AAR-STANAVFORLANT

[CV60]

This will be an ongoing AAR of the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic 1979 scenario. I'm doing it to introduce new players to some of the tactical concepts used in naval operations. Questions are welcome.

The scenario begins with this description:
Orders for Cmdr NATO Forces
Situation
CINCLANT has directed the multinational task force Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) to move into the Norwegian Sea at high speed in response to the Soviet sabler-rattling.
Enemy Forces
Intelligence gathering by P-3B Orion sorties of the Norwegian Sea indicate the Varag, sister ship of the Admiral Golovko, and escorting destroyers are situated in the vicinity of Jan Mayen Island. It is reported that this group will shortly sail at high speed to Murmansk in view of the current crisis. It has also been reported that the group has been ordered to destroy NATO shipping in the Norwegian Sea during their passage back to Soviet territory because of the Stavka's fears of a surprise NATO amphibious assault against the Kola Peninsula.

Friendly Forces
STANAVFORLANT: flagship USS Luce, HMS Active, HMNLS Van Speijk, FGS Lutjens, HMCS Ottawa and the Norwegian frigate Bergen.

Marine ARG: LPH Iwo Jima, LPD's Austin and Ogden, and FFG Talbot.

Royal Norwegian Air Force 333 Sqn, Andoya: P-3B Orion MPA

Royal Norwegian Air Force 333 Sqn, Bodo: CF-104G Starfighters specialized in anti-shipping strike with Bullpup missiles

RAF Lossiemouth: Buccaneers in anti-shipping role, Shackleton AEW.2

RAF Kinloss: Nimrod MR.1 MPA

NAS Keflavik: P-3C Orion MPA

Mission

STANAVFORLANT has been ordered to prevent passage of the Soviet task group to Murmansk and to protect the US ARG from Soviet attack.

Execution

1. The Amphibious Ready Group is to make a safe transit to the Vestfjord near Narvik within 36 hrs.
2. STANAVFORTLANT is to prevent the Soviet Task Group engaging the Amphibious Ready Group.
3. Loss of any Amphibious Ready Group Units is considered a mission failure.
4. The RNoAF F-104Gs and Bodo and RAF Buccaneers at Lossiemouth have been authorized to carry out a single strike only. Use them to their full potential.

Command & Signal


Command: USS Luce
Signal: EMCON State B, limited emissions.


My analysis of the situation and initial strategy is as follows:
Intelligence
RED Air: Unknown
RED Surface: One KYNDA class CG and unknown number of Destroyers invicinity (invic) Jan Mayen Island. Unknown if any other SAGs or patrol vessels are in the AOR
RED Subsurface: Unknown

Mission Analysis
There are two primary mission objectives: 1) Protect the ARG and 2) destroy the Soviet KYNDA Surface Action Group (SAG). The ARG is my center of gravity. Any loss of any unit in the ARG is a scenario loss. The ARG also has limited protection. Only the USS TALBOT (FFG-4) has a limited AAW/ASW capability. Unable to effectively defend itself, the ARG will need considerable ASW and AAW support from aircraft. The ARG also has approximately 300 nm to travel to reach the safe area, requiring a minimum advance of 9 nm/hour. That gives some time room for manuvers.
The second mission is to sink the KYNDA SAG. At least one unit of the SAG is armed with long range SS-N-3 SSMs, with a range of up to 220 nm. This far outranges any of my SSMs. However, by denying the USSR over the horizon (OTH) targeting, NATO can neutralize the long range of his SSMs. The actual destruction of the KYNDA SAG will be accomplished by aircraft. However, the guided weapons of the NATO aircraft are limited to approximately 15 nm in range, within the probable 22 nm AAW envelope of the KYNDA SAG. To minimize aircraft losses, I will try to clear the way with my limitted supply of HARPOON and EXOCET missiles, if I can bring STANAVFORLANT (NATO SAG) within striking range.

