Struggling in the East - SigUp vs. loki

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: jwolf

Congratulations on a well fought summer campaign, culminating in the capture of Rostov. You just might get a break in the weather during the mud season with snow in the North Soviet zone. If so, would that be enough to tip Moscow your way during November? If nothing else, the mud turns will give you a chance to get rail lines caught up or at least much closer to the front (assuming the partisans don't sabotage your efforts too badly). Good luck.

Thanks. Moscow is pretty much impossible at this stage. Far too well fortified. I'll probably concentrate on Kaluga in the few snow turns. That area is a real headache as a concentrated offensive from there in the blizzard can hurt tremendously.

[gingerbread]

To me it looks like you gave up the idea of causing death by a thousand cuts when you had reached 865 or so.

Those 50k-90k pockets add up. T21+ they also contribute to AP squeeze.

[SigUp]

Monthly Report: October 1941


Frontline 6th November 1941

After more than three months of continuous advance the German offensive was stopped in October by the infamous rasputitsa. Formerly traversable roads turned into muddy quagmires, not only limiting the mobility of the forces, but also severely restricting logistics. Relief came only in the form of a temperature drop with corresponding snowfall, the first of which fell in the Central Soviet Zone on 30th October.

While combat was forced to a halt by the weather, the Germans undertook administrative reorganisations. On 19th October the chaos atop the OKH was finally cleared when Hitler appointed Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge to succeed the killed Franz Halder. His post as head of 4th Army was inherited by XXXXIII. AK's Gotthard Heinrici, who in turn was replaced by Lothar Rendulic. Two weeks later another major rushuffling occured in the area of Army Group Centre, when Generaloberst Erich Hoepner took over 17th Army in the South. He was succeeded by Hermann Hoth as commander of 4th Panzer Group. The reorganisation was completed when LVI. AK's commanding general Erich von Manstein was called upon to lead 3rd Panzer Group.

During the same stretch the Luftwaffe also used the time to recuperate its tired bomber force. With the exception of a couple of groups, the bombers were pulled from the frontlines and refitted. Furthermore the aircraft of select squadrons were upgraded, namely from Ju-87 B to D and Bf-109 F2 to F4.

Moscow Sector



When the first snow fell in late October / early November, the German High Command was finally confronted with the prospect they least wanted - a campaign going into the harsh Russian winter. More daunting than the coming winter, however, were the reports delivered by signal intelligence and aerial reconnaissance. Behind Moscow and Tula the Red Army was massing reserve forces in a scale not anticipated by previous German estimates. Dozens of rifle divisions were waiting to get thrown into battle. Even more ominous was the amount of cavalry divisions stationed between Tula and Kolomna. On 3rd November 1941 Army Group Centre's commander von Bock wrote in his diary:

Newest reports show minimum of 20 cavalry divisions behind Soviet lines opposite 4th Army. Signs point to preparations for a general counterattack. Heinrici very worried about ability of divisions to withstand a major Soviet offensive.

As a consequence Heinrici bombarded Army Group command and OKH with reinforcement requests, pointing out the low combat readiness of the divisions mauled by the Soviet counterattack in late September. 6 of his 12 divisions possessed less than 60 percent of their authorised infantry strength. 7th and 137th Infantry Division were even below 50 percent. Aside from LIII. AK none of 4th Army's corps were capable of conducting offensive operations. Realising the importance of the area held by 4th Army, von Kluge - its former commander - immediately ordered the replacement of two divisions by fresh units arriving from the West in the hope of securing the lines before the Soviets were ready.

Similar news arrived from Army Group South, where cavalry divisions were reported to mass around Levaya Rossosh, Svoboda and Stanichno-Luganskoe. In contrast to 4th Army, however, 6th and 17th Army were in a far better state and possessed enough room to maneuver for times of crisis.

Losses

With combat intensity dropping the losses also bottomed out. In the four October weeks the German forces suffered only 26.000 permanent losses, down from close to 60.000 in September. Artillery losses amounted to 708, while 383 AFVs were written off. The Luftwaffe registered 49 fighters and fighter bombers, 38 Stukas and 66 level bombers as lost. Additionally 56 reconnaissance craft and 7 transports failed to returns from their missions.

