IJA 5th Artillery Command (and more)

[el cid again]

While doing some geographic research, I discovered information on Japanese artillery organization on Okinawa.
This is stated to be "the first time in the Pacific War that artillery was under a unified command."
This is incorrect - the first time was at Bataan, when the First Artillery Command, under Maj Gen Keno Kitajima,
was effectively employed to break the back of the defenses. This force had approximately

4 30 cm Howitzer (Long)
8 24 Type 45 Howitzers
16 Type 10 cm Type 92 guns
48 Type 96 15 cm Howitzers
36 Type 95 Field Guns

On Okinawa, the Fifth Artillery command, under Maj Gen Wata Kojo, had approximately

24 32 cm Type 98 Spigot Mortars
8 24 cm Type 45 Howitzers
12 15 cm Type 89 Guns
52 15 cm Type 95 Howitzers
72 75 mm Type 95 Field Guns
33 naval guns - estimated to be
5 20 cm Type 41 CD Guns
14 14 cm Type 3 CD Guns
14 12 cm Type 3 CD Guns
as well as 70 Type 4 20 cm Rockets

In spite of the impression, gained from operational experience, that Japanese
artillery was always attached to infantry formations and never used remote
fire direction centers, this is incorrect. In fact, the IJA arguably had the finest
coast defense forts in the world (on Iki and Tsushima Islands and at Pusan, Korea).
Otherwise, IJA artillery not attached to units was all controlled by a single Artillery
Group. De facto, this amounted to an artillery division. In 1941 it was controlled
by three commands, one attached to 2nd Army, another to 3rd Army, and one
under direct command of Kwangtung Army. All were planned for an offensive
move into Amur Province North of Vladivostok. It was Kwangtung Army's command
which was sent to Luzon when the enemy did not surrender quickly as expected.
In IJA parlance, a "command" is a proper name, and more or less equates to
an artillery brigade. It is composed of battalions and regiments.

Apparently artillery in the Artillery Group could have its own number sequence.
IJA had several different ways to identify artillery units - names, a field artillery
sequence, an artillery group sequence, a horse artillery sequence. For example,
the 23rd Division's artillery regiment was the "13th Field Artillery of the Artillery
Group, and the 24th Division's artillery regiment was the "42nd Field Artillery of the
Artillery Group"Names might apply to a single unit, or to a group formed by a static
training division, in which case there was also a separate number sequence for regiments
formed at that location. [If it is Japanese, it is usually complicated!]

[Symon]

Bullshit. Kitajima Kineo's 1st Arty HQ was a simple collective HQ for Arty Bns (Sep) brought over from elsewhere.. It had a MG and 22 other officers. It did not include indigenous arty from Divs, Regts, or any other separate arty Bn assigned to 14th Army. It didn't even have the equivalent of a single Bty-D staff.

5th Artillery command was way functionally different. Even so, it only had 1st and 23rd Med, and 7th and 100th Hvy Arty and a mox of mortars. Army Arty was under connand, e.g., 42nd FA Regt, 44th IMB FA Regt, etc..

Yes. The first functional unified IJ artillery command in the Pac Theater.

[edit]I understand that your premise is that Japanese in not translatable, and that you and only you can do so. Butt.. over 70% of Senshi Sosho has been translated and resides in various University libraries, both here and elsewhere. A few of them are on the Internet, but most are not. Maybe that is why you dismiss any issues with your vaporings; because one can’t find the truth on the Internet.

You try hard, but your conclusions are non-sequitor. Think you might want to talk with some of the AE OOB people.

[el cid again]

Remarkably wrong.

Added to the local units, The First Artillery Command included the First Heavy Artillery Regiment (not to be confused with
the First Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, also present). Also the 3rd Independent Mountain Gun Regiment, the 8th Heavy
Field Artillery Regiment, the 9th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion, the 2nd Independent Heavy Artillery
Company, the 2nd Independent Mortar Battalion, and both the 14th and 15th Independent Mortar Battalions. ALL of them
not part of 14th Army. To these were added the (ad hoc) Field Gun Battalion of 65th Brigade (three companies of
regimental guns formed into a provisional battalion for the campaign), the 22nd Field Gun Regiment, and the 3rd
Battalion, 51st Mountain Gun Regiment, all borrowed from 14th Army units.

