Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Max 86 »

With regard to the OP's question, from Creasy's 15 Decisive Battles of the World, chapter 4: Battle of Metaurus, he quotes another historian, Arnold:

"The similitude between the contest which Rome maintained against Hannibal, and that which England was for many years engaged in against Napoleon, has not passed unnoticed by recent historians. 'Twice' says Arnold, 'has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation; and in both cases the nation has been victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome; for sixteen years Napoleon strove against England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo."

The same applies to the ACW and WW2. The individual genius of the CSA commanders withered against the USA, same for Nazis and Japanese against the allies. I would add Gettysburg, Stalingrad and Midway to Zama and Waterloo mentioned in the quote.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Anguille »

ORIGINAL: Max 86

With regard to the OP's question, from Creasy's 15 Decisive Battles of the World, chapter 4: Battle of Metaurus, he quotes another historian, Arnold:

"The similitude between the contest which Rome maintained against Hannibal, and that which England was for many years engaged in against Napoleon, has not passed unnoticed by recent historians. 'Twice' says Arnold, 'has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation; and in both cases the nation has been victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome; for sixteen years Napoleon strove against England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo."

The same applies to the ACW and WW2. The individual genius of the CSA commanders withered against the USA, same for Nazis and Japanese against the allies. I would add Gettysburg, Stalingrad and Midway to Zama and Waterloo mentioned in the quote.

Mmmh...and what about Alexander the Great defeating the Persian Empire? or Julius Caesar defeating Pompeii? or Võ Nguyên Giáp defeating the US and the French?

Just to mention a few where the odds where against an individual genius...
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by decaro »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

It can be difficult to understand exactly what you're referring to when you don't explicitly state it, but losing D.C. along with its naval yard -- which never historically happened -- doesn't mean that the federal blockade of Southern ports just disappears as the Union has other naval yards nearby; the federal yard in Brooklyn was in operation since 1801 and by the Civil War its workforce grew to about 6,000 men. In fact, the Monitor was fitted at the Continental Iron Works in nearby Greenpoint.

The blockade would end because of the RN.

And exactly how would that unlikely intervention come about after an inconclusive war at sea in 1812 when the odds were stacked in Britain's "favour"?
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Jim D Burns »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
Lincoln was nearly voted out even with those victories. In fact it was probably the victories in 1864 that occurred just in the nick of time that tipped the election to him. But he still wouldn't leave office till sometime in early 1865 (I forget exactly when), so the South would have to be doing a lot better than historically for even the McClellan administration to give up at that point.

I agree, that’s why I stated the defeat would have had to be a decisive one. Such a defeat would have prompted the Union to bring a lot of strength out of the western theaters back to the east to protect Washington. Much of the success seen historically in 1864 would probably not have been seen since such a sound defeat would have caused the Union to go into turtle mode for quite a while as they licked their wounds.

They might have been able to recover and go on offensive in 1864, but the mood would have changed after such a sound beating and many would be fearful another such defeat could see the loss of Washington occur, so any offensive in 1864 would probably have been far less aggressive than historical. Emancipation probably wouldn’t have occurred yet either, so that would be an issue in the election as well.

But of course as you mention had Lincoln lost the election it is very possible McClellan would not have given up the fight. But I do think his administration was the only chance the South ever had of winning.

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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Lecivius »

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

It can be difficult to understand exactly what you're referring to when you don't explicitly state it, but losing D.C. along with its naval yard -- which never historically happened -- doesn't mean that the federal blockade of Southern ports just disappears as the Union has other naval yards nearby; the federal yard in Brooklyn was in operation since 1801 and by the Civil War its workforce grew to about 6,000 men. In fact, the Monitor was fitted at the Continental Iron Works in nearby Greenpoint.

The blockade would end because of the RN.

And exactly how would that unlikely intervention come about after an inconclusive war at sea in 1812 when the odds were stacked in Britain's "favour"?

I'll stay out of most of this. But in 1812 the British navy was strung out badly against Napoleon. It's resources were literally at the breaking point, and it's ships were at this time being made of a poor grade of timber & material. It's one of the great misconceptions (there are a few others) for the decisive way U.S. frigates handled British ones. When the Napoleonic wars ended Britain did indeed seal up the east coast of the United States. They could have, and did, do as they pleased. The tipping point was the British population had just ended one war. Privateers were making a real mess of British commerce. These 2 factors were the reason Britain agreed to end the war, not any military action.