Soviet losses in October amounted to 29.879 killed in action with another 127.441 captured. 3.383 artillery pieces and 198 AFVs were also lost. The VVS meanwhile lost 370 fighters, 91 tactical bombers and 190 level bombers.

OOB

On 6th November 1941 the German forces in the East numbered 3.414.928 men, 34.906 guns, 2.687 AFVs (1.970 in panzer divisions) and 3.286 aircraft. Red Army strength on the other hand spiked with the lack of losses. By the first November week the Soviets had 4.956.962 men under arms, supported by 43.847 guns, 3.423 AFVs and 6.795 aircraft.

Heeresgruppe Nord (v. Leeb)

16. Armee (Busch) - 204.407 men, 2.130 guns, 0 AFVs
II. AK (v. Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt) - 4 infantry divisions
X. AK (Hansen) - 4 infantry divisions
LI. AK (Reinhard) - 4 infantry divisions

18. Armee (v. Küchler) - 224.221 men, 2.482 guns, 0 AFVs
VI. AK (Laux) - 3 infantry divisions
XXVI. AK (Wodrig) - 3 infantry divisions
XXVIII. AK (v. Wiktorin) - 3 infantry divisions
L. AK (Lindemann) - 3 infantry divisions

Panzergruppe 4 (Hoth) - 236.501 men, 2.464 guns, 732 AFVs
V. AK (Ruoff) - 4 infantry divisions
XXXX. AK (mot.) (Stumme) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 SS motorized brigade
XXXXI. AK (mot.) (Reinhardt) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorized division
LVI. AK (mot.) (Kirchner) - 1 panzer division, 1 motorized division, 1 SS division

Heeresgruppe Mitte (v. Bock)

2. Armee (v. Weichs) - 200.554 men, 2.228 guns, 34 AFVs
8. SS-K.B.
XII. AK (Marcks) - 4 infantry divisions
XIII. AK (Angelis) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXV. AK (Kämpfe) - 4 infantry divisions

4. Armee (Heinrici) - 207.068 men, 2.585 guns, 29 AFVs
VII. AK (Fahrmbacher) - 3 infantry divisions
IX. AK (Hell) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXXIII. AK (Rendulic) - 3 infantry divisions
LIII. AK (Weisenberger) - 3 infantry divisions

9. Armee (Strauss) - 241.112 men, 2.749 guns, 51 AFVs
VIII. AK (Heitz) - 3 infantry divisions
XX. AK (Materna) - 4 infantry divisions
XXIII. AK (Stemmermann) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXXII. AK (Mieth) - 3 infantry divisions

Panzergruppe 2 (Guderian) - 191.988 men, 2.032 guns, 666 AFVs
III. AK (mot.) (v. Mackensen) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorized division
XXIV. AK (mot.) (v. Schweppenburg) - 2 panzer divisions, 2 motorized divisions
XXXXVII. AK (mot.) (Lemelsen) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorized division

Panzergruppe 3 (v. Manstein) - 248.120 men, 2.614 guns, 613 AFVs
I. AK (Model) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXVIII. AK (v. Chappuis) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXIX. AK (mot.) (Schmidt) - 2 panzer divisions, 2 motorized divisions
LVII. AK (mot.) (v. Arnim) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorized division, 1 motorized brigade

Heeresgruppe Süd (v. Rundstedt)

6. Armee (v. Reichenau) - 245.667 men, 2.703 guns, 0 AFVs
XVII. AK (Schmidt) - 4 infantry divisions
XXIX. AK (v. Obstfelder) - 3 infantry divisions
XXXXIV. AK (v. d. Chevallerie) - 3 infantry divisions
LV. AK (Vierow) - 2 infantry divisions, 1 Slovakian division

11. Armee (v. Schobert) - 265.624 men, 2.701 guns, 21 AFVs
XI. AK (v. Kortzfleisch) - 3 infantry divisions
XXX. AK (v. Salmuth) - 2 infantry divisions, 1 airlanding division
XXXIV. AK (Hollidt) - 3 infantry divisions
LIV. AK (Hansen) - 3 infantry divisions

