attempt by 190th and 362nd Rifle Division thwarted by 1st SS Motorised Brigade Stavka decided to go safe and pull back the valuable counterattacking forces, before the Germans had regrouped.
With the Lipetsk - Tambov front demanding the reserves, however, Stavka decided to pull back from vicinity of Tula, only leaving a single rifle division with the task to hold the city till their last breath. Not realising the extent of the Soviet withdrawal it wasn't until 18th July that the Germans began to follow the retreating Red Army divisions. Reaching Tula on the 21st July Generaloberst Maximilian von Weichs, who temporarily took over commmand of Army Group Centre following von Leeb's arrest and execution because of alleged conspiration against Hitler, ordered the commanding officer of 4th Army, Georg von Sodenstern, to prepare storming the city the following week.
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[1] That's the standoff I offered loki. He took one turn.
Turn 58: 23rd July 1942 - 29th July 1942
Turn 58: 23rd July 1942 - 29th July 1942
In the last week of July 1942 the great German summer offensive continued vigorously in the Lipetsk - Voronezh - Tambov sector. Near Voronezh 6th Army's XVII. AK began clearing the pocket and pushed into the city with the 171st Rifle Division holding the city surrendering on 26th July. This third pocket of the 1942 summer offensive forced another 10 Soviet rifle divisions to surrender, pushing the total up to 50 rifle divisions.
Model's LIX. AK in the meantime assaulted Lipetsk on 25th July. Supported by heavy Luftwaffe support the four elite German infantry divisions routed the defending units of the Soviet 5th Army, capturing the city three days later.
Further east near Tambov the German panzer corps targeted the remaining Soviet forces that successfully pushed back XXIV. PzK the previous week. On 23rd July XXXXVII. PzK supported by XXVII. AK pushed away units of 6th and 12th Army just south of Tambov, creating a lane for XIV. and XXXXVIII. PzK, together forming the northern pincer of an encirclement. The southern pincer was executed by XXIV. and XXXXVI. PzK who fought their way through the resistance of 9th Army and elements of 6th Army. By 26th July the two German spearheads linked up at the landbridge between Bityug, Karachan and Tsna. However, a heavy Soviet counterattack launched by 2nd Tank Army, 55th Army and elements of 58th Army forced the retreat of the entire XXXXVI. PzK on 29th July, reopening a supply path to the encircled formations consisting of two cavalry corps, two guards cavalry corps and four rifle divisions.
In the last week of July 1942 the great German summer offensive continued vigorously in the Lipetsk - Voronezh - Tambov sector. Near Voronezh 6th Army's XVII. AK began clearing the pocket and pushed into the city with the 171st Rifle Division holding the city surrendering on 26th July. This third pocket of the 1942 summer offensive forced another 10 Soviet rifle divisions to surrender, pushing the total up to 50 rifle divisions.
Model's LIX. AK in the meantime assaulted Lipetsk on 25th July. Supported by heavy Luftwaffe support the four elite German infantry divisions routed the defending units of the Soviet 5th Army, capturing the city three days later.
Further east near Tambov the German panzer corps targeted the remaining Soviet forces that successfully pushed back XXIV. PzK the previous week. On 23rd July XXXXVII. PzK supported by XXVII. AK pushed away units of 6th and 12th Army just south of Tambov, creating a lane for XIV. and XXXXVIII. PzK, together forming the northern pincer of an encirclement. The southern pincer was executed by XXIV. and XXXXVI. PzK who fought their way through the resistance of 9th Army and elements of 6th Army. By 26th July the two German spearheads linked up at the landbridge between Bityug, Karachan and Tsna. However, a heavy Soviet counterattack launched by 2nd Tank Army, 55th Army and elements of 58th Army forced the retreat of the entire XXXXVI. PzK on 29th July, reopening a supply path to the encircled formations consisting of two cavalry corps, two guards cavalry corps and four rifle divisions.
