Struggling in the East - SigUp vs. loki

[jwolf]

Very cool tables and charts.  I loved the big map.

Good luck surviving the winter and preparing for the offensive again in 1942.

[STEF78]

Superb graphics and map

Armaments are german or global?

If they are german, your opponent should be more agressive or he will pay the price when may comes

[SigUp]

Pool numbers are all German.

[Gabriel B.]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

A quick question, should I leave the He-111 H4 on the current version, upgrade them to H6, or just convert them all to Ju-88s now that a new version is available.

I say, leave them on H4, the improvement is not enough to justify the experience loss.
Several very good bomber groups withdraw in 1941, while the replacement groups experience is the low 70 , high 60 .

[SigUp]

Turn 29: 1st January 1942 - 7th January 1942



After the Soviet breakthrough in the area of 4th Panzer Army in the last week of 1941 Hoth reacted to this development by ordering his units to retreat into hedgehog positions along the frontline. Thereby the German positions should be strenghtened through a higher concentration of troops, while possible Soviet incursion attempts were to be dealt with by counterattacks. At the same time Hoth ordered LVI. AK (mot.) and XXXX. AK (mot.) to exakt a punishment operation against the Soviet 52nd Army northeast of Povarovo. On 3rd January the units were ready, among them 2nd, 5th and 8th Panzer Division, along with SS Totenkopf. The infantry support was provided by 206th Infantry Division. After a heavy airstrike the German mobile units quickly overran the lines of the three Soviet rifle divisions, forcing them to retreat under heavy losses.

Further south along the Oka at Peremyshl 4th Army with support of Guderian's panzers launched a counterattack against the exposed 1st Shock Army and 10th Army. Surprised and exhausted the Red Army divisions were pushed back along a 30-miles' wide front. Shocked, STAVKA ordered the offensive halted in this area and declined upon re-establishing contact with the German forces. North of Orel the Soviet winter offensive was also losing steam with the Germans concentrating their forces in an attempt to deny the breakthrough into the open fields east of Bryansk.

South of Orel meanwhile the German XXXXVI. AK (mot.) relentlessly intervened in order to aid the retreating infantry forces. Having rested an entire month the corps struck upon the hapless Soviet divisions camping in the open fields of Central Russia and drove them back 20 miles. Aided was this operation by counterattacks from 2nd Panzer Army's XXXXVII. AK (mot.). However, the danger was still very much present, when on 6th January the Soviet 50th Army reached the outskirts of Orel, threatning to push into the space between Orel and Kursk. In order to save Orel von Bock began with the planning of Operation Wagon Fort, which should put the Germans in a prime position to hold Orel using counterattacks as the primary means.



Although it demanded the highest attention, Orel wasn't the only worrisome area of the German front. East of Kursk Soviet pursuit forces heavily pressured 6th Army's rearguard, causing von Reichenau to worry that his XXIX. AK would arrive in too bad a shape to hold the defensive works that were prepared between Kursk and Kharkov. Therefore von Rundstedt authorised giving up Stary and Novy Oskol, sending XIV. AK (mot.) into the Kursk area to prepare for a counterstroke. With a functioning rail line connecting Kharkov and Kursk the redeployment of 9th Panzer Division and SS Wiking was completed by 7th January.

On 2nd January meanwhile the German XXXXVIII. AK (mot.) began their relief operation in eastern Ukraine to stop the bleeding that had occured after the Romanian collapse between Lutugino and Sverdlovsk in the last December week. Spearheaded by 11th and 16th Panzer Division made quick work of the Soviet 54th and 60th Army which were intent on pushing into the gap. Badly mauled, both armies refrained from further attempts to exploit the gap. Encouraged by the success further north, 11th Army around Rostov launched a scouting operation over the frozen Don. East of Bataysk 113th Infantry Division and the elite 22nd Airlanding Division routed the Soviet 127th Rifle Division, which was caught unprepared by the German incursion.

[Gabriel B.]

Solid performance so far , just make sure you do not exhaust your troops by counterattaking too much, it is a long winter after all,
and march should be the time for payback .

[SigUp]

Turn 30: 8th January 1942 - 14th January 1942

The second January week of 1942 saw fighting entirely dying off in the Moscow sector. Stifled by tough German defenses STAVKA halted the offensive and earnest discusions were raging within the highest Soviet circles on how to conduct further operations in this critical sector. Seeing the lack of Red Army activity Hitler already declared the lines secure and ordered von Kluge to refuse any requests by 3rd Panzer, 4th Panzer, 9th and 4th Armies for reinforcements.