17. Armee (Hoepner) - 226.326 men, 2.598 guns, 76 AFVs
IV. AK (v. Schwedler) - 4 infantry divisions
XXXXIX. GK (Kübler) - 4 infantry divisions
LII. AK (v. Briesen) - 4 infantry divisions

Panzergruppe 1 (v. Kleist) - 196.405 men, 2.367 guns, 409 AFVs
XIV. AK (mot.) (v. Knobelsdorff) - 1 panzer division, 1 SS division, 1 SS motorized brigade, Großdeutschland, 1 Slovakian mobile division
XXXXVI. AK (mot.) (v. Vietinghoff) - 1 panzer division, 2 SS divisions
XXXXVIII. AK (mot). (Kempf) - 2 panzer divisions, 1 motorized division

Armata 3 (Dumitrescu) - 237.620 men, 2.118 guns, 110 AFVs
Corp. 1 (Ionescu) - 4 infantry divisions
Corp. 4 (Sanatescu) - 4 infantry divisions
Corp. de Munte (Avramescu) - 3 mountain brigades
Corp. de Cav. (Racovita) - 1 armoured division, 3 cavalry brigades

Armata 4 (Ciuperca) - 233.973 men, 1.905 guns, 4 AFVs
Corp. 2 (Macici) - 3 infantry divisions
Corp. 3 (Atanasiu) - 3 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry brigade
Corp. 5 (Levanti) - 3 infantry divisions
Corp. 11 (Constantinescu-Claps) - 1 infantry division, 2 infantry brigades

Gyorshadtest (Miklos) - 2 motorized brigades, 1 cavalry brigade

CSIR (Messe) - 2 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division

Economy

On 6th November 1941 the Germans had 76.770 men available, in addition to 148.717 units of armaments. More worrisome was the drop in vehicles due to the rasputitsa. For the first time in the war the Motor Pool dropped below its requirements with 168.000 compared to a need of 169.000. Vehicles in units were also nearly 4.000 short of the need.

[Gabriel B.]

the 41b cavalry division is a 4100 men ant, even due to blizard efects few of them get to see 2 on the counter , what makes it so dangerous is the ability to flip hexes and keep up with the tank brigades .

It is very tempting for SHC to push armored brigades in hexes the infantry cant get to , 2 tank brigades backed up by a cavalry division are very dificult to dislodge .

My advice is to brake up 1st mountain division into 3 regimental battle groups and asign them to 2aok, 2pz-aok ,4aok as a tactical
reserve , 4th mountain and the 3 romanian mountain brigades should be reasigned to 11 aok, 17aok, 1p-zaok, 6aok .

If the soviets do not build up all of their cavalry into corps , look for oportunities to hit them hard . Otherwise soviet tank brigades are generaly easy to dislodge even in december .

[SigUp]

I intend to use both mountain divisions in the area of AGC, bolstering the critical area from 4th to 2nd Army. I'm not that concerned about AGS as I expect to retreat to a line Taganrog - Gorlovka - Kharkov - Kursk anyway. Hopefully the three Rumanian mountain brigades, as well as the Hungarian one will provide enough of a boost. Furthermore one panzer corps each will be based in Stalino and Kharkov, so should the need arise they can be utilized for counterattacking purposes.

[jwolf]

Is it possible you could take Sevastopol before the winter?  It would sure be nice to simplify the front there.  It sounds like you're not going to attempt any serious push elsewhere during November?

[SigUp]

Sevastopol with the current forces absolutely not. Level 3 forts in rough terrain is no joke (36 CV). For Sevastopol to be taken I need at least another German infantry corps. Perhaps I'll think about it in 1942.

[SigUp]

Turn 21: 6th November 1941 - 12th November 1941



Beginning on 6th November 1941 the temperature in the area between Lake Ladoga and Voronezh suddenly fell sharply below zero degrees. Combined with snowfall the ground that had been muddy froze solid in a matter of two nights. The German forces were quick to capitalize on the improved conditions and relaunched their offensive. However, times had changed and the width of the German assault was severely narrowed. The only place where the German assault exceeded tactical character was Kaluga.

