Tokyo Rose was a Hussy! Chez (J) vs. Canoe (A)
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Considering I still horribly new at the game is there really any reason for him to give the Tarawa invasion any attention right now? Seems like he should be focused on either Sumatra or Burma way before he considers Tarawa a threat.
- ny59giants
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Ocean Island is a size 2 port (12k). I hope you converted most, if not all, of your Clemson and Wilkes Class DDs to APDs. Form 2 Fast Transport TF to go get and drop off troops. They may take a few weeks, but it shouldn't be that difficult. Use some of your smaller xAKs to pull out the cargo components, eventually.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Michael, I wish I had my APDs handy! But they are off in the Indian Ocean assisting with the Malaya and Sumatra operations. They have seen front line duty, carrying part of the force that landed at Tavoy weeks ago, but mostly I try to protect them from dangerous front-line use. Right now they are parked at Colombo, loaded with an Indian HQ unit that was slated to go to Moulmein or Rangoon back when that LOC was still open. Now I'm trying to decide whether to offload the HQ unit or whether it might be useful in Sumatra. But thanks to all the Dutch and Brit HQ units I evacuated into Sumatra, those bases seem to have adequate support.
(That's far more than you wanted to know, but it illustrates all of the factors that go into even simple decisions like how to use APDs.)
(That's far more than you wanted to know, but it illustrates all of the factors that go into even simple decisions like how to use APDs.)
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
ORIGINAL: DarenDF
Considering I still horribly new at the game is there really any reason for him to give the Tarawa invasion any attention right now? Seems like he should be focused on either Sumatra or Burma way before he considers Tarawa a threat.
Tarawa is a base that can be built large amidst alot of other bases with good potential, so it is important. However, it isn't important compared to NoPac and the DEI, so Steve would be better served not diluting his forces in those two theaters until things are under control. (Of course, I'm hoping he will be enticed to dilute his forces.)
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
- ny59giants
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Dan, I didn't know where the APDs were at and didn't want you to say that they are sitting at Pearl doing nothing. I'm in early April 42 and mine may be pressed into more escort duties until I get enough SC and more DDs later in the year. The problem for an Allied player in early '42 is too many missions and not enough escorts, so I understand your dilemma.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
ORIGINAL: ny59giants
Dan, I didn't know where the APDs were at and didn't want you to say that they are sitting at Pearl doing nothing. I'm in early April 42 and mine may be pressed into more escort duties until I get enough SC and more DDs later in the year. The problem for an Allied player in early '42 is too many missions and not enough escorts, so I understand your dilemma.
and when it comes to ASW ratings the APDs are VERY good before the the DDs get their second upgrades... but overall the "ASW: 6" hasn't impressed me much with the APDs... - I have never been and never will be a specialist of game mechanics so maybe there's a reason why APDs on escort don't perfom quite as well in ASW as their DD-counterparts that have the same "6"...
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
ORIGINAL: SoliInvictus202
ORIGINAL: ny59giants
Dan, I didn't know where the APDs were at and didn't want you to say that they are sitting at Pearl doing nothing. I'm in early April 42 and mine may be pressed into more escort duties until I get enough SC and more DDs later in the year. The problem for an Allied player in early '42 is too many missions and not enough escorts, so I understand your dilemma.
and when it comes to ASW ratings the APDs are VERY good before the the DDs get their second upgrades... but overall the "ASW: 6" hasn't impressed me much with the APDs... - I have never been and never will be a specialist of game mechanics so maybe there's a reason why APDs on escort don't perfom quite as well in ASW as their DD-counterparts that have the same "6"...
Unless you have changed them the APDs don't usually have good leaders and their crew experience tends to be lower. Both are factors.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
6/8/42
Tarawa: Sub I-75 claims two xAK and AK Betelgeuse in a single day! That's good shooting, but Allied losses have been minimal and the ships continue to depart (many of them to unload at Palmyra before returning to Pearl).
SoPac: Hiei, Chikuma and Tone return to Pago Pago on an ineffective bombardment mission. I believe they are retiring to Suva, but I will hold the reinforcement convoy one day to make sure.
NoPac: An enemy TF of unknown composition, but most likely CVE Hosho, is steaming east towards the Aleutians.
