What happens Next?

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warspite1
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What happens Next?

Post by warspite1 »

Having finished Shame of Savo and, on the back of this, proceeded to re-read the excellent Guadalcanal by Frank, I have a question for the knowledgeable people of this forum:

With three US and one Australian heavy cruiser sunk or sinking Mikawa, aware from previous reports that there are loads of transports off Guadalcanal and Tulagi, decides to continue with the attack.

His cruisers set upon the transports with gusto and, not only sink most of them, but manage to sink HMA ships Australia and Hobart and US ships Chicago and San Juan in the process. All this for the loss of one light cruiser and two damaged heavy cruisers (as Crutchley's remaining ships fought back before dying).

Mikawa makes it back to Kavieng - Kako is not sunk as S.38 misses her.

Question

Realistically, in this dream scenario for the IJN, what happens now?

- What does Fletcher do with his carrier force?
- What happens to the Marines on the islands? Can they be reinforced or written off?
- If the former, where from and with what ships available?
- Assuming the Japanese re-take Guadalcanal and build their airfield, how long before the US recover from this set-back?
- Would it be the case that King would be forced on to the defensive in the Pacific (as originally proposed) or would the US want vengeance asap at the expense of the build up in Europe (or regardless of vengeance, decide that to save Australia the Pacific would need reinforcing)?

Any thoughts appreciated.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by spence »

Don't know the answer but my first question is any such scenario in the least realistic (even IJN wet dreams need to be evaluated in light of realities like the finite amount of ammunition available)?

How many rounds has Mikawa got for his guns after fighting with the Allied cruisers off Savo (logistics is so boring that I wouldn't be the least surprised if no historian has ever considered how many rounds remained but I'd be awful surprised if Mikawa didn't know)?

How many torpedoes (I assume he has at least fired off a full salvo from every ship at the Southern Group of CAs (Canberra and Chicago) and a second full salvo at the Northern Group)(same logistics question)?

Since he has to fight the remaining cruisers how much ammo does he have for the transports? IJN doctrine would have his aiming his remaining torps at the Allied warships...even with complete surprise the number of torp hits compared to the number launched doesn't do the IJN a lot of credit.









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RE: What happens Next?

Post by warspite1 »

Some good questions to add to the mix (albeit I think you are selling many fine historians short - I haven't read any accounts that criticise Mikawa for not continuing with the attack - although the Japanese did (after initially hailing Mikawa as a hero)). Certainly Loxton made the case for why Mikawa's actions were understandable.

My guess would be torpedo usage would have been high but 8-inch shell usage low on the basis that this was not some long range gun duel slogged out over hours, but a relatively brief encounter.

When you say a full salvo that means from one launcher? Whether all ships fired all torpedoes from their starboard side at the Southern Group I don't know, but for those that did, their port tubes would likely have been unused and available for the Northern Group.

Even then, I Assume the Furtakas have spare torpedoes? - I believe Chokai carried 16 for her 8 tubes. I don't think the light cruisers had spares. How long would it take to re-load the quadruple mounts? Presumably secondary armament could have been used against the transports? Sinking the transports wasn't necessary - leaving then as blazing hulks would do the job.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by jmalter »

IIRC from the Richard Frank book, Mikawa had expended >50% of cruiser ammo (dunno about torps). While he was aware of the US shipping, his ships were widely dispersed after fighting 2 different actions. It would've taken time to re-form before continuing to the south-east, & he'd pay for that the next day if he was found by US CV searches after sunrise.

'Course he could've ordered his ships to continue SE by divisions to attack shipping at Lunga & Tulagi before retiring, but would have lost tactical control & risked blue-on-blue mistakes.

