Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Gary Grigsby’s War in the East: The German-Soviet War 1941-1945 is a turn-based World War II strategy game stretching across the entire Eastern Front. Gamers can engage in an epic campaign, including division-sized battles with realistic and historical terrain, weather, orders of battle, logistics and combat results.

The critically and fan-acclaimed Eastern Front mega-game Gary Grigsby’s War in the East just got bigger and better with Gary Grigsby’s War in the East: Don to the Danube! This expansion to the award-winning War in the East comes with a wide array of later war scenarios ranging from short but intense 6 turn bouts like the Battle for Kharkov (1942) to immense 37-turn engagements taking place across multiple nations like Drama on the Danube (Summer 1944 – Spring 1945).

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loki100
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by loki100 »

I think this is a mix of both your points.

The Germans wanted to believe that the main offensive would come from Koniev's 1 Ukrainian at Lvov. Mainly as this appeared to be the obvious threat. Once they had understood Soviet intentions that way, then reports of Soviet build ups in Bielorussian could be dimissed as either deception or seen as evidence that the Soviets planned secondary attacks to hold AGC in place, and draw in its reserves, to ease the task for Koniev.

I think this is akin to Stalin's reading of the opening phase of Blau. To him, a German lunge for Moscow was so obviously what they *should* have done that any move in the south was either a deception, or a precursor. Its not beyond belief that a drive to Voronezh could have been an attempt to outflank the formidable Soviet defenses on the direct road to Moscow.

My academic specialism is in aspects of decision making, and especially the way we all tend to come to a belief and then find the evidence. Around Bagration, Soviet planning made it very easy for the Germans to believe exactly what they really wanted to believe. A flaw that afflicted both sides (and most armies) but one the Nazi regime seemed especially prone to.
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mmarquo
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by mmarquo »

loki100,

You may want to read, "Hitler's Stalingrad Decisions," by Geoffrey Jukes. An amazing and erudite analysis of Hilter's decision making for Fall Blau.

An interesting observation: psychorigidity and Bagration went hand in hand with psychorigidity and Normandy at the same moment in time. In both cases there was failure to correctly interpret the main axis of attack.

Marquo
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: Marquo

loki100,

You may want to read, "Hitler's Stalingrad Decisions," by Geoffrey Jukes. An amazing and erudite analysis of Hilter's decision making for Fall Blau.

An interesting observation: psychorigidity and Bagration went hand in hand with psychorigidity and Normandy at the same moment in time. In both cases there was failure to correctly interpret the main axis of attack.

Marquo


Looks fascinating, I'll see if I can access a full copy somehow.

The basic approach of deciding what you want to happen, and then forming everything to enable that outcome, sits at the core of German planning for Barbarossa. They knew they couldn't ship enough men, weapons and supply forward to also be able to deliver sufficient winter gear - so they assumed the campaign would be over by winter. To achieve this, they then had to assume a Red Army of a particular size and competence so that they could stick to such a timescale and so on.

Given such huge flaws, the surprise isn't that they failed - its how far they got.

In particular I don't believe there is any reason to believe the ferocity of a Russian winter took them by surprise. A lot of senior officers had served in Russia during WW1, more had trained in the USSR during the Weimar period. They had conducted joint exercises with the Finnish army. It wasn't a surprise, just that all their assumptions were that the campaign should have been over before it struck.
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Aurelian »

ORIGINAL: loki100
In particular I don't believe there is any reason to believe the ferocity of a Russian winter took them by surprise. A lot of senior officers had served in Russia during WW1, more had trained in the USSR during the Weimar period. They had conducted joint exercises with the Finnish army. It wasn't a surprise, just that all their assumptions were that the campaign should have been over before it struck.

Why not? The Russians themselves were not equipped for the winter war with Finland. But they learned from it
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by JJKettunen »

ORIGINAL: fbs
They ran from Napoleon, even gave Moscow away, and that was a successful strategy. Then they ran again in 1942 to Stalingrad, and once again that was successful.