Enemy Carriers Detached: The most interesting development of the day involves enemy carriers. While the KB is still posted at Sabang, patrols give a solid report of a carrier group consisting of at least a CVL and CV (34 fighters, 35 bombers, 42 auxilliary, which is an important data item) in the South China Sea, near Kuching, heading east. This is a serious division of the KB and it could be headed anywhere - around Borneo to work an ambush south of Java, to NoPac to lend a hand with operations there, or (and this is my hunch) to Tarawa to deal with the new crisis there. The fact that enemy patrols are so active out of Baker and probably Kwajalein are additional clues. So, in about a week, I'll have to be on my guard. And the danger zone will soon thereafter extend to Pago Pago. I'll also have to be carefull with Wasp, as it now appears that she might not be the only carrier in theater (she arrives at Balboa in two days).
DEI: Allied fighters from Oosthaven down at least 14 unescorted Bettys over Batavia. No big IJA stack moving on Batavia yet, but it has to happen very soon. Freighters carrying two fighter squadrons from Oz are on the final run, two or three days out of Oosthaven in waters that have plenty of subs. I have to cross my fingers. To the west, the Allied carriers are moving east, closer to the traditional patrol stations south of Sumatra. At this point, I can fly off my squadrons to eastern Sumatra if needed.
Burma: The Allied army withdrawal to western Burma is nearly complete, including the air transport evacuation of a battalion of 6th Indian Brigade isolated and threatened with destruction at Tavoy. The Chinese take the vacated base of Lashio. My plan has been to send these two small divisions into India to grow them large on the abundant supply there.
China: The Chinese are still evaluating the map after the two months of solid campaigning.
Tarawa: Sub I-75 claims two xAK and AK Betelgeuse in a single day! That's good shooting, but Allied losses have been minimal and the ships continue to depart (many of them to unload at Palmyra before returning to Pearl).
SoPac: Hiei, Chikuma and Tone return to Pago Pago on an ineffective bombardment mission. I believe they are retiring to Suva, but I will hold the reinforcement convoy one day to make sure.
NoPac: An enemy TF of unknown composition, but most likely CVE Hosho, is steaming east towards the Aleutians.
Enemy Carriers Detached: The most interesting development of the day involves enemy carriers. While the KB is still posted at Sabang, patrols give a solid report of a carrier group consisting of at least a CVL and CV (34 fighters, 35 bombers, 42 auxilliary, which is an important data item) in the South China Sea, near Kuching, heading east. This is a serious division of the KB and it could be headed anywhere - around Borneo to work an ambush south of Java, to NoPac to lend a hand with operations there, or (and this is my hunch) to Tarawa to deal with the new crisis there. The fact that enemy patrols are so active out of Baker and probably Kwajalein are additional clues. So, in about a week, I'll have to be on my guard. And the danger zone will soon thereafter extend to Pago Pago. I'll also have to be carefull with Wasp, as it now appears that she might not be the only carrier in theater (she arrives at Balboa in two days).
DEI: Allied fighters from Oosthaven down at least 14 unescorted Bettys over Batavia. No big IJA stack moving on Batavia yet, but it has to happen very soon. Freighters carrying two fighter squadrons from Oz are on the final run, two or three days out of Oosthaven in waters that have plenty of subs. I have to cross my fingers. To the west, the Allied carriers are moving east, closer to the traditional patrol stations south of Sumatra. At this point, I can fly off my squadrons to eastern Sumatra if needed.
Burma: The Allied army withdrawal to western Burma is nearly complete, including the air transport evacuation of a battalion of 6th Indian Brigade isolated and threatened with destruction at Tavoy. The Chinese take the vacated base of Lashio. My plan has been to send these two small divisions into India to grow them large on the abundant supply there.
China: The Chinese are still evaluating the map after the two months of solid campaigning.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
As re: the Northern Sumatra gambit.
You may find that infantry can march through the trails into Southern Sumatra more rapidly than you might have thought possible.