Manuver
To avoid detection, I will have it go to EMCON ALPHA (no emissions) and clear the North Cape area at high speed. After a 2 hour run to open water, the ARG will begin sprint and drift tactics.
I have 300 nm to travel in 36 hours. That gives a minimum speed of 9 knts.

AAW
Four Canadian F-104 with AIM-9N for CAP out of Bodo will provide CAP for the first 3 hours. As the ARG goes further south, I’ll hand off to the F-5s based out of Orland. The problem with the F-104 is that they don’t have a long range, which may require F-5 support earlier than I would like. The F-5’s will also be available for CAP for the NATO SAG, but I won’t launch them unless they are needed.
A Shackelton AEW aircraft will provide support to the ARG. Currently, it is 750 nm away from the ARG. I will launch an alert Shackelton after 5 hours to provide back up and to cover the NATO SAG.

SSC
The airborne P-3B will initially do a radar sweep of the ARG Planned Intended Movement (PIM) to sanitize it. It will then return to ASW box 1 and transition to an ASW mission. After initial sanitization, aircraft that are RTB will re-sanitize the PIM.
A P-3B from Andoya will launch to sanitize ASW box 1, positioned on the initial portion of the ARG PIM. One of the two SSC P-3B’s will reconfigure and ready as an ASW back up P-3 for alert missions. The other will remain as a SSC asset for locating and tracking the SAG.
USN P-3Cs from Keflavik will provide mid-Atlantic SSC services to locate the KNYDA SAG enroute to ASW patrol stations in ASW Box 3. They will also provide targeting information for any airstrikes against the SAG. After localization, Birddog duties will be handed off to non-US NATO assets

ASW
Overview: There is no intelligence regarding Soviet submarine assets in the area. However, given the proximity to North Fleet bases, assume that several SS/SSNs are possibly operating in the vicinity. The ARG will transit at high speed to neutralize the SS threat.
A series of ASW patrol areas along the ARG PIM will be sanitized by MPA assets before the ARG enters them. From north to south along the PIM they are ASW Box 1, ASW Box 2, ASW Box 4. A rectangular ASW box (ASW Box 3) that will act as a barrier to Soviet subs entering the area from the Atlantic side.
Primary mission for USN P-3Cs will provide sanitization of the western half of the ARG PIM (ASW Box 3) against possible Soviet SSNs coming from the west, and provide direct ASW services in support of the NATO SAG. Secondary mission will be SSC against the KNYDA SAG.
Primary mission for RAF Nimrods will be to provide sanitization of the southern half of the ARG PIM (Boxes 2 and 4). Depending on how the situation develops, I may use the Nimrods to set up a blocking position similar to ASW Box 3 further south.
The ARG only has a single organic Airborne ASW asset, the SH2 embarked on USS TALBOT (FFG-4). This asset will be used during ARG sprint periods, at a point 15-20 nm ahead of PIM. When not airborne, the ARG is tentatively planned to go to cruising or creep speed.

ASUW[/b]
The KNYDA-class cruiser carries eight SS-N-3 missiles with an range of 220nm. Because of this, any OTH targeting platforms within range of the NATO SAG or ARG will be destroyed. After destroying any OTH targeting platform, the affected surface vessels will clear the datum at high speed.
Primary ASUW assets will be the Buccaneers and CF-104. Only one vessel in NATO SAG is equipped with only four 65 nm range HARPOON SSMs. Accordingly, the SAG will not close the KNYDA SAG unless the KNYDA or any OTH assets have been neutralized.

EMCON
NATO surface vessels will be EMCON A. On CAPSTA, fighters will be EMCON A. AEW Aircraft EMCON D. Land based radars EMCON D. SSC aircraft EMCON D. MPA on ASW aircraft will be at EMCON B.

Environmental
The scenario starts at 2230, in November. Sunrise will be at approximately 0700
Weather is clear, no effect on operations.