Turn 59-60: 30th July 1942 - 12th August 1942
Turn 59-60: 30th July 1942 - 12th August 1942
Following the shock of the Soviet counterattack von Kleist and Guderian were determined to re-encircle the Soviet corps and ordered their panzer corps to regroup and immediately resume the attack. The main thrust came from the south as XXIV. PzK attacked northwards with the support of XXXXVI. PzK. One day after commencing the attack XXXXVI. PzK hit the fortified positions of 2nd Tank Army's 13th, 14th Tank Corps and 8th Motorised Brigade. However, aided by Luftwaffe intervention the German mobile formations showed their superior mobility with 16th Panzer Division and SS-Division Totenkopf flanking the Soviet positions, forcing 2nd Tank Army to retreat on 3rd August. To seal off the Soviet formations back into a pocket, however, the northern flank had to aid XXIV. PzK's push towards the Tsna river. After XXIV. PzK assaulted 58th Army's strong positions between the two German pincers on 2nd August, XXXXVII. PzK joined the fray the following day, throwing the Soviet formations into disarray. The Soviets tried to restore order by committing their local reserve, the 465th Rifle Division. But with the majority of the formations already having been outmaneuvered the division got caught up in the German advance and was swept away. On 5th August the spearheads of 3rd and 4th Panzer Division closed the trap on the Soviets, after 2nd Rifle Corps, 5th Guards Rifle Corps and 3rd Cavalry Corps were routed off the battlefield the previous day. Although a couple of divisions escaped, the Germans still could report the trapping of four cavalry corps, one guards rifle corps and one rifle division. Stavka gave up hope of relieving the units and pulled out the Red Army's elite formations.
With the Soviets firmly trapped 6th Army's XXIX. AK began cleaning up the pocket and on 10th August the last elements of the trapped forces had surrendered, bringing in nearly 80.000 prisoners. North of the pocket Weiss' XXVII. AK and Model's LIX. AK combined their forces, pushing the frontline up to Tambov and on 7th August began storming the city, held only by 87th Rifle Division. Overwhelmed by over 90.000 Germans the Soviets gave ground quickly and on 10th August the division gave up the city.
While Wilhelm List's Army Group B continued its march north Army Group Centre was about to launch an offensive of its own. Under the codename "Fischreiher" the Germans had prepared an attack over the Don between Stalinogorsk and Lev Tolstoy since mid-July, with the panzer corps of von Manstein's 3rd Panzer Army being reshuffled to that area to add to the power of the infantry forces of 2nd Army and 4th Panzer Army. A first push to gain a bridgehead over the river with infantry only in the first August week was thwarted by a Soviet counterattack, throwing back VII. and XIII. AK. Supported by panzers, however, the second attempt with an altered angle of attack from the direction of Stalinogorsk started on 6th August was more successful. By 8th August the Germans were rolling up the positions held by 1st, 2nd Shock Army, 24th Army and 32nd Army and two days later von Manstein's two panzer corps linked up near Gorlovo, encircling two divisions and a tank corps. Not daring to risk another major encirclement the Soviet high command issued a massive retreat order for the troops sitting in a developing salient between Lev Tolstoy and Michurinsk and by 12th August no Soviet troops in the central sector between Serpukhov and Novokhopersk possessed any contact with the German forces.
Following the shock of the Soviet counterattack von Kleist and Guderian were determined to re-encircle the Soviet corps and ordered their panzer corps to regroup and immediately resume the attack. The main thrust came from the south as XXIV. PzK attacked northwards with the support of XXXXVI. PzK. One day after commencing the attack XXXXVI. PzK hit the fortified positions of 2nd Tank Army's 13th, 14th Tank Corps and 8th Motorised Brigade. However, aided by Luftwaffe intervention the German mobile formations showed their superior mobility with 16th Panzer Division and SS-Division Totenkopf flanking the Soviet positions, forcing 2nd Tank Army to retreat on 3rd August. To seal off the Soviet formations back into a pocket, however, the northern flank had to aid XXIV. PzK's push towards the Tsna river. After XXIV. PzK assaulted 58th Army's strong positions between the two German pincers on 2nd August, XXXXVII. PzK joined the fray the following day, throwing the Soviet formations into disarray. The Soviets tried to restore order by committing their local reserve, the 465th Rifle Division. But with the majority of the formations already having been outmaneuvered the division got caught up in the German advance and was swept away. On 5th August the spearheads of 3rd and 4th Panzer Division closed the trap on the Soviets, after 2nd Rifle Corps, 5th Guards Rifle Corps and 3rd Cavalry Corps were routed off the battlefield the previous day. Although a couple of divisions escaped, the Germans still could report the trapping of four cavalry corps, one guards rifle corps and one rifle division. Stavka gave up hope of relieving the units and pulled out the Red Army's elite formations.