Here on a width of only 60 miles 19 German divisions were massed for a concentrated breakthrough of the heavily fortified Soviet lines. On 7th November XX. AK opened the offensive by penetrating 20th Army's lines east of Mozhaysk. Supported by heavy Luftwaffe bombings the Soviet forces were forced to withdraw by noon of the following day. Next the corps proceeded to roll up the flanks of 33rd Army's units to its south. Despite the intervention of 3rd Tank Brigade the two Soviet divisions holding that sector broke under the pressure and retreated eastwards on 10th November.

Just north of Kaluga 3rd Panzer Group began its operations on 8th November under the watchful leadership of the new commander von Manstein. Spearheaded by LVII. AK (mot.), supported by VIII. and XXXVIII. AK the Soviet lines held by 4th, 13th and 33rd Army were pierced after heavy fightings by the evening of 9th November. XXXIX. AK (mot.), the operational reserve of 3rd Panzer Group, was committed into that breach and pushed the lines a further 20 miles to the east. By 12th November Kaluga was under siege by Heinrici's 4th Army and the road to the Nara lay open.

However, the same improved conditions enabled the Soviets to pounce on weakened German units and all six major Soviet attacks succeded in pushing back the German divisions. East of Peremyshl 167th and 292nd Infantry Division were unable to withstand the pressure by the Soviet 3rd and 10th Army and had to concede defeat. Meanwhile three of 2nd Army's divisions were beaten by Soviet attacks between Teploe and Livny. Finally a surprise attack by 12th Army near Voronezh stunned 298th Infantry Division, which had to give up its positions at the Don. [Note]

In the South the front was relatively calm with the only major operation being the offensive by XI. AK to close in on Voroshilovgrad.

[Note: I should have known better by now and stacked the divisions, although I didn't expect loki to attack in an attempt to draw out my panzer divisions. Still, extremely frustrating to see that out of 6 attacks 5 were won by the +1 odds rule.]

[SigUp]

Turn 22: 13th November 1941 - 19th November 1941

The third November week saw a significant calming of operations in the Eastern theatre with the sole exception of Kaluga. After two days of rest von Manstein restarted the offensive with XXXIX., LVII. AK (mot.) and VIII. AK borrowed from 9th Army. The first German blow struck 4th Army's 143rd, 148th Rifle Division and 52nd Tank Division just northwest of Kaluga. Heavy artillery and Luftwaffe strikes paved the way for 28th Infantry and 7th Flieger Division leading the assault. Under heavy losses they scored a breach of four miles depth into the Soviet defenses and by the evening of 14th November the Soviets were forced to committ 52nd Tank Division to stop the breakthrough. Short on reserves, the tired out Soviet divisions were then unable to withstand 7th Panzer Division's attack the following morning and a few hours later the Soviets were routed, losing over 4.000 men and 70 out of 85 tanks. The second German blow came in the afternoon of 14th November to the northeast of Kaluga where 14th Motorized, 20th Panzer and 28th Infantry Division hammered the Soviet lines supported by 648 guns. By the 16th the Soviet forces were driven back and Kaluga itself became the target of German attacks.

The original plan envisioned an encirclement operation, but by this time it had become apparent that the Soviet resistance was too stubborn for an encirclement to deliver timely results. Thus the battle for Kaluga was opened on 16th November with a massive Luftwaffe bombing and the assault of five infantry divisions from 4th Army from three sides. The Soviet 160th, 312th and 350th Rifle Divisions put up heavy resistance and on the first day the Germans were unable to gain more than two miles of ground. Matters changed fast, however, on the next day when 12th Panzer and 20th Motorized Division pushed into the rear of the Soviet forces after the opening German attacks left Kaluga nearly encircled with only a ten miles wide corridor connecting Kaluga with the rest of the Soviet front. Panicked the Soviet troops began to disintegrate, while Kaluga was reduced to rubble by shells from 1.350 German guns. On 19th November Heinrici reported to von Bock that resistance had ceased in Kaluga. In the wake of this result STAVKA ordered Soviet forces from Kaluga down to Alekseevka in the South to disengage from the German forces in order to recuperate and save their strength.

