In a couple of ongoing AARs, the competitors agreed to one CV port attack on Dec 7th rather than just one (and only one) port attack on Dec 7th as a HR.
For quite some time, I have been going back and forth as to which I think is more appropriate. I guess the question boils down to whether or not Netties from Formosa would have been able to get to Manila after sunrise, but before the ships in the harbor could slip away.
Full sunrise in Manila on Dec 7th would have been around 5:15 am or so (local time). That means the sky would have been getting detectably lighter around 4:15 am. So, if the Japanese planned properly, they could have timed takeoffs from Formosa such that Netties could have been over Manila harbor at around 4:30 am, a time at which there would have been adequate light to perform the attack.
From a history website I found, Allied ships in Manila harbor weren't notified of the attack on Pearl Harbor until 3:40 am. I doubt many of them could have been underway (much less clear of the harbor) in the 50 minutes they would have had before this hypothetical Japanese attack hit (crew would have to have been recalled from shore, engines would have to have been fired up, the harbor would have been a complete clusterf#*k with ships getting in each other's way, etc).
So, now I'm leaning toward the one CV port attack rule instead (to allow for this hypothetical attack that most likely could have taken place).
Any ideas/comments?
Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
If I recall, there was fog over Formosa in the AM, not sure they could have launched any earlier.
RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
ORIGINAL: oldman45
If I recall, there was fog over Formosa in the AM, not sure they could have launched any earlier.
Yes, there was fog that night/morning - heavy enough that they had to wait for it to lift. But, it could have been clear.
With the game modeling weather events, you could have a successful launch, or you may be grounded.
RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
a lot of players compromise on this rule by allowing the creation of a random number of sub taskforces. I mean thats what you are after in Manila?
RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
ORIGINAL: Icedawg
In a couple of ongoing AARs, the competitors agreed to one CV port attack on Dec 7th rather than just one (and only one) port attack on Dec 7th as a HR.
For quite some time, I have been going back and forth as to which I think is more appropriate. I guess the question boils down to whether or not Netties from Formosa would have been able to get to Manila after sunrise, but before the ships in the harbor could slip away.
Full sunrise in Manila on Dec 7th would have been around 5:15 am or so (local time). That means the sky would have been getting detectably lighter around 4:15 am. So, if the Japanese planned properly, they could have timed takeoffs from Formosa such that Netties could have been over Manila harbor at around 4:30 am, a time at which there would have been adequate light to perform the attack.
From a history website I found, Allied ships in Manila harbor weren't notified of the attack on Pearl Harbor until 3:40 am. I doubt many of them could have been underway (much less clear of the harbor) in the 50 minutes they would have had before this hypothetical Japanese attack hit (crew would have to have been recalled from shore, engines would have to have been fired up, the harbor would have been a complete clusterf#*k with ships getting in each other's way, etc).
As far as house rules are concerned. Personally I don't begrudge Player one the right to stage multiple port attacks. Hindsight benie? yes....but from Turn 2 onward Player two gets all the hindsight it can handle either through Sir Robin, a coordinated multi national defense and small TF raids on most likely invasion points. The subs may or may not be effective depending on the die rolls. Some players place great value in hitting as many of those subs as possible. I'd rather kill the planes. I've never done the KB SRA option too as leaving the Pac Fleet intact on one's flank invites an early thrust.
So, now I'm leaning toward the one CV port attack rule instead (to allow for this hypothetical attack that most likely could have taken place).
Any ideas/comments?
They could have.....but the point of the Clark attack was to establish air superiority which is critical. The importance of this over the PI's is muted somewhat in AE because often the attack results are a bit meager. Still, i've seen some good results too and not damaging/destroying those planes is asking for trouble in the turns ahead. So from the "historical" perspective, I don't see that ever being a realistic option. Keep in mind too that Port Attack tends to be overbearing when it comes to hitting multiple ships 'and' the base in question at the same time. When the Japanese did attack Cavite the primary target was the base itself and it was wrecked making the base untendable so the ships became superfulous. Achieving early air superiority was a critical part of this.
RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
ORIGINAL: icepharmy
a lot of players compromise on this rule by allowing the creation of a random number of sub taskforces. I mean thats what you are after in Manila?
Yes. Nothing else in Manila is of any importance anyway.
I like the idea of some sort of compromise, but I'm not sure if this is the way to go. I'll give it some thought.
RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
ORIGINAL: Icedawg
In a couple of ongoing AARs, the competitors agreed to one CV port attack on Dec 7th rather than just one (and only one) port attack on Dec 7th as a HR.
For quite some time, I have been going back and forth as to which I think is more appropriate. I guess the question boils down to whether or not Netties from Formosa would have been able to get to Manila after sunrise, but before the ships in the harbor could slip away.
Full sunrise in Manila on Dec 7th would have been around 5:15 am or so (local time). That means the sky would have been getting detectably lighter around 4:15 am. So, if the Japanese planned properly, they could have timed takeoffs from Formosa such that Netties could have been over Manila harbor at around 4:30 am, a time at which there would have been adequate light to perform the attack.
