Strategy and Counter-Surprise: Intelligence within BAOR and NATO’s Northern Army Group
Its a google search that links to a PDF document which explores BAOR intel of various kinds including stay behind units, SAS and LRRP deploying behind lines, towards the end in the conclusion is this piece that looks at the lessons NATO took away from the 1973 Arab Israeli war;
NATO is confident of and requires 48 hours warning of an attack in Europe because of the scale of preparations necessary for even a limited attack. However, in a situation similar to the Central front, the Israeli's vaunted intelligence system noted all the indicators and failed to construe them correctly. NATO might do no better, and a close and careful reappraisal of our intelligence collection methods and analysis procedures is indicated.
Would NATO really have read the warning signs correctly
What kinds of human error could happen (e.g. that radar watch officer at Pearl harbour)
What war preparation can or does look like a peace time activity