With the Soviets firmly trapped 6th Army's XXIX. AK began cleaning up the pocket and on 10th August the last elements of the trapped forces had surrendered, bringing in nearly 80.000 prisoners. North of the pocket Weiss' XXVII. AK and Model's LIX. AK combined their forces, pushing the frontline up to Tambov and on 7th August began storming the city, held only by 87th Rifle Division. Overwhelmed by over 90.000 Germans the Soviets gave ground quickly and on 10th August the division gave up the city.
While Wilhelm List's Army Group B continued its march north Army Group Centre was about to launch an offensive of its own. Under the codename "Fischreiher" the Germans had prepared an attack over the Don between Stalinogorsk and Lev Tolstoy since mid-July, with the panzer corps of von Manstein's 3rd Panzer Army being reshuffled to that area to add to the power of the infantry forces of 2nd Army and 4th Panzer Army. A first push to gain a bridgehead over the river with infantry only in the first August week was thwarted by a Soviet counterattack, throwing back VII. and XIII. AK. Supported by panzers, however, the second attempt with an altered angle of attack from the direction of Stalinogorsk started on 6th August was more successful. By 8th August the Germans were rolling up the positions held by 1st, 2nd Shock Army, 24th Army and 32nd Army and two days later von Manstein's two panzer corps linked up near Gorlovo, encircling two divisions and a tank corps. Not daring to risk another major encirclement the Soviet high command issued a massive retreat order for the troops sitting in a developing salient between Lev Tolstoy and Michurinsk and by 12th August no Soviet troops in the central sector between Serpukhov and Novokhopersk possessed any contact with the German forces.
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RE: Turn 59-60: 30th July 1942 - 12th August 1942
Amazing AAR.
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RE: Turn 59-60: 30th July 1942 - 12th August 1942
Thanks!ORIGINAL: Timotheus
Amazing AAR.
Turn 61-62: 13th August 1942 - 26th August 1942
Turn 61-62: 13th August 1942 - 26th August 1942
Following the massive Soviet retreat in the Tula - Tambov sector the Germans starting on 13th August began their march north towards the Pronya river, encircling and destroying three straggling Soviet divisions in the process. With the rain period of October not far away, von Kluge's last move for the summer offensive called for an encirclement of the Soviet forces between Pronya and Oka, thereby gaining a solid defensive line along the Oka river and the city of Ryazan. Other suggestions like striking at the Soviet troops along the Khoper were discarded since von Kluge ruled out the feasibility of redeploying the German mobile forces, catching up to the Soviet units and then destroying them prior to the onset of the rasputitsa.
This operation, codenamed Fridericus, was to be carried by the armoured forces of 2nd, 3rd and 4th Panzer Army, supported by large parts of 2nd and 4th Army. Directly involved in the offensive operations were 15 panzer divisions, 11 motorised divisions and 30 infantry divisions. 4th Panzer Army with XXXXI. PzK and XXXXVIII. PzK was to attack eastward against Serebryanye Prude, while 2nd and 3rd Panzer Army struck north over the Pronya to complete the encirclement. The Luftwaffe supported the offensive with Luftflotte 2's II. Fliegerkorps and Luftflotte 4's V. Fliegerkorps. II. Fliegerkorps possessed 329 aircraft, among them the newest fighters the Luftwaffe had to offer with 84 Bf 109 G-2 and 74 FW 190A, while von Greim's V. Fliegerkorps consisted of 691 combat aircraft. The Luftwaffe commanders expected this to give them clear aerial superiorty over the Ryazan sector.
Following the massive Soviet retreat in the Tula - Tambov sector the Germans starting on 13th August began their march north towards the Pronya river, encircling and destroying three straggling Soviet divisions in the process. With the rain period of October not far away, von Kluge's last move for the summer offensive called for an encirclement of the Soviet forces between Pronya and Oka, thereby gaining a solid defensive line along the Oka river and the city of Ryazan. Other suggestions like striking at the Soviet troops along the Khoper were discarded since von Kluge ruled out the feasibility of redeploying the German mobile forces, catching up to the Soviet units and then destroying them prior to the onset of the rasputitsa.
