Evacuation TF/Allies

[LargeSlowTarget]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

Some factual errors here.


A "few" men is what, 8? Certainly not 50.

Sorry for not being more precise. When I say a "few men" or a "few squads" I am thinking about platoon size so 30-40 people.

The subs in question largely evacuated children and nuns. Not a lot of combat gear involved. And the stability issue does not arise with subs. Nor were nuns put ashore in a combat landing that required small craft.

They also evacuated pilots, staffer and specialists like the CAST codebreakers and President Quezon and family plus government officials. Of course without much combat gear. Combat troops stayed to defend Bataan in accordance with pre-war planning - but in theory combat troops could have been evacuated just as well since there isn't much difference between the body of a REMF and a frontline fighting man (well, some REMFS may take a bit more space). The Brits didn't evacuate much combat gear either from Dunkirk, no? And once more - we are not talking combat landing but evacuation. Any small craft required for evacs could come from local boat pools and ships's boats, rubber dinghys, rafts etc.

25 is less than 1/3 of their regular crew.

The Salmon/Sargo class subs of the Asiatic Fleet had a crew of 59. 25 additional people are 42% of regular crew. Neither 50% nor 33%, so I concede you half a point.

Crapping is not resource-constrained. Sea water to flush. Product sent over the side, not tanked.

I was not thinking about flush water, more about the a$$-to-bowl ratio which put constraints on the number of people that can be carried. Some bright guys have calculated that x number of people require about y number of toilets. US intel used that ratio to estimate the size of Japanes garrisons on atolls by the number of outhouses built on stilts in the lagoons - but that is leading OT.

Could DDs store a few cases of small arms ammo in corners? Sure. But that's not what you're saying. Even one supply point is more than that.

The 90 tons carried by Lansdowne seem to have been more than just a few cases of small arms ammo. And the Japanese DDs each carried 150 troops plus combat gear and some supplies.

And if you believe what you say, why take away the capability on Date X? If they could tote a few cases of ammo early they still can late.

Again, the capability is for early war evacs, not mid-late war invasions. Loss of that capacity can be explained by the addition of more AA+ammo, radar, DCs etc. through upgrades and the resulting increased crew size, taking the deck/storage/berthing spaces that have been available before the upgrades for transport ops.

I don't know what you mean by "a few squads." A squad is 10-11 men. A few--4-5?--is 50 men. And yeah, that many would SEVERELY tax a WWII DD, particularly a WWI design, if aboard more than a day with no additional water or berthing capacity. Not to mention how to get them ashore.

Japanese DDs on Tokyo Express duty carried 150 men and got them ahore resp. evacuated them in Feb 43. Again, what could prevent Allied DDs from doing the same if really necessary? Ship design was more or less the same so no physical barriers here. Just because it was not necessary and thus was not done does not mean the Allies could not have done it if they had chosen to do so.

But well - I am not happy with a design decision so I changed it for my personal mod. You are not happy with my design decision - fine, simply don't use it. 'nough said.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

The subs in question largely evacuated children and nuns. Not a lot of combat gear involved. And the stability issue does not arise with subs. Nor were nuns put ashore in a combat landing that required small craft.

They also evacuated pilots, staffer and specialists like the CAST codebreakers and President Quezon and family plus government officials. Of course without much combat gear. Combat troops stayed to defend Bataan in accordance with pre-war planning - but in theory combat troops could have been evacuated just as well since there isn't much difference between the body of a REMF and a frontline fighting man (well, some REMFS may take a bit more space). The Brits didn't evacuate much combat gear either from Dunkirk, no? And once more - we are not talking combat landing but evacuation. Any small craft required for evacs could come from local boat pools and ships's boats, rubber dinghys, rafts etc.

This site http://www.valoratsea.com/sptrans.htm is a pretty good summary of USN submarine special missions. A few things can be observed:

1. Most missions weren't nuns and children. I was incorrect there. Some were. The ones widely reported of course.

2. Most missions did not occur in the early months, before the PI fell. I was actually surprised how many took place in 43-44. Most of them were to insert intel gatherers, UDTs, etc.