[CV60]

I'm going to do this AAR as in a "Battlelog" where the events are recorded in a log. Unlike most logs, I will try to describe why I make the decisions I make
Phase I-Initial Maneuvers to Initial Contact

2130Z New orders received to destroy KYNDA SAG in vicinity (invic) Jan Mayen island. ARG goes to 22 knots
2130Z One air contact air contact detected by land based radar 019/160 from ARG. Does not appear to be radiating or on intercept course. Possible commercial aircraft (COMAIR).
2130Z One surface contact using civilian navigation radar is detected by ESM. Estimated 9 nm away from the ARG. If it is Soviet, then the ARG speed will give us away as a military target. Alter ARG course to 272/22 to outrun and deceive the possible tattletail. The airborne P-3B is vectored to visually identify (VID) the contact.
2145Z P-3B checked ONSTA ASW Box 1 and began ASW Patrol ops.
2149Z SKUNK 8 VID’d as fishing vessel. P3-B continued PIM surface sanitization. ARG changed course/speed to 258/22.
2205Z 2 F-104 on checked in on CAPSTA.
2230Z 2 F-104 launched to replace 2 on CAPSTA. A single F-5 is prepared to relieve the second set of F-104s. Given the range, it will be difficult to keep a effective CAP over the ARG. The primary duty of the CAP will be to shoot down any surveillance aircraft, as there will not be sufficient CAP on station to do much more than that.
2240Z SKUNK 9 ID’d by P-3B radar 13nm from STANAVFORLANT (NATO SAG) . No radar emissions,
2245Z SKUNK 10 ID’d by P-3C radar at posit 6912N00349W (between Jan Mayen and Norway). Contact course 050/5 knts. Possible merchant.
2249Z Three more surface contacts ID’d by P-3C radar invic 6912N00349W. All on same course and speed, all within 5nm of each other. Possible KYNDA SAG.
2250Z SKUNK 9 VID’d by HNLMS Van Speijk as an AGI via TV.
2254Z Launched the Alert-5 Norwegian P-3B to track the possible KYNDA SAG
2302Z AGI/SKUNK 9 VID as OKEAN –class AGI.

[CV60]

2302Z AGI/SKUNK 9 VID as OKEAN –class AGI.
2302Z The HMCS Ottawa is detached from NATO SAG to shadow the AGI and prevent it from tracking NATO SAG. Of my units, it has both the least amount of offensive and defensive firepower needed in a surface action. While I could sink the OKEAN, I’m not sure I want to just yet-I’m still trying the pull the ARG out of harm’s way, and I don’t want the sinking of a non-hostile Soviet ship to trigger an event that might result in Soviet aircraft flying on the ARG.
2305 SKUNK 14 ID’d near Vestfjorden, on course 298/5knts. Possible civilian shipping. P-3B diverted to VID.
2311Z SKUNK 15 ID’d near Vestfjorden, on course 244/5knts. Possible civilian shipping. P-3B diverted to VID.
2315Z SKUNKs 14 and 15 ID’d as civilian based on ESM. P-3B resuming transit to shadow possible KYNDA SAG.
2336Z New contact SKUNK 16. 694240N0010501W, course 167/5knts. P-3B vectored to VID.
2357 NATO SAG is outside of AGI’s surface radar. Order NATO SAG to change course/speed to 000/15knots to open the distance on the AGI, preparatory to altering to intercept course on possible KYNDA SAG.
0000Z 25 November 1979
0003Z Two fishing vessels VID’d invic 694004N0040527E
0008Z Unknown air contact Air contact detected cus 101/300knts 145 nm North of ARG. Contact does not appear to be emitting or altering course. CAP will not intercept to conserve fuel.
0026Z P-3B VIDs SKUNK 16 as a Warsaw Pact commercial fishing vessel. This unit will have to be tracked to avoid it reporting the NATO SAG posit.
0043Z P-3B revisits the possible KYNDA SAG, but does not go within SAM envelope, so there is no VID. Poss. KYNDA SAG does not emit any radars. At current PIM, SAG will still be outside of strike radius of F-104 and Buccaneers at daybreak. I was hoping to get a strike at daybreak, so I could coordinate the attack with the SAG. However, the possibility that the KYNDA has a HORMONE helo capable of OTH means I may have to delay the strike for 24 hours.
0046Z Bogey 19 changed course 180 degrees to 319/300. This track is inconsistent with commercial air. May possibly be a SSC asset.
0122Z Launched Shackleton AEW backup AEW
0200Z Nimrod begins sanitizing ASW box 4. Nimrod OFSTA from ASW Box 2
0205Z P-3B finishes SSC sweep of mid-Atlantic area, with no positive ID on any possible KYNDA SAG. Revisiting 6912N00349W, the posit of formation of contacts previously ID’d as possible KYNDA SAG.
0224Z Three new contacts invic 702415N0045502W. Do not appear to be in formation. Bogey 19 is in area, which is very suspicious, as it appears to be heading straight for the P-3B. Still no emissions from any surface or air contact.