On the other hand rather than meeting strength with strength you can turn this attempt by your opponent to push their culmination point in your favour. Block with a force using terrain ( and tactical air support ) in order to minimise the blocking force size and dislocate the enemy thrust by using the troops you've freed up through terrain and a small amount of tactical air support to counter-invade slightly behind the enemy thrust creating a dislocation, complicating their operational picture and inviting further misallocations which you can block with small forces - each time drawing more enemy forces into action, blocking them with small forces and drawing down enemy reserves as you free forces for yours until such time as you can transition to a general offensive as the enemy's reserves run out. So really what you are doing is a simple case of using a reverse Bagration to create a strategic opening - or for those more familiar with the ACW utilising Lee's doctrine of '62/'63. The lecturers at Frunze would be proud.
Not that there seems to be any sort of institutional memory of past AARs hereabouts ( which strikes me as sad ) but there is at least one AAR here in which a situation similar to this pertained and in which the Northern Sumatran gambit was utilised to create just such an over-reach past the natural culmination point, efficiency of force allocation and dislocation with forces freed from the defence. It might be useful to refer to that when considering what is and isn't possible/advisable here.
Bottom line though your opponent's culmination point has come and gone long ago. For the past several months all the talk of the game being in the balance has utterly overlooked his culmination point and thus has been innately flawed and may not represent entirely valid strategic analysis IMO. Now he is just exceeding his culmination point and showing you that he doesn't realise he reached and passed it some time ago. He is gifting you a position where he is over-reaching and off balance. Even small forces judiciously applied can now topple him. He culminated about 4 months ago gamewise at the end of March when he allocated to the irrelevancy of the Aleutians/Kuriles. At that point he culminated and didn't recognise it although it was pointed out in this thread at the time. If you look back at what has happened since then you can clearly see he culminated then.
You may find that infantry can march through the trails into Southern Sumatra more rapidly than you might have thought possible.
On the other hand rather than meeting strength with strength you can turn this attempt by your opponent to push their culmination point in your favour. Block with a force using terrain ( and tactical air support ) in order to minimise the blocking force size and dislocate the enemy thrust by using the troops you've freed up through terrain and a small amount of tactical air support to counter-invade slightly behind the enemy thrust creating a dislocation, complicating their operational picture and inviting further misallocations which you can block with small forces - each time drawing more enemy forces into action, blocking them with small forces and drawing down enemy reserves as you free forces for yours until such time as you can transition to a general offensive as the enemy's reserves run out. So really what you are doing is a simple case of using a reverse Bagration to create a strategic opening - or for those more familiar with the ACW utilising Lee's doctrine of '62/'63. The lecturers at Frunze would be proud.
Not that there seems to be any sort of institutional memory of past AARs hereabouts ( which strikes me as sad ) but there is at least one AAR here in which a situation similar to this pertained and in which the Northern Sumatran gambit was utilised to create just such an over-reach past the natural culmination point, efficiency of force allocation and dislocation with forces freed from the defence. It might be useful to refer to that when considering what is and isn't possible/advisable here.
Bottom line though your opponent's culmination point has come and gone long ago. For the past several months all the talk of the game being in the balance has utterly overlooked his culmination point and thus has been innately flawed and may not represent entirely valid strategic analysis IMO. Now he is just exceeding his culmination point and showing you that he doesn't realise he reached and passed it some time ago. He is gifting you a position where he is over-reaching and off balance. Even small forces judiciously applied can now topple him. He culminated about 4 months ago gamewise at the end of March when he allocated to the irrelevancy of the Aleutians/Kuriles. At that point he culminated and didn't recognise it although it was pointed out in this thread at the time. If you look back at what has happened since then you can clearly see he culminated then.
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Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
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RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Nemo, thank you for your thoughts. A couple of questions and comments in reply:
1. Do you think it is impossible for Steve to reover at this point? I realize that Steve has been teetering around here and there in reaction to various (and mostly successful) Allied moves. I also think that additional teetering may occur and that this just pushes him closer to the edge. But at this point, do you think he has one chance to get things right - to move decisively, soon and successfully against Sumatra (and also liquidating the Kuriles, which would be easy to do at the moment)?
2. Put it another way - if you stepped into Steve's shoes, do you think you could orchestrate a successful salvation of Japan's situation right now? I thin you could. (I realize this is putting you in an odd position to tout your own ability in effect.) IE, I think Japan's situation can be salvaged, and my concern is that there's still a chance that Steve can do it.