My 2 cents:

- What does Fletcher do with his carrier force?
Did Fletcher announce his retirement at the conference that took Crutchley & HMAS Australia away from the cruiser TFs, or did he decide on that post-Savo? It's a toss-up whether he'd've launched agressive search/strike missions the next morning, or taken counsel of his own depleted stock of a/c bombs & low escort fuel-states.
- What happens to the Marines on the islands? Can they be reinforced or written off?
USMC would have stayed, w/ a quicker transfer of the battalions on Tulagi over to Lunga. Logistics would suffer, we'd've had a Noumea Express to counter the Tokyo Express. 'Operation Shoestring' would've become 'Operation Spider-Thread'. USMC captured IJ food & construction equipment & could have completed the airfield. A more canny IJA commander than Col. Ichiki could have delayed the airfield's completion - this would allow subsequent IJA reinforcement to eventually capture the Lunga airfield, but at the same strategic cost to their offensive in New Guinea.
- If the former, where from and with what ships available?
The Guadalcanal shipping was *ALL* that was available (APD, APA, AKA, LC). Substantial losses of these vessels would have greatly hampered US efforts & delayed future amphib efforts, but IMO the USN would've adopted the same expedients as the IJN did to re-supply the troops.
- Assuming the Japanese re-take Guadalcanal and build their airfield, how long before the US recover from this set-back?
Maybe about 6 months?
- Would it be the case that King would be forced on to the defensive in the Pacific (as originally proposed) or would the US want vengeance asap at the expense of the build up in Europe (or regardless of vengeance, decide that to save Australia the Pacific would need reinforcing)?
King might've been forced to resign, but Roosevelt would've held steady & committed to keeping the SLOC to Oz/NZ open. MacArthur's influence would've increased - Pacific shipping, escorts & new construction would've been used to support him, rather than Nimitz. Ghormley's SoPac would become a purely logistical pipeline.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: jmalter

IIRC from the Richard Frank book, Mikawa had expended >50% of cruiser ammo (dunno about torps). While he was aware of the US shipping, his ships were widely dispersed after fighting 2 different actions. It would've taken time to re-form before continuing to the south-east, & he'd pay for that the next day if he was found by US CV searches after sunrise.

'Course he could've ordered his ships to continue SE by divisions to attack shipping at Lunga & Tulagi before retiring, but would have lost tactical control & risked blue-on-blue mistakes.

My 2 cents:

- What does Fletcher do with his carrier force?
Did Fletcher announce his retirement at the conference that took Crutchley & HMAS Australia away from the cruiser TFs, or did he decide on that post-Savo? It's a toss-up whether he'd've launched agressive search/strike missions the next morning, or taken counsel of his own depleted stock of a/c bombs & low escort fuel-states.
- What happens to the Marines on the islands? Can they be reinforced or written off?
USMC would have stayed, w/ a quicker transfer of the battalions on Tulagi over to Lunga. Logistics would suffer, we'd've had a Noumea Express to counter the Tokyo Express. 'Operation Shoestring' would've become 'Operation Spider-Thread'. USMC captured IJ food & construction equipment & could have completed the airfield. A more canny IJA commander than Col. Ichiki could have delayed the airfield's completion - this would allow subsequent IJA reinforcement to eventually capture the Lunga airfield, but at the same strategic cost to their offensive in New Guinea.
- If the former, where from and with what ships available?
The Guadalcanal shipping was *ALL* that was available (APD, APA, AKA, LC). Substantial losses of these vessels would have greatly hampered US efforts & delayed future amphib efforts, but IMO the USN would've adopted the same expedients as the IJN did to re-supply the troops.
- Assuming the Japanese re-take Guadalcanal and build their airfield, how long before the US recover from this set-back?
Maybe about 6 months?
- Would it be the case that King would be forced on to the defensive in the Pacific (as originally proposed) or would the US want vengeance asap at the expense of the build up in Europe (or regardless of vengeance, decide that to save Australia the Pacific would need reinforcing)?
King might've been forced to resign, but Roosevelt would've held steady & committed to keeping the SLOC to Oz/NZ open. MacArthur's influence would've increased - Pacific shipping, escorts & new construction would've been used to support him, rather than Nimitz. Ghormley's SoPac would become a purely logistical pipeline.
warspite1

The decision to withdraw was already made previously by Fletcher. Re launching strikes, the point of withdrawing was so he couldn't be attacked - I'm not sure he could have launched strikes from where he sailed to. That is why the decision was so controversial; he was leaving the TRS without air cover.



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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Buckrock »

ORIGINAL: jmalter

IIRC from the Richard Frank book, Mikawa had expended >50% of cruiser ammo (dunno about torps). While he was aware of the US shipping, his ships were widely dispersed after fighting 2 different actions. It would've taken time to re-form before continuing to the south-east, & he'd pay for that the next day if he was found by US CV searches after sunrise.