[Tomcat84]

Interesting AAR! And I really only care for air stuff normally :p

[CV60]

0313Z Bogey 27 appears to be chasing the P-3B and the AEW aircraft. An F-5 enroute to the CAPSTA was diverted to investigate. Bogey 27 increased speed to 550 knots, indicating it is a military contact.
0318Z Bogey 27 is VID’d by the F-5 as a BADGER D (Tu-16RM). Still no emissions. However, Because of its long range PUFF BALL surveillance radar, it is designated hostile.
0318Z TU-16RM destroyed by AIM-9N from F-5 invic 692143N0042309W. HMCS OTTAWA directed to deploy helo for SAR operations to crash site (SAR 1). The F-5 is RTB.
0319z No PUFF BALL radar was detected at the time of the shoot down. However, the NATO SAG is directed to clear the area at high speed, as it was 60nm from the recon aircraft at the time of the shoot down. The BADGER was 207 miles away from the ARG, so it may not have picked up the ARG on its radar, if it used its radar.
0323Z Norwegian radar detects BOGEY 32 a single airborne contact departing Severomorsk 285/400 knots.
0344Z BOGEY 32 crosses into Norwegian airspace at 550knots. Likely a recon aircraft. CAPSTA F-104 directed to intercept.
0344Z Possible KYNDA SAG alters course to 090/5knts. HMCS OTTAWA is directed to break off tattletail on AGI and clear the area, as it is beginning to come within range of possible KYNDA SAG.
0354Z BOGEY 32 VID’d as BADGER D recon aircraft. F-104 cleared to engage.
0354Z BADGER D shot down.
0356Z HMCS OTTAWA Search and Rescue (SAR) Helo onstation (ONSTA) SAR 1 to rescue survivors of first Tu-16 shootdown.

[CV60]

Thanks. I have fun doing these.

Interesting AAR! And I really only care for air stuff normally :p

[mikmykWS]

Really cool. Thanks!

Mike

[.Sirius]

Nice AAR

[CV60]

0400Z ARG continues to advance at 22 knots. My original plan was to use sprint and drift tactics. However, the possibility of the Tu-16s having ID’d the ARG position leads me to decide to open my last position. This will have the additional benefit of increasing the on station time of my CAP, which is having trouble maintaining a constant presence given the long transit distances. Accordingly, the ARG continues to head south at flank speed. This necessitates launching an ready P-3C and Nimrod to sanitize the approaches to Vestfjord ahead of schedule.
0400Z P-3C checks ONSTA southern half of ASW box 3 and begins to sanitize.
0403Z Shackleton AEW #3 is BINGO fuel, checking OFFSTA. Shackleton AEW #2 takes over AEW duties for AOR.