While the fighting stopped north of the Ula, south of it the struggle continued on. With Soviet units crossing the Oka and reaching the outskirts of Orel 2nd Panzer Army and XXXXVI. AK (mot.) continued their relentless counterattacks in order to keep Orel safe. North of Mcensk a swift strike by XXIV. AK (mot.) routed three Soviet rifle divisions, inflicting over 5.000 men losses. Just outside of Orel a collection of two infantry divisions under various commands, as well as a mountain division pounced on the exposed 10th Cavalry Corps of 50th Army, as XXXXVI. AK (mot.) employed a hit and run tactic against 2nd and 5th Cavalry Corps. Having identified the cavalry corps as main drivers of the Soviet offensive in that sector, Guderian and Vietinghoff were determined to punish them as often and as hard as they could.

The Soviets, however, were still chugging along. While XXIV. AK (mot.) counterattacked near Mcensk, 2nd Shock Army hit IX. AK's position which was supported by 13th Panzer Division. Despite nominally massively outclassed the Soviets managed to squeeze the Germans out of their positions. This attack was supported by a strike of 1st Shock Army against VII. AK, establishing a firm bridgehead over the Oka. South of Kursk meanwhile a company of two cavalry corps and a tank brigade dashed forward and pressured 6th Army's retreating divisions.

Looking past the combat, a German FBD reached Dzhankoy. And despite being preoccupied with the defense of Kaluga the commander of 3rd Panzer Army Erich von Manstein received a secret order from von Kluge to prepare an offensive codenamed "Störfang", with the target date being 1st March.

[SigUp]

Turn 31-32: 15th January 1942 - 28th January 1942

Having recognised the weakness of the overstretched Soviet troops at Orel, Guderian launched a massive counterattack to secure German hold on Orel. On 15th January 1942 2nd Panzer Army's divisions, supported by detachments of 2nd Army, moved out along a 50 miles wide front. Centred was this attack around 17th and 18th Panzer Division of XXXXVII. AK (mot.), which pushed into the seam between Bryansk Front's 28th and 50th Army. Following an opening bombardment II. Fliegerkorps both panzer divisions quickly gained ground on 50th Army's spearhead, the 8th and 10th Cavalry Corps. Surprised by this development both corps quickly fell back and were overrun by the German panzers. By the morning of the 18th January they had been routed while losing over 3.000 men. Next, both panzer divisions swung northeast and began separating 28th Army from its southern neighbour. Exhausted from the tough blizzard fight against the two cavalry corps the divisions were not able to gain ground as quickly as before and the Soviet divisions retreated in orderly fashion. XXXXVII. AK (mot.) northern flank was covered by supporting attacks from 29th Motorised, 60th Motorised, 31st Infantry, 45th Infantry, 183rd Infantry and 258th Infantry Division. Launched on 17th January they caught the Soviet staff in the midst of the chaotic days of XXXXVII. AK's rapid advance and badly mauled 28th Army, pushing it to the banks of the frozen Zusha.

South of Orel a largely infantry led attack struck 34th Army's 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps. Beginning 16th January 4th Mountain Division, supported by 34th Infantry, 52nd Infantry and 260th Infantry Division gradually pushed the Soviets back. A last attempt to stop the German advance was thwarted when XXXXVI. AK (mot.) flanked the Soviet units and pushed them to the Northeast.

Shocked by the strength of 2nd Panzer Army's attacks the Soviet leadership ordered a pull-out of nearly all units standing west of the Oka and Zusha, but not before using their cavalry corps for a last hit-and-run attack on Leibstandarte, 4th Mountain and 260th Infantry Division.



The high-spirited atmosphere on the German side didn't last long, however. Unnoticed by German reconnaissance the Soviets built up their strength for a strike at the German positions west and northwest of Moscow. On 23rd January Northwest Front's 52nd and 55th Army struck at the unsuspecting V. AK and managed to score several breaches in the German defenses. Despite admirable resistance the divisions were unable to seal the frontlines and had to be taken back three days later. At the Moskva meanwhile 21st and 23rd Army assaulted the front of VIII. AK. Similarly the Germans were caught unprepared and had to retreat following days of tough fighting.

These successes exposed several German divisions to a severe threat. 5th Panzer Division and 2nd SS Motorised Brigade at Klin were now surround to three sides by Soviet units, while the entire XXIII. AK and SS Totenkopf lost connection to neighbouring German units. Adding to that the Soviets dropped an airborne brigade west of the Lama to hinder German reinforcements and bring chaos to the rearguard, successfully causing multiple headquarters to hastily retreat.

[SigUp]

Turn 33: 29th January 1942 - 4th February 1942

In the first February week of 1942 the Soviet offensive in the Moscow region continued. Near Kalinin a massed attack by 22nd Army struck at 18th Army's 6th Infantry Division. The German units held off the initial five division attack for four days, before the division was forced back by a flanking maneuver launched by 10th Tank Brigade.