They didn't ran in 1942. It is an old myth, rebutted by Glantz.
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by mmarquo »

Hell, they even went on the offensive at Kharkov and through the timing for Blau off...
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by SigUp »

Although the Izyum-Kharkov offensive was a disaster for the Soviets. When the battle ended, the Germans had achieved the aim they had intended with Fridericus through their counterattack and weakened the Red Army in this area.
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by loki100 »

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

ORIGINAL: loki100
In particular I don't believe there is any reason to believe the ferocity of a Russian winter took them by surprise. A lot of senior officers had served in Russia during WW1, more had trained in the USSR during the Weimar period. They had conducted joint exercises with the Finnish army. It wasn't a surprise, just that all their assumptions were that the campaign should have been over before it struck.

Why not? The Russians themselves were not equipped for the winter war with Finland. But they learned from it

sorry, bit of a clumsy phrasing in my original. What I meant to say was the Germans knew full well how brutal the Russian Winter would be, but realised they couldn't prepare for it (ie their logistics were stretched to the limit with normal resupply). In their planning, they got around this by assuming the Red Army would have collapsed before they would have to engage in winter battles.

Open to correction on this, but I'm not so sure the Soviet winter tactics in 1941 were that brilliant. I seem to recall that Kalinin Front opened with about 30 AFVs, few of them T-34s. The T-26s had few advantages on snow and in the defensive battles there are reports of the Soviets using tractors to tow KV-1s into position.

The Soviets had major problems with supply, but at an individual level had the equipment needed to survive the winter temperatures, even if not the doctrine to fight effectively in those conditions
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Walloc »

ORIGINAL: Keke

ORIGINAL: fbs
They ran from Napoleon, even gave Moscow away, and that was a successful strategy. Then they ran again in 1942 to Stalingrad, and once again that was successful.

They didn't ran in 1942. It is an old myth, rebutted by Glantz.

Yes, but he also in the same sentences reveal other things. Like the fact that the pockets of teh summer of 42 was much more lose cuz of few men in the german formations /density of troops, so that overall 70% of the russians "pocketed" escaped. Unlike the pockets of 41 and early 42.

Kind regards,

Rasmus
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Aurelian »

ORIGINAL: loki100

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

ORIGINAL: loki100
In particular I don't believe there is any reason to believe the ferocity of a Russian winter took them by surprise. A lot of senior officers had served in Russia during WW1, more had trained in the USSR during the Weimar period. They had conducted joint exercises with the Finnish army. It wasn't a surprise, just that all their assumptions were that the campaign should have been over before it struck.

Why not? The Russians themselves were not equipped for the winter war with Finland. But they learned from it

sorry, bit of a clumsy phrasing in my original. What I meant to say was the Germans knew full well how brutal the Russian Winter would be, but realised they couldn't prepare for it (ie their logistics were stretched to the limit with normal resupply). In their planning, they got around this by assuming the Red Army would have collapsed before they would have to engage in winter battles.

Open to correction on this, but I'm not so sure the Soviet winter tactics in 1941 were that brilliant. I seem to recall that Kalinin Front opened with about 30 AFVs, few of them T-34s. The T-26s had few advantages on snow and in the defensive battles there are reports of the Soviets using tractors to tow KV-1s into position.

The Soviets had major problems with supply, but at an individual level had the equipment needed to survive the winter temperatures, even if not the doctrine to fight effectively in those conditions

I'm not sure that they did know. Sure, they had to win fast or not at all. (One reason being the desire to shift resources to fend off the US/UK bombing campaign. Wages of Destruction is well worth the read.).

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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by mmarquo »

Even so, the point is that the Soviet were not simply running in 1942, they were also attacking.

[:)]
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Aurelian »

ORIGINAL: Marquo

Even so, the point is that the Soviet were not simply running in 1942, they were also attacking.

[:)]

Yes they were. And without flying gas tanks [:D]
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Schmart »

ORIGINAL: Marquo

Even so, the point is that the Soviet were not simply running in 1942, they were also attacking.

