Some things that I have learned..

[crsutton]

About the real Pacific War from playing UV-WiTP and AE.

I thought I knew a lot but this great game has really added a lot of depth to my knowledge of the war. Here are some observations.

1. The Pacific is big. No joke here. What a massive theater. I have gotten an excellent idea of the geography of the war by pouring over the map for ten years.

2. No way Japan could have won. Forget about all those silly "what ifs" No matter what they managed to pull off the Allies were going to give Japan a big butt whipping.

3. The spitfire was not a great fighter. A sweet little bird but performance means nothing if you do not have great range. You can't win an offensive war with a short legged fighter.

4. The Allies were amazingly weak and unprepared in 1941. But you knew that.

5. Japan was not a second rate industrial power, but a third rate one. See item 2.

6. The Allies did not need to have a two pronged campaign. The Central Pacific route was not needed at all to defeat Japan.

7. Bombing Japan helped a great deal but is not the reason for Japan's defeat. She was going to starve to death anyways due to the loss of her sea lanes

8. Aside from tying up a lot of Japanese infantry, the Chinese theater held no strategic value for the Allies. Burma was pretty much a waste of resources too.

10. And most important, historians focus too much on carriers and warships. What defeated Japan more than anything else was the amazing sea lift ability that the Allies developed. I would have to say that this is the part of the war that I least understood. Japan could have fielded another 50 well equipped divisions but without a counter to Allied sea lift they would not have been able to stop the Allied advance and victory. The Allied ability to put massive force ashore at any point in the theater doomed Japan. The game made me realize how critical the LST and her lesser offspring were to Allied victory. Heck, I should have known. Every theater commander in the war begged and cried for more landing craft. You never really read of them crying for more battleships.

I am not throwing this out for controversy, just my observations. What have you learned about the real war by playing AE? I would be interested to hear.

[HexHead]

Subs, too after late '43.

#10 +1

Good points.

[obvert]

11. Sigint gave the Allies the ability to be where the Japanese didn't expect them and took away their ability to surprise the Allies. This gave the Allies a needed boost early in the war and got the momentum rolling by helping attrit precious Japanese ships, planes and equipment, as well as men, in the South Pacific. As Japan, I hardly even think of invading anything after mid-42 because I know it will show up in a report before I get there.

12. Radar detection and gunnery changed the playing field so significantly that the IJN was nearly incapable of winning a battle after about 1/44 even with seemingly overwhelming odds. The Cleveland and Fletcher were completely in charge after that point.

13. The Allies avoided the most critical area of the map for the majority of the war after losing it in the first 6 months; the DEI. Why? I don't know. But it makes me wonder, why was there never a massive amphibious landing at Benkolen or Oosthaven to drive to Palembang and take the oil?

14. A lot of stuff has to move around to feed an economy! Playing the Japanese side I think there is even more an understanding of this having to continually maximize efficient movement of oil and resources to the HI and supply back out. It's tedious, never-ending and nerve-wracking, but still kind of strangely enjoyable. It all makes sense how their war machine fell apart as their shipping as sunk and the sea lanes became untenable.

[Chickenboy]

I have learned the importance of putting a #9 in a list of 'ten things I have learned'. [:'(]

[JeffroK]

15. Hitler feared a 2 front war, the japanese either attacked or had a serious enemy on a 360deg front.

16. In addition to Allied shipping/The LST, the Bulldozer enabled the Allies to quickly develop portS and airfields at undelveloped sites which enabled them to island hop the Pacific and leave major enemy garrisons to wither.

17. Despite oft mention occurances, the Allies did fight as a team, once a strategy was mapped out and given point 15, allowed pressure to be put on the far more divided japanese services at many points of the compass.

18. Blind obedience to a doctrine which has the value of a mans life at zero cannot succeed in the face of a doctrine which gives great value to a mans life and supports it with immense firepower. Banzai & Kamikaze attacks are the tactics of a morally corrupt system.

19. Dont sneak up on a mighty industrial power when its still asleep on a Sunday morning unless phase 2 is anvasion of their capital city!