During the same time Army Group Centre's positions around Klin were turning untenable. The Soviet 15th Tank Brigade pushed into the 20 mile gap that had opened up between Army Group Centre and North, placing itself between the divisions at Klin and the Lama. Likewise Povarovo also experienced severe pressure. Just south of the city 29th and 30th Army managed to push back XXIII. AK after six days of tough fighting, leaving Povarovo exposed to three sides. A Soviet attempt to clear the retreating divisions failed, leaving the Germans with a small corridor to the city. Facing this crises Hoth threw most mobile units of his 4th Panzer Army into the fight, counterattack exposed Soviet units and backing up the battered infantry.

3rd Panzer Army's lines north of Kaluga was also attacked by a mass of Red Army divisions. Successful attacks by 3rd and 20th Army pushed the Germans back to their secondary defense line. Not even the intervention by 20th Panzer Division was able to stem the tide. However, von Manstein wasn't troubled by this development since the secondary defense line provided enough protection to repel any further incursions.

A week after surprising the Germans at Klin STAVKA managed to catch the Germans unprepared again. This time at the seam between 4th Army and 2nd Army, where 2nd Shock Army pushed over the Oka and established a solid bridgehead. It even succeeded in opening up a gap in the German lines, with a single tank brigade reaching the open fields in the German rear area. But with the majority of 2nd Panzer Army's mobile units recouping between Kirov and Bryansk, Guderian possessed more than enough elements to remedy the situation.



The Soviet offensives were not limited to Army Group Centre's front. At Vyzhny Volochek the Red Army massed forces to attack L. AK's lines, successfully pushing back the SS Polizei Division. Likewise in the south Caucausus Front's 37th and 40th Army lunged at the German-Rumanian lines 40 miles north of Rostov, forcing 161st Infantry Division and the 8th and 18th Rumanian divisions to retreat.

[SigUp]

Turn 34: 5th February 1942 - 11th February 1942

With German reserves committed near Istra the Soviet High Command ordered their units at Klin to assault 4th Panzer Army's positions around the city. Following two bombardment waves four divisions of 52nd and 55th Army attacked in the early morning hours of the 5th February. This first wave was quickly repelled by the German forces, who lost only 400 men compared to over 2.700 for the Soviets. However, this success was short-lived, as two days later the entirety of 55th Army, supported by two fresh divisions of 52nd Army pressured the German forces. Unable to cope with the onslaught 106th Infantry Division began to crack, opening up a small hole south of Klin. Faced with the possibility of encirclement Ferdinand Schaal ordered 5th Panzer Division and 2nd SS Motorised Brigade to evacuate the city.

While losing Klin was a big blow, situation was somewhat remedied by the successful counterattacks of German armoured forces at Istra. A total of six rifle divisions were routed with Soviet losses amounting to over 9.000 men, badly mauling 29th and 30th Army.

Similar success was achieved by 2nd Panzer Army's counterstroke at the seam of 2nd Army and 4th Army. The entire bridgehead held by 1st Shock and 24th Army was eliminated, with another six divisions routed.



After pushing away 18th Army's SS Polizei Division away from the river Msta the Soviet concentration up north shifted towards 16th Army's 96th Infantry Division. With a 5:1 superiority in terms of manpower 4th Shock Army succeeded in punching a 10 miles wide hole into the German lines.

Following Caucasus Front's success against a German-Rumanian held position north of Rostov during the first February week a swift counterattack led by XXXXVIII. AK (mot.) and 22nd Airlanding Division shifted from Rostov quickly turned the situation around. Beginning 6th February 11th and 16th Panzer Division quickly penetrated the Soviet lines and by the 8th the Soviets were pushed behind the initial frontline. Seeing the futility of further offensive operations in that region, STAVKA ordered a general fallback between the Don in the northeast and east, while the divisions south of Rostov were taken back to the Veya. Voroshilovgrad, one of the initial liberations of the winter offensive, was evacuated on 11th February. With German forces not expecting this development, the retreat went forth unhindered, creating a massive no-man's-land between the two adversaries.

[SigUp]

Turn 35-37: 12th February 1942 - 4th March 1942

In the last three weeks of February all eyes were focused on the Kalinin - Mozhaysk sector, where the Soviet offensive picked up steam and pushed the German frontline units to the brink. Spotting holes in the German lines between the three divisions holding Povarovo and the main forces to the west the Soviet armies wasted no time in infiltrating the German lines, isolating 87th and 206th Infantry Division, as well as SS Totenkopf. A massed attack by nine rifle divisions of 48th and 30th Army to rout the German units, however, failed badly as the Soviets lost 4,600 men to only 296 German losses. Further to the north at Kalinin the German 26th Infantry Division west of the city was pushed away by a determined Soviet strike and the 10th Tank Brigade moved in to encircle 6th and 294th Infantry Division holding the city.