If you go off O'Hara's "US Navy vs the Axis", the heavy cruisers used less than a third of their main gun ammo and the two light cruisers even less. Secondary ammo used was minimal for most.

As for torpedoes remaining. assuming they loaded the spares, Chokai still had 16, the Furutaka, Kinugasa and Kako still had 8 while the Aoba was left with 3 in her one workable mount. Of the light cruisers, the Yubari still had 2 torpedoes remaining while the Tenryu had used all hers. The destroyer Yunagi may or may not have used any of her torpedoes while operating alone and away from Mikawa's cruisers.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by warspite1 »

Okay so if we assume that the attack was possible (with the ammo still available), does anyone have any comment re the original questions?
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Buckrock »

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Having finished Shame of Savo and, on the back of this, proceeded to re-read the excellent Guadalcanal by Frank, I have a question for the knowledgeable people of this forum:

With three US and one Australian heavy cruiser sunk or sinking Mikawa, aware from previous reports that there are loads of transports off Guadalcanal and Tulagi, decides to continue with the attack.

His cruisers set upon the transports with gusto and, not only sink most of them, but manage to sink HMA ships Australia and Hobart and US ships Chicago and San Juan in the process. All this for the loss of one light cruiser and two damaged heavy cruisers (as Crutchley's remaining ships fought back before dying).

Mikawa makes it back to Kavieng - Kako is not sunk as S.38 misses her.

Question

Realistically, in this dream scenario for the IJN, what happens now?

- What does Fletcher do with his carrier force?
- What happens to the Marines on the islands? Can they be reinforced or written off?
- If the former, where from and with what ships available?
- Assuming the Japanese re-take Guadalcanal and build their airfield, how long before the US recover from this set-back?
- Would it be the case that King would be forced on to the defensive in the Pacific (as originally proposed) or would the US want vengeance asap at the expense of the build up in Europe (or regardless of vengeance, decide that to save Australia the Pacific would need reinforcing)?

Any thoughts appreciated.
For what it's worth,

IMO, it's highly unlikely Mikawa could have pulled off the destruction of the invasion force. He just wouldn't have had the time unless he
stayed at it until daybreak and the more forces he encountered, the more likely he risked further damage and even worse for him, it
would become more likely Fletcher (whose force was still only 150nm away even at 5.00am) would be alerted as to Mikawa's presence off
Guadalcanal.

However, on the assumption Mikawa somehow gets your stated dream result......
- Fletcher's carriers would have still been able to operate at sea to protect the US forces at Guadalcanal and Tulagi and the sea route
leading back to Espiritu Santo and Noumea, just as they did historically. Mikawa's dream victory would have no affect there.

- The Marines had already landed enough ammo to see them through an historical August (including Ichiki's assault) but they would have
had a food supply crisis much worse than historical. However, the Japanese were probably incapable of exploiting it before SOPAC could
remedy it with emergency measures. The cost of making these supply shipments to Guadalcanal/Tulagi the immediate priority may have
meant a delay in the movement of the men and equipment of the CUB-1 air base engineers and the Marine Air Group support echelons.
At worst, this could result in Marine aircraft lacking the support to operate from Henderson Field until the last days of August.

- There were two APDs as well as several APs and AKs at Noumea and Espiruto Santo at this time that weren't involved in the invasion.
There were also other transports (such as USS William Ward Burrows) already enroute for the theatre as the invasion took place. Given
that the Japanese historically were unable to stop similarly small numbers of Allied transports sneaking in and out from Guadalcanal/Tulagi
after the invasion, these should be enough to allow the Marines to survive while the Allies begin filling the South Pacific logisitics hole created
by Mikawa's dream victory.


Because the Japanese resistance was virtually over and the bulk of the Marines' combat force (including artillery, light tanks and about half of
the 90mm AA from 3rd Marine Def Batt) was already ashore when Mikawa arrived, some dream naval victory alone wouldn't have led to the
Japanese retaking Henderson Field. For that to happen, the Japanese would have had to also done better than historical with their own
reinforcement efforts as well as their efforts to suppress Henderson Field and also interdict Allied sea supply lines.