3. The missions by Argonaut, Narwhal, and Nautilus can be ignored for the purposes of this thread. They were fitted out for this mission, not thrown into it.

4. The list is not completely correct. For example, I found and read the actual patrol report of USS Permit, as I was amazed at the number reported--51 men evacced. In reality the patrol report cited 8 enlisted and 3 officers in the period named.

5. I read three patrol reports at random, two from the early, emergency days, and one, USS Angler, from later war. All of them are fairly silent on conditions on the boat relative to the passengers. Patrol report formats called for tactical data and other, useful data such as weather, nav aids, and ASW details. But there are some end-of-patrol data that can be used to imagine what conditions were like.

For example, the CO of USS Seawolf, in January 1942, received orders from Commander, Submarines, U.S. Asiatic Fleet to proceed to Corregidor with a load of AA ammo, and to bring out a full load of torpedoes from the Cavite magazine, as well as any passengers the local commander designated. To accomplish this he was required to unload all but eight of his own torpedoes, and his own gun ammo, and to load 40 tons of ammo. This was 179,000 rounds of .50 cal, and 73 3in AA shells. About enough for one air raid.

The CO did this under protest. He demanded and documented a CYA meeting with the Sub Group staff where he asked for specific instructions as to his duty to attack enemy shipping on the way. They waffled and tried to give him their own CYA answer, but he persisted. When he returned to the boat he briefed his XO as a witness.

He completed the inbound mission. On the trip in the boat grounded due to trim, wiping the sound heads, and saw and avoided dozens of potential targets. It took portions of three days plus Army personnel to complete the unloading and loading of eight torpedoes from shore. The boat had to leave, go out and dive to avoid air raids during the process. The local commander ordered passengers aboard. No number is given in the report; it is 1-line and never mentioned again. Possible security issue with the low classification of the patrol report, or perhaps something else. The site I cited above says 21 personnel, but it also says 23 torpedoes, and there were only eight.

The microfilm is missing Annex I and J which reported habitability and materiel defects.

The February mission of USS Seadragon does have habitability information. The CO reported that provisions were wholly inadequate for the patrol/evac. Much of the meat obtained from the tender, USS Holland, rotted, and the flour was found to be full of weevils. Additionally, lack of training and experience made the cooks stow too little raw food, and rationing was needed for most of the patrol.

The crew's health was reported as poor at the end of patrol. Vitamin deficiencies were reported, with pre-scurvy symptoms after three weeks. Multiple cases of diarrhea. One-third of the crew was food poisoned at one meal from bad meat. Extreme hot-bunking was needed due to passengers. All mattresses were thrown over the side due to unsanitary condition. In port 1/3 of the crew slept on deck or on the pier due to bunks having been removed at Cavite to make room.

Fresh water was precious. One aux. engine was devoted to making water while surfaced nearly every day and the main engines were often used as well.. Bathing was banned. A/C condensate was used to wash dishes. Per man per day ration was 5.5 gallons for all uses, including cooking.

The later-war mission of USS Angler in March 1944 involved picking up 58 civilians from Panay and transporting them to Darwin, a great distance. The number is never named in the patrol report; only mention of "the special mission" is found, presumably for classification reasons. Angler was bigger and more modern, but also had a larger crew of about 75.

The transit to Darwin took about two weeks. During the second-half of the patrol the potable water supply became contaminated and over 1/3 of the crew was unable to stand watch. In addition, the yeast supply was found to be unusable and there was no bread available. But in the finest traditions of the service, the CO reported, tersely, his Factors of Endurance: 20 torpedoes remaining, 9,000 gal. of fuel, and Zero (0) days provisions. The "Limiting Factor This Patrol" was . . . "Completion of special mission." As a former submarine supply officer I shudder at what zero days provisions would look like underway.

In general, reading the reports of many of these missions, they were a serious waste of resources. The early ones were morale-driven, the later ones often by a misunderstanding in senior non-submariner officers, of what submarines are good at. The paltry amounts of supplies delivered did not justify taking a prime fleet unit out of its offensive role.