Facing this severe crisis the commander of 4th Panzer Army, Hermann Hoth, showed remarkable resolution, as he calmly assembled a relief force for both forces. On 20th February XXXX. and XXXXI. AK (mot.) began with the operation to save the troops trapped in Povarovo. Spearheaded by the fresh 1st Panzer Division the Germans quickly gained ground and by the end of the following day the lines of communication had been reestablished. The Soviets, however, were determined to recapture Povarovo and two days later over 160,000 men pressured the German forces into a hasty rout out of the city.

Meanwhile the second panzer division of XXXXI. AK (mot.) struck at the Soviet rifle divisions southeast of Kalinin. Coupled with an infantry attack against 10th Tank Brigade the two divisions in Kalinin were freed on the 22nd February, but 26th Infantry Division once again was unable to repel a Soviet counterstroke and Kalinin was once again cut off.



A furious Hitler demanded swift countermeasures to remedy these setbacks. Hoth, fully aware that Povarovo was out of German reach, convinced the Führer that in the current climate only limited attacks could be conducted. On 27th February XXXX. AK (mot.) led an assault supported by elements of XXXXI. and LVI. AK (mot.) and successfully pushed the Soviets back 10 miles and ensured the security of the west bank of the Lama. Hoth was in position to conduct his counterattack because Georg von Küchler's 18th Army was able to restore the supply lines to Kalinin by themselves. With only 10th Tank Brigade guarding the corridor VI. AK quickly overran the Soviet forces and Kalinin was free once more. While a Soviet counterattack again pushed 26th Infantry Division over the Volga, the fierce resistance by the Germans, in addition to the warming of the weather, convinced the Soviet staff that further attempts to recapture the important rail hub was futile and refused to reestablish the encirclement.

[jwolf]

ORIGINAL: SigUp
AK quickly overran the Soviet forces and Kalinin was free once more.

That's an ironic use of "free" for sure. I'm interested to see what happens after the long mud season. Good luck!

[SigUp]

Turn 38: 5th March 1942 - 11th March 1942

As March arrived the weather conditions improved significantly, restoring mobility and readiness to the battered German units. In the Kalinin - Klin sector the Soviets launched one last successful local attack and pushed out 106th and 268th Infantry Division out of the forest north of Klin. Other than that the fighting in this sector ended, as both sides were too exhausted to launch a significant offensive.



In the meantime the capturing of the southern bank of the Don at Rostov lead to a restructuring of the German command structure in the Centre and South. Von Rundstedt's Army Group South was split into two separate army groups. 11th Army, together with the 3rd and 4th Rumanian Army formed Army Group A under von Rundstedt, while 1st Panzer Army, 17th Army and 6th Army came under the command von Wilhelm List's Army Group B. In order to simplify Army Group Centre's duties and provide a clearer command and control for the upcoming Unternehmen Schneehase Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army was reassigned to this new army group.

Unternehmen Schneehase was the codename for a limited German offensive that aimed primarily at the capture of the rail junction of Yelets. Secondary objective was the regaining of a front line closer or at the Don between Khokhol and Tikhaya Sosna. Due to the bad condition of the infantry this operation was to be carried by the armoured forces of Guderian and von Kleist. In the week leading up to the 12th March Guderian massed three motorised corps (III., XXIV., XXXXVII.) with five panzer divisions and four motorised divisions on the land bridge between Zusha and Sosna. These divisions were to break the Soviet line at Verkhovye before swinging south towards Sosna / Yelets. The southern wing likewise consisted of three motorised corps (XIV., XXXXVI., XXXXVIII.), possessing four panzer divisions, four motorised divisions (among them three SS), Regiment Großdeutschland and the Slovak mobile division. Von Kleist's troops were tasked with attacking between Gorshechnoe and Kastornoe in an eastward direction. After reaching Khokhol the plan was for the divisions to attack in direction of Yelets and Sosna and in the ideal case linking up with 2nd Panzer Army to encircle the Soviet units standing at the Olym.



While in the centre the offensive was still in preparation, the Germans launched Unternehmen Störfang, the assault on Sevastopol, on 5th March 1942. Störfang had been prepared for since late December / early January, beginning with the extension of the rail repairs towards Simferopol. As leader for this operation the talented Erich von Manstein, commander of 3rd Panzer Army, was chosen. Final preparations were finished in late February, as XXXIV. AK was placed under 17th Army while the I. and XX. AK, which took down Leningrad back in Summer 1941, were railed in from their resting quarters in East Prussia. Furthermore the Rumanian airforce constantly bombared the Soviet divisions near Sevastopol, before reinforced by Kurt Pflugbeil's IV. Fliegerkorps.