0500Z SITREP
SITREP: At this point, the possible KYNDA SAG is still slowly closing the Norwegian coast at a speed of advance (SOA) of 5 knots. It is approximately 330 miles from the entrance to Vestfjord, the destination for the ARG. It is possible the Soviets have correctly surmised that the entrance to Vestfjord is a chokepoint for ARG, and that they plan to use an embarked HORMONE helo to conduct over the horizon targeting (OTH) at that point.

Because of this threat, the strike on the KYNDA SAG must occur before it gets within range of the Vestfjord approaches. At the current rate of advance, the possible KYNDA SAG will be within range of the Vestfjord approaches in 16 hours, although at high speed it could be within launch range in 4 hours.

Because of these factors, the airstrike must occur on 25 November. Local sunset is approximately 1638. Waiting until the Possible KYNDA SAG is within range of the Vestfjord approaches means that the RAF Buccaneers could not attack, as they are a daytime only system. Therefore, NATO must strike the SAG within the next 11.5 hours. As a precondition for the strike, the KYNDA SAG must be positively VID’d. Although there are no other possible candidates for the KYNDA SAG, NATO only gets one airstrike. Therefore, VID is crucial, as the Soviets are not emitting, so ELINT is ineffective in identifying the targets. Because of the need for VID, NATO will rig the SAG during daylight, to increase the VID range and maximize the odds of VID’ing the targets. NATO will use a P-3, rather than an embarked helo from the NATO SAG, as the appearance of a helo this far from shore would confirm to the Soviets that there is a hostile SAG in the area. Because of the high risk to the P-3, NATO will need another P-3 to take over surveillance duties against the KYNDA SAG in the event the P-3 assigned to VID is lost.

For strike planning purposes, an airstrike TOT must hit at approximately 1600. That puts the target point 340 nm from the Bodo airbase, at the extreme range of the BULLPUP-armed F-104s. It is 700 nm from RAF Lossiemouth, well within the 850 nm combat radius of the Buccaneers. The location of these airbases means that a coordinated strike package will naturally be a multi-axis attack, with the F-104s hitting the SAG from the east, and the Buccaneers from the south. However, given the extreme range for the F-104s, it is possible that they may end up BINGO before they can actually deliver the strike. Further, the lack of any NATO jammers and the 15nm range of the BULLPUP and AJ.168 MARTEL means that the strike may suffer high casualties. To reduce air losses and maximize the chance of success, the NATO SAG will manoeuvre to within HARPOON and possibly EXOCET range north of the KYNDA SAG and attack with SSMs timed to impact as the strike packages enter the SAG SAM envelope.

The lack of flight activity from the possible KYNDA SAG is a bit troubling. It may indicate either that this is not a KYNDA, or that it doesn’t have an operational helo, or that the Soviet commander is husbanding his air resources until he believes he has a target. In any case, the HORMONE must be destroyed as soon as it launches. This will require a F-5 on CAP nearby. Additionally, an AEW aircraft is needed for early warning of any HORMONE flight and to direct the intercept.

[CV60]

0508Z SAR Helo completes SAR mission, returns to HMCS OTTAWA.
0509Z NATO SAG begins its run to get into a HARPOON and possible EXOCET launch position by 1600Z. At this point, I’m still undecided whether I will close to 50 nm or 30 nm from the KYNDA SAG. Initially, the SAG will begin the transit at 12 knots. The Norwegian P-3B will sanitize the SAGs PIMs from surface contacts. Once sanitized, the SAG will increase speed to flank speed, until it is at a point 140 nm away from the KYNDA SAG. The reason for this is that the NATO SAG will be putting a lot of noise in the water at flank speed. CZ zones are at 35/70/105/140 nm, and this is deep water, so CZ detections are possible. Although I don’t think KYNDA SAG will be able to pick it up the NATO SAG at the 4th CZ, I don’t want to risk it. I’ll also have a USN P-3C do an ASW sanitization of the expected engagement area, as NATO SAG will likely be loitering at creep speed for awhile in the area, and vulnerable to a SSN/SS. Regarding the surface contact sanitization of the NATO SAG PIM-There appears to be a fair number of commercial craft in the area. NATO SAG will attempt to avoid these by at least 25 nm, to avoid any contact. More concerning is the OKEAN AGI. On its last reported course and speed, it will be passing near the NATO SAG in approximately 7 hours.