IMO, the main impact of a dream victory for Mikawa is that the Marines have to stay defensive for longer, thereby delaying the US offensive
that would eventually capture all of Guadalcanal and that the heavy loss of invasion shipping at Savo would also impact initially on the
later Allied drive up the Solomons. By the second half of '43 though, the affect of Mikawa's dream victory would barely be noticed.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Trugrit »


Buckrock,

I agree with your points.

IMO - I may be the only student of naval history who believes that If Turner
had been doing his job properly and Mikawa charged the anchorage the Japanese
would not have sunk the transports.
The question is: Was Turner doing his job properly?

A screen is not that hard to penetrate and Turner should have been ready to flee out of range
at the first sign of enemy contact.

Turner wanted the Japanese to attack; he thought they would get a warm reception.
This per Richard Frank in his book Guadalcanal. Turner was naive in the early war period.

This link is the account from the Japanese point of view.
According to the Japanese account lack of ammo was not a consideration.
http://www.navalhistory.org/2012/08/09/ ... avo-island

Mikawa had three reasons for withdrawing, this was number one:
“The force was at 0030 divided into three groups, each acting individually, with the flagship in the rear. For them all to assemble and reform in the darkness it would be necessary to slow down considerably. From their position to the north¬west of Savo Island it would take 30 minutes to slow down and assemble, a half hour more to regain formation, another half hour to regain battle speed, and then another hour to again reach the vicinity of the enemy anchorage. The two and a half hours required would thus place our re¬entry into the battle area at 0300, just one hour before sunrise.”

On the map you can see how the Japanese were scattered after the battle.
The Japanese estimated it would have taken 2.5 hours to get back to the anchorage.

From the Naval narrative:
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/onl ... nd1942.htm
“Back at XRAY, as soon as the first flares appeared, unloading ceased, boats cast off and headed for the beach, and all ships were darkened and got underway promptly. Under cover of darkness and rain, they moved out Lengo Channel to the eastward at about 10 knots.”

Richard Frank in his excellent book Guadalcanal says on page 119:
“Admiral Turner observed the aircraft flares and the gunfire. At 0145 the Guadalcanal transports
Stopped unloading, and all got underway five minutes later. Commendably, the transports milled
Around for several hours without either a collision or an exchange of gunfire between friends,
Despite poor visibility and the temptation to imagine enemies near at hand.”

There is nothing “commendable” about milling around in the dark for several hours with
A Japanese surface task force close by that is obviously there to destroy you. The transports
Should have been hauling ass out of the area at top speed. In 2.5 hours at 10 knots the transports
Should have been over 20 miles away, out of range, before Mikawa arrived at XRAY.

There is no naval doctrine that says a transport task force has to sit at the anchorage and
Wait to be attacked. Run like hell is a valid option.

Also, the transports were not completely helpless; there were a number of destroyers
And minesweepers in the area still available for surface combat.
There would have been another surface fight as the Japanese closed on the transports.

DISPOSITION OF FORCES, NIGHT OF 8 AUGUST:
“Of the 19 transports in the Task Force, 14 were anchored or underway near Guadalcanal and 5 were in the Tulagi area on the night of 8-9 August. The latter were screened by an arc of vessels composed of the transport destroyers Colhoun, Little, and McKean, reinforced by the destroyers Henley and Ellet. The Monssen had been giving fire support to our troops on Makambo Island that evening, but with the fall of darkness had taken her assigned position screening the San Juan on patrol.”
“The larger group of transports off Guadalcanal was screened by several ships on the arc of a circle of 6,000 yards radius with the Tenaru River as its center. On this arc were the minesweepers Trever, Hopkins, Zane, Southard and Hovey, and the destroyers Selfridge, Mugford and Dewey.”
The Australia (CA) and the San Juan (CL) were also available - between YOKE and XRAY.
The naval narrative is not completely accurate but close.
Frank does not give the exact composition of the transport screens.
He does list all warships available.