With eight infantry divisions ready the Germans struck in the early morning hours of 5th March. Preceded by heavy bombardments of IV. Fliegerkorps and the Rumanians the entirety of I. and XX. AK assaulted the Soviet trenches in the hills 20 miles southwest of Simferopol. Main driver of the assault was 21st Infantry Division. While XX. AK occupied the Soviet forces in their left flank, the divisions of I. AK broke the Soviet lines by 9th March. A last ditch attempt by 175th Rifle Division in reserve to restore the lines by counterattacking the German forces was easily repelled. One day later the Germans had closed in within ten miles of Balaklava and reached the outer defenses of the fortress area Sevastopol.

[SigUp]

Turn 39: 12th March 1942 - 18th March 1942

When the weather cleared up on 12th March 1942 the German offensive "Schneehase" was initiated by the first decisive committment of the Luftwaffe in 1942. Supported by Ju-88s from II. Fliegerkorps Guderian's divisions pounded the Soviet 19th Army and carved up a hole of 40 miles length. With von Mackensen's III. AK (mot.) as spearhead drove 30 miles into Soviet-held territory and closed within 20 miles of the rail junction at Yelets. In this process the German divisions were very careful in maintaining close contact with each other in order to deter Soviet counterattacks.

In the meantime von Kleist's panzers swung south of the Olym and advanced on a broad front. Facing well dug-in Soviet units at the initial point of contact von Kleist made sure that his units proceeded to attack very carefully and by the end of the week reconaissance forces reached the outskirts of the first objective Khokhol. The Soviets, however, made sure that the German troops heeded the advice of their commanders, when a limited attack by a cavalry corps forced 134th Infantry Division to give up the freshly reconquered town of Studenyj.



On the Crimea the German Sevastopol offensive continued unabated. On 13th March Model's I. AK launched a surprise attack against Coastal Army's 296th Rifle Division. Not expecting a German attack without prior Luftwaffe bombardment the Soviets quickly collapsed and two days later the first line of the Sevastopol fortress was in German hands. After Model's divisions secured the forest northeast of Sevastopol they began supporting XX. AK's attack on the fortified position held by three Soviet divisions in the vicinity of Balaklava. Following three days of tough fights the Soviets gave in and retreated into Sevastopol. The Germans, however, were unable to prevent 156th, 165th and 176th Rifle Division from successfully pulling out of the Crimean mountains and setting up right at the coast. Nevertheless by the 18th March Sevastopol harbour lay in range of German medium artillery.

[SigUp]

Turn 40: 19th March 1942 - 25th March 1942

As the entire theatre north of Orel settled into a balance the German offensive near Yelets continued for the second week. After surveying the map following the intial success Guderian saw the chance of an encirclement of the Russian forces at the Olym, provided the goal of capturing the rail junction Yelets were to be given up. After meeting with GFM Wilhelm List and Ewald von Kleist in Poltava on 18th March it was decided that beginning the next day 2nd Panzer Army would swing southeast over the frozen Sosna and head for Delgorukovo, where it would meet up with von Kleist's divisions coming from Khokhol.

The biggest hurdle for the northern wing was the presence of two Soviet cavalry corps of 34th Army entrenched on the northern bank of the Sosna. In order to get them out of the way a collection of various divisions of 2nd Panzer Army attacked the positions of 26th Army on the flanks of the two cavalry corps and after two days of fighting was able to dislodge them. With the flanks open the follow up attack by XXXXVII. AK (mot.) routed the Soviet units and two panzer divisions of III. AK (mot.) reached Delgorukovo on the evening of the 23rd March. The link-up with von Kleist's XIV. AK (mot.) was completed the following day, after 1st Panzer Army had successfully beaten elements of 5th and 50th Army. In the resulting Olym pocket seven rifle divisions and one cavalry corps were trapped - the first major success of 1942.

While the panzers punched their way through Soviet resistance, 6th Army south of them reclaimed the territory lost in January and the Oskol river line along with Stary and Novy Oskol.



In front of Sevastopol von Manstein, after two days of rest, continued the operation to squeeze the Soviets into the city of Sevastopol itself. On 21st March three divisions of I. and XX. AK assaulted the coastal position near Balaklava and routed the three Soviet divisions that had barely avoided encirclement the week before. Despite the urgent need to capture Sevastopol before the spring thaw set in, von Manstein gave his units another few days of rest and positioned his forces for the all-out assault against Sevastopol, while heavy siege guns began their destructive work.

