Books on Eastern Front Logistic?

[invernomuto]

Hi,
could anyone suggest me a good book (or an internet resource) about Logistic for the Eastern Front? E.g. I would like to know infos like the daily ammo expenditure by a German or Russian division or the daily fuel usage by a Panzer division. Is there something that covers that subject?
Thanks in advance.

Bye

[aspqrz02]

I'd have to check, but I think the US War Department's 1944 "Handbook of German Military Forces" has some data on that in it somewhere ... it was reprinted by one of the US University Presses maybe 10 years or so ago.

Apart from that, I can't think of anything specific on WW2 German Units ...

However, I am sure that one of the US military logistic planning documents was available online (at the ATDL, IIRC, but that seems offline permanently) ... USMC? ... and it had tables of logistic data for Amphibious Assaults. The version I saw was hand altered with crossings out (in a scanned PDF) but had 1950's equipment plus some updating, it may be of some help if you can track it down.

Field Manual 55-15 has data for current US Army units, and may give a general idea.

Phil

[herwin]

Try a good university research library for German and Russian language sources.

[wosung]

Martin Van Crefeld, Supplying War:

A German fast division (armour, motorized) needed 300 tons of supplies a day. An I.D. perhaps 200 tons, p.159. A German fast division in North Africa needed 350 tons a day, inluding water, p.185.

In June 1941 a German fast division had an organic fuel carrying capacity of 430 tons, plus 400-500 tons additional by Heerestransport columns, pp.151-152. Each German division started that war with 2-3 basic loads of ammo, plus there was a Heeres reserve for ammo for 20 divisions, p. 151.

In Summer 1941 in Russia a German 100 km (60 mi) Verbrauchssatz (authorized fuel consumption) lasted for 70 only, because of bad roads. In the first year in Russia the Heer needed 330.000 tons of fuel per month instead of planned 250.000 tons p.157.

Overlord planners calculated with 600-650 tons of supply per Wally division and day, 300-350 were needed p. 215, 228.



Each of the 4 x (1000+ pages) volumes of "Germany and the Second World War" dealing with the war in Russia (two of them do so exclusively) has a chapter or a few pages about logistics. Please note that until now only a few of those over 10 volumes are translated into English (The rest probably also will be translated).

In July 1941 the Ostheer needed 12.000 tons of fuel per day. 9.000 were planned. Vol.4, p. 963.

In the first year of that war, from June 1941 to April 1942 the Ostheer needed on average 90.000 tons of ammo per month. Far more than anticipated. In the second year the ammo consumption rose on average to 117.000 tons (or 260 ammo trains) per month, with the infantry ammo being doubled because of Stalingrad, Vol. 6, p 789, Vol. 8, p. 19.


Regards

[Montbrun]

"Germany and the Second World War" - most have been translated:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_an ... _World_War

and can be purchased from Oxford University Press:

http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/category/aca ... ry/gsww.do

You can sometimes find a good deal second-hand or on eBay.

Brad

[wosung]

Thank you!

That Wiki entry is a good comprehensive overview in English.

Although pricey (If you can read German you can get the series for 20-40 Euros per volume), and although the earlier volumes are some twenty years old and ageing (esp. the Barbarossa Volume 4), I can really recommend the series. Esp. Vol. 8 is one of the best titles I've read about the Ostkrieg.

Regards

[Richrd]

I disagree with the above figures. The entire 6th Army requested 500 tons a day as it's minimum requirement. In War without Garlands, a book just chock full of numbers, he quotes 70 tons/day for a division. Also refer Stopped at Stalingrad, or something like that.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Richrd

I disagree with the above figures. The entire 6th Army requested 500 tons a day as it's minimum requirement. In War without Garlands, a book just chock full of numbers, he quotes 70 tons/day for a division. Also refer Stopped at Stalingrad, or something like that.

Perhaps 500 tons a day of trace supply for the Armee. Fuel or ammunition was more like 300 tons per division-day in heavy combat.

[Lieste]

Some of those supply figures look somewhat out of context... that the W Allies had a requirement of 600 tons and "only used" 300-350 tons might have a lot more to do with a chronic shortage of (Regimental/Divisional/{Light} Corps) artillery ammunition (one of the biggest consumers of weight for ammunition), and the difficulty in moving any supply forward by roads, than the supply 'requirement' of the force. Ultimately a unit will do the best with what is on hand - but I don't recall anyone seriously claiming that supply was excessive for a typical division during Normandy or the advance to the Westwall.

[wosung]

ORIGINAL: Richrd

I disagree with the above figures. The entire 6th Army requested 500 tons a day as it's minimum requirement. In War without Garlands, a book just chock full of numbers, he quotes 70 tons/day for a division. Also refer Stopped at Stalingrad, or something like that.