The German commanders carefully registered this development and concluded that the Red Army was preparing for a massive counteroffensive. Signal intelligence, captured Red Army soldiers and aerial reconnaissance indicated that possibly 70 percent of the Soviet forces were directly facing Army Group centre. Guderian for example warned that his troops were too weak to withstand a massed Soviet counteroffensive with the intent of recapturing Orel in the long term. Meanwhile Strauss pulled two divisions out of the frontline for refits in anticipation of Soviet pressure. Hitler, however, was having none of this. In a conversation with staff chief von Kluge he accused the generals of being paranoid and seeing ghosts, impressed like school children by Potemkin villages. But even die-hard supporters within the army were voicing their doubts, as exemplified by 6th Army's commander von Reichenau who reported to his superior von Rundstedt on 18th November 1941:

Five months of heavy fighting have left our units weary and exhausted. With the front stretching thus far out 6th Army has lost the ability to conduct offensive operations on an operational scale. Furthermore the weather is becoming worse by the hour. The freezing temperatures are taking a heavy toll on equipment and men, who are still dressed in their summer uniforms. Therefore news of a buildup of fresh Soviet forces across the Don river are highly disturbing. Especially the presence of an estimated 12 cavalry divisions indicates an offensive intent. I firmly believe in the superiority of our soldiers, but with the current situation a Soviet offensive will be hard to stop in the current lines. Therefore I have taken the liberty and passed the order that heavy equipment be maintained in a mobile state, in case a need for operational evasive maneuvers should arise.

[Sorry, no map this time, just not enough changes to warrant that. Next time will see a map detailing possible lines in the rear that are to be held.]

[jwolf]

Well done on the conquest of Kaluga; I had read that in Loki's AAR and was curious how you would describe it.  I really like the flavor you give to some of the epic battles, picturing them as successive commitments on both sides of additional divisions in a desperate drive to turn the tide.

With two more turns in November I hope you're able to get firmly dug in before the Russians strike.  Do you expect any more offensive operations during the next two turns, or will you just hit his line where you can, without advancing?

[SigUp]

No operative offensives anymore. Time just not enough to set them up with breakthroughs etc. As for pounding deliberate attacks just to whittle down Red Army strength, I would love to. Unfortunately his disengagement has robbed me of the opportunity. With snow just not enough mobility to get in, hammer out a deliberate attack and get out. I don't want to leave my units possibly exposed for counterattacks. North of Kaluga a couple of strikes may be possible. Aside from that I'll probably start pulling units (my 6 high morale infantry divisions if I. and XX. AK and selected panzer formations) into cities in the rear.

[Gabriel B.]

Good leaders are the key in my view.
Failed admin/ combat checks is something you can ill aford during blizard turns.

Panzer commanders have generaly also good infantry skils, so it cost efective to give them some infantry divisions ,
while depriving less than stellar corps leaders of combat units.

[SigUp]

Thanks for the advice. Last turn I already began switching out some leaders with low morale values. In terms of infantry skills the lowest ranked are 6.

[STEF78]

Very interesting AAR, your maps are wonderful and your comments very useful!

Good luck for the blizzard [;)]

[SigUp]

Thanks. [:)]

Right now I'm a bit delayed on the next turn due to work reasons. Guess tomorrow the next part of the AAR will be up and the last pre-blizzard turn done. I'm not really that confident going in, just too many Russians. Incredible how the Red Army blows up if you don't inflict 100.000 plus casualties a turn. [X(]

[STEF78]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

I'm not really that confident going in, just too many Russians. Incredible how the Red Army blows up if you don't inflict 100.000 plus casualties a turn. [X(]

That's true but reduced blizzatf gives a very exciting and fun winter 41/42. Nothing to see with "old blizzard"

[Gabriel B.]

can you post the list of destroyed soviet formations ?

[jwolf]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

I'm not really that confident going in, just too many Russians. Incredible how the Red Army blows up if you don't inflict 100.000 plus casualties a turn.

I've only played the AI, but yes, this is very discouraging. Even with the Reds just about totally destroyed, with the front past the Volga, a few mud turns will get their numbers back up miraculously. And it never works that way for the Germans!

Good luck with your winter preparations.