[CV60]

0514Z Norwegian radar detects BOGEY 31 a single airborne contact departing Severomorsk 389/408 knots.
0530 BOGEY 31 appears is now moving at 0 knots. Possible Helo, but inconsistent with initial 408 knot reported speed. Contact appears to be orbiting over the CREEK MILL Station.
0605Z BOGEY 31 has left its orbit and is now on course 295/469knots over the North Cape. Vectoring F-5 in CAPSTA to intercept.
0607Z To hopefully avoid losing a P-3B when it rigs the possible KYNDA SAG, I am going to try doing a reconnisance run over the possible SAG with a F-5 and see if I can get the possible SAG to activate its radar.
0608Z F-5 will likely have to RTB before intercept. Launching an alert F-104 to run the intercept.
0610Z P-3C launches from Keflavik to sanitize for subs invic NATO SAG
0610Z F-5 on CAPSTA ETA due to fuel.
0610Z Alert F-104 launched to intercept BOGEY 31
0618Z Warsaw Pact Fishing Factory Ship VID’d at 692410N0004245E on course 104/11knts
0633Z BOGEY 31 tracking south along Norwegian coast. No emissions detected. ARG slows to 10 knots to mimic merchant traffic.
0643Z BOGEY 31 VID’d by F-104 as recon aircraft. Designated hostile.
0643Z BOGEY 31 VID’d as TU-16RM. Engaged with AIM-9N and destroyed. Aircraft down 124 nm from ARG, well within the range of its PUFF BALL radar. Although no emissions were detected, ARG will resume flank speed to hopefully throw off any targeting attempts.

[CV60]

0718Z F-5 begins a West-East run on the possible KYNDA SAG at 200 feet altitude. Hopefully, the low altitude and high speed will allow the F-5 to make a VID without getting shot down.
0720Z F-5 passed down the side of a KANIN–class DDG and egresses to the south. Is now RTB due to fuel state. No radars detected. No other contacts identified. Although no KYNDA CG was identified, the presence of a warship and the formation the four ships are traveling in, as well as lack of any other contact in the AOR strongly indicates that this is the KYNDA SAG. The KYNDA SAG has changed course to 073/5knts. If the SAG continues on this course, it will throw off the planned attack, as NATO SAG must now maneuver further north. The primary problem is the fishing boat traffic in the area. The fishing boats are effectively screening the NATO SAG from closing from the east, and making a undetected end run to the north difficult

[CV60]

0730Z Commander’s Intention: The identification of KYNDA SAG and its apparent change of course to 073 appears to confirm the earlier intelligence estimate that it is heading for the North Cape. This change of course means that it may be out of range of the Scotland-based RAF Buccaneers if the attack is delayed until tomorrow. However, the KYNDA SAG’s screening behind the fishing vessels makes an undetected approach difficult. NATO SAG will continue to attempt a run to the North to get into position for an HARPOON/EXOCET strike. To try to encourage to KYNDA SAG to move more south, and reduce the flight distance for the airstrike, the HMSC OTTAWA is directed to close the OKEAN AGI and give away its position.
0817Z A second WP factory ship is VID’d at 701422N0000052E course 081/5. It should pass to the north of the NATO SAG as it maneuvers into position
0822Z NATO SAG is approaching the boundaries of the 4th CZ from KYNDA SAG. Decreases speed to 8 knots.
0830Z P-3C begins ASW sanitization for NATO SAG
0833Z Launch P-3B to relieve SSC P-3B
0845Z SSC P-3B is OFFSTA. USN P-3C is tracking KYNDA SAG.
0847Z HMCS OTTAWA is 1 nm from AGI OKEAN. Interestingly, the KYNDA SAG changed course to 092/5 knots, towards the HMSC OTTAWA.
0854Z HMCS OTTAWA detects an active missile seeker with its AN/WLR-1C.

