Looking at the site here:
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Grumble-Gargoyle.html
It appears the system does use shorter range SAMS in self defence but only if the missiles (ARM/cruise)
manage to get into the minimum launch zone of the S300.
The popular idea of shooting cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles or standoff missiles at the S-300P/S-300V battery, assuming its location is known, is only viable where such a weapon has a sufficiently low radar signature to penetrate inside the minimum engagement range of the SAM before being detected - anything less will see the inbound missile killed by a self defensive SAM shot. The current Russian view of this is to sell Tor M2E/SA-15D Gauntlet and Pantsir S1/S2 / SA-22 self-propelled point defence SAM systems as a rapid reaction close in defensive Counter-PGM system to protect the S-300P/S-300V battery by shooting down the incoming missile if it gets past the S-300P/S-300V SAMs. Integration of the new Fakel 9M96 series point defence SAM would provide an organic Counter-PGM defensive capability in the battery.
So the question is, does a small Harm missile create enough of a radar return versus larger cruise missiles or RV's? Becuase it seems Russia realizes the problem of ordinance getting within the minimum launch zone of the S-300 and plans to use the Tor and Pantsir system to engage the Harm's, and not have the S-300 do all of the work in this case. And do the S-300 variations in the sim have a minimum engagement zone modeled?
Tactics come into play too, perhaps try getting at low altitude with the HARM shooters and fire them off at shorter ranges to the S-300. The Harm loses velocity as it travels, especially if launched at max range and high altitude. Your task is to keep the HARM at high speed, and as close to the target as you dare to decrease the systems reaction time.
There are also ARM decoy systems in the real world to consider. This public info from a 2002 source regarding the Patriot battery use of multiple ARM decoys.
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm3-01.85(02).pdf
file:///C:/Users/Administrator/Downloads/ADA310623.pdf
Page 3 at the above link describes the Patriot Bait system.
The bait system involves radio bait and its decoy system, infrared bait and its decoy system. The "Patriot" air-defense guidance radar is equipped with a decoy system, which is an independent transmission system, pointing at a target with the "Patriot" guidance radar in external synchronization. In this case the carrier frequency and waveform of a transmitted signal are identical to those transmitted from an air-defense radar, and are positioned as much as possible within the ARM angular resolution range. Because of this device, ARM fails to distinguish the guidance radar from the decoy station in space, either mistakenly hitting the center of the connecting line between the guidance radar and decoy station or deviating to the latter.
ARM Alarming system
The U.S. Air Force deployed a special ARM alarming system near the warning radar AN/TPS-43E, which can control radar shut-down immediately after an ARM is detected.
http://vnfawing.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=394&sid=4e84392488cdb981bc5d42a3d19f9654
http://books.google.com/books?id=K_T4M-nA6JYC&pg=PA612&lpg=PA612&dq=AN/TLQ-32&source=bl&ots=uPMyPwl4YI&sig=OTSasz6dqfkRlQ0bQ_GYV2swrxM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=RPwyU-fWEqTlsASw9oDYAw&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=AN%2FTLQ-32&f=false
Above mentions AN/TLQ-32 ARM-D decoy system for Patriot battery.
Features of the ARM-D include it's capability to emulate frequency-agile radars; 360 degree coverage; protection of both the radar and the decoy assets against ARMs; lightweight fiber optic interface between the radar and decoy emitter groups and low prime power operations. In operational use, three decoys are allocated to each radar system. The surveillance decoys are designed to be capable of protecting the radar site from multiple missile launches, whether simultaneous or consecutive.
http://www.mobileradar.org/Other_radar_ancillary.html
TLQ-32 ARM Decoy Set
Description: A ground-based system that produces a decoy signal to protect battlefield radar from anti-radiation missiles.
Technical Data:
Dimensions:
Emitter unit: 7 x 3 x 3 ft
Unit weight: 112 lb
Characteristics:
Frequency: 2.9 to 3.1 GHz
Power: 680 W (nominal)
Coverage: 360º
Setup/teardown: < 15 min
Lift/carry: 2 persons per module
Modules per system: 3 + power source
Power requirement: 2.5 kW (GFE generator)
Units: Central control unit (CCU)
Emitters (3)
Redundant fiber-optic links
Description: The TLQ-32(V) consists of a transmitter assembly, modulator assembly, control/monitor, and antenna. The units are integrated on a pallet, with the antenna extending above the center (transmitter) module. They are interconnected by fiber-optic cable to a control unit in the radar operations shelter and protected with Kevlar. The system was designed for either fully automatic or manual operation. There is an extensive built-in test capability for ease of maintenance, and the modularity makes rapid setup and teardown possible.