A nearly perfect contradiction of Symon's report. As for talking to AE OB people, I did talk to Joe Wilkerson,
spent some years specializing in ground orders of battle. 5th Artillery Command had rather more than he reports
(but possibly that information was not yet available when he wrote). As for lack of an FDC, I am not sure how
many people Symon thinks are needed to run one, but 22 officers plus a commander greatly exceed the number required.
As Kitajima was the leading artillery specialist, surely he organized one if it was needed. I would love to see
an order of battle detailed enough to show there was NOT such an organization. I bet there isn't one.

ORIGINAL: Symon

Bullshit. Kitajima Kineo's 1st Arty HQ was a simple collective HQ for Arty Bns (Sep) brought over from elsewhere.. It had a MG and 22 other officers. It did not include indigenous arty from Divs, Regts, or any other separate arty Bn assigned to 14th Army. It didn't even have the equivalent of a single Bty-D staff.

5th Artillery command was way functionally different. Even so, it only had 1st and 23rd Med, and 7th and 100th Hvy Arty and a mox of mortars. Army Arty was under connand, e.g., 42nd FA Regt, 44th IMB FA Regt, etc..

Yes. The first functional unified IJ artillery command in the Pac Theater.

[edit]I understand that your premise is that Japanese in not translatable, and that you and only you can do so. Butt.. over 70% of Senshi Sosho has been translated and resides in various University libraries, both here and elsewhere. A few of them are on the Internet, but most are not. Maybe that is why you dismiss any issues with your vaporings; because one can’t find the truth on the Internet.

You try hard, but your conclusions are non-sequitor. Think you might want to talk with some of the AE OOB people.

[el cid again]

Go to Neihorster's site and look up 23rd Army (at Hong Kong). You will find the
First Artillery Command is already deployed at the start of the Pacific War. Most
of the units in Scenario 1 are correct, or almost correct (unit size or weapon may
be wrong). However, notice in particular two symbols for artillery observation
and artillery fire direction centers. If First Artillery Command already had
an observation unit and a fire direction unit in December 1941, surely it had them
when it went to Bataan.

[el cid again]

More information keeps becoming available. As far as I know, official Japanese scholarship continues to add
volumes to the official history of WW2 - which long since went over 100 volumes. A German scholar has apparently
been able to render more of the start of war order of battle (and some other OBs) in greater detail than was
previously available.

When the Pacific War Begins (which is 8 December 1941, Tokyo time - the only time zone that makes sense for the
theater - and which was used theater wide by Japan) - there were already five Artillery Commands. Numbered
with every odd number from 1 to 9. Four of these were still in Manchukuo. But one of them was already forward
deployed - in South China. This was the First - the same one that a few months later is used to break the back
of resistance on Bataan.

It appears likely each of these commands (more or less a brigade - all were composed of regiments and battalions and,
rarely, independent companies) had a unit whose symbol means it had spotters and a fire direction center. It looks
like these were numbered 1 to 5 and they were NOT assigned in any particular order. Thus, the 1st Artillery
Command has the Fifth (spotting and FDC) Unit (whatever English words you prefer go in the parenthesis - if
you can think of a better phrase I would use it - "artillery support" perhaps?). In addition, these commands
include one or two truck transport companies. These - according to the wartime US Army Handbook on Japanese Military
Forces - had about 50 trucks (with 1 1/2 ton capacity - which is the standard Japanese truck capacity of WW2).

The new order of battle data indicates some detail cleanup of AE orders of battle is required. But it was remarkably
close - sometimes having calling a battalion a regiment or vice versa - rarely having the wrong weapon. The main
issue is the failure to permit these units to form into combine artillery brigades, which would make them more
effective in game terms. But every one of these commands was quite comparable to superior Allied artillery organizations.

[el cid again]

On detail review, I conclude there were 4 formal and one ad hoc artillery commands.
Officially, there were the 1st, 5th, 7th and 8th artillery commands. The fifth,
however, split is assets to support 4th and 20th Armies. The first supported 23rd
Army. The 7th supported 3rd Army. And the 8th supported 5th Army. These four
commands were supported by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Artillery Support regiments.

In addition, 25th Army had a sort of ad hoc artillery command, but it had NO
artillery support regiment.