25 is less than 1/3 of their regular crew.

The Salmon/Sargo class subs of the Asiatic Fleet had a crew of 59. 25 additional people are 42% of regular crew. Neither 50% nor 33%, so I concede you half a point.

As above, Gato was 75-80, Tench and Balao about the same.

Crapping is not resource-constrained. Sea water to flush. Product sent over the side, not tanked.

I was not thinking about flush water, more about the a$$-to-bowl ratio which put constraints on the number of people that can be carried. Some bright guys have calculated that x number of people require about y number of toilets. US intel used that ratio to estimate the size of Japanese garrisons on atolls by the number of outhouses built on stilts in the lagoons - but that is leading OT.

By direct observation I can report that crapping can be done very quickly if the COB posts a petty officer with a stopwatch at the head. And more than one man has pissed in the bilges while on watch. I myself once evacuated my bladder while hanging on the handles of #1 scope at PD. Didn't piss down the well, but rather in an empty milk jug.

Could DDs store a few cases of small arms ammo in corners? Sure. But that's not what you're saying. Even one supply point is more than that.

The 90 tons carried by Lansdowne seem to have been more than just a few cases of small arms ammo. And the Japanese DDs each carried 150 troops plus combat gear and some supplies.

90 tons isn't a lot. The 179,000 .50 cal. rounds was 72,585 pounds. A later patrol I read managed to carry 666 ammo boxes of assorted small arms ammo by sacrificing food stowage. A DD can carry more than a sub of course, but not a lot more unless they unload their own magazine volume or make the ship un-fightable.

Re the Japanese, it's 650 statute miles from Rabaul to Guadalcanal. At 25 kts. that's about a day. Troops could do that on canteens and no food, arriving starving but mobile. They'd be on the weather decks, making fighting he ship unfeasible. And the Slot was a relatively protected transit, not open sea. The weather decks would not be an option between island chains.

I don't know what you mean by "a few squads." A squad is 10-11 men. A few--4-5?--is 50 men. And yeah, that many would SEVERELY tax a WWII DD, particularly a WWI design, if aboard more than a day with no additional water or berthing capacity. Not to mention how to get them ashore.

Japanese DDs on Tokyo Express duty carried 150 men and got them ahore resp. evacuated them in Feb 43. Again, what could prevent Allied DDs from doing the same if really necessary? Ship design was more or less the same so no physical barriers here. Just because it was not necessary and thus was not done does not mean the Allies could not have done it if they had chosen to do so.

But well - I am not happy with a design decision so I changed it for my personal mod. You are not happy with my design decision - fine, simply don't use it. 'nough said.

As above, I thought more needed to be said. Your mod is of course your own. But claiming non-APD US DDs had any hope of being effective evac assets is unwarranted.

[LargeSlowTarget]

I am still not convinced. If the Japanese DDs can evac troops from Gudalcanal to Shortlands or Rabaul, the US DDs should be able to evac troops from Guadalcanal to Luganville or Noumea as well. And I am sure the evacuees prefered to endure temporary inconvenience caused by cramped conditions to the tender hospitality of a Japanese POW camp. Furthermore, the crews of Lady Lex, Yorktown, Wasp and Hornet etc. were not left swimming or had to wait for APDs to be picked up - their screen did evacuated them to Australia, Pearl and Noumea. But well, let's agree to disagree like gentlemen.

[pontiouspilot]

I can live with what the designers dreamed up, artificial as it is. The manual however seems lacking in explaining what Hal et.al pointed out to me, too late to help me.

[jmalter]

Doesn't the game-engine include randomized downgrading a transported LCU's stats (morale, disruption & fatigue, as well as unload damage)? I refer to the manual 6.2.3.5 - different ship-types used as transports have varied levels of downgrade, probably based on their ability to provide food, water & bunk-space to the embarked troops.

So if LargeSlowTarget has modded his fleet to give USN DDs a transport-capacity, those embarked LCU fragments will take serious hits the longer they stay at sea, & might take some months to fully recover after unloading.

Riding an AP, troops will transport over long distances in good shape. Riding an LST or APD, not so much.