From a history website I found, Allied ships in Manila harbor weren't notified of the attack on Pearl Harbor until 3:40 am. I doubt many of them could have been underway (much less clear of the harbor) in the 50 minutes they would have had before this hypothetical Japanese attack hit (crew would have to have been recalled from shore, engines would have to have been fired up, the harbor would have been a complete clusterf#*k with ships getting in each other's way, etc).
As far as house rules are concerned. Personally I don't begrudge Player one the right to stage multiple port attacks. Hindsight benie? yes....but from Turn 2 onward Player two gets all the hindsight it can handle either through Sir Robin, a coordinated multi national defense and small TF raids on most likely invasion points. The subs may or may not be effective depending on the die rolls. Some players place great value in hitting as many of those subs as possible. I'd rather kill the planes. I've never done the KB SRA option too as leaving the Pac Fleet intact on one's flank invites an early thrust.
So, now I'm leaning toward the one CV port attack rule instead (to allow for this hypothetical attack that most likely could have taken place).
Any ideas/comments?
They could have.....but the point of the Clark attack was to establish air superiority which is critical. The importance of this over the PI's is muted somewhat in AE because often the attack results are a bit meager. Still, i've seen some good results too and not damaging/destroying those planes is asking for trouble in the turns ahead. So from the "historical" perspective, I don't see that ever being a realistic option. Keep in mind too that Port Attack tends to be overbearing when it comes to hitting multiple ships 'and' the base in question at the same time. When the Japanese did attack Cavite the primary target was the base itself and it was wrecked making the base untendable so the ships became superfulous. Achieving early air superiority was a critical part of this.
I see what you are saying. The Japanese didn't have the all-knowing hindsight the player has in AE. In real life, the Japanese feared the aircraft at Clark more than the subs at Manila. In the game, it's the other way around. Those subs scare the bajesus out of me, but I could care less about the planes at Clark. The few B-17s that are there aren't that big of a deal and the fighters can be disposed of in a week or two of sweeps.
Like you said, the Japanese "could have" attacked the port rather than the airfield, but since conventional wisdom stressed air superiority at the time, they chose the airfield. The player's conventional wisdom stresses killing those damned subs, so since the Japanese could have attacked the port, I'd say it should be left as a possibility to be discussed between the players.
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Bullwinkle58
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RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
ORIGINAL: Icedawg
ORIGINAL: icepharmy
a lot of players compromise on this rule by allowing the creation of a random number of sub taskforces. I mean thats what you are after in Manila?
Yes. Nothing else in Manila is of any importance anyway.
With stockpiling and supply spinners the LI is not trivial. You can suck a fair bit into Bataan before the door closes.
The Moose
RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... P1/ch2.htm
well in this brief listing - they indeed only concentrate on army and AF, but I just saw somewhere I think on this forum the intelligence given by civilians till 1940 -I am sure Subic bay had spies
well in this brief listing - they indeed only concentrate on army and AF, but I just saw somewhere I think on this forum the intelligence given by civilians till 1940 -I am sure Subic bay had spies
RE: Port Attack vs CV Port Attack
3 days later some subs were still at Cavite 
12/10 Wed. Cavite Navy Yard, P. I., is heavily damaged by enemy air
attack.
Guam surrenders to Japanese landing force.
Japanese land on Camiguin Island and at Gonzaga and Aparri,
Luzon, P. I.
British battleship PRINCE OF WALES and battlecruiser REPULSE
are sunk by Japanese naval air attack near Kuantan, Malaya.
United States naval vessels damaged at Cavite, P. I.:
Destroyer PEARY (DD-226), by horizontal bomber.
Submarine SEADRAGON (SS-194), by horizontal bomber.
Submarine SEALION (SS-195), by horizontal bomber.
Minesweeper BITTERN (AM-36), by horizontal bomber.
But the Navy did react instantly - although with submarines - loading is a very long procedure (through the small hatchways, designed so as to breach the pressure hull as minimally as possible), overhauls are always on-going, only a certain percentage could/can get underway fast
12/08 Mon. United States declares war on Japan.
Striking Force, Asiatic Fleet (Rear Adm. W. A. Glassford)
departs Iloilo, P. I., for Makassar Strait, Netherlands East
Indies.
12/10 Wed. Cavite Navy Yard, P. I., is heavily damaged by enemy air
attack.
Guam surrenders to Japanese landing force.
Japanese land on Camiguin Island and at Gonzaga and Aparri,
Luzon, P. I.
British battleship PRINCE OF WALES and battlecruiser REPULSE
are sunk by Japanese naval air attack near Kuantan, Malaya.
United States naval vessels damaged at Cavite, P. I.:
Destroyer PEARY (DD-226), by horizontal bomber.
Submarine SEADRAGON (SS-194), by horizontal bomber.
Submarine SEALION (SS-195), by horizontal bomber.
Minesweeper BITTERN (AM-36), by horizontal bomber.
But the Navy did react instantly - although with submarines - loading is a very long procedure (through the small hatchways, designed so as to breach the pressure hull as minimally as possible), overhauls are always on-going, only a certain percentage could/can get underway fast
12/08 Mon. United States declares war on Japan.
Striking Force, Asiatic Fleet (Rear Adm. W. A. Glassford)
departs Iloilo, P. I., for Makassar Strait, Netherlands East
Indies.