Virtually every artillery unit attached to these commands, even the First Independent
Artillery Company, are identified in the Niihorster database under their parent command.

[Hrafnagud]

You are referring to the Artillery Intelligence Regiments. There were only three active on 8 December 1941 - the 1st and 2nd, both in Manchuria with the Kwantung Army, and the 5th, which was attached to the 1st Artillery Command under the 23rd Army.

The 5th Artillery Intelligence Regiment assisted in the capture of Hong Kong, was then sent to the Philippines (as part of the 1st Artillery Command) in March 1942, and was returned to the Kwangtung Army in May 1942. The 5th Artillery Intelligence Regiment was also slightly larger than the other two - 27 officers and 738 enlisted, as opposed to 22 officers and 446 enlisted for the 1st and 2nd Artillery Intelligence Regiments (which were at reduced war strength).

These three regiments also functioned as parent units for detachments that could be sent out to active theaters such as China, Burma and at Rabaul.

The 3rd, 4th and 6th Artillery Intelligence Regiments were only activated in February 1945 for the defense of the Japanese homeland. They had the same organisation as under the 1941 Mobilization Plan, with 667 men and 70 trucks.

Under the 1941 Mobilization Plan, these Artillery Intelligence Regiments had the following organization:

HQ company (258 men, with balloon, photography and signals platoons, and 30 trucks)
Survey company (93 men, three platoons of three survey sections each and a computing section, and 10 trucks)
Flash-ranging company (225 men, three platoons each of three plotting stations, and 21 trucks)
Sound-ranging company (91 men, six listening posts, and 9 trucks)

In addition, other elements could be assigned as needed, including meteorological, aerial photo interpretation, and chemical.

[Hrafnagud]

With regards to the Artillery Commands - the Hohei shireibu:

These were brigade-equivalent headquarters formed by the Imperial Japanese Army to command the various disparate, non-divisional artillery units. They acted purely as command and staff elements at army and area army levels. The 1st Artillery Command HQ was formed in 1940 and was dispatched to China where it participated in several campaigns under the 23rd Army. It then took part in the assault on Hong Kong, and was then transferred to the Philippines in March 1942. It assisted in the reduction of Bataan and Corregidor, before being shipped back to the Kwantung Army in May 1942, where it was attached to the 4th Army.

Three more artillery commands were activated in Manchuria in July 1941 - the 5th Artillery Command (for the 4th Army), the 7th Artillery Command (for the 3rd Army), and the 8th Artillery Command (for the 5th Army).

These commands (all located in Manchuria from May 1942) were small - around a hundred men each - and the number of subordinate elements attached to them varied considerably among the units and over time as non-divisional artillery was shifted in and out of their superior armies.

The 1st Artillery Command was consistently the smallest, usually controlling the 1st Medium Artillery Regiment, the 1st Heavy Artillery Regiment, the 9th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion, and the 5th Artillery Intelligence Regiment. The 7th Artillery Command, on the other hand, was usually the largest, with the following units: 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment, the 9th, 17th, and 22nd Medium Artillery Regiments, the 2nd Heavy Artillery Regiment, the 1st, 4th, 6th, 10th, and 13th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalions, the 1st Independent Artillery Mortar Regiment, and the 2nd Artillery Intelligence Regiment.

Once the 1st Artillery Command returned to Kwangtung in May 1942, only two artillery commands were used outside of Manchuria before mid-1945. The 9th Artillery Command was formed in July 1944 to control the 7th Medium Artillery Regiment, the 5th Independent Medium Artillery Battalion, the 3rd Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion, and the 1st Independent Artillery Mortar Battalion at Rabaul. The 5th Artillery Command was moved to Okinawa in late 1944 to control the non-divisional artillery there (1st and 23rd Medium Artillery Regiments, 7th Heavy Artillery Regiment, 100th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion, and 1st Independent Artillery Mortar Regiment).

As the threat to the homeland increased, all the Artillery Commands in Manchuria (as well as most of their subordinate units) were recalled to Japan proper and on 1 June 1945 a new series of these commands were formed - the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 10th, 11th, and 12th, followed a month later by the 3rd Artillery Command. Once again, the subordinate elements controlled by each HQ varied; however, for illustrative purposes, the 4th Artillery Command had 119 men and attached to it were the 9th Independent Field Artillery Regiment, the 20th and 28th Medium Artillery Regiments, the 44th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion, and the 21st, 24th and 25th Trench Mortar Artillery Battalions.

