Was preparing for conventional war in Central Europe totally futile?

[istari6]

So I'm just reaching the end of the standalone scenarios in FCRS. Last up is "Thor's Hammer", and the scenario setup is pretty sobering. The Soviets are storming towards the Dutch border & the BAOR is coming apart under repeated hammer blows. As NATO commander, I've been authorized two Lance SSMs if needed to stop the Soviets from breaking out to the Atlantic Coast.

It's a pretty depressing scenario, in part because it seems so plausible. I've also had a chance recently to read "The Chieftains", the "Red Effect" series, and some other historical web resources on what each side might have done during a Central European war in the 1980s.

What I take away from this reading is how it seems tactical nuclear weapons would have been used under almost any conceivable scenario. If NATO succeeded in stopping the Warsaw Pact cold near the IGB, the Soviets would almost certainly have used TNWs to break open the front (if they hadn't already use them at the outset in the initial opening bombardment). If the WP had torn through NATOs defenses and reached the Rhine with momentum, NATO would have turned to TNWs to stop them. Finally, if both sides were stalemated somewhere in West Germany, it seems likely the Soviets would have used TNWs to regain momentum before internal political unrest in the WP became a threat.

So no matter how the conventional fighting went (NATO winning, WP winning, NATO/WP stalemate), someone would have escalated, right?

IF this is true, why did NATO and the WP pour trillions of dollars into preparing these vast conventional armies in the first place? I find this period fascinating from a military history standpoint, and the wargamer in me loves the opportunities and challenges of weaving together all the various strands of high intensity peer-level conventional warfare (MBTs, IFVs, CAS, attack helicopters, OH, EW, etc etc).

But there does seem to be a strange futility to the entire effort in a way there wasn't in WWII. No matter what the soldiers and generals do on the battlefield, it doesn't matter. If they win, the other side likely turns to TNWs. Why not save the trillions of dollars and stick with the tripwire defense if that's where the Central European fight would have ended up anyway?

Chris

[istari6]

And the edit function is fixed- huzzah!

[CapnDarwin]

Only winning move is not to play. Both sides had plans for using not only tac nukes but in some cases 100kt+ nukes to remove enemy forces, airfields and C3 locations. I don't think the war would have stayed or even started nuke free. Just damn happy it never happened. [&o]

[istari6]

Totally agree about being glad it never happened. Seems that even if it hadn't escalated into Armageddon, it would have been much like WWI: a horrible bloodbath that was ruinous to all involved (even if much shorter than 1914-1918).

[OldSarge]

A common topic of conversation during guard/staff duty was: "What will the French do?". The French had made no secret of using the "force de dissuasion" should it be necessary and, during the period covered by the game, they were actively engaged in nuclear tests in the Pacific. So the common thought was the French would react as soon as the WP had made serious breaches in the NATO line and if a few Americans/Germans got burned in the process..oh well "c'est la guerrre."

It would've become very nasty, very quickly!

A nice article on the U.S. Pershing missiles In the Cold War

[calgar]

Istari6

If you are really interested in getting into Deterrence Theory, or at least the basics to answer your question, I would recommend this book by Lawrence Freedman Deterrence.

This is probably the best introduction to start with this topic.

To give you a very quick answer: Noone is interested in a nuclear exchange, right? So when you have no conventional forces, and a war starts, you you have any means of escalating slowly? No, you have to resort to destroy the planet or accept to be defeated. And that is on nobody's agenda.

Regards,

A

[TheWombat_matrixforum]

ORIGINAL: calgar

Istari6

If you are really interested in getting into Deterrence Theory, or at least the basics to answer your question, I would recommend this book by Lawrence Freedman Deterrence.

This is probably the best introduction to start with this topic.

To give you a very quick answer: Noone is interested in a nuclear exchange, right? So when you have no conventional forces, and a war starts, you you have any means of escalating slowly? No, you have to resort to destroy the planet or accept to be defeated. And that is on nobody's agenda.

Regards,

A

Pretty much. Spending gazillions on conventional forces that 1) never got used and 2) would only in all probability have been a delaying factor in moving to WMDs in the case of a war was infinitely less expensive than having no other options than immediate Armageddon. During the fifties, the USAF and other fans of strategic air warfare tried to shift US policy entirely towards nuclear war fighting, with the Army pretty much left as a constabulary to police the rubble. Luckily, we pretty quickly got over that delusion. Some bright people figured out that if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail....

[WABAC]

ORIGINAL: istari6

So I'm just reaching the end of the standalone scenarios in FCRS. Last up is "Thor's Hammer", and the scenario setup is pretty sobering. The Soviets are storming towards the Dutch border & the BAOR is coming apart under repeated hammer blows. As NATO commander, I've been authorized two Lance SSMs if needed to stop the Soviets from breaking out to the Atlantic Coast.