[geofflambert]

[quote]ORIGINAL: JeffK


18. Blind obedience to a doctrine which has the value of a mans life at zero cannot succeed in the face of a doctrine which gives great value to a mans life and supports it with immense firepower. Banzai & Kamikaze attacks are the tactics of a morally corrupt system.
[quote]

I am in total agreement with you vis a vis moral corruption in the Japanese system, but be careful, there was plenty of that going around.

[DHRedge]

ORIGINAL: JeffK


18. Blind obedience to a doctrine which has the value of a mans life at zero cannot succeed in the face of a doctrine which gives great value to a mans life and supports it with immense firepower. Banzai & Kamikaze attacks are the tactics of a morally corrupt system.

It is more complicated then that. It was the failure of the actions, that makes it so obviously wrong. And the failure included the use of nukes that gave them no chance. If they would have convinced USA against a home island invasion, that tactic would have been successful.

I do disagree with that as a tactic, I personally think the Bushido code of no retreat no surrender is in error. The story of the Ronin, if true, tells of them effectively in surrender for 10 years till they could mount a successful campaign to complete there mission. I think the ideology of Bushido code, meant to get people to be cogs in a societal machine, and also true in many cultures, went to far. But I understand the concept it is taught in many cultures to be willing to give for the greater good of society, even till death.

The 'system' that creates that effect is 'community' where a few pilots sacrifice themselves for there families and home country. (in theory)

There action would be no different then as told in the movie Wrath of Khan where Spock saves the ship. (without attacking, but same concept)
Needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few or the One.
and what a comment, "You have always been, and always will be, my friend".
That explains the concept, and that is the only reason for such action, to defend through love of others some cherished cause or person.

However Kamikaze was tactically flawed, and the eagerness to Banzi or Kamikaze I think was in error, but i do understand the concept. Although the recruiting, and the reason for the war and reason not to instead have a peace would be the question that would need to be asked at that time.

It should be noted, when the rest of the people in some community don't give a crap about you, or what happens to you, and they want you to die for them, that is much to ask, and should be thought on carefully. Although you can consider going against them for the arrogance of them thinking you should die for them when they don't care about you, nor have a valid need for you or any other person to die except something they call being on a team where they think they get, while others pay for them to have.

It should be noted, the reason for WW2 was to destroy production and kill people on any side, to try and rebalance the capitalism equations that were failing, so it is pretty obvious that death would seep into many areas of that conflict. When production is over demand capitalism fails, WW2 stabilized capitalism till 1970s.

ORIGINAL: JeffK
19. Dont sneak up on a mighty industrial power when its still asleep on a Sunday morning unless phase 2 is anvasion of their capital city!

There only way they could have won would be if America did not fight, and they thought an attack would create that, while much of USA was trying to find a way to join in the war to help England and Western Europe.

Japan should have made USA attack them. The error of Pearl Harbor is a really astounding miscalculation.

[Chickenboy]

20. The first 6 months of the war for the Allies were a confused mosaic of tactical and strategic defeats, fear of the unknown and uncertainty bordering on despair. Any game attempting to emulate this rampant defeatism should evoke these feelings. Allied players that play with cocksure confidence in inevitable triumph from day 1 are missing the point.

No fate but what we make.

[BigBadWolf]

ORIGINAL: DHRedge

The story of the Ronin, if true, tells of them effectively in surrender for 10 years till they could mount a successful campaign to complete there mission.

If I may add, most Japanese historians agree that the story of 47 Ronins is a story of revenge, not Bushido. Bushido would demand them to attack right after the death of their master, even though their enemy was prepared at that time and they would most likely suffered defeat, but that is unimportant to Bushido. Instead, they planned for two years, pretending to be drunks. What if their enemy died before they got the chance to execute their plan? they would suffer eternal shame.

[DHRedge]

ORIGINAL: BigBadWolf

ORIGINAL: DHRedge

The story of the Ronin, if true, tells of them effectively in surrender for 10 years till they could mount a successful campaign to complete there mission.

If I may add, most Japanese historians agree that the story of 47 Ronins is a story of revenge, not Bushido. Bushido would demand them to attack right after the death of their master, even though their enemy was prepared at that time and they would most likely suffered defeat, but that is unimportant to Bushido. Instead, they planned for two years, pretending to be drunks. What if their enemy died before they got the chance to execute their plan? they would suffer eternal shame.