[:)]


That is another element that is missing from WITE: All the failed Russian attacks and attempted offensives in 1942. Russian players tend to sit back and fight to absorb the Axis 1942 offensives, gathering their strength for 1943 and beyond. But in reality, the Russians launched numerous attacks during 1942, most of which failed and cost heavy casualties but did draw off some German reserves, resources, and attention. This may be largely the 'Stalin Factor' at work and obviously not easy to portray in a game. Maybe Russian players haven't yet learned how to carry out such holding or draining attacks in 1942, but does the game system allow for it? I wonder if the somewhat underrated Russian manpower replacement system in WITE tries to take into account that pretty much no Russian player is going to conduct a bunch of failed offensives in 1942...
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Michael T »

I think it is only now that the game is finally roughly balanced with the use of the Sudden Death scenario with some HR SD rules for 41 as well thrown in. Unfortunately most of the Vet's have moved on now. So the chances of seeing a top level encounter are slim. I think a game with the SD scenario between two class players would yield the kind of warfare in 1942 that you describe.
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Bozo_the_Clown »

That is another element that is missing from WITE: All the failed Russian attacks and attempted offensives in 1942. Russian players tend to sit back and fight to absorb the Axis 1942 offensives, gathering their strength for 1943 and beyond. But in reality, the Russians launched numerous attacks during 1942, most of which failed and cost heavy casualties but did draw off some German reserves, resources, and attention. This may be largely the 'Stalin Factor' at work and obviously not easy to portray in a game. Maybe Russian players haven't yet learned how to carry out such holding or draining attacks in 1942, but does the game system allow for it? I wonder if the somewhat underrated Russian manpower replacement system in WITE tries to take into account that pretty much no Russian player is going to conduct a bunch of failed offensives in 1942...

I'm playing a game right now in which I fight back in 42 like hell. So it's definitely possible. I don't know why a Soviet player would want to simply retreat in 42. You can mount a nice offensive with a hand full of rifle corps and two or three tank corps.
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by mmarquo »

ORIGINAL: Michael T

I think it is only now that the game is finally roughly balanced with the use of the Sudden Death scenario with some HR SD rules for 41 as well thrown in. Unfortunately most of the Vet's have moved on now. So the chances of seeing a top level encounter are slim. I think a game with the SD scenario between two class players would yield the kind of warfare in 1942 that you describe.

I believe that most Soviet players do make opportunity attacks in 1942; but sustained offensives like Kharkov '42 are very risky.

Where have the other vets gone? What are they playing?
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by chaos45 »

okay this forums super pisses me off I type something up go to submit and it shoots a time out error erasing what I typed...really need to fix that.

Glantz STalingrad series going to make it short since stupid server wiped me out after being meticulous.

5.9 million soviets may 1942- deployable

6 million casualties- 3.5 million dead/captured/missing

4.3 million soviets Jan 1942- deployable- doubt you will ever see a soviet army that small in the game


Germans:

2.5 million- April 1942

1 million axis allied April 1942

approx 1 million german losses by 1Jan 1942- about right many sick to recover from the winter Im sure.

Draft call of almost 400,000 Germans alone in DEC1941- puts them in units right about april/may 1942 I would guess and why the German army was able to rebuild so quickly esp with sick/wounded returning as well.

Lots more reading to do but found the statistics interesting considering this is supposed to be one of the most well researched books on the topic using both German and Soviet records to date.
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Gabriel B. »

ORIGINAL: chaos45

1 million axis allied April 1942.

No. That is just creative math, not soldiers at the front .
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Walloc »

ORIGINAL: chaos45

okay this forums super pisses me off I type something up go to submit and it shoots a time out error erasing what I typed...really need to fix that.

Control A - Control C is a common pratice on these forums before hitting the send button. U not the first to experience this.
Glantz STalingrad series going to make it short since stupid server wiped me out after being meticulous.

5.9 million soviets may 1942- deployable

6 million casualties- 3.5 million dead/captured/missing

4.3 million soviets Jan 1942- deployable- doubt you will ever see a soviet army that small in the game

Do the russian armies gets to large generally speaking yes but they arent the only ones. One can question ask ur self as the russian player know that the german army is aslo inflated that u hafta preemptively counteract this and try and save as much as possible in 1941 in part leading to runs. Ur mobiblization/replacement numbers wont do this for u.