It's a pretty depressing scenario, in part because it seems so plausible. I've also had a chance recently to read "The Chieftains", the "Red Effect" series, and some other historical web resources on what each side might have done during a Central European war in the 1980s.

What I take away from this reading is how it seems tactical nuclear weapons would have been used under almost any conceivable scenario. If NATO succeeded in stopping the Warsaw Pact cold near the IGB, the Soviets would almost certainly have used TNWs to break open the front (if they hadn't already use them at the outset in the initial opening bombardment). If the WP had torn through NATOs defenses and reached the Rhine with momentum, NATO would have turned to TNWs to stop them. Finally, if both sides were stalemated somewhere in West Germany, it seems likely the Soviets would have used TNWs to regain momentum before internal political unrest in the WP became a threat.

So no matter how the conventional fighting went (NATO winning, WP winning, NATO/WP stalemate), someone would have escalated, right?

IF this is true, why did NATO and the WP pour trillions of dollars into preparing these vast conventional armies in the first place? I find this period fascinating from a military history standpoint, and the wargamer in me loves the opportunities and challenges of weaving together all the various strands of high intensity peer-level conventional warfare (MBTs, IFVs, CAS, attack helicopters, OH, EW, etc etc).

But there does seem to be a strange futility to the entire effort in a way there wasn't in WWII. No matter what the soldiers and generals do on the battlefield, it doesn't matter. If they win, the other side likely turns to TNWs. Why not save the trillions of dollars and stick with the tripwire defense if that's where the Central European fight would have ended up anyway?

Chris

The tripwire was where it was at on both sides from the Berlin Wall to the Cuban Missile Crisis. And neither side seemed to want to maintain that status after they survived those crises.

[istari6]

Thanks all for the replies. (Delayed response as I was tied up with work the past week)

If I'm understanding the logic correctly, given enough time a conventional battle would have almost certainly escalated to TNWs. However, having conventional forces engaged first for days or even weeks gives time for other forces to intervene (cease fires, UN efforts, changes in political leadership, etc) rather than having to face immediate choice of nuclear weapons the moment the first T-80 crosses the IGB. That makes a certain amount of sense.

P.S. OldSarge - agree with you that the French probably wouldn't have shed too many tears over the Germans getting beat up first before they reinforced. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s when memories of WWII were still fresh.

[ultradave]

Being an Army officer at the time (Field Artillery) and nuclear weapons secondary specialty. the most important thing I learned was how to blow the nuclear artillery shells up (conventionally) so that they were scattered over the countryside before the Russian army overran us. While there were plans to use tactical nuclear weapons, it was assumed that it could not have been kept at a tactical level, and would quickly escalate. Really as a young captain, my fellow officers and I never expected to see 30 years old. We also assumed that by the time authorization to use them came, we'd be contemplating firing/dropping nuclear weapons on West German soil to hit the follow on Russian forces. Hence the idea of disabling the weapons since we figured that was not something that would seriously be contemplated.

The major impetus for the iNF treaty was exactly this. Getting rid of all of those intermediate ranged weapons that could have been escalated to a general exchange.

Reading this it sounds so depressing. I guess that's rightly so. It was pretty depressing at the time. (now I work in the area of non-proliferation and nuclear materials security).

[henri51]

As I remember it,
1) the Soviets had the capability to win a conventional war in Europe.
2)The US was the only nation that had not signed the treaty agreeing to non-first-use of nuclear weapons (whether or not the Soviets would have followed the agreement is open to question), and the US official policy was to use nuclear weapons if the Soviets broke through. Fortunately the soviets did not really have anything to gain in a conventional war in Europe.After all they believed that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, especially if helped along by subversion.

[Agiel]

There's a flip side to the coin. Dimitris of the Command team had relayed to me (he cited a book, but I could have sworn I saved that Amazon link somewhere) that there were operational-level wargames in which players were given access to nuclear arms with the caveat that their use had a chance to lead to general escalation. In those wargames, human players wouldn't touch the nuclear option with a 10 foot crap-covered stick, even when confronted with tactical situations that screamed for their use, to the point that the human players were eventually replaced with "cold, rational computer players" that were more than happy to push the big red button. The better angels of our nature or mutual deterrence at work? In any case, it proves the old saying "Plans never survive first contact with the enemy."

