Debunking the Glantz myth

[lycortas]

Probably the most important thing to remember about the Soviet archives is that getting access in the post-Soviet era is not a balm for all of our east front historical woes.

Stalin was unique in history, he had no loyalty to anyone.
Stalin made sure that both during the Civil War and during the second world war he looked great. After he died Zhukov tried resurrecting his own reputation through creative rewrites of Soviet history. Much of his rewrites were attacks on Stalin.

Then Khrushchev got in the game and he was no fan of Zhukov's. Khrushchev rewrote much of Istoriya and SUPPOSEDLY purged a great deal from the state archives.

After Khrushchev's death more changes were made.

How much Glantz gained from access is debatable; i suspect most low level unit documents were of use. But stuff about Stalin screwing things up (or not screwing things up) are really hard to tell if they are accurate.

One of my favorites is the downfall of Timoshenko; did he screw up at Kharkov or did Stalin? Most sources say Stalin did but those sources were heavily influenced by Khrushchev and Zhukov, what were their relationships with Timoshenko?

I just picked up Glantz for the first time.. i would never say he is pro Soviet, he actually shows me info about Army Group North that Seaton never did making the Germans look a bit better. But i am stunned by all of the mistakes in Glantz or terrible editing.

Michael

And Flavious, law, really? I am so dissapointed in you. I have my masters in Linguistics Archaeology and Astrophysics.

[Tarhunnas]

ORIGINAL: turtlefang

As far as German spy operations during MARs, here's the story:

On November 8, Hitler received a report from R. Gelen, the head of the Russian Department of the Intelligence Service (the founder of West Germany's counterespionage agency in the future). There the Rzhev Salient was reported to have been chosen by Soviet SCCR as the main aim of a new offensive... snip

Great post Turtlefang! Interesting, but I share your scepticism. Like all spy stories and alleged intelligence coups, it is hard to determine what is true and not. People seem to like all kinds of conspiracies, especially involving intelligence, so a lot of unsubstantiated stories are going around. Also, sometimes the story might originally be intended to hide the existence of another more sensitive intelligence source.

[Flaviusx]

Oh I quit practicing a while ago.

[turtlefang]

Tarhunnas -

Thanks for the comment. While I am very skeptical, I still won't completely discount it. The Soviets scored some incredible spy victories over the Germans in the war (Lucy being one of the most famous), and there is creditable evidence that they continued to have some (or at least one), high level spy in the German inner circle right up to the end of the war. I could see this story as a cover for something not true, a cover for an existing spy ring, and even true with a different twist. I, and it's my opinion, just have a hard time believing that even Stalin would throw away that many troops and material on a "diversion" when NO ONE at the time knew Saturn would work or that it would work as well as it did.

Lycortas -

Glanzt is a great researcher, a poor writer and needs truly professional help in editing and no one knows why he doesn't get it. Although I suspect he just doesn't consider it important - his lecture notes are simply terrible, I've picked up a few over the years and they look like an 8th grader could do them.

Unfortunately, Erickson - who was as good a researcher as Glanzt just didn't have the access to the same material. And he was a much better writer.

As far as what's in the achieves and what's been destroyed, your right, we will never know. The USSR used disinformation and revisionist history to support internal and external politics. And it was perfectly alright to change history or destroy it to make someone look better - or worse.

Zhukov and Timoshenko were rivals, BTW, and Zhukov the junior at the time. Stalin, from what we can tell, was never a fan of Timoshenko - he wan't one of Stalin's cavalry boys from the revolution so the relationship wasn't "strong" (although being one of the cavalry boys wasn't a guarantee of anything over the long term with Stalin). We don't have enough information on Kharkov although I suspect Timoshenko screwed up. Stalin proved remarkably tolerate of losing when he interfered as long as the general fought and didn't retreat or give up too soon. He was much less tolerant if the general went against his advice and lost. Or just lost. Just to be clear, this is speculation on my part. And I think a lot of the "blame Stalin" came out of the Cold War.

Khrushchev, on the other hand, was really a rather minor party official in the Great War. He had history rewritten to enhance his role but he didn't really have a big role or influence in WW2 - and no where near as much as was assumed by the West based on Russian sources and where he ended up (on top). It was a case of the "Big Lie".

[Flaviusx]

The official Soviet line at the time on Kharkov was that it was Bagramyan's fault, then Chief of Staff for Timoshenko. He was in the doghouse for a while after that, but clawed his way to the top in due course, taking over the 11. Guards Army and eventually 1. Baltic Front. Went on to become a MSU.

Timoshenko for his part was eased into obscurity.

Glantz started off self publishing, bear in mind, and picked up a lot of bad habits from that. He also I think cares more about quantity than quality, his output is impressive as hell. But one does miss the polish of Erickson who would spend years getting a book just right and had very exacting standards in contrast to Glantz who just pushes stuff out the door at a relentless pace.

Erickson was a formal academic with extremely rigorous standards, and Glantz really isn't, he pulled himself up by his own bootstraps and more or less occupied a scholarly space by default. Nobody is even contesting it.

If Erickson were still alive, we'd get some healthy competition between the two. They are strong in different ways.

[Aurelian]

I think Glantz should team up with House, or someone like him, more often.

I've read Erickson's "The Road to..." more than once. But have yet to finish Glantz's "Colossus Reborn" or even "To the Gates of Stalingrad."

Can't argue with it. Glantz could use some polish. But I suspect he has a different audience in mind.