[AndrewJ]

Gaaahhh! Cliffhanger! Can anything save the HMCS Ottawa?? [:(]

[.Sirius]

Heh only a twin Mk33 76mm against SS-N-3 Shaddocks should be interesting though

ORIGINAL: AndrewJ

Gaaahhh! Cliffhanger! Can anything save the HMCS Ottawa?? [:(]

[AlexGGGG]

CHAFF CHAFF?

[CV60]

0855Z HMCS OTTAWA is hit by two SS-N-3a SHADDOCK. It was unable to jam the SHADDOCKs. I had some distant hopes that the missiles might home in on the AGI, but it was not to be. It appears that 4-6 missiles were in the salvo. They came from Bearing 252, so the missiles appeared to use mid course guidance from the KYNDA SAG.

0855Z HMCS OTTAWA is sunk in posit 691327N0052612E. I didn’t expect the KYNDA to attack the HMCS OTTAWA. In my opinion, that was a waste of a salvo of missiles against a secondary target. While the loss of the HMCS OTTAWA is regrettable, it appears to have resulted in a temporary shift in the KYNDA SAG’s movement to the south.

0858Z The KYNDA SAG returns to course 062/5 knots. Aside from having the Soviets expend SHADDOCKs, it appears using the HMCS OTTAWA to draw the KYNDA SAG further south was a wasted effort. I didn’t expect the KYNDA SAG to expend a large percentage of its limited supply of SHADDOCKs on a lone destroyer that was clearly outside of the SAG’s threat envelope. With that said, the plan to try to draw the KYNDA SAG further south was ill-conceived on my part. Given the range of the SS-N-3, It was not necessary for the KYNDA to actually move further south to make the attack. TO accomplish the objective of leading KYNDA SAG further south, I had to use a bait that was further out of range and more enticing than a lone destroyer. A SAR P-3B is launched from Andoya to take SAR coordinator duties.

0915Z In planning the air strike on the KYNDA SAG, I realize that I made an error in my sunrise/sunset calculations. Sunset is at 1230, not at 1618. 1618Z is when it is nautical twilight, i.e, really dark. Dumb Ensign mistake on my part. However, civil twilight is 1449, and that should give me enough light for the EO systems in the Martel- equipped Buccaneers. At its current PIM, the KYNDA SAG will be at 694238N0002714W (Target point EARLY) at 1449. That is my time on target (TOT). This point is 717 nm from the RAF Lossiemouth-based Buccaneers and 353 nm from my F-104s at Bodo. Because of the extreme range for the F-104s, the strike will be timed off of them. At cruise speed, they will need 45 minutes to reach the target position, plus an additional 2 minutes to launch and form up, giving a launch time of 1402. The Buccaneers will need 90 minutes to reach the target area. I’ll have them depart 10 minutes early, at 1310. Two of them have anti-radiation (ARM) missiles, so they will clear the path through the SAG's air defenses. NATO SAG is unable to safely close to within EXOCET range. Right now, its ships are badly strung out from the high speed run. I want to get it to within mutual supporting distance in case the KYNDA SAG detects its position. Because of this, it will only be able to launch HARPOONS at approximately 50 nm range. They will be timed to hit the KYNDA at 1448.5Z. Targeting information will be provided by the P-3C that is on station. The Shackelton AEW will coordinate the airstrike timing.

[CV60]

0916Z Because of the new launch position for NATO SAG, the P-3C ASW sanitization box is shifted approximately 15 nm to the ENE. CAPSTA is moved to the SSW to remain close to the ARG and reduce transit time.