Then there's the fact that nobody can say with certainty how the next great war between conventional forces is going to turn out. In the First World War, everyone knew it was going to be battles between line infantry and cavalry. In the Second World War, everybody knew that it was going to be trench warfare and charges across No Man's Land. In the run-up to the Six-Day War everyone knew that the lynchpin of victory was mechanised forces and artillery... and so forth.

[calgar]

Original by ultradave

[...] it was assumed that it could not have been kept at a tactical level [...]

after an intense debate about tactical nukes /Limited War Theory in the 50s, Kissinger said the following in 1960:

Original by Kissinger

The more the preassures build upagainst any use of nuclear weapons, the greater will be the gap between our deterrent policy, our military capability, and psychological readiness - a gap which must tempt aggresion. The years ahead must therefore see a substantial strentghening of the conventional forces in the world.

They just realized that tactical nukes were....well, not tactical. In the 50s hopes were high that the distinction between nuclear and conventional war could be overridden by the "limited/total" war distinction. Limited meaning "using tactical nukes, but not using their bigger brothers". The Soviets never had that distinction. And to keep a war limited, both have to play along.

Original by henri51

2)The US was the only nation that had not signed the treaty agreeing to non-first-use of nuclear weapons (whether or not the Soviets would have followed the agreement is open to question), and the US official policy was to use nuclear weapons if the Soviets broke through.

Could you tell me what treaty you are referring to? Both are signatories of the UN-Charta, by which offensive war is prohibited anyway.

Original by Angiel

In those wargames, human players wouldn't touch the nuclear option with a 10 foot crap-covered stick, even when confronted with tactical situations that screamed for their use,[...]

interesting! I would be glad if you could provide me/us with the link. What you are referring to is the use of nukes centrelized/decentralized. In this wargame, players were unwilling to use them in an decentralized manner, but it would be interesting to know whether the same people would go for the button when the red airborne troops are being dropped in D.C. (centralized use)

[henri51]

Calgar, the US policy keeping open the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons since Eisenhower made the policy implicit in the fifties: " “In the event of
hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." This policy was repeated a number of times by US officials including Henry Kissinger and George W. Bush.

In the 60's and later the other four major nations (France, the UK, Russia, China)with nuclear armaments have stated a policy of no first use (whether they would respect it or not is debatable).This is well documented on the web, but I have not pinpointed a specific treaty except one of the non-proliferation treaties which I have not had time to check in detail. Newer member of the nuclear club have stated policies varying from guaranteed use in case of war (Pakistan) to non-committal silence (Israel).

A history of non-first-use policies is http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: henri51

In the 60's and later the other four major nations (France, the UK, Russia, China)with nuclear armaments have stated a policy of no first use (whether they would respect it or not is debatable).This is well documented on the web, but I have not pinpointed a specific treaty except one of the non-proliferation treaties which I have not had time to check in detail. Newer member of the nuclear club have stated policies varying from guaranteed use in case of war (Pakistan) to non-committal silence (Israel).

A history of non-first-use policies is http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102feiv.pdf

I think British policy accepts 'first use', the current doctrine is clear in retaining it and I've never seen anything from the Cold War era to suggest it used to be different. This book actually argues that even if they wanted to, the British cannot move no 'first use' due to common NATO doctrine.

Soviet policy went through a major change with the fall of Kruschev. Up to then, it was assumed that any war would be nuclear (and not just tactical), regardless of who started the war or who made first use. After that, they shifted the boundaries a lot, but basically assumed a feasible conventional war that could well go nuclear - with the small possibility that such an exchange on the battlefield would not escalate. Whether or not they were sincere in ruling out no first use is still not clear - as the article you cite acknowledges. They certainly planned and modelled war scenarios that started nuclear, but this could be seen as prudent preparation and planning rather than statement of intent.

The problem of course about WMD and Soviet policy was that they explicity treated chemical munitions as part of their conventional weaponry and would have used them as they deemed suitable.

[Mad Russian]

I would think there were two "First Use" policies for France. One where West German soil was involved and one where French soil was involved.

Good Hunting.

MR

[OldSarge]

Here is a link to an interesting paper from 1983 that discusses French Nuclear Forces in the 1980's and 1990s. While it doesn't go into the decision process about "First Use" it does indicate that the French polcy at the time was to employ tactical nuclear forces to send a clear signal to the Soviets. A good read for those interested!

[calgar]

Original by henri51

Calgar, the US policy keeping open the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons since Eisenhower made the policy implicit in the fifties: " “In the event of
hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." This policy was repeated a number of times by US officials including Henry Kissinger and George W. Bush.

I was asking, because what you are referring to is not a treaty but rather policy, as you say yourself. The quote has to be put into context, which is Eisenhowers strategy of massive retaliation. What Kissinger thinks about that can be read here.

Regards,

A