3. Re: the "landing behind" idea - thank you for the suggestion. We have the house rule about landing only at bases and dot hexes (I think), so the only targets for Allied landings would be Padang, Sibolga and Sabang. Those are likely to be decently garrisoned, so the Allies would have to bring alot and have plenty of air cover. Not sure it would work, but it's something I'll look at very carefully if Steve comes by land rather than sea.
4. I have a restricted Marine regiment at Capetown prepping for Benkolen. I'm thiking about buying it and sending it to Sumatra.
1. Do you think it is impossible for Steve to reover at this point? I realize that Steve has been teetering around here and there in reaction to various (and mostly successful) Allied moves. I also think that additional teetering may occur and that this just pushes him closer to the edge. But at this point, do you think he has one chance to get things right - to move decisively, soon and successfully against Sumatra (and also liquidating the Kuriles, which would be easy to do at the moment)?
2. Put it another way - if you stepped into Steve's shoes, do you think you could orchestrate a successful salvation of Japan's situation right now? I thin you could. (I realize this is putting you in an odd position to tout your own ability in effect.) IE, I think Japan's situation can be salvaged, and my concern is that there's still a chance that Steve can do it.
3. Re: the "landing behind" idea - thank you for the suggestion. We have the house rule about landing only at bases and dot hexes (I think), so the only targets for Allied landings would be Padang, Sibolga and Sabang. Those are likely to be decently garrisoned, so the Allies would have to bring alot and have plenty of air cover. Not sure it would work, but it's something I'll look at very carefully if Steve comes by land rather than sea.
4. I have a restricted Marine regiment at Capetown prepping for Benkolen. I'm thiking about buying it and sending it to Sumatra.
"Rats set fire to Mr. Cooper’s store in Fort Valley. No damage done." Columbus (Ga) Enquirer-Sun, October 2, 1880.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Dan,
1. Steve won't recover, no. I've been saying this for 4 to 5 months of gametime. Another player taking over who has the discipline to conduct a root and branch strategic re-analysis might recover and be able to take Sumatra through an isolation + later invasion strategy.
Attacking the Kuriles and taking them all wouldn't change his strategic situation at all. Taking the Kuriles won't save his economy or gain him ground you MUST retake.
If he tries to move vs Southern Sumatra I think you'll break him. Why? He'll be too direct with too little force. He could either be less direct ( but I don't think he's tricky enough ) or bring more force ( but he squanders it in side-efforts which rob his main thrust of the necessary weight ).
2. Hmm, well you know I think that I think that there are a lot of abusive people on the forum who would simply love to twist anything I say in response to that and misrepresent it as some sort of narcissistic rant. What I will say is that I believe an isolate and invade strategy backed with sufficient force would succeed in trapping and destroying your force in Sumatra - at which time one could take care of the Kuriles at one's leisure. Any player who could appropriately and ruthlessly prioritise their strategic planning, concentrate forces and carry it through with a modicum of operational and tactical ability would be able to isolate and take Southern Sumatra. It would take so long that that would mark their culmination point though. I do not believe many players on the forum have shown the necessary strategic prioritisation, focus and insight to do that though. I believe that there are about 8 or 9 who could do this. Your opponent is not, IMO, one of those 8 or 9.
3. Or you could land on the Western Malaysian coast - that would create significant problems for the troops in both Northern Sumatra and Burma and would raise the spectre of cutting his troops in Burma off from their land-locked supply lines as well as forcing him to either commit more of his reserves to stabilise Malaysia OR draw troops from the Northern Sumatran thrust back into Malaysia to stabilise Malaysia. Whatever he does you will get to kill troops and ships at sea - which is always the easiest place to kill them.
In my game in a similar situation I blocked in Northern Sumatra and landed in Malaysia. Once that happened my opponent quit because, I believe, he had no significant reserves left to throw in and thus I was about to break out and create a contiguous Allied landbased line of communication running all the way from India uninterruptedly to Shanghai - in Mid-42.