0920Z In order to get NATO SAG into position and keep the SAG ships within supporting range of each other, I will have to risk allowing it to come within visual range of neutral fishing vessels. While not optimal, it is more risky allowing the SAG to remain spread out.

1116Z ARG enters Vestfjord (Safe area).

1129Z Shackelton AEW takes off from NAS Keflavik to relieve Shackelton currently ONSTA

1307Z AS.J37 (ARM) equipped RAF Buccaneers begin to taxi for launch from RAF Lossiemouth.

1308Z AJ-168 equipped RAF Buccaneers begin to taxi for launch from RAF Lossiemouth.

1311Z RAF Buccaneers have launched and are enroute. The plan is to have the AS.J37 (ARM) equipped aircraft lead the strike in and supress the KYNDA CG and KANIN DDG, and hit the SAG immediately before the HARPOONs hit. The other four AJ-168 Buccaneers have split into 2 strike elements, one dedicated to the northern most, and one to the unknown western most contact in the SAG. The F-104s will hit the KANIN and the KYNDA, as they are closest.

1325Z P-3C conducting direct support ASW Ops with NATO SAG checks OFFSTA. Is replaced by another P-3C

1342Z NATO SAG has reformed. Slow to 7 knots to cross the 2nd CZ. Range: 72 nm from KYNDA SAG.

1347Z The P-3C have confirmed all surface tracks in the engagement area. There are no unknown tracks near the NATO SAG that can give away its position.

1354Z Shackelton AEW#3 checks ONSTA and replaces Shackelton AEW #1

1359Z BULLPUP-armed F-104s from Bodo begins taxi for take-off. I’m planning on using 3-two aircraft elements: One to hit the KYNDA, one to hit the KANIN and one to do a restrike on anything that was missed.

[CV60]

1406Z F-104 Launch complete.

1413Z Increase NATO SAG speed to 16 knts.

1423Z NATO SAG is 61nm from KYNDA SAG. Within HARPOON range. The airstrike is slightly ahead of schedule, with the SEAD strike occurring at 1443Z, impact at 1444Z. Harpoons will hit at 1444.5Z, and the strike packages will hit at 1445.5Z

1423Z The P-3B on SAR Coordinator duty and the P-3C are directed to clear from the attack axis to avoid Blue on Blue engagements. P-3C will take up position to the NW of the KYNDA SAG at 50 nm and provide targeting updates. Shackelton AEW is located to the SSE at 90nm to provide coordination.

1426Z FGS LUTJENS detects an ASW Helo, probable HORMONE at an estimated 38nm. F-5 on CAPSTA is directed to engage.

1428Z F-5 on CAPSTA is RTB for fuel. F-104 coming on CAPSTA is directed to engage. Contact appears to be tracking at 104/55 knots, so it may not have seen the NATO SAG. It will run into the F-104 strike package, though.

1433Z Both the Buccaneer and F-104 strike packages are 100 nm from KYNDA SAG. They descend to 12,000 feet.

[CV60]

1437Z The F-104 engages a HORMONE A with an AIM-9N and destroys it 34nm from the NATO SAG. I don’t know if it saw the SAG. KYNDA SAG changes course to 084/5knots

1437Z Strikes are 50 nm from target. Descend to 1000 feet.

1442Z HNLMS Van Speijk launches four Harpoon RGM-84A. Of note, I forgot to take into account the time it would take to actually target the HARPOONs. Consequentially, instead of clearing the way for the airstrike, they will be slightly behind the airstrike. That may cost me some aircraft.

1443Z The western most contact is ID’d as a BORIS CHILIKIN AOR. The Buccaneers are retargeted to the most northern contact.

1444Z The northern most contact is ID’d a MOD KASHIN DDG. Strikes “pop up” to 2000 feet.

1445Z F-104s release weapons

1445Z Buccaneers release weapons

1446Z KYNDA SAG begins emitting. SEAD aircraft launch ARMs