Loosing DC may or may not have involved Europe. But it would have changed the political landscape of the Federals. I think it would have caused a peace treaty, allowing the Confederacy to remain a state.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by tcarusil »

I recall reading, many years ago, in Strategy & Tactics magazine that disease was the largest cause of death during the Civil War.
As I recall, 2 out of 3 deaths were related to disease, not bullets or bombs.

TomC
ORIGINAL: Josh

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Good stuff chaps - keep this going, I like hearing views on the US civil war [&o].

+1 here.
Absolutely no expert here so I'm quite surprised to read what Curtiss here writes...that many deserters and that many sick? Ofcourse it makes perfectly sense but until now I wasn't really aware of it, always thought the majority of casualties was on the battlefield. So thanks.
Even *more* surprised to hear about the role of the navy.. it was *that* important? I always thought of it as a footnote. Guess you're neve too old to learn eh?
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Jim D Burns »

ORIGINAL: tcarusil

I recall reading, many years ago, in Strategy & Tactics magazine that disease was the largest cause of death during the Civil War.
As I recall, 2 out of 3 deaths were related to disease, not bullets or bombs.

Tables 2 and 3 in the link I posted above give breakdowns of causes of death.

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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by decaro »

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




The blockade would end because of the RN.

And exactly how would that unlikely intervention come about after an inconclusive war at sea in 1812 when the odds were stacked in Britain's "favour"?

I'll stay out of most of this. But in 1812 the British navy was strung out badly against Napoleon. It's resources were literally at the breaking point, and it's ships were at this time being made of a poor grade of timber & material. It's one of the great misconceptions (there are a few others) for the decisive way U.S. frigates handled British ones. When the Napoleonic wars ended Britain did indeed seal up the east coast of the United States. They could have, and did, do as they pleased. The tipping point was the British population had just ended one war. Privateers were making a real mess of British commerce. These 2 factors were the reason Britain agreed to end the war, not any military action.

Loosing DC may or may not have involved Europe. But it would have changed the political landscape of the Federals ...

... that landscape would literally change if the Federals moved to a new neighborhood in NYC, but I doubt Lincoln would ever settle for a "divided Union".

And the last major military action happened after the war was already over for two weeks.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

It can be difficult to understand exactly what you're referring to when you don't explicitly state it, but losing D.C. along with its naval yard -- which never historically happened -- doesn't mean that the federal blockade of Southern ports just disappears as the Union has other naval yards nearby; the federal yard in Brooklyn was in operation since 1801 and by the Civil War its workforce grew to about 6,000 men. In fact, the Monitor was fitted at the Continental Iron Works in nearby Greenpoint.

The blockade would end because of the RN.

And exactly how would that unlikely intervention come about after an inconclusive war at sea in 1812 when the odds were stacked in Britain's "favour"?

The intervention would come about due to British and French flagged vessels sailing into the now diplomatically recognized Confederate ports. If they're allowed to pass, there goes the blockade. If they aren't, the RN would have grounds to intervene.

As to whether the RN lacked the ability to halt the blockade, that's just silly. To conduct a blockade you must have naval supremacy. The US wouldn't even have had naval parity.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by decaro »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




The blockade would end because of the RN.

And exactly how would that unlikely intervention come about after an inconclusive war at sea in 1812 when the odds were stacked in Britain's "favour"?

The intervention would come about due to British and French flagged vessels sailing into the now diplomatically recognized Confederate ports. If they're allowed to pass, there goes the blockade. If they aren't, the RN would have grounds to intervene.

As to whether the RN lacked the ability to halt the blockade, that's just silly. To conduct a blockade you must have naval supremacy. The US wouldn't even have had naval parity.

The same navy that held it's own against the British fleet in 1812 now has gunboats and ironclads that don't have to steam far from home for refit if needed.

"The U.S. Navy struggled during the decades following the War of 1812 to keep up with rapidly changing technology. While the navy was not in the forefront of technological change, it experimented with steam-powered propulsion systems, armor plating, breechloaders, shell guns, and the telegraph. The service also organized an engineering-oriented naval academy in 1845 at Annapolis, Maryland, in an effort to enhance what was already a well-established professionalism ...