This operation, codenamed Fridericus, was to be carried by the armoured forces of 2nd, 3rd and 4th Panzer Army, supported by large parts of 2nd and 4th Army. Directly involved in the offensive operations were 15 panzer divisions, 11 motorised divisions and 30 infantry divisions. 4th Panzer Army with XXXXI. PzK and XXXXVIII. PzK was to attack eastward against Serebryanye Prude, while 2nd and 3rd Panzer Army struck north over the Pronya to complete the encirclement. The Luftwaffe supported the offensive with Luftflotte 2's II. Fliegerkorps and Luftflotte 4's V. Fliegerkorps. II. Fliegerkorps possessed 329 aircraft, among them the newest fighters the Luftwaffe had to offer with 84 Bf 109 G-2 and 74 FW 190A, while von Greim's V. Fliegerkorps consisted of 691 combat aircraft. The Luftwaffe commanders expected this to give them clear aerial superiorty over the Ryazan sector.
Turn 63-64: 27th August 1942 - 9th September 1942
Turn 63-64: 27th August 1942 - 9th September 1942
The last large-scale offensive operation of the Ostheer of Summer 1942, Unternehmen Fridericus, was launched in the morning of 27th August 1942 with numerous Luftwaffe air strikes against the Soviet frontline units. When the ground operations began a few hours later, the Germans had to discover, that the Red Army had pulled back several units in anticipation of the German onslaught. Still, the Germans rolled forward undeterred and on 29th August the elite LIX. AK of Walter Model broke through the Soviet defenses behind the Pronya. Behind the the panzers of Guderian and von Manstein rolled through the gap towards Ryazan. One day later XXXXVII. PzK fought its way through and stood at the gates of the city at the Oka. With 2nd Panzer Army's divisions covering the right flank, von Manstein's divisions swung northwest towards Serebryanye Prudy, bypassing Ryazan to the west. In the meantime the offensive arm built around 4th Panzer Army, supported by Weiss' LIII. AK, broke through the Soviet 10th Army's lines south of Kashira and headed towards 3rd Panzer Army, brushing aside resistance of 3rd Shock Army and 32nd Army. On 1st September the link-up between Hoth and von Manstein's forces was complete, trapping eight rifle divisions between them and the Pronya. STAVKA, realising that it would be impossible to bail the units out, decided to sacrifice them and pull the mass of the Soviet units behind the mighty Oka, leaving only Ryazan as a bridgehead.
After resting the forward divisions for three days, with the Mikhailov pocket being cleared by the units of 4th Army's I. and IX. AK, the Germans regrouped to prepare the assault on Ryazan, while pushing forward to the Oka. Ryazan was well defended by the 1st Shock Army with two rifle corps and a rifle division. However, the German High Command had utmost faith into the abilities of Walter Model and his crack troops who had already captured Leningrad in 1941 and Sevastopol in March 1942. For the Ryazan operation the Germans assigned Model 12 divisions with 191.000 men, 1.988 guns and mortars and 1.230 AFVs. It was the largest set-piece battle the Wehrmacht had fought to that date. On 4th September the Luftwaffe opened the assault with a massive bombardment that turned the city into rubble and units of LIX. AK entered the city right after. Despite clawing themselves into the houses and ruins of the city, the Soviet defenders steadily lost group and moreover also couldn't count on reinforcement from the other side of the Oka, since the Luftwaffe heavily interdicted the area. On 7th September the Germans reached the Oka and split the Soviet defenders, who were then overwhelmed by the sheer number of German soldiers that kept coming at them. On 9th September the last of them either surrendered or routed over the river, giving 3rd Panzer Army total control over the city.
While the German offensive raged in the centre, STAVKA took the opportunity to mass units in the Vyshny Volochek sector for a limited offensive against 18th Army's L. AK. When the Soviets attacked on 28th August they achieved total surprise, since sloppy reconnaissance had failed to pick up the Soviet build-up. Under attack by three guards rifle corps and subjected to heavy artillery fire, 86th Infantry Division was forced to pull back on 1st September and the Soviets used the gap that was created south of the Shlina river to push a tank corps through. In addition the Red Army also launched an airborne operation to create chaos in the German rear, successfully putting three airborne brigades on the ground. However, not everything went smoothly for the Soviets as 55th Army's attack agaisnt 126th Infantry Division was repelled, despite the use of two guards rifle corps.