[Michael T]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UAeqVGP-GPM

[lycortas]

Turtlefang,

Fangs, um, thanks for the info about Timoshenko. I think you could not be to talented and survive Stalin. Frunze was almost undoubtedly killed off in surgery and then Tukachevsky was purged for Un-communist behavior and taking bribes from capitalists... i have always felt that Timoshenko's reputation was more than his talent. He was a very minor officer in the Civil War.

I might disagree about Khrushchev though; he was the third highest ranked commissar in Russia in '41 and by the end of the war he was the senior commissar. He was hardly unimportant.

thanks,
Mike

[NavalNewZ]

Well done. I was worried that this was going down *that road* like a thread I saw on boardgamegeek that descended into 15 pages revolving around an individual who was defending his definition of 'irony, because his original point was long forgotten. I'm impressed at those who have managed to turn this around, and even made it interesting. Thank you.

[hfarrish]

It actually would be interesting to know the level of post-grad education on this forum...I suspect it would actually be very, very high. Law, Fordham U., 2006 myself...

[mmarquo]

Medicine, Universite de Liege, 1980...

Marquo

[elmo3]

School of Hard Knocks

[parusski]

76mm said:

This thread has gotten truly surreal, arguing about who is right and wrong without even knowing what issue is being discussed.

Well sir you are wrong and I am right. Disprove me.[:D]

[Aurelian]

ORIGINAL: elmo3

School of Hard Knocks

That is one tough school. And it's a lifetime long.

[Zebedee]

ORIGINAL: el hefe

The Germans have always relied on quick victories in order to win their wars with quick overwhelming knock out blows to prevent long and drawn out campaigns. They had to be quick to respond to threats from multiple directions. This strategic thinking formed the basis of their military culture for hundreds of years. The German military culture focused on operational and small unit tactics and superior leadership to deal with these neighborly threats. Because of this focus, it almost completely neglected logistics and strategic intelligence and any strategic warfare capability. Once the knockout blow against the Soviet Union passed, Germany didn't have a chance for a total victory in my opinion with few options and capability to wage a strategic war. The Soviets had enough manpower, material, and space to survive the initial assaults. Then, it learned to fight back.

Trey

Frieser in Blitzkrieg Legend present an interestingly nuanced view of this. Worth reading if you've not yet. Argument basically is that lessons were learned from WW1 but promptly set aside by many after 1940. Would also say that logistics weren't neglected (cf complaints about Rommel from General Staff, logistics for Barbarossa performing as required for the initial planning) but strained beyond all reasonable limits by 'victory fever'. Just a by-the-by.

Harrison's work on the Soviet economy is of interest. By all historical standards, the SU should have collapsed. Why it didn't is an interesting discussion.

Anyways, I came into this thread expecting some factually based debunking of Glantz as a historian. I must confess to not being surprised that the thread failed to deliver. There are errors in Glantz' work. But it's utterly assinine to point to a disagreement with Beevor over intent for Mars and make dubious claims on the back of that. I do however enjoy Michael T's threads on how to better game the mechanics of WitE. Those at least are very enlightening and give me pointers on what to avoid when finding someone to play against

[LiquidSky]

One good thing about this, is it prompted me to go out and buy a couple books. I picked up Antony Beevor's Stalingrad, and Glantz's Clash of Titans.

First thing I notice is that Beevor seems to write at about a high school level of history. (Or history for the masses). Glantz is more a graduate level reference book. With greater detail, I suppose, comes a greater chance of error.

And I notice that Beevor uses these books in his bibliography:

Glantz, David, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, London, 1989 ———, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II, Novato, Calif., 1990 Glantz, David, and House, J. M., When Titans Clashed, Kansas City, 1996

So it seems Beevor at least appreciates Glantz's work.

[hfarrish]

Beevor is a good writer, which translates well into general histories. Glantz is a horrible writer that doesn't but does have good research. Best advice I've ever had was to read the Glantz books edited by J. House...makes a huge difference.

[gids]

One good thing about this, is it prompted me to go out and buy a couple books. I picked up Antony Beevor's Stalingrad, and Glantz's Clash of Titans.

First thing I notice is that Beevor seems to write at about a high school level of history. (Or history for the masses). Glantz is more a graduate level reference book. With greater detail, I suppose, comes a greater chance of error.

And I notice that Beevor uses these books in his bibliography:

Glantz, David, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, London, 1989 ———, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II, Novato, Calif., 1990 Glantz, David, and House, J. M., When Titans Clashed, Kansas City, 1996

So it seems Beevor at least appreciates Glantz's work.
 
 
 
 
 
Very nice

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: gids

One good thing about this, is it prompted me to go out and buy a couple books. I picked up Antony Beevor's Stalingrad, and Glantz's Clash of Titans.

First thing I notice is that Beevor seems to write at about a high school level of history. (Or history for the masses). Glantz is more a graduate level reference book. With greater detail, I suppose, comes a greater chance of error.

And I notice that Beevor uses these books in his bibliography:

Glantz, David, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, London, 1989 ———, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II, Novato, Calif., 1990 Glantz, David, and House, J. M., When Titans Clashed, Kansas City, 1996

So it seems Beevor at least appreciates Glantz's work.





Very nice

About 10+ years ao I got:

When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Modern War Studies) by David M. Glantz

and to accompany it

Russo German War, 1941-45 by Albert Seaton


Leo "Apollo11"

[mmarquo]

Beevor's goal is not to produce pedantic historical references detailing the impact of every bullet fired, rather to give the reader a feel for the human context of events; and in this regard he is very good. I use Glantz to when designing scenarios for various games. Erickson seems to fall in between and I like him best.

Marquo