[el cid again]

This is pretty good. Where did you find the data?

German scholarship appears to indicate four identified regiments in 1941 - and one of those split into two
components to support both 4th and 20th armies. The numbers also differ. I wonder if someone is confusing
the Artillery Intelligence Regiment numbers with the Artillery Command numbers? I am still working this out.
But I show 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th Regiments supporting 1st, 5th, 7th and 8th Artillery Commands at this time.
The 5th Artillery Command was split. Only the 1st Artillery Command was not in Manchukuo when the Pacific
War began. As you say, it was at Hong Kong. While AE did a pretty good job identifying the component artillery
battalions and regiments in it, it does not permit their forming up into a single artillery brigade - as it
should. Neither do the other commands in "NE China" (US terminology of the period) form up into artillery brigades.

But I am still working this out. I really appreciate the data on what was in such a command?

Generally, this contradicts a long standing theory in the West that Japan did not have, or know how,
to have, a fire direction center to coordinate numbers of artillery units.

ORIGINAL: Hrafnagud

You are referring to the Artillery Intelligence Regiments. There were only three active on 8 December 1941 - the 1st and 2nd, both in Manchuria with the Kwantung Army, and the 5th, which was attached to the 1st Artillery Command under the 23rd Army.

The 5th Artillery Intelligence Regiment assisted in the capture of Hong Kong, was then sent to the Philippines (as part of the 1st Artillery Command) in March 1942, and was returned to the Kwangtung Army in May 1942. The 5th Artillery Intelligence Regiment was also slightly larger than the other two - 27 officers and 738 enlisted, as opposed to 22 officers and 446 enlisted for the 1st and 2nd Artillery Intelligence Regiments (which were at reduced war strength).

These three regiments also functioned as parent units for detachments that could be sent out to active theaters such as China, Burma and at Rabaul.

The 3rd, 4th and 6th Artillery Intelligence Regiments were only activated in February 1945 for the defense of the Japanese homeland. They had the same organisation as under the 1941 Mobilization Plan, with 667 men and 70 trucks.

Under the 1941 Mobilization Plan, these Artillery Intelligence Regiments had the following organization:

HQ company (258 men, with balloon, photography and signals platoons, and 30 trucks)
Survey company (93 men, three platoons of three survey sections each and a computing section, and 10 trucks)
Flash-ranging company (225 men, three platoons each of three plotting stations, and 21 trucks)
Sound-ranging company (91 men, six listening posts, and 9 trucks)

In addition, other elements could be assigned as needed, including meteorological, aerial photo interpretation, and chemical.

[el cid again]

None of this is very surprising for me. The symbols used on the TO&E indicates two kinds
of elements, apart from administrative: spotters and fire direction elements. Neither of
these requires a large number of men. A spotter team in my experience is 1 or 2 men; but
a Japanese artillery spotting vehicle (tracked) I found yesterday is stated to have a
crew of 6! It does have a lovely optical rangefinder. An FDC needs at least that many, but
not more than a squad sized number. Artillery control is essentially just a math exercise.
Once you have a plan, you simply issue orders by telephone, radio or messenger.

[Hrafnagud]

The Artillery Intelligence regiments could also be called "target acquisition" or "observation" regiments. They were specifically set-up to help co-ordinate counter-battery fire, something which Japanese doctrine had long ignored.

There were only three of these regiments on 8 December 1941 - the 5th (which was attached to the 1st Artillery Command), the 1st (attached to 8th Artillery Command) and the 2nd (attached to 7th Artillery Command).

A further three artillery intelligence regiments were only formed in 1945, for defense of the Japanese homeland.

Japanese artillery doctrine prioritised immediate and close infantry support, with very little centralisation of artillery assets. Japanese observation equipment and techniques pre-War were generally inferior to Western nations. During the Bataan siege, the Japanese artillery almost met their match in U.S. artillery. However, by the end of the war the Japanese artillery intelligence regiments were capable of relatively sophisticated sound- and flash-ranging techniques along with well-coordinated aerial observation.