Agreed, from that I postulate that Samurai acted under a different set of values then the Bushido Code. Then after the time of warrior Samurai, there was an age of peace where many Samurai wrote of ideas, and many of them were written by Samurai that never fought battles, that had an effect of solidifying the Bushido code. And it also was to elevate the Samurai culture, possibly adding rigidly to the doctrine that did not exist in practice during the actual time of waring Samurai.

Or the legend discussed lofty ideals that are not always practical in battle. Warring Samurai would understand that, while the poet Samurai would celebrate the legend, including adding some less then accurate doctrine.

It is my contention, that the code of the Samurai was distorted by the poet Samurai, as often happens in story, and the actual Samurai that fought battles would have known the tactical advantages of various actions of repositioning and preparing and coordinating.


On the topic of shame
If they were in process of planning when he died, they could conclude divine favor had completed there plan for them, as long as they were always planing during that two years to find a successful method, there should be no shame. Would it not be of greater shame to take the route of lack of patience and fail, then to plan until a path opened to complete the mission?

The other side of the discussion

An excuse of hesitation because of cowardice or lack of perseverance would be shameful, and I also understand that in that heightened state of warrior form, the thought of failure of any just cause is not contemplated, so any hesitation could be seen as lack of confidence in the righteousness of ones own cause.



However
I postulate the use of trickery, is that part of the warring culture, the guy that carved a stick from an oar(writer of 5 rings), used being late as an advantage, and used anger to unbalance an opponent, both would seem to be not of highest rigid honor, but both are honored stories. And trickery also includes calculating best time for an action.



It goes to ideas of 'rules' in society, and 'rules for warfare'. I find that a distinct difference from the philosophy of "all warfare is deception(including trickery)" and ponder if that distinction is the conversation about Ninja(chaos forms), versus Samurai(order forms).

Note I see both forms as having value and purpose.



Since I think often on songs, and muse.

On that note, another Medusa song that in some way shows more balance with both sides needed for a victory, something that the later Bushido by the poet Samurai seems to miss. And the story of her relocation to the Island before gaining the assistance of Perseus. And also showing support in various forms when on the island.

Heart - These Dreams
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41P8UxneDJE

Then her return from the Island

Heart - Strait On
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKwOOymOURo

[DHRedge]

The purpose of honor in battle, is to win favor of those that support a just cause, and win the support of peoples.

I conclude that if used as a 'reaction' to a situation, as enforcement, (the double no, in justice), then waring methods called trickery, if they are within a persons own code of behavior, things like camouflage, or misdirection, would not be of lack of honor, and with that would also be preparation for a successful attack.

But always when I think that comes the next thought, if a cause is righteous it will alway succeed, and hesitation or trickery is only to move the decision from requirements of intervention in the face of any odds.

If you plan, you take the material route,
if you attack regardless of outcome, or odds of survival, you put the outcome in the hands of intervention.

I think that is much of that discussion.

Then again if some 'spiritual' doesn't like you,
or does not favor your cause,
it might tell some group to throw themselves into doomed attacks.

So there is always that also.

What a great conversation.

[Gunnulf]

#5 seems a little bit of an exaggeration. For all their disadvantages and flaws a 3rd rate industrial power would not be able to field what was at its height a huge navy, air force and army. Of course they were eclipsed by the US and the Commonwealth forces despite their focus on Europe. But certainly only US, Germany, UK & USSR had a larger industrial base (all of which I would argue to be 1st rate) so categorizing Japan 3rd rate doesnt leave much space for 2nd rates really. Even Italy would in economic terms fall into 2nd rate industrial category.

[BigBadWolf]

And most important, historians focus too much on carriers and warships. What defeated Japan more than anything else was the amazing sea lift ability that the Allies developed.

All those sea lift vessels would be useless without carriers to protect them.

[topeverest]

excellent points sir.

Yamamoto was right in that he didn't want to go to war and that the only successful empire end would have been a negotiated peace after a quick string of massive empire victories. The coral sea took any chance of that away, if it ever was possible. But even before that, the Americans probably had decided on the size and major components of the Pacific military machine which would seal the empire's fate. IMHO, the empire never actioned the kind of military campaigns or weapons platforms that might have had a chance to break the American will before their industrial might came on-line. From the very first day of the war, with the empire strategy and mix of naval leaders, only a miracle could have saved the empire.