This is a good book:
http://www.amazon.com/Neptunes-Inferno- ... 0553385127

The Frank book is better and more detailed:
http://www.amazon.com/Guadalcanal-Defin ... 0140165614

In my humble opinion of course.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by crsutton »

Whats if's don't necessarily delve into the political forces back in the US. A number of high ranking officers and politicians favored a heavy commitment to the Pacific over the Europe first policy eventually adopted. As it was the fierce fighting combined with heavy naval losses during the Guadacanal campaign caused the American high command to shift more assets to the Pacific anyways. Just look at your reinforcement schedule in game to see the warships shifted to the Pacific during the months of June and July 1942. They were making good the losses. As a result of events in the Pacific the Americans actually did amend their planning and committed more and more resources to the Pacific than intended. Their own success actually dictated this, and this increased commitment never stopped. So Europe first was still in play but not so much as people think.

So what if? Well, I don't think the American public would have ever allowed the US government to abandon the marines at Guadacanal. Ever.. Tourch might have been delayed or reduced and enough resources diverted to the Pacific to rectify the situation.

Now then, replace this particular what if with any of the other what ifs that are floated here from time to time. invasion of Hawaii, invasion of OZ, invasion of India, invasion of Alaska, invasion of Laguna Beach [:D], it does not matter. Political pressure on the home front would dictate that the US would have responded with more force and resources with each greater threat in the Pacific. Barring a real series of total disasters, I doubt there ever would have been any sort of retreat and huddle. My two cents anyway.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Numdydar »

+1

Barring Germany of developing the a-bomb well before anyone else, having the US in the war was an automatic I Win button for the Allies. No matter what happened in the PTO/ETO once the US developed the a-bomb it was game over for the Axis no matter how much land/countries the Axis had overrun.

As a different what if, the US just sends materials to the Allies and lets Japan run amok in the Pacific. Spends the entire war effort to develop the a-bomb and proceeds to drop them until the Axis surrenders [:)]. To me this is just as a valid what if as anything else I have read here and elsewhere.

Basically the only way the Axis could have kept there gains was for the US to stay out of the war. Which is why any game/simulation starting in 1939 or later the Axis will typically lose, at least against a human player anyway [:)]. As that time frame is pretty much too late to have any real impact on US involvement. So if you really want to play 'what if', you need to have a time frame that starts in 1933/36 in order to have anything have a real impact. Otherwise all you are doing is trying to beat the historical record, which is fun in and of itself [:)]
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Buckrock »

ORIGINAL: Trugrit
IMO - I may be the only student of naval history who believes that If Turner
had been doing his job properly and Mikawa charged the anchorage the Japanese
would not have sunk the transports.
The question is: Was Turner doing his job properly?

A screen is not that hard to penetrate and Turner should have been ready to flee out of range
at the first sign of enemy contact.

Turner wanted the Japanese to attack; he thought they would get a warm reception.
This per Richard Frank in his book Guadalcanal. Turner was naive in the early war period.

I don't think Turner was blameless in what (almost) happened to his transports but he was also somewhat constrained by his priorities.

Many of Turner's transports off Guadalcanal did get underway to clear the anchorage shortly after the first signs of enemy contact
within Savo Sound. As you suggested earlier, they moved some distance away (north-east) and hid themselves amongst the rain
squalls there. It actually wasn't a bad compromise in the circumstances as it got them well out of the anchorage area if the enemy
swept through it but not so far away that the transports couldn't be back off the beaches at dawn to resume the critical task of
unloading the troops, equipment and supplies still onboard.

And in Turner's defense, considering the size of his screening force and the relatively narrow waters they defended, he was probably
justified in believing that the enemy couldn't penetrate through without being brought to battle first.

Had Turner instead immediately withdrawn his transports and ran them away to the east at the first sign that the enemy were in Savo
Sound, he might have had some explaining to do later. Such a move would not only have imposed further delays on the unloading, it
also flew in the face of a previously agreed view by the various commanders that the defensive screen was considered sufficient to
detect and repel any likely attempt by the enemy that night to attack the transports.

As the task force commander, Turner was obligated to back the agreed defensive plan, at least until he had sufficient cause to believe
it wasn't working.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Chickenboy »

ORIGINAL: crsutton
Well, I don't think the American public would have ever allowed the US government to abandon the marines at Guadacanal. Ever.. Tourch might have been delayed or reduced and enough resources diverted to the Pacific to rectify the situation.