[el cid again]

I have calculated an artillery intelligence regiment should be composed of

15 observation vehicles [typically Type 100 observation vehicle of type 95 truck]
13 unarmored halftrack or trucks (typically type 98 halftrack or type 95 truck)
5 truck squads (of 4 type 95 trucks)
and about 61 support squads (IF you want these regiments to provide support for the
artillery) OR 33 support squads (IF you want the normal support ratio).

[el cid again]

Finally I have found an acceptable way to model these units which makes
them more than chrome, but functional. A surprising problem was the symbol.
I was forced to compromise and use an artillery symbol (caused by defining
them as artillery units), which I did not want to do (because they have NO
artillery!). This classification permits a suffix of "regiment" which is not
only correct, but permits a commander of relatively low rank (classified as
small ground unit). I wanted to use HQ classification, but AE does not really
permit HQ to use officers for "small ground units" nor the "regiment" suffix.
These compromise units are actually a bit more than the Artillery Intelligence
Regiments per se: they include everything in the HQ of an artillery brigade
other than elements of artillery companies, battalions or regiments. The most
important of these elements are "tractor companies" and the HQ staff and
communication elements. That is slightly awkward in that not every artillery
command at the start of the game has one of these regiments, yet they really do
have a HQ staff and communications element, and a "tractor company" as well.
The tractor company part can be addressed by attaching it to the largest artillery
unit in the command. Modding, as with game design, is an endless series of
compromises between perfect modeling and what will work in software terms.

The invention of "spotters" (ground) for RHS does give these units a real intelligence
value for the hex they are in. A spotter is a low probability of detection surface
search radar. It was originally intended (when RHS added it) for use vs ships at night,
mainly for coast defense artillery units, or in the form of "night glasses/ship", for
surface naval combat at night. However, these regiments, which are carefully designed
to model actual organization, have 15 of these spotters. That should result in very
good reporting of enemy ground units in the same hex, at least on the turn after the
unit arrives in the hex.

A different invention for these units, which I have already applied to armor units bigger
than a battalion (albeit in a very limited way), permits the combined units to be self
supporting. It changes the meaning of "support" inside a composite unit from purely
logistical and cosmetic to an actual support unit. RHS added supply and support units
mainly so supply consumption and transport requirements will be right. AE (and WITP
generally) only model "combat effective" elements in a command. This has a very perverse
impact on supply requirements. It ALWAYS is too small, and the LESS EFFICIENT units, which
have less firepower, do NOT require MORE supplies and more sealift, airlift or rail/road
capacity impacts as they should. [That is because "pack" units use human bearers or
pack mule strings, which carry very little, but eat a lot of what they carry; "draft"
units use carts, still feed animals, but carry more than pack strings do; "motor" units
carry more cargo without feeding any animals to feed. To which add that pack units often
have the very weakest artillery (which is all they can haul along), draft units often
have slightly better artillery (at least in range, sometimes also in shell weight), while
motor units usually have longer range artillery with heavier shells. The net effect is that
a typical units that is pack is the weakest in firepower, but the most expensive to feed and
lift, while the motor units are the least expensive to feed and lift, but usually have more
firepower - draft units being usually slightly more powerful and slightly cheaper to feed
than pack units. This kind of modeling is very good and applies equally to both sides, but
it is more of an "invisible" advantage for the Allies, which have more motorized units, and
which get ever more of them as time passes. The relative advantage of motorization does
apply to the Axis, however, with the few units that have it, and that makes them preferable
to use (maximum power for least cost in lift and supplies).] Adar got me thinking about this
by complaining my "support" was "only cosmetic, not real." Well, now it is kind of real.
An Artillery Command (IF it includes an artillery intelligence regiment) is usually almost
perfectly self supporting (because it has motorized support squads at a higher ratio to
squads supported). Instead of the nominal SOP of a unit gets 5/6 of the support it needs
(so a HQ can supply more, making it more "supported" IF an HQ is around), an Artillery command
has that support sort of organic (particularly if you combine its elements into one unit).
The actual ratio depends on the command itself. The smallest command (the First) has a better
support ratio than the largest (the Fifth at the time of Okinawa), because there is less to
support in the First than in the Fifth. This is because all of the artillery intelligence
regiments were almost exactly the same in organization (even more than they were the same in
size, slight variations in manpower and vehicles did not change the numbers of functional units).
As well, the number of tractor companies assigned varies from zero to two, with one being typical,
for an artillery command. We CAN model this part because we define each artillery support regiment
individually and assign it to a specific artillery command. A different effect is that the player
gets the better intel in the hex due to the (ground) spotters, and so does AI, which may help
make other ground units more effective occasionally.