I personally don't think the Americans would ever have given up short of threatening the CUSA - and even that is questionable - even if the declaration of war had been delivered in time.

[tocaff]

Actually you could make a point that it was everything combined that produced the Allied inevitable victory.

The fact that the USA outproduced the rest of the world during the war and it never even shifted it's economy to a 100% war footing was absolutely incredible.

It didn't hurt that the Allied leadership, though they made many mistakes, did have a focus that their enemies lacked and as a result there were many "right" decisions made.

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

20. The first 6 months of the war for the Allies were a confused mosaic of tactical and strategic defeats, fear of the unknown and uncertainty bordering on despair. Any game attempting to emulate this rampant defeatism should evoke these feelings. Allied players that play with cocksure confidence in inevitable triumph from day 1 are missing the point.

No fate but what we make.

Well said and excellent points at start CR.

[ny59giants]

13. The Allies avoided the most critical area of the map for the majority of the war after losing it in the first 6 months; the DEI. Why? I don't know. But it makes me wonder, why was there never a massive amphibious landing at Benkolen or Oosthaven to drive to Palembang and take the oil?

Most Japanese players don't suffer a "Midway" and have the balance of sea power shift so suddenly. Also, the game allows a huge increase in Japanese aircraft production. Some things in AE are modeled well, but it is hard to model all the knowledge learned after the war out of the game.

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: obvert

11. Sigint gave the Allies the ability to be where the Japanese didn't expect them and took away their ability to surprise the Allies. This gave the Allies a needed boost early in the war and got the momentum rolling by helping attrit precious Japanese ships, planes and equipment, as well as men, in the South Pacific. As Japan, I hardly even think of invading anything after mid-42 because I know it will show up in a report before I get there.

12. Radar detection and gunnery changed the playing field so significantly that the IJN was nearly incapable of winning a battle after about 1/44 even with seemingly overwhelming odds. The Cleveland and Fletcher were completely in charge after that point.

13. The Allies avoided the most critical area of the map for the majority of the war after losing it in the first 6 months; the DEI. Why? I don't know. But it makes me wonder, why was there never a massive amphibious landing at Benkolen or Oosthaven to drive to Palembang and take the oil?

14. A lot of stuff has to move around to feed an economy! Playing the Japanese side I think there is even more an understanding of this having to continually maximize efficient movement of oil and resources to the HI and supply back out. It's tedious, never-ending and nerve-wracking, but still kind of strangely enjoyable. It all makes sense how their war machine fell apart as their shipping as sunk and the sea lanes became untenable.

I think it's the feeling of control. Rather than having a glut of supplies that just need to go freakin' everywhere and I can do it because I have the shipping, playing as Japan forces you to choose what to send where; doing it efficiently is both challenging (therefore rewarding) and necessary to playing a good game. It's also the sense of accomplishment.

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: Gunnulf

#5 seems a little bit of an exaggeration. For all their disadvantages and flaws a 3rd rate industrial power would not be able to field what was at its height a huge navy, air force and army. Of course they were eclipsed by the US and the Commonwealth forces despite their focus on Europe. But certainly only US, Germany, UK & USSR had a larger industrial base (all of which I would argue to be 1st rate) so categorizing Japan 3rd rate doesnt leave much space for 2nd rates really. Even Italy would in economic terms fall into 2nd rate industrial category.

See USSR 1950-1990.

[Lokasenna]

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: Gunnulf

#5 seems a little bit of an exaggeration. For all their disadvantages and flaws a 3rd rate industrial power would not be able to field what was at its height a huge navy, air force and army. Of course they were eclipsed by the US and the Commonwealth forces despite their focus on Europe. But certainly only US, Germany, UK & USSR had a larger industrial base (all of which I would argue to be 1st rate) so categorizing Japan 3rd rate doesnt leave much space for 2nd rates really. Even Italy would in economic terms fall into 2nd rate industrial category.

See USSR 1950-1990.

Indeed. Paints a nice real world example of "guns or butter".