Agreed. But what would have happened were the Marines overrun and destroyed in detail on Guadalcanal? Not such a far-fetched outcome. In that case, what would there have been to reinforce? The Marines wouldn't have been abandoned so much as entirely lost. Would that have changed the American calculus for pursuing the war effort in the Pacific?

My opinion is that it would have led to a different outcome in the Pacific. Such a monumental loss closely on the heels of the fall of the Philippines would have infused the Japanese with a much more long-term sense of victory disease and possibly corrupted the Allied will to fight with a renewed sense of defeatism.

Ultimately, I still see the atomic attacks on mainland Japan happening about the time they did. But the road and the timeline there would have been significantly different.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by wdolson »

The Americans were very much in lessons learned mode in 1942. If the 1st Marine division had been lost, it would have been a blow to morale, but the next amphibious operation would have likely been overkill from day 1.

While there were decisive battles for the Axis, there really was no decisive battle situation for the US. The planners knew that a massive tidal wave of material was coming down the pipeline. They were under pressure to have some good news for the PR people, but the only issue was morale. For the Axis, there was a limited supply of material, especially things with long lead times like large ships. Evey loss was much more critical to their ability to continue fighting. As long as there were still enough Americans to put into uniforms, the rest of what was needed was only a matter of time delay if that.

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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Chickenboy »

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The Americans were very much in lessons learned mode in 1942. If the 1st Marine division had been lost, it would have been a blow to morale, but the next amphibious operation would have likely been overkill from day 1.

Aye, but it is my position that that next amphibious operation would have been considerably delayed. Alternatively, the reliance on overkill may have truncated some of MacArthur's P/NG landings-done on a comparative shoestring. I still believe that the route traveled would have been different.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by geofflambert »

I think one thing to consider is that (in my view) the Americans were always overly optimistic in the ETO (including the Med) and pessimistic in the Pacific, with the very notable exception of the Battle of Midway and some others. But there is no question in my mind that the US was in a much better position to resupply and reinforce the Marines on Midway than the Japanese their troops.
This proved to be the case. I don't think either Nimitz or MacArthur, or for that matter FDR would have abandoned them. Aside from the question of being abandoned, those Marines refused to give in, regardless. Anyway, the Japanese could not afford to commit their carriers, and the Americans, while reluctant, could.

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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Buckrock »

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
Aye, but it is my position that that next amphibious operation would have been considerably delayed. Alternatively, the reliance on overkill may have truncated some of MacArthur's P/NG landings-done on a comparative shoestring. I still believe that the route traveled would have been different.

In terms of the geographic route of an Allied advance, MacArthur still wanted to capture jumping-off points in the Bismarck Sea for his eventual invasion of the Philippines. I doubt any SOPAC loss of Guadalcanal would alter his plans. If anything, SWPA would now get top priority in the southern Pacific area and gain more resources for their 1942-1944 offensives. Allied air power and Japanese logistics would still lead to MacArthur gaining his objectives. The question is simply when in 1944 they would all finally be achieved.

And at some point before then, probably just before the USN began committing its fleets to the Central Pacific offensives, Allied resources should be sufficient to send SOPAC back into the Solomons to aid in the isolation of Rabaul. With most of their forces being tied up with New Guinea operations, the Japanese would struggle in stopping any SOPAC invasion or subsequent push further up the Solomons.

IMO, same final result, just on a different day.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by warspite1 »

Thanks for the responses – although I think with some of them, something got lost in the translation.

First off and to be clear, there is nothing in the OP to suggest that even a much heavier defeat at Savo leads to anything other than a US victory in the Pacific and the ultimate unconditional surrender of Japan. That is an absolute given. What is (imo) interesting about this episode is what the Americans would do in response to this reverse – given the resources available both locally and wider.

crsutton touched on the latter in answer to Question 5 in the OP with the comment that “Torch might have been delayed or reduced and enough resources diverted to the Pacific to rectify the situation”. That would be interesting – possibly giving Hitler a bit of breathing space in North Africa and then Italy 1943?

His statement “I don't think the American public would have ever allowed the US government to abandon the marines at Guadalcanal” is one that few would disagree with (it’s not in the US DNA - although I would temper with “if humanly possible”), and indeed the point of the OP was to explore how that could be achieved – what resources were available, what was possible – and in what timeframe?

