Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run?

[rmonical]

We are just in December in my first CGas Soviets. We started with the moral inflicted version (.08?) and upgraded to .10 a few turns ago. I defended forward with the expected ineptness. 2.2 million captured to date. A number of divisions lost in November that had been pocketed earlier. I held Lenningrad (a priority) and Moscow. He sent two corps from PG2 south and took Rostov. He successfully raided Stalino and Tula even though I could see it coming. He pinned Stalino on T12. I defended vigorously and the Stalino fell on T22. That and associated pockets became part of the November division/brigade loss of 60. To get that kill he may have overstayed and it looks like I'll get a few divisions in return. I have not assessed the full impact of .10 yet, but I have a lot of divisions in the rear sitting at 45 morale. I think this is the level they go into combat now . I used to wait until 47 or more.

With that experience base, I do not see how the Soviets can execute their historical operations against a competent German player who roughly follows the historical script and achieve anything like historical results. The German losses will still be much lower and the Soviet losses much higher than historical.

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: Bozo_the_Clown
I really made an impression on you with that Tambov move. [:)] However, in that game my opponent just retreated, retreated, retreated. He gave up everything without a fight. Even Leningrad was barely defended. The slightest threat of a pocket was answered with a full retreat of the entire front. It was a perfect example of a Soviet player preserving his troops and simply waiting for the blizzard. I believe in the entire game there was only one counterattack on turn 16. Not much fun but very effective.

That's why this game needs more shooting squads...

[The Guru]

Me, I favor hitting the side that runs with random general reassignments and a hefty AP hit. Your perfect command arrangements will be...rearranged by Stalin or Hitler. And the AP hit means you'll be stuck with their pet generals for a bit.

The AP hit alone should be a big deterrent to running on the Soviet side. For the Germans, not quite so much, but still.

It's a very interesting idea, but I can hardly imagine the Soviet generals ordering and implementing a massive strategic retreat against Stalin orders, and then be shot as expected.
The level of generalized desobedience at all echelons that that would require would probably mean that Stalin actually no longer rules the game.

I would go for a combination of SD conditions at various stages of the campaign, PLUS National Morale penalties & AP.

The National Morale penalties seeem to me to be a most justifiale countermeasure as they are both highly realistic ( no sure how confident the average Soviet soldier would feel if the whole of Russia was being overrun without reaction, or teh average German soldier if the invincible Wehrmacht was suddenly to pull ack thousands of km westwards) and would provide string game incentive, as a plummeting National Morale could well irretrievably activate the downward spiral of defeat

[Wiking SS]

The Soviet AI runs away (except for zoc-locked units)if you don't do a Lvov pocket.

[mmarquo]

Maybe an answer to the blizzard is to obligate the Soviet player to do at least one HQ build-up every turn he does full, non-hasty attacks; this will drain AP's and trucks...

[Ketza]

The best way to handle the Blizzard in my opinion is like the old GDW game Fire in the east. Certain Soviet units received a "winterized" bonus such as mountain units and units from Siberia. Certain Axis units such as mountain and SS had the same bonus. This bonus was a +2 offensive or -2 defensive on the CRT which was very substantial.

Typically as a Soviet you could scrape together enough winterized guys to fill up one front and deliver a sizable punch in that area. As the Axis you really didn't have enough winterized units for an offensive but if you had them in the right place you could somewhat blunt the Soviet offensive.

[Flaviusx]

The old FITE gimmick was just that, a gimmick. Not the right way to deal with this. There were limits on Soviet offensive ability, but this wasn't because they had some arbitrary number of winterized units.

If you're going to limit something, go with HQs, somehow, not units as such. The Red Army entered the winter scraping the barrel in terms of firepower, ammo, logistical support generally. They didn't the ooomph to make things happen across the entire front. So only those units led by a limited number of HQs could undertake full offensive operations.

The other thing I'm having problems with is the way the blizzard nixes the German ability to counterattack in a totally undifferentiated manner. That's not right. Once again, this is an artifact of the way the blizzard is applied globally rather than on a unit basis or with regards to the individual circumstances of any given unit.