Despite the initial shock, the high command of Army Group North was quick to react and on 3rd September two divisions of its reserve arrived to deal with the airborne units and help stabilise the front of L. AK afterwards. In the northern part 5th Mountain Division came down from Tikhvin, while the landings at Firovo were dealt with by 101st Jäger Division originally stationed in Rzhev. Additionally XXXX. PzK marched northwards from their positions behind the front of 9th Army and launched a swift counterattack against 9th Tank Corps on 5th September. With the tank corps routed a day later, the lines of L. AK was secure again. However, OKH wasn't content with just sealing the breakthrough and on 2nd September von Kluge ordered Hoth's 4th Panzer Army to immediately pull out Weiss' XXVII. AK and Kempf's XXXXVIII. PzK (which included two of the finest German panzer divisions with the 1st and 11th, as well as Division Großdeutschland) and rail them north. Von Kluge's aim was to hammer the Soviet guards rifle corps with the elite German formations and capture the eastern bank of the Msta with its good defensive terrain and the city of Vyzhny Volochek. But before these units arrived at the front, STAVKA had already decided to give up the operation and pulled back to the initial positions, removing the guards rifle corps from the frontline.
The last large-scale offensive operation of the Ostheer of Summer 1942, Unternehmen Fridericus, was launched in the morning of 27th August 1942 with numerous Luftwaffe air strikes against the Soviet frontline units. When the ground operations began a few hours later, the Germans had to discover, that the Red Army had pulled back several units in anticipation of the German onslaught. Still, the Germans rolled forward undeterred and on 29th August the elite LIX. AK of Walter Model broke through the Soviet defenses behind the Pronya. Behind the the panzers of Guderian and von Manstein rolled through the gap towards Ryazan. One day later XXXXVII. PzK fought its way through and stood at the gates of the city at the Oka. With 2nd Panzer Army's divisions covering the right flank, von Manstein's divisions swung northwest towards Serebryanye Prudy, bypassing Ryazan to the west. In the meantime the offensive arm built around 4th Panzer Army, supported by Weiss' LIII. AK, broke through the Soviet 10th Army's lines south of Kashira and headed towards 3rd Panzer Army, brushing aside resistance of 3rd Shock Army and 32nd Army. On 1st September the link-up between Hoth and von Manstein's forces was complete, trapping eight rifle divisions between them and the Pronya. STAVKA, realising that it would be impossible to bail the units out, decided to sacrifice them and pull the mass of the Soviet units behind the mighty Oka, leaving only Ryazan as a bridgehead.
After resting the forward divisions for three days, with the Mikhailov pocket being cleared by the units of 4th Army's I. and IX. AK, the Germans regrouped to prepare the assault on Ryazan, while pushing forward to the Oka. Ryazan was well defended by the 1st Shock Army with two rifle corps and a rifle division. However, the German High Command had utmost faith into the abilities of Walter Model and his crack troops who had already captured Leningrad in 1941 and Sevastopol in March 1942. For the Ryazan operation the Germans assigned Model 12 divisions with 191.000 men, 1.988 guns and mortars and 1.230 AFVs. It was the largest set-piece battle the Wehrmacht had fought to that date. On 4th September the Luftwaffe opened the assault with a massive bombardment that turned the city into rubble and units of LIX. AK entered the city right after. Despite clawing themselves into the houses and ruins of the city, the Soviet defenders steadily lost group and moreover also couldn't count on reinforcement from the other side of the Oka, since the Luftwaffe heavily interdicted the area. On 7th September the Germans reached the Oka and split the Soviet defenders, who were then overwhelmed by the sheer number of German soldiers that kept coming at them. On 9th September the last of them either surrendered or routed over the river, giving 3rd Panzer Army total control over the city.
While the German offensive raged in the centre, STAVKA took the opportunity to mass units in the Vyshny Volochek sector for a limited offensive against 18th Army's L. AK. When the Soviets attacked on 28th August they achieved total surprise, since sloppy reconnaissance had failed to pick up the Soviet build-up. Under attack by three guards rifle corps and subjected to heavy artillery fire, 86th Infantry Division was forced to pull back on 1st September and the Soviets used the gap that was created south of the Shlina river to push a tank corps through. In addition the Red Army also launched an airborne operation to create chaos in the German rear, successfully putting three airborne brigades on the ground. However, not everything went smoothly for the Soviets as 55th Army's attack agaisnt 126th Infantry Division was repelled, despite the use of two guards rifle corps.