"The Civil War, which began in 1861, also highlighted for the United States the potential national virtues of sea power. The Union had a near monopoly on naval power during the war. Naval officers, more so than army officers, remained loyal to the Union. The majority of the U.S. Navy's men-of-war were in northern ports. The absence of Confederate oceangoing sea power initially gave the Union de facto control of the seas."

http://www.history.navy.mil/history/history2.htm

BTW "silly" is wrapping special orders around some cigars and then losing both before the battle.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by rodney727 »

Jim I agree with you. If Lincoln lost the election the democrats would have thrown in the towl and would have put everyone in the north on food stamps and welfare[:D]
ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns

I think the only real chance the South ever had of “winning” the Civil War was the election of 1864. So any strategy that would have helped defeat Lincoln would have been the strategy to pursue. That said if Longstreet was in charge, his defensive nature would have probably kept the Southern Army south of the Potomac in 1863 and no decisive engagement would have been fought in the east. This might have had little to no effect on the election, but the historical win at Gettysburg for the north could very well be what allowed Lincoln to win re-election in the first place, so staying on defense may have been the right thing to do, then again maybe not.

Had Lee gotten a decisive military victory in 1863 north of the Potomac, then there was a very real possibility it would have cost Lincoln the election. So in my view the best course for the South would have been a mix of the two. Lee’s aggressive move north was needed to force the issue and bring the Federal army to battle, Longstreet’s argued for defensive stance with an attempted flanking maneuver was probably their best chance for a military victory at Gettysburg.

Had the South simply beaten the Federal Army and then withdrawn, I think the election of 1864 would still have been in real doubt even if they didn’t go on to take and hold any major cities in the north. War weariness and historically unprecedented high casualty lists had turned a lot of people against the war and a decisive defeat in the field in 1863 would have probably sealed the fate of the election as people would fear that the war and blood could go on for many more years if not decades.

Of course the Federal Army might have been able to possibly recover and launch a successful spring offensive in 1864 that would have wiped away the memory of a decisive loss in 1863, who knows. Regardless, there was no chance of a military victory in my view, the election was their only real hope.

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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by rodney727 »

Man for man vessel for vessel the Yankee fleet was ever the equal of the British. The north wanted no conflict with the British as I'm sure the British wanted no war with the north. Thank goodness cooler heads prevailed.
ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Joe D.




And exactly how would that unlikely intervention come about after an inconclusive war at sea in 1812 when the odds were stacked in Britain's "favour"?

The intervention would come about due to British and French flagged vessels sailing into the now diplomatically recognized Confederate ports. If they're allowed to pass, there goes the blockade. If they aren't, the RN would have grounds to intervene.

As to whether the RN lacked the ability to halt the blockade, that's just silly. To conduct a blockade you must have naval supremacy. The US wouldn't even have had naval parity.

The same navy that held it's own against the British fleet in 1812 now has gunboats and ironclads that don't have to steam far from home for refit if needed.

"The U.S. Navy struggled during the decades following the War of 1812 to keep up with rapidly changing technology. While the navy was not in the forefront of technological change, it experimented with steam-powered propulsion systems, armor plating, breechloaders, shell guns, and the telegraph. The service also organized an engineering-oriented naval academy in 1845 at Annapolis, Maryland, in an effort to enhance what was already a well-established professionalism ...

"The Civil War, which began in 1861, also highlighted for the United States the potential national virtues of sea power. The Union had a near monopoly on naval power during the war. Naval officers, more so than army officers, remained loyal to the Union. The majority of the U.S. Navy's men-of-war were in northern ports. The absence of Confederate oceangoing sea power initially gave the Union de facto control of the seas."

http://www.history.navy.mil/history/history2.htm

BTW "silly" is wrapping special orders around some cigars and then losing both before the battle.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by rodney727 »

You forgot to mention impressment of American sailors ended... We got lucky in the war of 1812.... However Jackson would have defeated any British army the British could muster. But this is the civil war. From 1861-1865 we had the naval power and the manpower to deal with both the south and anything the British could throw at us. In the end it was not worth the time and energy of the British empire to get involved. Also what most people don't realize is there were many British supporters for the north in parliament .
ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




The blockade would end because of the RN.

And exactly how would that unlikely intervention come about after an inconclusive war at sea in 1812 when the odds were stacked in Britain's "favour"?