Everybody gets hit with all the penalties regardless, and these are so severe that they overwhelm the minor ways the Axis can mitigate the blizzard under existing rules.

Then there is the distance issue: the Axis turns into a pumpkin the moment it crosses Poland. (Hence Pelton's infamous runaway.) That's way too binary. The situation should gradually worsen the further east you go, not turn the dial at 11 when you cross the border. Particularly overextended units (like the historical AGC) would get it the worst, but an AGN ought to take it in some stride, for example, given the early winter quarters, better supply situation, etc. Even AGS did reasonably well once it fell back to the Mius, which is hardly near Poland.

[Great_Ajax]

The successful Soviet winter 1941 counteroffensive was due to five things:

1. The barely functioning German supply system was completely immobilized when the blizzard hit.
2. Poor weather grounded the Luftwaffe which was decisive in countering previous Soviet attacks.
3. German infantry strength was less than 50% - could not effectively employ its doctrinal elastic defense due to shortage of infantry.
4. Low amounts of armored vehicles and aircraft due to logistics (no repair parts or replacements).
5. German intelligence failed to detect a larger offensive (underestimated the Soviets).

How the Germans stopped the Winter counteroffensive:

1. Stopped elastic defenses in favor of static strongpoints. This worked for two reasons - German resolve and Soviet disorganization.
2. Static strongpoints provided Germans with shelter against the blizzard.
3. Commitment of additional Luftwaffe aircraft once the weather cleared.
4. Poor Soviet logistical support and organization.

Reasons against a strategic withdrawal in which some were discussed:

1. Lack of transport meant that artillery and heavy equipment would have to abandoned making the 1942 situation even worse than it was.
2. Morale impact on soldiers due to massive withdrawal - ie. Napoleon.
3. Being caught in the open during the blizzard was death. A strategic withdrawal would have resulted in even more losses due to the elements.


IMO, in order to fix the blizzard you have to remove the current blizzard Axis blasting effects which heaps on casualties and replace it with a better overall casualty system. Attackers are not suffering enough casualties in the game - especially in the disabled casualties category. Long Term disabled numbers should be two the three times greater than the KIA number. You also have to fix the logistics and optempo for both sides. Current HQ Build Ups and aerial resupply are outrageously broken. Logistics impact on vehicle, truck, and aircraft serviceability are vastly understated. Germans should not be able to build fortifications greater than Level One before the Blizzard. Fort levels (or lack thereof) should have an impact on cold weather losses. Units without fortifications or moving should be exceptionally susceptible to vehicle and personnel losses. That would be just a start.

Trey

Trey

[chaos45]

MY point of view on the game based on history.

First off German losses for the most part seem very close to history alot of of the time 500k+ going into december. So people claiming the German casualties are to low in the border battles seems off. The border battles for the most part were historically a cake walk for the German Army. They had surprise, planning, and a logistical build up all in place. The Soviets were completely disorganized, and drove straight into their deaths for the most part trying to counterattack the German army initially. Only in a few locations was the Soviet defense stubborn and effective- effective being the key work.

Most of the books I have read even by German veterans dont point to real vicious and hard fought battles until later in the campaign. Thats when casualties start to rise units begin to get depleted and many state they started to realize this was going to be a hard war and not like the earlier campaigns in the west. The Soviets stop surrendering in drove and start to counter-attack and fight to the last in many instances. Again this is really getting into the Fall though when they Soviets begin to get organzied, and are dug-in defending to the last as they realize they cant just let the Germans continue to advance.

So IMO the initial battles loss rates are very close to historical. However, once into say fall time frame the battle results need to change to show harder fighting and losses. To caveat this though the Soviets even on the defense odds are should take more losses even when they hold. To represent their much more ineffective training/defensive strategy often relying on mass conscripts to hold and mass counterattacks to stall/re-take positions. To me this is where the game truly breaks down, because in General for all of 41 and in 42 even when being stopped the Germans typically lost fewer men than the Soviets. Even stalingrad wasnt the massive victory the Soviets propoganda points to....estimates are the campaign still cost them upwards of a million men to get the "win"

In board games most designers have used either a high combat effects value for German units over thier paper strength or had the different armies roll on different combat charts, or even just given one side a bonus of negative based on quality for the combat chart results. This seems to be where the game fails is that its using a universal combat results table and it probably needs to have a results table more tailored the combatives involved. In other words Soviets just in general lose more men in combat win or lose period. Maybe the chart changes to lessen this in 43 on, but still in general they should lose more men even when winning. That is the current problem in the game.

In real life the Germans should have done better than they did especially in 43-44. Strategic desicions from High Command- Hitler prevented this. Backup positions were only built in rare circumstances, one of them main reasons for the utter collapse of AG sounth after Kursk- retreat wasnt conducted until all was lost, and no retreat line/fortification had been prepared. Most players wont make these mistakes they will have retreat positions prepared and probably wont wait for their lines to completely collapse before begining to retreat. This in turn led to squandered German armored reserves counter-attacking into hopeless situations and being chewed up with little real infantry support due to the collapsing lines. So just a better strategic vision from HQ could have saved the Germans countless units and losses in this situation alone.

Even in 43-44 the German units were in general better trained and organized than the Soviets, which is why even in totally hopeless situations they seemed to manage to bloody the Soviets out of all context to the forces invovled. In some cases destroying entire Soviet attacking formations for almost no losses to the German defenders...ya you wont see that in WiTE.

So in general the combat results system is crap and really needs a total rewrite to get close to history. A reasonably successful German 41-42 campaign(s) followed by limited offensive operations with defense in depth by the Germans from 43 on should net a German strategic win no matter what the Soviet player wants to do. Prepared defensive lines with reserves is what every German general wanted to do after Stalingrad and Hitle refused to allow this and only grudingly allowed AG north to do with the Panther line and even that was almost to late to be effective. Historically the Panther line saved AG North from destruction....imagine if AG Center/AG south had been allowed to conduct a defense plan along those lines as well instead of being groudn up in senseless exposed combat in poor positions as was often the case. Some German generals argued that from 43 on the best strategy was to assume the strategic defensive and defend in depth grinding the Soviets down with attrition since loss ratios were so far in favour of the Germans typically. The only campaigns the Germans lost more than the Soviets in was really the Super late 44 into 45 fighting and even then it about 1:1 or abit over 1:1 in favour of the germans with halftrained, under-equipped, and hastilly thrown together units trying to stop an enemy with vast material superiority.

No stupid strategic decisions in 43/44 keeps an in tact well equipped and well trained German army heavily entrenched bleeding out the Soviets in the end game- plus most likey you still have Hungary/Finland/Romania on your side because you dont suffer massive setbacks due to stupidity. Not to mention the almost complete destruction of AG south when the Romanians changed sides...this probably alone sped up the end of the war. The soviets were getting extremely low on manpower in 44/45 and only be mass conscripting all the recaptured lands and forcing the Romanians/Bulgarians and captured hungarians to fight for them were they able to stay on the offensive like they did. Take away those resources and im sorry to say I think its up to the Western allies to win the war as the Soviets would be bled out...least thats what the General history in retrostpect seems to show me.

[Flaviusx]

Soviet late war Maskirovka was capable of suckering anybody, not just Hitler.

Richard Gehlen? Nobody was more surprised than he by Bagration. All that German tactical acumen doesn't amount to a hill of beans when the Soviets sucker punch you at the operational and even strategic level as they did more and more frequently as the war went on. Quite simply, they didn't know what the Soviets were up to and the Soviets got the drop on them.

So, yeah. Hitler was an idiot, sure, and much can be blamed on him, but saying that the Germans are guaranteed a strategic win with a free hand is a bit much. Seems to me both sides had their crosses to bear in this respect, Stalin in 1941 being every bit as idiotic as Hitler was later on. He got better. Hitler got worse.

The Red Army got better, too.

Now I do agree the combat results system is very problematic with the way losses are handled, and that it makes things way to easy for the attacker.

[loki100]

Almost too much to pick apart ... but lets try

ORIGINAL: chaos45

Most of the books I have read even by German veterans dont point to real vicious and hard fought battles until later in the campaign. Thats when casualties start to rise units begin to get depleted and many state they started to realize this was going to be a hard war and not like the earlier campaigns in the west. The Soviets stop surrendering in drove and start to counter-attack and fight to the last in many instances. Again this is really getting into the Fall though when they Soviets begin to get organzied, and are dug-in defending to the last as they realize they cant just let the Germans continue to advance.

The battles at Smolensk scared the German high command witless and caused substantial German losses. It wasn't just logistics that held up AGC it was the need to recover from those bruising battles.

ORIGINAL: chaos45]In other words Soviets just in general lose more men in combat win or lose period.

probably the one point all would agree - the combat results inflict far too few losses on the attacking side

ORIGINAL: chaos45]Backup positions were only built in rare circumstances, one of them main reasons for the utter collapse of AG sounth after Kursk- retreat wasnt conducted until all was lost, and no retreat line/fortification had been prepared.

two problems here. I'd agree that if you wanted to keep the war going as long as possible in the hope that, as in the Seven Years War, 'something' would happen, then a strategic defense in 1943 is a better option. But, from Hitler's point of view it made no difference if the Red Army took Berlin in May 45 or May 46 - he was going to be dead. So a long shot gamble that just might have wrecked the Red Army suddently looks attractive.

Post-Kursk, the whole idea of fighting east of the Dniepr was to give time to complete the defensive line on the West bank that had been being dug since the previous winter.

ORIGINAL: chaos45]Even in 43-44 the German units were in general better trained and organized than the Soviets, which is why even in totally hopeless situations they seemed to manage to bloody the Soviets out of all context to the forces invovled. In some cases destroying entire Soviet attacking formations for almost no losses to the German defenders...ya you wont see that in WiTE.

Vasily Grossman, a Soviet war correspondent who fell out with the system post-war, has a brilliant section in his memoires. Some German general who was captured in the early stages of Bagration was ranting on to the Soviet intelligence officer about how rubbish the Red Army was. Finally the Soviet officer snapped, pointed to the nearby destroyed guns and armour and asked it they were that useless, how come he was now their pow.

[SigUp]

ORIGINAL: Flaviusx

Soviet late war Maskirovka was capable of suckering anybody, not just Hitler.

Richard Gehlen? Nobody was more surprised than he by Bagration. All that German tactical acumen doesn't amount to a hill of beans when the Soviets sucker punch you at the operational and even strategic level as they did more and more frequently as the war went on. Quite simply, they didn't know what the Soviets were up to and the Soviets got the drop on them.

Well, this view is slightly too simplistic. Gehlen and his men did anticipate an attack against AGC, but they were treating this possibility as a sideshow. He was fixed on the idea of an assault out of the Kovel area. The Germans main fear in the Summer of 1944 was a Soviet drive from Kovel to Warsaw and then along the Vistula to the Baltic Sea, cutting off both AGN and AGC. Considering the distance, not an unreasonable suggestion and seeing the ease with which Konev in July managed to destroy the German front in this area one can say that the Red Army missed a big chance for ending the war in 1944 when they chose to attack in Belorussia.

As for the Maskirovka, it did not fool the German army commands. The Germans may have underestimated the scope of the attack, due to the lack of deep-penetrating aerial reconnaissance (by 1944 it was largely gone due to weakness of the Luftwaffe, as well as fuel shortage), leading to them not picking up the troops far behind the frontlines. But they nevertheless had a good idea of what was coming. In the weeks prior to the launch of Bagration all armies of AGC (3rd Panzer, 4th, 2nd and 9th Army) picked up signs for an impending attack and even guessed the objectives in each area correct. For example von Trescow and the staff of 2nd Army predicted a Soviet assault from Vitebsk and Bobruisk with the target of a linkup at Minsk. As for the date, they were predicting 22nd June with 100% certainty, due to the obvious attractiveness of that date. The armies were bombarding army group command with warnings and that's where the holdup of the information happened. Busch simply refused to acknowledge such warnings, or pass up this information up the chain of command to Hitler. He probably was still acting under the impression of the harsh rebuke suffered at the hands of Hitler, when he approached him with the suggestion of a partial retreat in April 1944 and avoided anything that may have upset the mood of the Führer.

EDIT:

First off German losses for the most part seem very close to history alot of of the time 500k+ going into december. So people claiming the German casualties are to low in the border battles seems off. The border battles for the most part were historically a cake walk for the German Army. They had surprise, planning, and a logistical build up all in place. The Soviets were completely disorganized, and drove straight into their deaths for the most part trying to counterattack the German army initially. Only in a few locations was the Soviet defense stubborn and effective- effective being the key work.

I don't know where you got this information from, but this is blatently wrong. German bloody losses from June 1941 to March 1942 were highest in the months of July and August. In July the Ostheer suffered 164.988 dead, wounded or captured and in August 189.813. For the rest of the time the losses were 131.687 in September, 113.762 in October, 84.051 in November, 77.093 in December, 87.182 in January, 88.014 in February and 105.042 in March. So, these 500.000 is way off. Just counting the bloody losses, the Germans already lost 725.359 through November. If you count the people who had to leave the combat area due to sickness for example, the loss figure rises to 1.026.251 men through November.

[chaos45]

ORIGINAL: loki100

Almost too much to pick apart ... but lets try

ORIGINAL: chaos45

Most of the books I have read even by German veterans dont point to real vicious and hard fought battles until later in the campaign. Thats when casualties start to rise units begin to get depleted and many state they started to realize this was going to be a hard war and not like the earlier campaigns in the west. The Soviets stop surrendering in drove and start to counter-attack and fight to the last in many instances. Again this is really getting into the Fall though when they Soviets begin to get organzied, and are dug-in defending to the last as they realize they cant just let the Germans continue to advance.

The battles at Smolensk scared the German high command witless and caused substantial German losses. It wasn't just logistics that held up AGC it was the need to recover from those bruising battles.


-rebuttal- That is not a border battle, and also amounted to super extensive Soviet losses compared to what the Germans lost. In fact many consider it to be a strategic failure by the soviets...so not sure pointing to strategic failure as a success means much. Logistics were more a problem than anything, killing lots of the enemy tends to use up alot of ammunition and fuel which was difficult to get to the frontline during this period historically.

ORIGINAL: chaos45]In other words Soviets just in general lose more men in combat win or lose period.

probably the one point all would agree - the combat results inflict far too few losses on the attacking side

-rebuttal-Again I specifically said Soviet...not all sides. As I mentioned seperate combat charts/results need to be used for both sides, until late in the war it was rare for the Germans to lose more than the Soviets in any operation. Even in Bagration where the Soviets had massive numerical superiority and surprise they still took about 1:1 losses to the Germans, and this was with massive German surrenders so that tells you how intensive their losses were in breaking the front lines and getting those encirclements were. Even at Kursk were the Soviets were as entrenched as they could ever be the Germans killed more of them and destroyed more of thier equipement than they lose, and the Germans were on the offensive.

ORIGINAL: chaos45]Backup positions were only built in rare circumstances, one of them main reasons for the utter collapse of AG sounth after Kursk- retreat wasnt conducted until all was lost, and no retreat line/fortification had been prepared.

two problems here. I'd agree that if you wanted to keep the war going as long as possible in the hope that, as in the Seven Years War, 'something' would happen, then a strategic defense in 1943 is a better option. But, from Hitler's point of view it made no difference if the Red Army took Berlin in May 45 or May 46 - he was going to be dead. So a long shot gamble that just might have wrecked the Red Army suddently looks attractive.

- rebuttal-Kill enough Soviets on the Strategic defensive and may allow a change to offensive or to stop/blood the Allies more for a negotiated peace. Hitler was an extremely poor strategic leader and it wasnt until he realized all was lost that he even thought about a negotiated peace but by then it was to late. If the war drags out allied losses mount a negotiated peace becomes more likely short of the possible nuclear option. Which the Germans had no idea about.

Post-Kursk, the whole idea of fighting east of the Dniepr was to give time to complete the defensive line on the West bank that had been being dug since the previous winter.

-rebuttal- Ahh yes positions that were never even started prior to defeat at Kursk is alot of field commanders and even German divisional histories that talk about the lack of thought and preperations for the Dniepr positions. German high command gambled everything on Kursk and put no effort into fortifying the line until the Soviets went over to the strategic offensive after Kursk and by then it was to late. When the units got to supposed prepared positions there was nothing there.

ORIGINAL: chaos45]Even in 43-44 the German units were in general better trained and organized than the Soviets, which is why even in totally hopeless situations they seemed to manage to bloody the Soviets out of all context to the forces invovled. In some cases destroying entire Soviet attacking formations for almost no losses to the German defenders...ya you wont see that in WiTE.

Vasily Grossman, a Soviet war correspondent who fell out with the system post-war, has a brilliant section in his memoires. Some German general who was captured in the early stages of Bagration was ranting on to the Soviet intelligence officer about how rubbish the Red Army was. Finally the Soviet officer snapped, pointed to the nearby destroyed guns and armour and asked it they were that useless, how come he was now their pow.

I stand by my statement and think Soviet casualty figures prove my point more than enough. German stratgic stupidity caused Bagration more than the Soviets "skill"....same with Stalingrad. Any idiot can see by looking at a map that the German positions at Stalingrad were ridiculous, Bagration not as bad except for when you look and see they have virtually no mobile reserves for an entire army grp. Again very poor defensive planning on the strategic side.

Soviet revisionists can talk up the Soviet army all they want but the fact is they paid in rivers of blood to beat the German army, and this is an undisputed fact. If Truman had known that not eliminating the Soviet union in 1945 would cause a cold war lasting 50 years he might have went along with Churchill and just wiped out the Soviet Union right after Germans gave up. The Soviets strategic reserves were exhausted and lend lease was the main things really keeping them going. The reason the Soviets built so many tanks and artillery pieces is because lend lease was supply food/trucks/ammunition/fuel and all the other true necessities to continue the war. The USA and Britian played the war politically masterfully except at the end. Allowing the Germans and Soviets to kill each other in masses and then just virtually waltzing in at the end to finish off the war for extremely low casualty counts by comparision.

Also rebuttals added in qoute text not as familiar with how the qoutes work on this site lol.

[Chris21wen]

ORIGINAL: fbs

One thing I don't understand in this discussion about the soviet running, is why people think that doesn't reflect a realistic historical option.

They ran from Napoleon, even gave Moscow away, and that was a successful strategy. Then they ran again in 1942 to Stalingrad, and once again that was successful.

So why do people think that there should be a penalty for the soviets running away in 1941? That seems to be one of their best historical strategies available for 1941.

I think that instead of trying to answer "what penalties should be applied", a more realistic discussion would be "what would the German Army do in 1941 if the Soviet ran away"? I think they would just keep moving forward towards their historical goal at the Volga, and the only reason why the game punishes the Germans for doing what historically they would do, is that imho all rail gets damaged upon conquest, and that's way unrealistic.

I think that if rail has a small chance of being damaged upon German conquest (say 20% instead of 100%), that will allow the Germans to keep moving forward, as they would.

One of the problems with historical wargaming is we know what happen and why and the games tend to follow. You could create your own scenario based on the premise that they did run.

[Great_Ajax]

My view is that the Germans were masters of the tactical art of war - leadership, unit tactics, and doctrine so they were able to generally "out battle" their opponents on the battlefield. However, the Soviets mastered the strategic and operational art of war. Once they did that, they didn't have to be masters of the tactical art. The Germans were also hindered by a combination of a severe lack of mobility in 44/45 and poor strategic decisions.

Trey

[Aurelian]

ORIGINAL: fbs


and the only reason why the game punishes the Germans for doing what historically they would do, is that imho all rail gets damaged upon conquest, and that's way unrealistic.

I think that if rail has a small chance of being damaged upon German conquest (say 20% instead of 100%), that will allow the Germans to keep moving forward, as they would.

Damaged rail is realistic.

Russian railnet was/is a different gauge, (Baltic region not so much.) so it would have to be dismantled, damaged beyond use, if you like, to be converted anyway.