[SigUp]

Turn 23: 20th November 1941 - 26th November 1941

In late November 1941 the signs for a Soviet winter offensive mounted and sent German frontline commanders in a heavy commotion. Despite Hitler's insistence on the Soviet buildup being a mirage, staff chief von Kluge ordered the army group commanders to deliver a report detailing Soviet buildups, anticipated offensives and planned German countermeasures by 25th November.

Army Group North

North of Moscow von Leeb was confidently looking ahead into December. Soviet troops facing the Finns and 16th Army were weak, while the positions were well fortified. 18th Army's lines were not as well secured, but von Küchler doubted his army would be a focus of a Russian winter offensive. Furthermore the location of a mobile corps at Rzhev meant that a breakthrough could be sealed off without too much damage.

Army Group Centre



The most concerning area of the front in late November was the area of von Bock's Army Group Centre, where German intelligence and reconnaissance made out large numbers of Soviet reserve units in the rear. Five full fronts, parts of an additional one and the troops of the Moscow Military District were facing Army Group Centre's three armies and three panzer groups. The biggest buildup of units occured in the Tula sector where prisoner interrogations revealed troops redirected from Leningrad front after the Valdai fell to German forces in October. Von Bock and his army commanders came to the conclusion that the biggest strike would probably occur here with 4th Army and 2nd Panzer Army being the recipient of it. Additionally major offensives were anticipated against 4th Panzer Group at Klin and 2nd Army near Livny.

To prepare for the imminent threat von Bock ordered various formations - first and foremost mobile divisions - to be pulled out of the front to serve as local and operational reserves. Of 4th Panzer Group's three armoured corps two were pulled into reserve positions at Rzhev and Volokolamsk with the remaining one backing up infantry positions at Klin. Von Manstein meanwhile pulled the two mobile corps of his 3rd Panzer Group into Kaluga and Mozhaysk. This luxury was not possible for Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, which had to keep most of its fast divisions in the frontline to strengthen the infantry forces that were badly shaken by Soviet counterattacks the previous months. To serve as operational reserves the elite infantry formations of I. and XX. AK were also pulled out.

In terms of defensive preparations the German commanders were prepared to offer harsh resistance to every Soviet breakthrough attempt. Von Bock and his subordinates agreed that a preventive retreat was unnecessary and possibly dangerous to morale. [Note 1] Additionally rear area fortifications were prepared by 3rd Panzer Group stretching from Mozhaysk to Kaluga, while another defensive line was located between Orel and Kursk.

Army Group South



In the South von Rundstedt was less worried about Soviet prospects. Though Soviet buildups south of Voronezh had him and von Reichenau on high alert, the overall state of Army Group South was more optimistic by his estimations. The main thrusts was most likely to come against 6th Army's bulge with perhaps an attempt to separate it from Army Group Centre's 2nd Army. Additionally a major attack was probable against 17th Army's positions north of Voroshilovgrad.

To counter the threat von Reichenau proposed a retreat towards Oskol as soon as the Soviet offensive was launched, while the armies further south would hold their lines. To cover for eventualities von Kleist's 1st Panzer Group was split up. One corps each would be located at Kursk, Stary Oskol and Dybaltsevo.

More concerning than the situation on the mainland,however, was the front at the straits of Kerch where the Rumanians were exhausted. Three weak divisions were holding Kerch, while another corps as fortifying positions at Ak-Manay. Ciuperca was not confident of his troops ability to hold back a serious Soviet crossing attempt and therefore LIV. AK pulled two German divisions out of the frontline near Sevastopol and put them into reserve in Simferopol.

Other news

On 23rd November 1941 the commander of IV. AK von Schwedler suffered a heart attack while on an inspection tour. His replacement was Generalleutnant Kurt Herzog. Two days later Ion Antonescu gave up command of his army group to Iosif Iacobici to focus on the political leadership of his country. [Note 2]

[Note 1: North of Kaluga I trust my defenses and the terrain to eliminate the need for a runaway, south of Kaluga I don't have the terrain to run. 4th Army and 2nd Panzer Group will probably be badly mauled, but I don't think I can afford the Soviets to run into the open field west of the Oka all too fast.]

[Note 2: Antonescu was killed in action, but I find this pretty implausible.]

[SigUp]

And here are the destroyed formations for Gabriel: