The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
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- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
They have some disruption and some disablements, but generally recover pretty quickly.
It's bad news to go against prepared defenses without solid prep and everything else in order. But when the objective is to surprise and overwhelm an unprepared enemy, stealing some bases, you just do it. I took Sabang with about 55% prep, but very other base thus far has been with 20% or less prep.
One of the leading proponents of moving fast and in overhwleming force - prep be danged! - is Nemo. I'm sure many experienced players have that the same intuitive grasp that sometimes circumstances warrant foregoing prep.
It's bad news to go against prepared defenses without solid prep and everything else in order. But when the objective is to surprise and overwhelm an unprepared enemy, stealing some bases, you just do it. I took Sabang with about 55% prep, but very other base thus far has been with 20% or less prep.
One of the leading proponents of moving fast and in overhwleming force - prep be danged! - is Nemo. I'm sure many experienced players have that the same intuitive grasp that sometimes circumstances warrant foregoing prep.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
If you wonder why prep is so low, remember that all the troops (except 18th UK Div.) came from Hawaii, where they were prepping for the Aluetians. So, they strat loaded for the long journey to Australia with prep changed to the various New Guinea targets. During transport aboard ship (and in off-map boxes), troops do not gain prep points, so when they left Hawaii prepped 5% or 15% for New Guinea targets, they arrived in Oz at the same levels. Then, I switched them to Sumatra targets, so prep dropped to 0% and gained just a little bit before the troops were again loaded for the long journey to Sumatra, during which they didn't gain any prep points.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
- Chickenboy
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
It's a tradeoff. Speed and flexibility, audacity and brute force against efficacy, soundness and sustainability. No prep vs. full prep. Sure, you can throw unprepared units at targets. When you find some 'soft' ones, you may very well succeed in capturing your initial objective.
However, guess wrong and find a dug-in entrenched opponent that is unimpressed by your initial attack and things could go pear-shaped. Disruption alone can make a unit combat ineffective for months afterwards. Get on the wrong side of the AV curve, and the tables may be turned and the disrupted attacker may be fighting for their lives.
It's a balance. I think CR has done a good job of realizing the balance necessary here.
However, guess wrong and find a dug-in entrenched opponent that is unimpressed by your initial attack and things could go pear-shaped. Disruption alone can make a unit combat ineffective for months afterwards. Get on the wrong side of the AV curve, and the tables may be turned and the disrupted attacker may be fighting for their lives.
It's a balance. I think CR has done a good job of realizing the balance necessary here.
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
A few decisions to make now, rendered tough because I expect the enemy to show up in force any day now.
1. Do I take a chance on mounting an amphibious invasion against Langsa (loading would begin tomorrow, D-Day probably in three days using AP and AK)? Or do I march the division down the road? I'm leaning towards the latter only because it's much less risky at this point. It will also reduce the disruption factor of the landing. So I beginning to think this isn't a hard decision. (That will mean 37th Div., 1st Marines, and two tank regiments will be approaching Langsa from the landward side).
2. What do I do with 27th Div., which will be free to move in a day or two (once I'm sure the final division will make it to act as the garrison of my key base). 27th is prepping for Medan. It probably makes sense to keep her on Sumatra, because the battle for Medan will be tough. In fact, so much time is passing that I need to think it through.
3. That will give the Allies a fair bit of 18th UK Div., an Indian brigade, and a tank regiment at Alor Star, plus whatever targets of opportunity are present when the paratroops arrive in two days.
4. Where do I position the carrier? I've made that decision, but I'll keep it close to my vest for now.
5. What about the four slow USN BBs? They've replenished at Colombo. I think I send them back to Sabang, but I haven't fully decided yet (in part because I halfway expect the KB to arrive before they can make it).
1. Do I take a chance on mounting an amphibious invasion against Langsa (loading would begin tomorrow, D-Day probably in three days using AP and AK)? Or do I march the division down the road? I'm leaning towards the latter only because it's much less risky at this point. It will also reduce the disruption factor of the landing. So I beginning to think this isn't a hard decision. (That will mean 37th Div., 1st Marines, and two tank regiments will be approaching Langsa from the landward side).
2. What do I do with 27th Div., which will be free to move in a day or two (once I'm sure the final division will make it to act as the garrison of my key base). 27th is prepping for Medan. It probably makes sense to keep her on Sumatra, because the battle for Medan will be tough. In fact, so much time is passing that I need to think it through.
3. That will give the Allies a fair bit of 18th UK Div., an Indian brigade, and a tank regiment at Alor Star, plus whatever targets of opportunity are present when the paratroops arrive in two days.
4. Where do I position the carrier? I've made that decision, but I'll keep it close to my vest for now.
5. What about the four slow USN BBs? They've replenished at Colombo. I think I send them back to Sabang, but I haven't fully decided yet (in part because I halfway expect the KB to arrive before they can make it).
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
- JohnDillworth
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
I'd land on Langsa while I still have the element of surprise. He can,and probably has moved planes into the area, but combat units are still not in place in force. Surprised the air attacks have no increased, unless he is planning for a big show. As for the old BB? I move them back to Sabang. Looks like there are Japanese BB's in the area and they they may make a run up he straits at you. Perhaps they will be helpful escorting troop and supply ships . I don't think you will need them much until the first KB visit is resolved but big loaded guns are nice to have on call. I still think you have a few days before the KB arrives. I think he is coming with everything so he wants the CVL's and the CVE's too. You have air search in place so you should get a few days warning at least.
Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. - Yasser Arafat Speech to UN General Assembly
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
Yes, air patrols and pickets are in place.
The slow BBs are moving back to Sabang.
I'm not sure about moving amphibous on Langsa. KB and LBA are two concerns, but the greatest danger now might come from combat TFs moving up from Singers. I think that's almost a sure thing by the time I can get amphibs loaded.
Sabang can hold many more squadrons than a level three field ordinarily can thanks to the Air HQ bonus. Currently, the field has 10 squadrons including, among others, 115 fighters.
The slow BBs are moving back to Sabang.
I'm not sure about moving amphibous on Langsa. KB and LBA are two concerns, but the greatest danger now might come from combat TFs moving up from Singers. I think that's almost a sure thing by the time I can get amphibs loaded.
Sabang can hold many more squadrons than a level three field ordinarily can thanks to the Air HQ bonus. Currently, the field has 10 squadrons including, among others, 115 fighters.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
What do you have to lose in the Langsa Op, vs what you can gain?
Is the percentage chance of failure worth risking the assets being used?
What do you gain, operationally, strategically, if you succeed? What do you lose, operationally, strategically, if you fail?
Is the percentage chance of failure worth risking the assets being used?
What do you gain, operationally, strategically, if you succeed? What do you lose, operationally, strategically, if you fail?
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
Concerning Obvert's comments earlier, I see his point that IJN naval superiority after an exchange battle cuts the SLoC, but if the exchange is deep enough, KB is out of the war. I might trade the success of Sumatra for the destruction of KB and the collapse of Burma at this early stage of the conflict.
In addition, I think Dan can make this at worst a "winning exchange." KB has to cut the SLoC and destroy the Allied CVs, they can't just blockade indefinitely. Therefore, Dan can hang his CVs in an advantageous position where Allied LBA's impact is maximized and Japanese LBA is minimized. A standoff won't work for John as he eventually runs low on fuel and has to retire. Under those circumstances, I'd wager Dan gives better than he gets. Then John has the unenviable choice of trying round two under the same operational and strategic constraints, likely losing most of the rest of his carriers, or concedes control of the local seas and thus loses the war. Either way, Dan wins in the end, IMHO.
Dan, getting the Nicobars captured and up for LBA air ops would help with this a bit, IMHO.
In addition, I think Dan can make this at worst a "winning exchange." KB has to cut the SLoC and destroy the Allied CVs, they can't just blockade indefinitely. Therefore, Dan can hang his CVs in an advantageous position where Allied LBA's impact is maximized and Japanese LBA is minimized. A standoff won't work for John as he eventually runs low on fuel and has to retire. Under those circumstances, I'd wager Dan gives better than he gets. Then John has the unenviable choice of trying round two under the same operational and strategic constraints, likely losing most of the rest of his carriers, or concedes control of the local seas and thus loses the war. Either way, Dan wins in the end, IMHO.
Dan, getting the Nicobars captured and up for LBA air ops would help with this a bit, IMHO.
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
John never took the Nicobars. PBYs are operating out of two of the bases (supply was moved there beginning a week or two prior to D-Day, then the base force support a day or two before). There are also PBYs operating out of the islands of Sumatra's west coast, Sabang and Diego Garcia. So patrol coverage should be pretty good.
I'm not sure how the battle is going to come together or turn out, yet, but in all likelihood I'll gather all my fighting ships at and near Sabang, where mines, subs, PT boats (if they make it in time) and the airfield will help. There's a chance Sabang will go to level four before the battle.
I'm not sure how the battle is going to come together or turn out, yet, but in all likelihood I'll gather all my fighting ships at and near Sabang, where mines, subs, PT boats (if they make it in time) and the airfield will help. There's a chance Sabang will go to level four before the battle.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
ORIGINAL: Cribtop
In addition, Therefore, Dan can hang his CVs in an advantageous position where Allied LBA's impact is maximized and Japanese LBA is minimized.
Ah, but John could (and should imho) do exactly the same!. There is no reason to seek a carrier exchange in neutral waters (in the triangle outlined by Canoerebel). SLOCs can be cut at least partially by keeping KB near Japanese LBA, above the Malacca straight and in the Andaman Sea, protecting Japanese airfields from getting bombarded and allowing the IJN to bombard Allied airfields, which are still undeveloped anyway. In this case, if Dan wanted a carrier battle, he could only get one under unfavorable circumstances (KB+LBA).
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
That's interesting, but that would be the best possible case for the Allies. It would leave open the sea lanes to Sabang and vicinity from Diego Garcia. I would just hang off the Sumatra coast to the west, keeping Sabang's airfield in between my carriers and his. Then he can't come out without traveling through narrow channels with the risk of facing my combat ships and subs.
No, he won't choose that course of action unless his highest priority is to rescue the Burma Army. If that's Job One for him, he migh come up the Malacca Straits, but I still think that's unlikely.
These are all possibilities, but I still think by far the most likely course is for John to come through the Indian Ocean. Fuso closing on Cocos per yesterday's SigInt is one piece of evidence strongly supporting that possibility.
Lots of uncertainty here, so it's alot of fun trying to guess.
No, he won't choose that course of action unless his highest priority is to rescue the Burma Army. If that's Job One for him, he migh come up the Malacca Straits, but I still think that's unlikely.
These are all possibilities, but I still think by far the most likely course is for John to come through the Indian Ocean. Fuso closing on Cocos per yesterday's SigInt is one piece of evidence strongly supporting that possibility.
Lots of uncertainty here, so it's alot of fun trying to guess.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
I'm reading both AARs, so no comments except that the Sumatra invasion caught me by surprise... Nicely played, my fellow Southerner.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
So, just to check, after 5 days you do NOT have a base on mainland Malaysia - the islands off the coast don't count obviously.
As to Sumatra:
I've done it in a couple of games and I've had it done to me once. When I did it I transected Malaysia as part of the landings and pushed my forces into Malaysia, besieging Singapore and moving to Bangkok. This caused the utter collapse of Burma - IJA units ended up being airlifted out abandoning their heavy equipment - freeing the Indian army to enter the fray and really bring pressure to bear in Thailand - from whence I opened another land route to China. Singers was besieged for about 6 weeks until I got enough force together to take it. I had my force allocation pretty much the opposite of CR though. I landed in August/September and brought about 10 divisions. I spread one throughout Sumatra and launched 6 to Malaysia/Singers with the other 3 marching up to Bangkok- meeting up with British Indian forces. After all Sumatra is only a minor strategic victory. To unhinge the entire Front you need to follow it up with another strategic leap - Malaysia is that leap.
When I faced it I simply kept KB in the Malacca straits - which is NOT the poorest of the options as some here say but actually the strongest possible option... why?
1. Assume that any losses to submarines will be attritional and not decisive ( and surround KB with ASW TFs ).
2. KB's job is NOT to sink CVs or even transports. Its job is simply to stop the Allies landing supplies in Sumatra. This means KB's job is simply to survive and pose a threat which can pounce out whenever the Allies are spotted.
3. IJAAF and IJNAF bombers bombed every airfield in Sumatra into the stone age. It cost me in fighters lost in sweeps but it was a price worth paying. This wrote down his supplies.
4. I marshalled my tank forces in Malaysia along with some inf divisions and then launched them across the straits with the support of ALL of KB and every IJAAF and IJNAF bomber on the map. The enemy division guarding the base I wanted basically evaporated and my tank units pursued.
5. He got desperate and tried to rush troops in - by this time I had a land base and KB simply waited for his transports to begin unloading, ignoring his CVs. When the transports reached a port KB unleashed, along with the IJAAF. The result was the supplies and most reinforcements were sunk/drowned.
6. SC TFs tried to interdict KB. Every time this happened they ran into one of my screening TFs. I lost ships but every ship he had damaged was sunk by Netties or KB the next day. The guts of the RN was sunk trying to interfere with KB.
By the time it was over he only had cadres from about 6 divisions, had lost a half-dozen BBs and I riposted and took Ceylon. Of course I had left Sumatra poorly garrisoned as part of a maskirovka wherein I wanted him to invade as I wanted to take Ceylon but didn't want him being able to counter-invade. So I used Sumatra to destroy the forces he would need for this mission and then took Ceylon and held it till '44.
I doubt John will stick to the Malacca straits. He'll seek battle and the sinking of ships ( in the Indian Ocean ) and thus miss effecting the strategic critical point --- while paying lip service to it ... as is his normal wont.
As to Sumatra:
I've done it in a couple of games and I've had it done to me once. When I did it I transected Malaysia as part of the landings and pushed my forces into Malaysia, besieging Singapore and moving to Bangkok. This caused the utter collapse of Burma - IJA units ended up being airlifted out abandoning their heavy equipment - freeing the Indian army to enter the fray and really bring pressure to bear in Thailand - from whence I opened another land route to China. Singers was besieged for about 6 weeks until I got enough force together to take it. I had my force allocation pretty much the opposite of CR though. I landed in August/September and brought about 10 divisions. I spread one throughout Sumatra and launched 6 to Malaysia/Singers with the other 3 marching up to Bangkok- meeting up with British Indian forces. After all Sumatra is only a minor strategic victory. To unhinge the entire Front you need to follow it up with another strategic leap - Malaysia is that leap.
When I faced it I simply kept KB in the Malacca straits - which is NOT the poorest of the options as some here say but actually the strongest possible option... why?
1. Assume that any losses to submarines will be attritional and not decisive ( and surround KB with ASW TFs ).
2. KB's job is NOT to sink CVs or even transports. Its job is simply to stop the Allies landing supplies in Sumatra. This means KB's job is simply to survive and pose a threat which can pounce out whenever the Allies are spotted.
3. IJAAF and IJNAF bombers bombed every airfield in Sumatra into the stone age. It cost me in fighters lost in sweeps but it was a price worth paying. This wrote down his supplies.
4. I marshalled my tank forces in Malaysia along with some inf divisions and then launched them across the straits with the support of ALL of KB and every IJAAF and IJNAF bomber on the map. The enemy division guarding the base I wanted basically evaporated and my tank units pursued.
5. He got desperate and tried to rush troops in - by this time I had a land base and KB simply waited for his transports to begin unloading, ignoring his CVs. When the transports reached a port KB unleashed, along with the IJAAF. The result was the supplies and most reinforcements were sunk/drowned.
6. SC TFs tried to interdict KB. Every time this happened they ran into one of my screening TFs. I lost ships but every ship he had damaged was sunk by Netties or KB the next day. The guts of the RN was sunk trying to interfere with KB.
By the time it was over he only had cadres from about 6 divisions, had lost a half-dozen BBs and I riposted and took Ceylon. Of course I had left Sumatra poorly garrisoned as part of a maskirovka wherein I wanted him to invade as I wanted to take Ceylon but didn't want him being able to counter-invade. So I used Sumatra to destroy the forces he would need for this mission and then took Ceylon and held it till '44.
I doubt John will stick to the Malacca straits. He'll seek battle and the sinking of ships ( in the Indian Ocean ) and thus miss effecting the strategic critical point --- while paying lip service to it ... as is his normal wont.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
He has Alor Star.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
ORIGINAL: Canoerebel
That's interesting, but that would be the best possible case for the Allies. It would leave open the sea lanes to Sabang and vicinity from Diego Garcia. I would just hang off the Sumatra coast to the west, keeping Sabang's airfield in between my carriers and his. Then he can't come out without traveling through narrow channels with the risk of facing my combat ships and subs.
No, he won't choose that course of action unless his highest priority is to rescue the Burma Army. If that's Job One for him, he migh come up the Malacca Straits, but I still think that's unlikely.
These are all possibilities, but I still think by far the most likely course is for John to come through the Indian Ocean. Fuso closing on Cocos per yesterday's SigInt is one piece of evidence strongly supporting that possibility.
Lots of uncertainty here, so it's alot of fun trying to guess.
I'm not saying that's the course John would choose, but the one he should (imho) choose. You have the SigInt, far better knowledge of john than me (us) and other information which we don't know to make your guesses much more likely to be right.
IIRC, KB has the range to attack your shipping on the "west" side of Sumatra while being in the Malacca straight. That positioning completely cuts off your Malaya SLOCs (which should be Job One imho) and threatens your Sumatra SLOCs enough to necessitate carrier support until your airfields are developed. It also gives him a free reign to bombard and counter-invade Malaya and the "eastern" coast of Sumatra with everything he is got.
ORIGINAL: Nemo121
When I faced it I simply kept KB in the Malacca straits - which is NOT the poorest of the options as some here say but actually the strongest possible option... why?
1. Assume that any losses to submarines will be attritional and not decisive ( and surround KB with ASW TFs ).
2. KB's job is NOT to sink CVs or even transports. Its job is simply to stop the Allies landing supplies in Sumatra. This means KB's job is simply to survive and pose a threat which can pounce out whenever the Allies are spotted.
3. IJAAF and IJNAF bombers bombed every airfield in Sumatra into the stone age. It cost me in fighters lost in sweeps but it was a price worth paying. This wrote down his supplies.
This is what I basically wanted to say, but Nemo said it better. The risk from subs and SC TF is acceptable, considering the circumstances John is in, and certainly smaller than chasing your carriers in neutral waters.
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
Hey, Nemo, you're wrong (but only in insignificant ways that don't detract from your larger point).
Your comment was that the Allies have to take a base on Malaya within five days of the fall of Sabang. We're only four days out, the Allies have landed at Alor Star, and have twice attacked. It won't fall on day five, but a fresh brigade is coming ashore. There's a chance.
One factor that affected the operation is that 27th USA Div. (in combat mode and on amphibious ships) came ashore in strat mode, somehow. It will be ready for action tomorrow. Paratroops will also be available tomorrow or the day after. So the Allies will continue to work on Alor Star.
Supply isn't a near term problem for the Allies. There's 200k ashore at Sabang, with more coming in. The limit is 53k, so I think the waste will be pretty significant until the airfield goes to level four in four or five days.
I knew John had at least ten divisions in Burma and plenty more scattered around New Guinea (plus 7th Div. in the Aluetians). This plan has been predicated on that knowledge - that marshalling his troops and getting them to Sumatra is going to be a tough, tough battle. And he's not going to win the air war or the combat TF war unless he first wins a decisive carrier battle. The Allies have too many good fighters and combat ships available and the Japanese navy has been attritioned considerably over the past two months. Not to the point of being inferior, by any means, but certainly not being in a position to overwhelm the Allies in a surface clash or sustained operations.
Ironfisted control of Sumatra is critical because it unhinges the Japanese position in Burma, which seems to have taken place. Yes, in your hands the Allies could have landed in Malaya in strength, in part because you would have planned it that way from the outset. I planned this for Sumatra from the outset, partly because Sumatra is important and partly because it had major repurcussions in Burma.
I'm just glad you don't get to remove me from command. I'm having too much fun. (And I'm also gaining more experience that will help me better foresee and plan for future operations. Until then, this will have to do.)
Your comment was that the Allies have to take a base on Malaya within five days of the fall of Sabang. We're only four days out, the Allies have landed at Alor Star, and have twice attacked. It won't fall on day five, but a fresh brigade is coming ashore. There's a chance.
One factor that affected the operation is that 27th USA Div. (in combat mode and on amphibious ships) came ashore in strat mode, somehow. It will be ready for action tomorrow. Paratroops will also be available tomorrow or the day after. So the Allies will continue to work on Alor Star.
Supply isn't a near term problem for the Allies. There's 200k ashore at Sabang, with more coming in. The limit is 53k, so I think the waste will be pretty significant until the airfield goes to level four in four or five days.
I knew John had at least ten divisions in Burma and plenty more scattered around New Guinea (plus 7th Div. in the Aluetians). This plan has been predicated on that knowledge - that marshalling his troops and getting them to Sumatra is going to be a tough, tough battle. And he's not going to win the air war or the combat TF war unless he first wins a decisive carrier battle. The Allies have too many good fighters and combat ships available and the Japanese navy has been attritioned considerably over the past two months. Not to the point of being inferior, by any means, but certainly not being in a position to overwhelm the Allies in a surface clash or sustained operations.
Ironfisted control of Sumatra is critical because it unhinges the Japanese position in Burma, which seems to have taken place. Yes, in your hands the Allies could have landed in Malaya in strength, in part because you would have planned it that way from the outset. I planned this for Sumatra from the outset, partly because Sumatra is important and partly because it had major repurcussions in Burma.
I'm just glad you don't get to remove me from command. I'm having too much fun. (And I'm also gaining more experience that will help me better foresee and plan for future operations. Until then, this will have to do.)
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
(And I'm also gaining more experience that will help me better foresee and plan for future operations. Until then, this will have to do.)
Hmm.
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
I don't know. I just don't see John III coming up the Malacca Straits with carriers. Like many (not all) players, he seems to have an enhanced fear of subs, to the point that I've often seen him avoid going the straight way when he knows they're around. And I do think the Straits are bad news - currently, there are at least 20 subs there. John will know or guess that. With a big Allied airfield, minelayers (he's seen them) and lots of combat ships hanging around Sabang...well, I just don't see it. Not from John III. He will want sea room - room to maneuver - and I think many players would viscerally - or at least subconciously - feel the same.
So, you guys may be right, but my money is on the IO. If he comes through the Straits, though, I'll be glad, because I think that offers the strongest combination of factors for the Allies.
So, you guys may be right, but my money is on the IO. If he comes through the Straits, though, I'll be glad, because I think that offers the strongest combination of factors for the Allies.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
4
You really ought to send the 'before' save game to MichaelM.
One factor that affected the operation is that 27th USA Div. (in combat mode and on amphibious ships) came ashore in strat mode, somehow.
You really ought to send the 'before' save game to MichaelM.
Intel Monkey: https://sites.google.com/view/staffmonkeys/home
- Canoerebel
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RE: The Good The Bad & The Indifferent
That's not the only time it's happened. I also had an Army RCT land the same way at Padang, which was a major factor in the decision to diver that force to Sibolga. I also had a strong contingent of 1st Marines evaporate from their beachhead at Langsa, but not sure that was a bug. Perhaps they got wiped out by attrition when my BBs bombarded the beachhead.
But overall these have been relatively minor things and, to me, fall within the realm of "weird things happen" to slow things down and alter plans. "No plan survives contact with the enemy" kind of stuff. Overall, the invasion has gone exceedingly well, so "what's done is done."
P.S. Okay, I hear you about sending a save to Michael. I suppose the turn before 27th Div. came ashore might be the one to send. Uh...how do I send a save to Michael?
But overall these have been relatively minor things and, to me, fall within the realm of "weird things happen" to slow things down and alter plans. "No plan survives contact with the enemy" kind of stuff. Overall, the invasion has gone exceedingly well, so "what's done is done."
P.S. Okay, I hear you about sending a save to Michael. I suppose the turn before 27th Div. came ashore might be the one to send. Uh...how do I send a save to Michael?
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.