When did the entire 6th army needed 500 tons a day? When immobilized & already downsized at Stalingrad? Minimum requirement means minimum, like in not able to put up a great show.

Regards

[wosung]

ORIGINAL: Lieste

Some of those supply figures look somewhat out of context... that the W Allies had a requirement of 600 tons and "only used" 300-350 tons might have a lot more to do with a chronic shortage of (Regimental/Divisional/{Light} Corps) artillery ammunition (one of the biggest consumers of weight for ammunition), and the difficulty in moving any supply forward by roads, than the supply 'requirement' of the force. Ultimately a unit will do the best with what is on hand - but I don't recall anyone seriously claiming that supply was excessive for a typical division during Normandy or the advance to the Westwall.

That's what Crefeld wrote. In 1944 Wally units were supposed to be really lavishly supplied, compared to German ones, but were bigger than the latter too. Crefeld's point (the context you referred to) here is, because Wally planned standard divisional supply was excessive, operations in France were over-cautious when those high supply standards were not met.

Regards

[invernomuto]

Thank you very much! Very useful information.

[Richrd]

I still don't buy into 300 tons a day per division. Hard and fast logistical information on the eastern front is hard to come by. I guess that not a lot of people are really interested in that aspect. I am, and have collected some tidbits over the years. I have some info somewhere that I'll try to dig up.

[pompack]

ORIGINAL: Richrd

I still don't buy into 300 tons a day per division. Hard and fast logistical information on the eastern front is hard to come by. I guess that not a lot of people are really interested in that aspect. I am, and have collected some tidbits over the years. I have some info somewhere that I'll try to dig up.

part of the problem is the multitude of standards of what is "needed". The ability of a division to consume supply was enormous and most of this consumption was in the artillery. Just one example, if just the 105's in a division (18) fired one round every five minutes, you would consume over 85 tons per day while at the maximum RoF the 105's consume about two tons/minute. So the division supply requiremnt is principly determined by what the artillery needs to do.

[Balou]

One more. It's a pdf at

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... i4a07p.pdf

Link refers to an estimate made by by US officials in 41/42. Below an excerpt.

[wosung]

ORIGINAL: Richrd

I still don't buy into 300 tons a day per division. Hard and fast logistical information on the eastern front is hard to come by. I guess that not a lot of people are really interested in that aspect. I am, and have collected some tidbits over the years. I have some info somewhere that I'll try to dig up.

Well, I don’t want to sell you a thing. I’m just presenting some data from named sources. You should be able to check those data.

Just don’t buying it is a bit ... thin.

FWIW:
From Germany and the 2nd WW, Vol. 6.
Fuel consumption Ostheer Mid Oct 1941- Mid March 1942 667.292 cubic meters or tons, on average 11 trains a day. For this period, ammo consumption was 390.000 tons, pp. 788-790.
Daily fuel consumption Ostheer in Sept. 1942.: 5.000-6.000 cubic meters or tons, p. 946.

As for the German 6th Army:
As early as in Sept. 1942 it was operating at the very end of the logistical chain, so that air supply was needed. There wasn’t enough fodder for it’s 100.000 horses, rations (potatoes, vegetables, meat, flour) were lacking. The needed cattle herds were too slow to arrive before mud, thus additionally 1500 tons canned meat monthly was needed. As for flour, 6th Army consumed 6.000 tons a month, plus 1.000 tons for the Rumenian troops. Transportation also was lacking. To build a solid railbridge across the Don 70 train loads of material were calculated. In Aug. 1942 6th Army quarter master calculated, that until may 1943 that army would need 1452 train loads (600 tons each) of supplies (rations, cloths, building material, fodder) – note that ammo and fuel are not part of that list. As for fuel, in october when 6th Army wasn’t moving much any longer, 850 cubic meter/tons per day were allowed, but only 456 tons could be delivered, pp.988-992.

Regards

[Lieste]

The supplies listed above are for a US Estimate for a German 'Division Slice' not just for a Division - they include GHQ troops, so care must be taken not to double count these, or the support weapons they include (27,000 vs 16,000 TOE vs ?? Actual strength).

Also note the conclusion is that these figures have almost no agreement to the on the ground realities - and this report is most important as it broke new ground in intelligence analysis, not because it is correct.

[goranw]

Hi!
A map done by OKH.
Supplies delivered up to 2 july in area Nord.
Goran

[wosung]

Really interesting! Thank you for posting this.

Is this map part of a publication?

regards

[Jeffrey H.]

I would think the divisional supply rates would have to be normalized to a 'per head' basis across nationalities.