[Remmes]

Great AAR. Reads like a book. Nice work on the maps and graphics as well. Thanks for posting!

[swkuh]

+1, very well done...

[SigUp]

Winter Report 1941/1942

In early April 1942 rainfall and thaw turned to fields of Russia into a basin of mud, putting an end to five months of unabated warfare south of Kalinin. The Germans scored the last successes of the winter campaign, when they successfully eliminated the Olym pocket and captured Sevastopol.

Von Manstein's final attack began on 26th March with a heavy artillery and Luftwaffe assault. Over 1.000 guns and 110 bombers ravaged the Soviet lines in a span of three hours, after heavy siege artillery spent the entire previous week softening the forts. For two days the Soviet defenders heroically held the lines, before 12th Infantry Division of XX. AK captured Maxim Gorki I, giving 30th Infantry Division a clear path to Bartenyevka and on the evening of 28th March the Germans had reached Severnaya Bay. In the Southeast Model's I. AK struggled against 276th and 413th Rifle Division defending the Sapun Ridge. Wanting to finish off Sevastopol before the April rainfalls von Manstein ordered XX. AK to cross Severnaya Bay on 29th March and reinforced I. AK with LIV. AK's 170th Infantry Division and additional StuG battalions. After the successful crossing of XX. AK the Soviet position at the Sapun Ridge became untenable and the Soviet will was broken. The divisions of Coastal Army flooded towards Cape Khersones, where ships of the Black Sea Fleet were hastily evacuating as many troops as possible. By 1st April the proximity of the German forces and Luftwaffe intervention forced the Soviets to abandon the operation and 413th Rifle Division which had covered the evacuation surrendered, with some elements escaping into the hills to continue the fight as partisans.


Frontline 4th December 1941 dashed, 2nd April 1942 dotted

OOB - 2nd April 1942

Heeresgruppe Nord (v. Leeb)

16. Armee (Busch) - 163.476 men, 2.176 guns, 26 AFVs
II. AK (v. Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt) - 5 infantry divisions
X. AK (Hansen) - 4 infantry divisions
LI. AK (Reinhard) - 4 infantry divisions

18. Armee (v. Küchler) - 202.641 men, 2.270 guns
VI. AK (Kleffel) - 3 infantry divisions
XXVI. AK (Wodrig) - 3 infantry divisions
XXVIII. AK (v. Wiktorin) - 3 infantry divisions
L. AK (Lindemann) - 3 infantry divisions

4. Panzerarmee (Hoth) - 210.045 men, 2.312 guns, 1.056 AFVs
V. AK (Ruoff) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXX. AK (mot.) (Schaal) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 SS brigade
XXXXI. AK (mot.) (Reinhardt) - 3 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division
LVI. AK (mot.) (Kirchner) - 1 panzer division, 1 motorised division, 1 SS division

Heeresgruppe Mitte (v. Bock)

2. Armee (v. Weichs) - 176.650 men, 1.937 guns, 62 AFVs
8. SS-K.B.
XII. AK (Marcks) - 4 infantry divisions
XIII. AK (Angelis) - 4 infantry divisions
XXXV. AK (Kämpfe) - 3 infantry divisions

4. Armee (v. Sodenstern)[1] - 231.464 men, 2.630 guns, 22 AFVs
VII. AK (Fahrmbacher) - 2 infantry divisions, 1 mountain division
IX. AK (Hell) - 4 infantry divisions
XXXXIII. AK (Rendulic) - 3 infantry divisions
LIII. AK (v. Tippelskirch) - 4 infantry divisions

9. Armee (Felber)[2] - 199.707 men, 2.208 guns, 50 AFVs
VIII. AK (Heitz) - 4 infantry divisions
XXIII. AK (Stemmermann) - 4 infantry divisions
XXXXII. AK (Mieth) - 4 infantry divisions

3. Panzerarmee (Koch) - 187.817 men, 2.027 guns, 706 AFVs
XXXVIII. AK (Strecker) - 3 infantry divisions, 1 mountain division
XXXIX. AK (mot.) (Schmidt) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division, 1 motorised brigade
LVII. AK (mot.) (v. Arnim) - 2 panzer divisons, 2 motorised divisions

Heeresgruppe A (v. Rundstedt)

11. Armee (v. Manstein) - 122.376 men, 1.312 guns, 21 AFVs
XXX. AK (v. Salmuth) - 2 infantry divisions, 1 airlanding division
LIV. AK (Hansen) - 3 infantry divisions