The radar operator controls the system with the Central Control Unit (CCU) in the TPS-75(V) operations shelter. Three independent emitters each include a synthesizer, modulator, RF amplifiers, and control circuits; all are shock-mounted inside polypropylene transit cases that snap together to configure the emitter. The antenna at the site is installed with a quick-disconnect clamp, while a redundant fiber-optic link consists of two fibers in a loop with the data flow going in opposite directions. Optical transmitters are located at the CCU and each emitter.
The TLQ-32(V) was designed to produce a decoying signal that emulates the sidelobe radiation pattern of the TPS-75(V) tactical radar. The CCU accepts radar triggers and frequency code information, which are converted into command messages and sent via fiber-optic link to the emitters. The command messages consist of a timing signal and a frequency code, and an indicator for selecting which emitter to radiate. They are sent to the emitters, and the emissions are set up. This involves tuning the emitter to the approximate frequency of the next radar pulse and initiating the pulse timing. The decoy pulse is internally modulated to a 13-bit Barker code.
Three transmit units are located some distance from the radar, and either mask the sidelobe signals so that an attacking ARM’s seeker cannot locate the radar, or deceive incoming anti-radiation missiles into exploding harmlessly away from the radar’s antenna without destroying the decoy emitter.
The design facilitates the rapid replacement of faulty modules. The emitters are form-fit-function identical, and a line-replaceable unit or complete case can be replaced without the need for adjustment or alignment. It has an extensive built-in test capability.
Although the initial systems are limited to use with the TPS-75(V) because the modulator is hardwired to simulate the associated radar’s antenna pattern, the system can be changed to emulate other systems. The hardwiring could be changed, or a software adaptation of the output signal could be developed. This would make it easier to adapt the TLQ-32(V) ARM Decoy to other radars.
Operational Characteristics. Anti-radiation missiles use aircraft sensors to locate radar sites that pose a threat to an attack. After launch, the missile’s onboard sensors home in on the radar by sensing the characteristic pattern of the antenna sidelobes. The missile then explodes close to the antenna in an attempt to put the radar out of commission.
The ARM Decoy’s function is to mislead the missile seeker enough to make it impact or detonate harmlessly away from the main radar antenna. One anti-missile technique involves shutting off the radar transmitter, depriving the ARM of a signal to home in on. However, this puts the radar temporarily out of service during an attack - the goal of the attacker anyhow.
The TLQ-32(V) emitters are located away from the radar to be protected. With the three units set up in a configuration specifically tailored to provide incoming anti-radiation missiles with a more attractive target than the original radar antenna, the system masks the true sidelobes by specifically emulating the sidelobe pattern of the radar, the pattern on which the missile homes. Designers call the area in which the missile impacts the “ARM pit.” Distances and deployment schemes are classified. Minor adjustments in the field can match the decoy to its particular radar.
Bear in mind the above system was in full production in 1992. This helps illustrate that large SAM systems are more heavily protected than many people probably realize.
From this site:
http://www.almaz-antey.ru/en/catalogue/millitary_catalogue/1218/1221/1223/1227
S-300 VM Minimum radar cross-section of engaged targets, m2 0.02
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/s400.htm
the S-400 Triumf. This fourth generation system used S-300 missiles, but possessed capabilities against low RCS stealth aircraft, small cruise missiles, and future low-RCS re-entry vehicles. The electronics were on a completely new technical basis and used new solutions to the detection, tracking, and guidance problems. The system was claimed to represent a bigger step from third generation systems (S-300PMU, S-300PMU-1, S-300PMU-2) than third generation systems represented to first generation systems. However the first trials series, completed in 2003, were unsatisfactory. The Russian government found the new system to be only 10-15% more capable than its predecessors. The decision was taken to replace some of the 48N6E missiles of the system with new versions of the 9M96, which had over double the performance. This combination was found to provide sufficient improvement to justify production.
The given RCS of the AGM-88 in this sim is currently 0.032 m2. and the S-400 system quote and S-300VM above means the Harm is getting close to the quoted S-300VM minimum RCS to be able to engage it. Given the advancements mentioned to bring the S-400 a leap above it's predecessors, it would seem to imply that older S-300 systems may not have the capability to reliably engage a rlatively low rcs missile like the HARM, and with the info above, it looks like the Russian defense industry had troubles improving on the systems performance versus such low RCS aircraft and weapons. This also helps explain the article at the top of my post having the TOR and Pantsir systems to defend legacy S-300 sites.
I would imagine these systems would have trouble if the sim player uses Offensive jamming and decoys. Probably pretty effective, along with dedicated stealth cruise missiles like the JASSM.