As u noted earlier yes the russians do take few casulties when attacking later on. As Sigup showed u that isnt exclusive to teh russian the germans take far few casulties too in 1941. AS is the case of 50% lower than historic if u use ur own 500k number. This is by numbers that has been researched in the 00es by the Bundeswehr research department(BBND). Which have bene hard at work revising numbers including such work as dr Rüdiger Overmans. Hard to call those soviet revisionists...
Not only that the russian get less in kickbacks and when u look at the number u actually mobilize on teh russian side in history and in game it falls far short of the historic. So yes u take fewer casulties attacking and i wrote an synopis on the issues of the combat engine a year or year and a half ago u coudl possibly go back and look at. This goes for both sides but as russian presumably will attack for longer and the numbers are higher it doesnt necesarrily equals out.

So in some sense tho as u can argue u do see larger russian armies than historic the lower casulties has to some extend by counteracted by designers to give the russians far less replacement than historic. Tho not to an extend that u see historic russian OOB numbers. Again this isnt exclusive to teh russian side and u could see it as a countermessaure by the russian player to what happens on the german side.
Also u talk alot of how the germans could have done better. A typical error in what if is is not to take into account that the otehr side might have done things differently too. If u allow the german player to "correct soem of what u see as historic mistakes". Well the russian player might do the same. Why launch all of the spoiling attack of Stalins, Why get overextended as the likes of the situasion that sets up 3rd Kharkov. If u dont u take fewer losses too. So u go to some length to tell about what the german could have done differently but fail to take the same into account on the russian side. Who says if u allowed as german to use different tactis that the russian player doesnt follow suit and alters his. That he doesnt make the same historical mistakes nor on the russian side. if we assume they indeed are mistakes. I mean u started the what if situasion and allows for it on one side to change its stuff.

About the numbers u cite. On the russian side there has been research too and since its one of Peltons favorit books to use and u dont think we can call him a soviet revisionist i suggest u look into the work of such as G. I. Krivosheev. He gives some what different numbers in 1941 than previously thot tho he isnt shy on upping later on.
He also go into length about teh russian mobilization numbers that in game is pretty far from his numbers.
Germans:

2.5 million- April 1942

1 million axis allied April 1942

approx 1 million german losses by 1Jan 1942- about right many sick to recover from the winter Im sure.

Draft call of almost 400,000 Germans alone in DEC1941- puts them in units right about april/may 1942 I would guess and why the German army was able to rebuild so quickly esp with sick/wounded returning as well.

Lots more reading to do but found the statistics interesting considering this is supposed to be one of the most well researched books on the topic using both German and Soviet records to date.

Yes and then there is the ingame realities. I suggest reading a thread.
tm.asp?m=3386083&mpage=2&key=

The german side in game atm doesnt only take far fewer casulties in 1941 and they also gain manpower at a rate that is higher than historic. Which as noted in the thread it isnt unusal to seea a pre Blau in game german only OOB numbers of 3.6-3.7m range. The lower end of scale when every thign goes wrong is numbers is 3.2-3.3m. Still a good number over the historic ones and even the games own 42 scn.

So there is an automacy in that cuz of the above reasons that the german army gets inflated. If u give teh german army 700k-800 more troops well u know as russian in order to compete in 42 that u better have a larger than historic army too. If we assumed u had a near historic army and the possible larger german army then along with axis minor u not far from having parity in numbers come summer of 42 in game. Sure its a axis side wet dream but it isnt a particular historic situasion. In where the german side had to steal and borrow from AGN/AGC to make an offensive in AGS possible. A situasion that is hard to show when u in no way are nearly as depleted through taking fewer losses and gaining more Manpower of the german side than historic If u had had historic situasions where german army come Blau u could have put 700-800k more men into Blau, how would it have fared?