Armata 3 (Dumitrescu)[3] - 194.909 men, 2.103 guns, 111 AFVs
Corp. 1 (Ionescu) - 4 infantry divisions
Corp. 4 (Sanatescu) - 4 infantry divisions
Corp. de Munte (Avramescu) - 2 mountain divisions, 1 mountain brigade
Corp. de Cav. (Racovita) - 3 cavalry divisions, 1 armoured division

Armata 4 (Ciuperca) - 190.315 men, 2.021 guns, 4 AFVs
Corp. 2 (Macici) - 3 infantry divisions
Corp. 3 (Atanasiu) - 3 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division
Corp. 5 (Levanti) - 3 infantry divisions
Corp. 11 (Constantinescu-Claps) - 1 infantry division, 2 infantry brigades

Heeresgruppe B (List)

6. Armee (v. Reichenau) - 216.878 men, 2.423 guns, 1 AFV
XXIX. AK (v. Obstfelder) - 4 infantry divisions
XXXIV. AK (Tiemann) - 3 infantry divisions
LII. AK (v. Briesen) - 4 infantry divisions
LV. AK (Vierow) - 2 infantry divisions, 1 Slovakian division

17. Armee (Hoepner) - 231.171 men, 2.653 guns, 48 AFVs
IV. AK (Geyer) - 4 infantry divisions
XI. AK (v. Kortzfleisch) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXIV. AK (Hollidt) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXXIX. GK (Konrad) - 4 infantry divisions

1. Panzerarmee (v. Kleist) - 241.562 men, 3.021 guns, 725 AFVs
XVII. AK (Schmidt) - 4 infantry divisions
XIV. AK (mot.) (v. Knobelsdorff) - 1 panzer division, 1 SS division, 1 Slovakian mobile division, 1 SS motorised brigade, Großdeutschland
XXXXVI. AK (mot.) (v. Vietinghoff) - 1 panzer division, 2 SS divisions
XXXXVIII. AK (mot.) (Kempf) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division

2. Panzerarmee (Guderian) - 190.273 men, 2.156 guns, 924 AFVs
III. AK (mot.) (v. Mackensen) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division
XXIV. AK (mot.) (v. Schweppenburg) - 1 panzer division, 2 motorised divisions, 1 infantry division
XXXXVII. AK (mot.) (Lemelsen) - 3 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division

Losses

After the tough winter campaign Axis losses rose to 1.333.839 men, 9.944 guns and 4.268 AFVs. The death count lay at 291.632 men, while 8.071 men were captured. The Soviets registered 3.373.712 men as total losses, with 393.202 dead and 1.746.249 captured. 45.839 guns and 17.237 AFVs were lost. Furthermore 174.915 vehicles were reported as destroyed.

The Luftwaffe on 2nd April reported 437 fighters, 124 fighter bombers, 238 tactical bombers, 713 level bombers, 639 reconaissance aircraft and 202 transport aircraft as missing. The VVS suffered losses in the region of 47 fighters, 8.185 fighter bombers, 1.016 tactical bombers, 2.581 level bombers, 189 reconaissance aircraft and 91 transports.

Reserves

On 2nd April German manpower reserves stood at 55.603 men with armament stocks at 288.943.

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[1] Heinrici was KIA
[2] Strauss was sacked
[3] Corp. 1/4 are resting in Rumania

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The Road to Blau

With Barbarossa having failed to complete the objective of defeating the Soviet Union in a single summer campaign, the German staffs began plannings for the 1942 summer offensive in February 1942, despite the ongoing Soviet winter offensive. Replacing von Brauchitsch with himself in December 1941, Hitler was interfering heavily into the planning process, to the annoyance of his Chief of Staff von Kluge. Contrary to all military planners the Führer demanded a push into the Caucasus to secure the oil fields of Maykop, Grozny and Baku. Realising the logistical impossibility and military worthlessness of this endeavour, von Kluge spent much of the month trying to convince Hitler of his cause. Finally during a meeting on 3rd March, after enlisting the support of the new Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer in regard to economical matters, was von Kluge able to change the Führer's mind.

However, the military leadership of the Eastern Army itself was still split on which road to take. When he began the planning process, von Kluge ordered the staffs or Army Group Centre, Army Group B and Army Group A to present him three operation plans for the summer offensive. The only specification given by him was the requirement, that the offensive be limited on the frontage of a single army group, since the Heer in the east had been badly mauled by the developments since June 1941. When the winter campaign concluded in the first week of April, only 20 of the 120 German infantry divisions in the Soviet Union fulfilled the requirements for the consideration of being fit for offensive operations.