Buckrock said “some dream naval victory alone wouldn't have led to the Japanese retaking Henderson Field. For that to happen, the Japanese would have had to also done better than historical with their own reinforcement efforts as well as their efforts to suppress Henderson Field and also interdict Allied sea supply lines”. Well of course, but the whole point is exploring the knock-on effects of that “dream” victory and the effect on supply and reinforcement by each side given the changing dynamic.

Re the Marines that landed being beaten, Chickenboy said, “Not such a far-fetched outcome”. I would agree with that – unless the Americans could quickly supply, and ultimately reinforce those troops. So question 2 (and particularly 3) in the OP are the key ones. How do the Americans keep the troops supplied – and stop the Japanese adequately supplying their own forces?

Buckrock said “There were two APDs as well as several APs and AKs at Noumea and Espiruto Santo at this time that weren't involved in the invasion. There were also other transports (such as USS William Ward Burrows) already enroute for the theatre as the invasion took place”. But the question is: would they have been enough? and would they have been able to achieve the goal of re-supply? The key here surely is the airfield. Buckrock also says:

“Given that the Japanese historically were unable to stop similarly small numbers of Allied transports sneaking in and out from Guadalcanal/Tulagi after the invasion, these should be enough to allow the Marines to survive while the Allies begin filling the South Pacific logistics hole created by Mikawa's dream victory”. But the Americans were able to do this in daylight as they controlled the skies (and it was the Japanese that had to resort to sneaking in and out at night). Jmalter suggested a Tokyo Express equivalent – the Noumea Express. Certainly possible, except we know that such a method would be unlikely to supply or reinforce the troops to the extent needed.

So, once again, speed of response becomes the crucial factor. In a scenario where all the Marines have is what they landed with (and possibly some additional help from the Noumea Express) and are seemingly cut-off, how quickly (if at all) can they get the airfield up and running? IIRC the airfield was up and running around the 18-20th August. Presumably that timescale would have been put back in this scenario even if the Japanese had not managed to re-capture it.

So pending the airfield being usable (by either side) another really important question that hasn’t been answered is the role of Fletcher and the carriers. Remember Fletcher, without knowing what had happened at Savo, and knowing he was leaving Turner’s transports (that he was responsible for) on their own, withdrew with Ghormley’s agreement as he was worried about Japanese torpedo bombers.

Geofflambert said “Anyway, the Japanese could not afford to commit their carriers, and the Americans, while reluctant, could”. Re the latter point, yes the Americans could, but Fletcher had already shown, he was loath to do so. So Question 1 of the OP is vital here. For any large-scale re-supply mission, those precious carriers need to be committed to the area. Does King make that call? Re the first part of the comment I’m not sure where that comes from as the Japanese did commit their carriers – Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

Excellent debate, please keep the comments coming! Matrix – please make a game of this campaign!!
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Buckrock
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Buckrock »

ORIGINAL: warspite1
Buckrock also says:
“Given that the Japanese historically were unable to stop similarly small numbers of Allied transports sneaking in and out from Guadalcanal/Tulagi after the invasion, these should be enough to allow the Marines to survive while the Allies begin filling the South Pacific logistics hole created by Mikawa's dream victory”. But the Americans were able to do this in daylight as they controlled the skies (and it was the Japanese that had to resort to sneaking in and out at night). Jmalter suggested a Tokyo Express equivalent – the Noumea Express. Certainly possible, except we know that such a method would be unlikely to supply or reinforce the troops to the extent needed.

Actually, the Allies initially made their transport runs at night, switching to daylight missions once the airfield was operational. In
fact, the USN realised fairly quickly that fighter cover over the waters between Guadalcanal and Tulagi was not vital for the survival
of transports if operating in small numbers there. Generally there would be only one bombing raid a day from Rabaul and the Solomons
weather dictated that it arrive (if at all) in the area between 10am and 2pm. Transports quickly developed routines to take advantage
of this. If they wanted to be daring, they could continue unloading until they received a coastwatcher confirmation that a Japanese air
raid was making its way down the Slot, giving the transport perhaps two hours to try getting clear.

The problem for the Japanese was that the bombers based in Rabaul were so far away that flying daily shipping interdiction missions from
there just in the hope of catching a visiting transport would likely have seemed a waste of valuable assets.