Another thing to consider is that Russian railways were not built to the same standard. The rail beds were not capable of handling the heavier German locomotives. So again, even if you take an intact rail line, you have to rebuild it anyway.

The bridges dated back to WW1 or earlier. They were not capable of handling the heavier Western trains.

http://www.feldgrau.com/dreichsbahn.html

tm.asp?m=2928392&mpage=1&key=railways�

[Aurelian]

ORIGINAL: chaos45

Soviet revisionists can talk up the Soviet army all they want but the fact is they paid in rivers of blood to beat the German army, and this is an undisputed fact.

Don't know what revisionists you're talking about, but we all know the Soviets lost more in combat than the Germans. All the way to the Elbe. That is also an undisputed fact.

Also undisputed is that while they were masters at tactics, their strategic reasoning was subpar. What was the strategic reasoning behind invading the Soviet Union with your manpower reserves already scraping the bottom of the barrel? Or the lack of strategic reserves? And so on.

There is no revision that though they won battle after battle, it didn't matter. There is no revision in Halders's diary •"The Russian colossus... has been underestimated by us. Whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another dozen."

[76mm]

ORIGINAL: chaos45
First off German losses for the most part seem very close to history alot of of the time 500k+ going into december. So people claiming the German casualties are to low in the border battles seems off. The border battles for the most part were historically a cake walk for the German Army...

Most of the books I have read even by German veterans dont point to real vicious and hard fought battles until later in the campaign. Thats when casualties start to rise units begin to get depleted and many state they started to realize this was going to be a hard war and not like the earlier campaigns in the west. The Soviets stop surrendering in drove and start to counter-attack and fight to the last in many instances. Again this is really getting into the Fall though when they Soviets begin to get organzied, and are dug-in defending to the last as they realize they cant just let the Germans continue to advance.

I guess we're reading different books; I've read several books about Barbarossa in the last several months, and all of them indicate that the Germans had hard fights and endured heavy casualties throughout the summer. Sure, many Sov units surrendered en masse but on the other hand many fought to the last man.

[Flaviusx]

It's pretty much like Trey sez. The Soviets found a way to get around German tactical superiority at the operational and strategic level by the end of 1942 and kept on leveraging that advantage to greater and greater results.

Some of this can be blamed on Hitler, but not all of it, and indeed, sometimes Hitler had it right and the German officer corps had it badly wrong, even at that late date. For example, Manstein wanted to continue the Kursk offensive; the entire concept was indeed a General Staff product, and Hitler ditched it with alacrity. Rightly so. That same Erich von Manstein made clear operational mistakes that allowed the Belgorod offensive to succeed in August, and the November offensive against Kiev. I'm picking on him in particular because he is with good cause seen as the height of German operational expertise, but the plain fact of the matter is the Soviets had his number in 1943.

The Germans did produce some exceptional defensive specialists, but he wasn't one of them. Model and Heinrici win that award, and even they couldn't stop the Soviets.

Sigup, as for oversimplifying things, it doesn't matter if corps and divisional commanders could sense an offensive unfolding. So long as the Soviet maskirovka efforts could get into the German decisonmaking loop at a higher level, they'd always win the race. Fooling OKH and Gehlen (never mind Hitler) was more than good enough to do the trick.

[SigUp]

Well, I wouldn't call it a giant success of maskirovka. Army commands are pretty high up the ladder and when they can predict your actions with great accuracy, then you can't call the deception a huge success. It is more a showing of a lack of proper decision making processes in the Nazi state. Kind of funny listening to Nazi propaganda about how their "Führer State" was so much superior in terms of decision making in war compared to the "corrupt" western democracies, when in the end the institution and person of the Führer was the biggest holdup in proper decision making. Anyway, even if Hitler would have listened, it wouldn't have changed the fact of the overwhelming superiority of the Red Army. The question wasn't whether a catastrophe would occur, but rather how big the catastrophe would become. As it turns out, due to the actions of OKH, Hitler, as well as the incompetence of Busch, Bagration turned into the biggest defeat in German military history.