The plan of Army Group Centre argued for Moscow as the central lynchpin of the Soviet state, which should be captured as quickly as possible. For that 9th Army, 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Panzer Army would push from the north against the Moskva-Volga Canal, before swinging south towards Noginsk in the rear of the Soviet capital. To complement this northern wing 4th Army, 1st Panzer Army and 2nd Panzer Army were to attack along the Oka in the general direction of Ramenskoe. Despite the obvious lure of Moscow, von Kluge rejected this plan, arguing that the terrain of this area was not suited for extensive panzer operations. Together with the fact that the Soviets were already working on fortifying this area since 1941, he expected a battle of trench warfare and attrition for which the Wehrmacht wasn't suited.

Army Group B's plan likewise targeted Moscow. But unlike Army Group Centre, it's staff devised an indirect method of capture. In the first stage the German armies were to force a decisive battle of destruction near Tula, where most of the Red Army's elite formations were located. After having destroyed the Soviet forces, the German panzer armies were to combine into a powerful armoured fist, that opened up Moscow from the direction of Kolomna. After deliberations, von Kluge likewise rejected this plan. As the former commander of 4th Army, von Kluge knew very well how well-fortified the Tula area was and he assessed it as too risky exposing the precious German formations to punishing counterattacks in the open fields of Central Russia.

Therefore in the end Army Group A's plan was accepted. Unlike the former plans, von Rundstedt's staff targeted the Red Army above everything else. Behind closed doors many German officers realised the impossibility of enforcing a total victory against the Soviet Union and Army Group A's plan was the extension of this attitude. Instead of total victory, the target was a piecemeal destruction of the Red Army, thereby robbing Stalin of the will to continue the fight and agree to favourable peace terms with the Reich. Analysing the deployment of the Soviet forces the army group staff came to the conclusion that launching an offensive between Chernaya Kalitva and Donets was the most promising proposition. The area there wasn't well-developed in depth and the frontline was held mostly by a single division covering 10 miles of front. A breakthrough near Rovenki and Kamensk, linking up between Millerovo and Chertkovo had the chance of encircling about 15 Soviet divisions, while ripping a 100 miles' wide gap into the Soviet lines. Afterwards the German formations were to cross the Don at Boguchar, placing themselves in the rear of the Soviet Don armies, with a chance to destroy them by swinging back west against Svoboda - Voronezh.

With this starting point, OKH the proceeded to develop the plan in detail, while also planning various feints to keep Stavka off balance and believing that Tula would be the direct target. It wasn't until the last week prior to the launch of the offensive that the armoured formations were called into their deployment areas and on 24th June 1942, nearly exactly one year after Barbarossa, the German formations were ready to launch Clausewitz, the first part of Fall Blau, the long-awaited summer offensive of 1942.


Fall Blau (later Unternehmen Braunschweig): Phase 1 Clausewitz in black; Phase 2 Dampfhammer in grey


Deployment of the opposing forces on 25th June 1942

OOB

Heeresgruppe B (List)

6. Armee (von Reichenau) - 240.188 men, 2.689 guns
XVII. AK (Schmidt) - 4 infantry divisions
XXIX. AK (Obstfelder) - 4 infantry divisions
XXXXIV. AK (Tiemann) - 3 infantry divisions
LV. AK (Vierow) - 4 infantry divisions

1. Panzerarmee (von Kleist) - 203.351 men, 2.332 guns, 1.330 AFVs
XIV. PzK (von Knobelsdorff) - 1 panzer division, 1 SS motorised division, 1 Slovak mobile division, 1 SS motorised brigade, Großdeutschland
XXXXVI. PzK (von Vietinghoff) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 SS motorised division
XXXXVIII. PzK (Kempf) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division, 1 SS motorised division

2. Panzerarmee (Guderian) - 254.498 men, 2.608 guns, 1.415 AFVs
XXVII. AK (Weiss) - 4 infantry divisions (formerly XX. AK)
III. PzK (von Mackensen) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division
XXIV. PzK (von Schweppenburg) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division
XXXXVII. PzK (Lemelsen) - 2 panzer divisions, 2 motorised division

Heeresgruppe A (von Rundstedt) - only participating units

17. Armee (Hoepner) - 234.417 men, 2.469 guns, 12 AFVs
IV. AK (Geyer) - 4 infantry divisions
XXXXIX. GK (Konrad) - 4 infantry divisions
LII. AK (von Briesen) - 5 infantry divisions
22. Luftlande-Division

3. Panzerarmee (von Manstein) - 258.231 men, 2.699 guns, 995 AFVs
XI. AK (v. Kortzfleisch) - 4 infantry divisions
LIX. AK (Model) - 4 infantry divisions (formerly I. AK)
XXXIX. PzK (Schmidt) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division
LVII. PzK (von Arnim) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorised division

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