I'll stay out of most of this. But in 1812 the British navy was strung out badly against Napoleon. It's resources were literally at the breaking point, and it's ships were at this time being made of a poor grade of timber & material. It's one of the great misconceptions (there are a few others) for the decisive way U.S. frigates handled British ones. When the Napoleonic wars ended Britain did indeed seal up the east coast of the United States. They could have, and did, do as they pleased. The tipping point was the British population had just ended one war. Privateers were making a real mess of British commerce. These 2 factors were the reason Britain agreed to end the war, not any military action.

Loosing DC may or may not have involved Europe. But it would have changed the political landscape of the Federals. I think it would have caused a peace treaty, allowing the Confederacy to remain a state.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by decaro »

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns

I think the only real chance the South ever had of “winning” the Civil War was the election of 1864. So any strategy that would have helped defeat Lincoln would have been the strategy to pursue ..."

During that election, Southern General Jubal Early had just such a strategy, but by force of arms, not ballots.

Monocacy: The Battle That Saved Washington
BY B. FRANKLIN COOLING

"These men died to save the National
capital, and they did save it."
— Lewis Wallace

"NATIONAL PARK SERVICE ACQUISITION OF THE ARABY FARM IN THE FALL OF 2002 (with the help of the Civil War Preservation Trust), guaranteed the integrity of the Monocacy National Battlefield. Here, on July 9, 1864, where the turnpike from Frederick to Washington and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad both crossed the Monocacy River three miles south of Frederick, Maryland, occurred one of the most important actions of the Civil War. Little known to many Americans, the bloody combat that took place here determined the fate of the nation's capital in a presidential election year. Colorful leaders of lesser rank — not Great Captains — played out the single day's drama. This Confederate tactical victory turned into a strategic defeat because of a single twist of fate — time The day's delay occasioned by this battle disrupted Confederate general Jubal Early's schedule for capturing the nation's capital and possibly President Abraham Lincoln himself while affecting the election year's summer politicking and lessening the Union's ever-tightening grip on Robert E. Lee's army at Richmond and Petersburg. Monocacy was a classic example of a little battle having importance far beyond territorial extent or size of forces engaged ..."

And I for one had never even heard of this battle!
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Curtis Lemay »

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

The same navy that held it's own against the British fleet in 1812 now has gunboats and ironclads that don't have to steam far from home for refit if needed.

Actually it didn't hold it's own in that war - most of its warships ships ended up bottled up in harbors by war's end. But, that's irrelevant. Gunboats aren't ocean-going vessels (as the fate of the original Monitor demonstrated), which is what is required to effect a blockade. Most of the US naval production was (sensibly) for inland waters.

But that's irrelevant as well. As I stated, they must have naval supremacy (not parity, not even superiority) to blockade the South. That's because, to blockade, they have to distribute their ships all along the South's lengthy coastline in small detachments. Each would be easy prey for strikes by an enemy combined fleet. Facing the RN, the USN would have to stay together - and probably have to pull back to northern waters.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by decaro »

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

The same navy that held it's own against the British fleet in 1812 now has gunboats and ironclads that don't have to steam far from home for refit if needed.

Actually it didn't hold it's own in that war - most of its warships ships ended up bottled up in harbors by war's end. But, that's irrelevant. Gunboats aren't ocean-going vessels (as the fate of the original Monitor demonstrated), which is what is required to effect a blockade. Most of the US naval production was (sensibly) for inland waters.

But that's irrelevant as well. As I stated, they must have naval supremacy (not parity, not even superiority) to blockade the South. That's because, to blockade, they have to distribute their ships all along the South's lengthy coastline in small detachments. Each would be easy prey for strikes by an enemy combined fleet. Facing the RN, the USN would have to stay together - and probably have to pull back to northern waters.

The War of 1812 wasn't a defeat for the USN, or any other branch of service involved in that protracted draw.
And during the Civil War, the USN had gunboats and ironclads -- to guard the mouths of rivers and ports -- in addition to, not in place of, its Blue Water fleet.

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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Lecivius »

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

The same navy that held it's own against the British fleet in 1812 now has gunboats and ironclads that don't have to steam far from home for refit if needed.

Actually it didn't hold it's own in that war - most of its warships ships ended up bottled up in harbors by war's end. But, that's irrelevant. Gunboats aren't ocean-going vessels (as the fate of the original Monitor demonstrated), which is what is required to effect a blockade. Most of the US naval production was (sensibly) for inland waters.