Despite the initial shock, the high command of Army Group North was quick to react and on 3rd September two divisions of its reserve arrived to deal with the airborne units and help stabilise the front of L. AK afterwards. In the northern part 5th Mountain Division came down from Tikhvin, while the landings at Firovo were dealt with by 101st Jäger Division originally stationed in Rzhev. Additionally XXXX. PzK marched northwards from their positions behind the front of 9th Army and launched a swift counterattack against 9th Tank Corps on 5th September. With the tank corps routed a day later, the lines of L. AK was secure again. However, OKH wasn't content with just sealing the breakthrough and on 2nd September von Kluge ordered Hoth's 4th Panzer Army to immediately pull out Weiss' XXVII. AK and Kempf's XXXXVIII. PzK (which included two of the finest German panzer divisions with the 1st and 11th, as well as Division Großdeutschland) and rail them north. Von Kluge's aim was to hammer the Soviet guards rifle corps with the elite German formations and capture the eastern bank of the Msta with its good defensive terrain and the city of Vyzhny Volochek. But before these units arrived at the front, STAVKA had already decided to give up the operation and pulled back to the initial positions, removing the guards rifle corps from the frontline.
RE: Turn 63-64: 27th August 1942 - 9th September 1942
turned the city into rubble
Almost makes you wonder whether Ryazan was worth taking after all that. [;)]
Great account of a good, well-planned and well-executed operation.
I'm anxious to see what happens after the mud season. Good luck!
RE: Turn 63-64: 27th August 1942 - 9th September 1942
It's late '42 and advancing 50 miles on a 100 mile wide front is lauded as a great success. Compare that with the advances of the previous summer [:)]
RE: Turn 63-64: 27th August 1942 - 9th September 1942
Moreover, using close to 60 divisions nonetheless. With that force in 1941 I could've moved the lines of an entire army group some 150 miles. Still better than not being able to do any offensive action though (I'm looking at you 1943-45). [:D]ORIGINAL: morvael
It's late '42 and advancing 50 miles on a 100 mile wide front is lauded as a great success. Compare that with the advances of the previous summer [:)]
RE: Turn 63-64: 27th August 1942 - 9th September 1942
"at me 1943-44" [:D] You haven't seen 1945 yet, with my beautiful Breslau-Berlin operation (for which I am to blame, and I am very sorry for that, but I want to return to the AAR when 1.08 will be finished).
RE: Turn 63-64: 27th August 1942 - 9th September 1942
ORIGINAL: morvael
It's late '42 and advancing 50 miles on a 100 mile wide front is lauded as a great success. Compare that with the advances of the previous summer [:)]
Point conceded, but better that than a long advance with weak flanks guarded by Hungarians and Rumanians ...
Turn 65-66: 10th September 1942 - 23rd September 1942
Turn 65-66: 10th September 1942 - 23rd September 1942
After the conclusion of the Ryazan battle the plains of Central Russia that saw massive combat in the previous two months finally came to a rest. OKH decided to switch over to the defensive, but not after some heated debates with commanders of Army Group Centre. Especially the commanding general of 4th Army, Georg von Sodenstern, was very vocal about continuing the push over the Oka to threaten Moscow from the south. And indeed, the relative strength of the German forces along the Oka compared to the Red Army forces made a successful crossing possible, however, von Kluge saw no benefit in doing so. In a meeting with Army Group Centre's commanders on 4th September, after XXVII. AK and XXXXVIII. PzK had already left for the north, von Kluge made his view very clear: Given the depth of the Soviet defenses a German offensive would in all likelihood only reach Ramenskoe at best before the onset of the rasputitsa, still putting them about 40 miles short of Moscow. On the other hand the massive force committment that would be necessary for that operation would leave other sectors of the front dangerously undermanned in terms of operational reserves. The Msta battle that was raging showed it clearly that the Red Army was capable of massing enough forces to push through infantry-only held lines.
With this matter settled, the Germans turned their attention to Army Group North's counterattack. Following the Soviet retreat 18th Army's staff hastily presented an alternative to the operation that called for a frontal assault against Vyzhny Volochek and the Msta line. With the Soviet rifle corps taken out von Küchler suggested to send XXVII. AK and XXXXVIII. PzK over the Tveritsa to maneuver into the rear of the Soviet divisions at Vyzhny Volochek. That way it would be possible to threaten the Soviets with encirclement, forcing them to either give up their positions, or risk a pocket.