There is some uncertainty remaining. Older materials suggest there were only three
artillery intelligence regiments in December, 1941, with three more forming in early 1945. Newer
material suggests there were four in 1941 and that one of them was split, literally in two places
at the same time (with fewer squads in both places of course). Now I have these units working the
best I can, I will render artillery commands properly defined (but only for specific dates). Most
will appear in their 1941 form, and sometimes "grow" - e.g. the First Artillery Command has a
daughter unit (First Artillery Command minus) which starts the game, but which can become the full
First Artillery Command as it was used on Bataan, if it adds the regiments attached for that. Unlike
other artillery commands, which show up on Okinawa and Iwo Jima, or are sent to Japan, I don't know
where the First was in 1945? So the 1945 scenario assumes it was returned to Japan, and it is not
modified (since I don't know its 1945 form) - but still in its 1942 form. I am ignoring the one
case of a split artillery support unit and a split artillery command (in Manchukuo in 1941), assigning
them as combined units to just one of the two armies supported (the one with more artillery). It is
a simplification - players may attach the command to the other army, or to any army, if they pay
the price in political points to change command.

[el cid again]

5th Artillery Command begins the Pacific War period at Tsitsihar in Manchukuo, responsible for
supporting military operations defending the Northern frontier of that nation (which I do regard
as a nation, and the most successful economically in the world in the 1930s, consistently growing
at double digit rates throughout the Great Depression era, due to promotion of small enterprise,
and due to attracting five million immigrants from the USSR, China, Korea and Japan).  

Late in the war it moves to Okinawa and is exterminated there in 1945.

In game terms, even for a solitaire game, it is impossible to know game events years into a campaign.

But for a 1945 game - which Scenario 126 is - it IS possible to model the command for 1945 events.

So I modeled 126 differently.  Apart from revising the misdefined, IJA 62nd Infantry Division,
I got rid of three base forces on the island and its coast defense unit.  I turned the 5th Artillery Command
into a "fortress" and assigned to it (as happened in history) the coast defenses (and forts) of the
former CD unit.  In that scenario the unit is static. [It is almost static - there are only two hexes on Okinawa,
and almost the entire battle occurs in just one of them.  The Allies landed in both hexes, and likely always
will, so moving isn't very germane in any case.]  The base forces, many elements of the fortress unit,
and at least 20,000 Okinawans, plus a host of minor IJA and IJN units were turned into a gigantic number of infantry and construction troops.  Many of these were added to the two divisions and the brigade on the island, but these units lack the slots to add the many different kinds of squads required.  So I created an Okinawa Militia Corps, which is also a static unit.  Its main problem is, apart from special forces and some naval infantry, it has little infantry training.  Okinawa is rare for the Japanese:  they had perhaps too many weapons.  Mainly because they were supposed to be sent forward, but shipping losses prevented this from happening.  In effect, the island gets two infantry divisions, an artillery brigade, an armor regiment, an infantry brigade and this gigantic "militia" corps (which includes 20,000 actual local Okinawa militia called as such). 

But the 1941 scenarios - 121 to 125 and 129 - get a different, and always potentially mobile 5th Artillery Command.  It does NOT include the 33 coast defense guns historically attached on Okinawa at any point.  These remain in the fortress unit which never disappears.  The base forces also do not disappear in 1945.  As modders we cannot know what will happen by 1945, and an RHS principle is "if we give it to you, unless absolutely necessary for compelling reasons, we won't take it away from you."  Okinawa might not be the site of a battle. And units based on it might move somewhere else.  We let the players of each game manage events.  In these scenarios, 5th Artillery command has two forms:

1) Its form in 1941, in Manchuria.  This is very much smaller than its form in 1945.

2) A later form, controlled by having it upgrade to a different organization, similar to the later form, omitting
the CD units.  This appears in Manchuria and may either stay there or move somewhere else.  To move to a different theater will cost political points - it is Restricted Temporary - but it can be done if the cause is worth spending the points - and if time and transport permit the movement.