Ur premise about the german army ability to recover is simply off base. The german army except for a few Month during the mud periode in spring mud of 42 and 43 was in continual decline. The numbers that come back to the german army is fairly consitandly always lower than those that leave. U can say sure but u could do better a german in 41 and thst is right but as shown in the other thread. U Manpower input doesnt compute to the historic ones so u with an automacy is going to do better Manpower wise and the isses of to low casulties attacking that hits teh russian later on is teh same for the germans in 41/42.
Look at fb.asp?m=3394514
and u can get numbers and charts beyound march 42 at: ww2stats.com
Again this is BBND and OKW/OKH numbers.
A general error that had had becomed teh norm until recently when talking german losses was only to look at numbers for "blutige verlüste" which doesnt include for example sick, frontbits and other causes that woudl else fall under nomral attritional effects. Whether u leave ur unit and may or may not come back from projectile wound or from a case of trenchfoot doesnt really matter to OOB numbers but if u only include half in ur losses estimate, well ur numbers are going to get scewed. So many times the number used in books is based purely on the "blutige verlüste" but that isnt a real messure of what the german actualy lost in strength.

In game we see german armies in early/mid 43 of 4.3m. So in short many of the reaons of the combat engine things that causes lower russian casulties affects the german army the same and it gets larger than historic and u dont have much choice but to follow suit as russian.
That dosnt mean u not right in that the combat engine isnt flawed if u ask me. I how ever dont share the conconclusions u draw from that as u dont seem to look at what the same isues does to the german side.
Futher some of ur lines of thots and views on what history was like. Seems to emminate from the book like Paul Carrells and other based on 1970ies research and if that is what ur read it might be perfectly understandble. Which again toke alot of its information directly from interviews and memories of the german generals from the 1950ies. 1st hand sources what could be better....

Problem is that later research has looked critically at alot of the statements that drove the 1970ies books( i generalize) and prove them to misleading at best and higly inaccurate at worst. Then those "primary sources" tend to put alot of blame om Hitler and very little on them selfs. That migth be understable from a psycological perpespective but doesnt necesarrily make it right. Nor do many of them spend much if any times on the logistical side of things but rather on their real superiority in tactics/operations, but an army marches on its stomach or it dont march at all. One in reality makes the other a possibility or not as teh case might be and if the one is flawed it put its limits on the other. No where is there any real answers to those issues from these primary sources.

If i were u i would for example read up on some of newer books on AGN in 42 and 43. A time where teh german "easily" resplused the soviet offensives and overall the defensive strategy worked. Non the less if u look into the revised casulty numbers of the troops involved overall in these operations. Sure russians toke more casulties, but it cant just have been a question of german annihilating the russian formations, with no losses to them self. Not that it cant have happned in cases but overall the casulty comparison simply makes it so, that it overall cant be true. This in a case that perfectly fits ur premise of ur defensive strategy and u dont have losses like AGCs destruction to scew the numbers towards the russians.


With newer resaearch primarily from 1990 and on there appaeare lots of flaws and inaccuracies if u wana put it mildly. What one general as Bayerlein descripes and what he gives as casulties for Pz Lehr on its way to Normandy isnt in line with the his divisonal records, actually fairly far from it, and that funnily enough he him self have sign off on those records back in 1944. That isnt to saay it disnt slow Pz Lehr and it didnt have its effects on the advances it certainly did, but the extend of such isnt always factually in line with the statements. So when ppl have started to look some what critially on the statements from these primary sources and looked at what the germans own records tells it doesnt always looks the same.

Kind regards,

Rasmus
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RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

Post by Bozo_the_Clown »

So what is considered the perfect size of the Soviet army in the game? I'm currently at turn 60 in one of my games and I have 8.3 million troops. I'm not building any more divisions. Just combining divisions into rifle corps and loading those up with support units. Also, I've only build 5 tank corps. And I've put many tank brigades on static. Therefore, I have 200k vehicles while I only need 130k. I kind of don't want my army to grow bigger and bigger but it happens anyway. [&:] Where are all these troops going if I don't build new divisions? How can I stop my army from growing in to a 12 million behemoth?

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