I also think you're overestimating how long the Marines would have to rely on a "Noumea Express". Historically, it took just one delivery
from 6 APDs (equal to 300 tons of cargo) to bring all the airbase engineers and aircraft maintenance personnel (with their equipment and
stores) neccessary to allow Marine aircraft operations from Henderson Field to begin on the 20th August. Once the airfield opens, Allied
logistics become easier as they can make better use of Tulagi port now it is within an air defence. After that, it will just come down to
how long before the Allies decide to push through the first of their major supply convoys.

As I stated earlier, there would be a supply crisis, there would be some very unhappy Marines and there would likely be a delay in the
opening of Henderson Field until the end of August but the Japanese would also likely be unable to take advantage of it while the
opportunity lasted.
ORIGINAL: warspite1
So pending the airfield being usable (by either side) another really important question that hasn’t been answered is the role of Fletcher and the carriers. Remember Fletcher, without knowing what had happened at Savo, and knowing he was leaving Turner’s transports (that he was responsible for) on their own, withdrew with Ghormley’s agreement as he was worried about Japanese torpedo bombers.
Fletcher wanted to refuel and to have the time to rest his crews and increase his ready fighter numbers by preparing the spare aircraft
carried on-board and repairing many of those rendered inoperable from the combats on 7th and 8th August. By Aug 14th, Fletcher's carriers
were back again, operating about 300nm from Guadalcanal and would continue to operate at sea in support of Guadalcanal right through to
the Eastern Solomons on the 24th of August.

I'm not sure exactly what you want to know about Fletcher's carriers but his concerns about the Japanese torpedo bombers related more to
him having to operate close to Guadalcanal (around 100nm) over several days while supplying air cover to Turner's invasion force against
determined Japanese attacks. Fletcher believed that continuing to do this would inevitably lead to the Japanese locating and attacking his
carriers while his fighters were at full stretch.

On the other hand, Fletcher didn't seem averse to the idea of operating close to Guadalcanal for shorter periods in August. He demonstrated
this when he was prepared to close on the 15th Aug in response to intel that an enemy naval force might be nearby. It wasn't. Then on the
21st Aug, Fletcher brought his carriers to within 50 miles of Guadalcanal at dawn despite suspecting the Japanese knew he was in the area.
He returned again the next day in order to provide air cover to two US transports that were unloading at Guadalcanal.

What concerns Fletcher had about enemy torpedo bombers didn't appear to stop him closing Guadalcanal when he felt it could be done without
excessive risk.
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RE: What happens Next?

Post by Chickenboy »

ORIGINAL: Buckrock
ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
Aye, but it is my position that that next amphibious operation would have been considerably delayed. Alternatively, the reliance on overkill may have truncated some of MacArthur's P/NG landings-done on a comparative shoestring. I still believe that the route traveled would have been different.

In terms of the geographic route of an Allied advance, MacArthur still wanted to capture jumping-off points in the Bismarck Sea for his eventual invasion of the Philippines. I doubt any SOPAC loss of Guadalcanal would alter his plans. If anything, SWPA would now get top priority in the southern Pacific area and gain more resources for their 1942-1944 offensives. Allied air power and Japanese logistics would still lead to MacArthur gaining his objectives. The question is simply when in 1944 they would all finally be achieved.

And at some point before then, probably just before the USN began committing its fleets to the Central Pacific offensives, Allied resources should be sufficient to send SOPAC back into the Solomons to aid in the isolation of Rabaul. With most of their forces being tied up with New Guinea operations, the Japanese would struggle in stopping any SOPAC invasion or subsequent push further up the Solomons.

IMO, same final result, just on a different day.

I respectfully disagree. I think that a chastened USN / USMC may keep an even tighter reign on limited resources. "MacArthur's Navy" produced enough political friction with the USN as it was. It's hard to see him being given free reign with *more* resources that are harder to come by if the USN / USMC was making do with less in SOPAC.

If the MarDiv was wiped out on Guadalcanal, it's not impossible to see an abandonment of the "up the island chain" approach on the Solomons in favor of something else. A renewed focus on the Gilberts, perhaps. An earlier invasion of the Marianas maybe. A return to the Solomons may have been removed from the options, IMO.
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