After rerouting the attack divisions the German offensive began on 13th September with XXVII. AK smashing a hole into the Soviet defenses which was quickly exploited by the armoured forces. With Division Großdeutschland and 1st Panzer Division heading the charge the bridgehead was quickly expanded to 30 miles in length and 20 miles in depth
By 15th September Spirovo was in German hands and Vyzhny Volochek only 10 miles away. The Soviets, however, quickly halted the withdrawal of their elite guards and in a counterattack threw 25th Motorised Division back.
With the guards rifle corps back in the frontline a breakthrough from the south seemed impossible, so von Küchler decided on 17th September to pull the units out of the Tveritsa bridgehead and send them north again to the Msta, where L. AK launched a first attack against the Soviet 27th Army and crossed the river 20 miles north of Vyzhny Volochek. When the divisions of XXVII. AK and XXXXVIII. PzK arrived at the Msta on 19th September they wasted no time in assaulting Vyzhny Volochek head-on. Against the three divisions of 11th Army holding the city the Germans sent in the entire XXXXVIII. PzK along with two infantry divisions of XXVII. AK, totalling over 124.000 men and 1.400 guns and mortars. Against this overwhelming numerical superiority, not to mention the quality of those crack German troops, the Soviets quickly folded and by 23rd September the last resistance in the city died down.
After the conclusion of the Ryazan battle the plains of Central Russia that saw massive combat in the previous two months finally came to a rest. OKH decided to switch over to the defensive, but not after some heated debates with commanders of Army Group Centre. Especially the commanding general of 4th Army, Georg von Sodenstern, was very vocal about continuing the push over the Oka to threaten Moscow from the south. And indeed, the relative strength of the German forces along the Oka compared to the Red Army forces made a successful crossing possible, however, von Kluge saw no benefit in doing so. In a meeting with Army Group Centre's commanders on 4th September, after XXVII. AK and XXXXVIII. PzK had already left for the north, von Kluge made his view very clear: Given the depth of the Soviet defenses a German offensive would in all likelihood only reach Ramenskoe at best before the onset of the rasputitsa, still putting them about 40 miles short of Moscow. On the other hand the massive force committment that would be necessary for that operation would leave other sectors of the front dangerously undermanned in terms of operational reserves. The Msta battle that was raging showed it clearly that the Red Army was capable of massing enough forces to push through infantry-only held lines.
With this matter settled, the Germans turned their attention to Army Group North's counterattack. Following the Soviet retreat 18th Army's staff hastily presented an alternative to the operation that called for a frontal assault against Vyzhny Volochek and the Msta line. With the Soviet rifle corps taken out von Küchler suggested to send XXVII. AK and XXXXVIII. PzK over the Tveritsa to maneuver into the rear of the Soviet divisions at Vyzhny Volochek. That way it would be possible to threaten the Soviets with encirclement, forcing them to either give up their positions, or risk a pocket.
After rerouting the attack divisions the German offensive began on 13th September with XXVII. AK smashing a hole into the Soviet defenses which was quickly exploited by the armoured forces. With Division Großdeutschland and 1st Panzer Division heading the charge the bridgehead was quickly expanded to 30 miles in length and 20 miles in depth
By 15th September Spirovo was in German hands and Vyzhny Volochek only 10 miles away. The Soviets, however, quickly halted the withdrawal of their elite guards and in a counterattack threw 25th Motorised Division back.
With the guards rifle corps back in the frontline a breakthrough from the south seemed impossible, so von Küchler decided on 17th September to pull the units out of the Tveritsa bridgehead and send them north again to the Msta, where L. AK launched a first attack against the Soviet 27th Army and crossed the river 20 miles north of Vyzhny Volochek. When the divisions of XXVII. AK and XXXXVIII. PzK arrived at the Msta on 19th September they wasted no time in assaulting Vyzhny Volochek head-on. Against the three divisions of 11th Army holding the city the Germans sent in the entire XXXXVIII. PzK along with two infantry divisions of XXVII. AK, totalling over 124.000 men and 1.400 guns and mortars. Against this overwhelming numerical superiority, not to mention the quality of those crack German troops, the Soviets quickly folded and by 23rd September the last resistance in the city died down.
RE: Turn 65-66: 10th September 1942 - 23rd September 1942
ORIGINAL: SigUp
OKH decided to switch over to the defensive...
For the rest of the war? So the operation at Ryazan was the last dance? [:(]