But that's irrelevant as well. As I stated, they must have naval supremacy (not parity, not even superiority) to blockade the South. That's because, to blockade, they have to distribute their ships all along the South's lengthy coastline in small detachments. Each would be easy prey for strikes by an enemy combined fleet. Facing the RN, the USN would have to stay together - and probably have to pull back to northern waters.

The War of 1812 wasn't a defeat for the USN, or any other branch of service involved in that protracted draw.
And during the Civil War, the USN had gunboats and ironclads -- to guard the mouths of rivers and ports -- in addition to, not in place of, its Blue Water fleet.


We must be looking at history from 2 separate views.

Once the British navy was released from European duties in 1814 the American navy was bottled up in harbor & ceased to exist as a force to reckon with. Privateers, war weariness, and cost to commerce were the cause of British discontent.

At the onset of the Civil War the Americans had only a few ocean going naval vessels. Lincoln & Wells were commandeering anything afloat & put a few guns on it. The British were not only superior, but had ocean going ironclads at this time. Picture Anaconda in reverse, with Northern cities under blockade. By the end of the war there may have been enough of the monitors to defend federal ports. If the blockade had not squeezed industry too tight. And that is only counting British involvement. The French were also not at all happy with the impact of the war on their industry. Look to the effectiveness of the Shenandoah, a single ship, as an example of what "might have been".
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by decaro »

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




Actually it didn't hold it's own in that war - most of its warships ships ended up bottled up in harbors by war's end. But, that's irrelevant. Gunboats aren't ocean-going vessels (as the fate of the original Monitor demonstrated), which is what is required to effect a blockade. Most of the US naval production was (sensibly) for inland waters.

But that's irrelevant as well. As I stated, they must have naval supremacy (not parity, not even superiority) to blockade the South. That's because, to blockade, they have to distribute their ships all along the South's lengthy coastline in small detachments. Each would be easy prey for strikes by an enemy combined fleet. Facing the RN, the USN would have to stay together - and probably have to pull back to northern waters.

The War of 1812 wasn't a defeat for the USN, or any other branch of service involved in that protracted draw.
And during the Civil War, the USN had gunboats and ironclads -- to guard the mouths of rivers and ports -- in addition to, not in place of, its Blue Water fleet.


We must be looking at history from 2 separate views.

Once the British navy was released from European duties in 1814 the American navy was bottled up in harbor & ceased to exist as a force to reckon with. Privateers, war weariness, and cost to commerce were the cause of British discontent.

At the onset of the Civil War the Americans had only a few ocean going naval vessels. Lincoln & Wells were commandeering anything afloat & put a few guns on it. The British were not only superior, but had ocean going ironclads at this time. Picture Anaconda in reverse, with Northern cities under blockade. By the end of the war there may have been enough of the monitors to defend federal ports. If the blockade had not squeezed industry too tight. And that is only counting British involvement. The French were also not at all happy with the impact of the war on their industry. Look to the effectiveness of the Shenandoah, a single ship, as an example of what "might have been".

You're looking at what "might have been"; I'm looking at what was: indeed, two separate views.


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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by Lecivius »

ORIGINAL: Joe D.



You're looking at what "might have been"; I'm looking at what was: indeed, two separate views.




No, it's the other way around. But as I said, 2 separate views.
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RE: Southern Strategy: Lee vs. Longstreet

Post by decaro »

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

ORIGINAL: Joe D.




The War of 1812 wasn't a defeat for the USN, or any other branch of service involved in that protracted draw.
And during the Civil War, the USN had gunboats and ironclads -- to guard the mouths of rivers and ports -- in addition to, not in place of, its Blue Water fleet.


We must be looking at history from 2 separate views.

Once the British navy was released from European duties in 1814 the American navy was bottled up in harbor & ceased to exist as a force to reckon with. Privateers, war weariness, and cost to commerce were the cause of British discontent.

At the onset of the Civil War the Americans had only a few ocean going naval vessels. Lincoln & Wells were commandeering anything afloat & put a few guns on it. The British were not only superior, but had ocean going ironclads at this time. Picture Anaconda in reverse, with Northern cities under blockade. By the end of the war there may have been enough of the monitors to defend federal ports. If the blockade had not squeezed industry too tight. And that is only counting British involvement. The French were also not at all happy with the impact of the war on their industry. Look to the effectiveness of the Shenandoah, a single ship, as an example of what "might have been".

"Look to the effectiveness of the Shenandoah, a single ship, as an example of what 'might have been'" is my emphasis of your own words.


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The best fighter-bomber of World War II
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