4. When I defended in Palembang I took huge pains - not mentioned in my AAR since I was concerned about FatR being his normal cheating self and spilling my plans to my opponent - to build up the Cocos Islands in order to enable me to continue bringing troops into Southern Sumatra even if the Japanese took bases in Java etc. My thinking was to ship them into the Cocos Islands, unload them under a large CAP and then fly them into Southern Sumatra. It also invited his SC TFs to come into MY air range and outside of his LRCAP to tangle with my shipping. Even a 1:1 exchange rate would work in my favour since I'd be able to improve it by killing cripples with airstrikes the next day.
1. Steve won't recover, no. I've been saying this for 4 to 5 months of gametime. Another player taking over who has the discipline to conduct a root and branch strategic re-analysis might recover and be able to take Sumatra through an isolation + later invasion strategy.
Attacking the Kuriles and taking them all wouldn't change his strategic situation at all. Taking the Kuriles won't save his economy or gain him ground you MUST retake.
If he tries to move vs Southern Sumatra I think you'll break him. Why? He'll be too direct with too little force. He could either be less direct ( but I don't think he's tricky enough ) or bring more force ( but he squanders it in side-efforts which rob his main thrust of the necessary weight ).
2. Hmm, well you know I think that I think that there are a lot of abusive people on the forum who would simply love to twist anything I say in response to that and misrepresent it as some sort of narcissistic rant. What I will say is that I believe an isolate and invade strategy backed with sufficient force would succeed in trapping and destroying your force in Sumatra - at which time one could take care of the Kuriles at one's leisure. Any player who could appropriately and ruthlessly prioritise their strategic planning, concentrate forces and carry it through with a modicum of operational and tactical ability would be able to isolate and take Southern Sumatra. It would take so long that that would mark their culmination point though. I do not believe many players on the forum have shown the necessary strategic prioritisation, focus and insight to do that though. I believe that there are about 8 or 9 who could do this. Your opponent is not, IMO, one of those 8 or 9.
3. Or you could land on the Western Malaysian coast - that would create significant problems for the troops in both Northern Sumatra and Burma and would raise the spectre of cutting his troops in Burma off from their land-locked supply lines as well as forcing him to either commit more of his reserves to stabilise Malaysia OR draw troops from the Northern Sumatran thrust back into Malaysia to stabilise Malaysia. Whatever he does you will get to kill troops and ships at sea - which is always the easiest place to kill them.
In my game in a similar situation I blocked in Northern Sumatra and landed in Malaysia. Once that happened my opponent quit because, I believe, he had no significant reserves left to throw in and thus I was about to break out and create a contiguous Allied landbased line of communication running all the way from India uninterruptedly to Shanghai - in Mid-42.
4. When I defended in Palembang I took huge pains - not mentioned in my AAR since I was concerned about FatR being his normal cheating self and spilling my plans to my opponent - to build up the Cocos Islands in order to enable me to continue bringing troops into Southern Sumatra even if the Japanese took bases in Java etc. My thinking was to ship them into the Cocos Islands, unload them under a large CAP and then fly them into Southern Sumatra. It also invited his SC TFs to come into MY air range and outside of his LRCAP to tangle with my shipping. Even a 1:1 exchange rate would work in my favour since I'd be able to improve it by killing cripples with airstrikes the next day.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Nemo brings up an interesting concept but for the sake of accuracy I will elaborate a little bit on what he brought up.
Culmination point is an interesting concept that is one of the main building blocks behind the works of Clausewitz. Clausewitz concept is slightly different than what Nemo is talking about as Clausewitz refers to the Culminating Point of Victory.
".....In the progress of action in war, the combatant force is incessantly meeting with elements which strengthen it, and others which weaken it. Hence it is a question of superiority on one side or the other. As every diminution of power on one side is to be regarded as an increase on the opposite, it follows, of course, that this double current, this ebb and flow, takes place whether troops are advancing or retiring...." There is more to this concept than the part I clipped, follow the link below to read the whole chapter.
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Bk7ch21.html
I would surmise that Steve has been off balance since the loss of his fast AO's immediately following the attack at Pearl Harbor has has never been in a position to get the upper hand let alone reach a culminating point. To reach the culmination point of victory (in a historical context for Japan) Steve would have to be on the offensive yet for most of the game he has been in a reactive posture.
CR's latest question to Nemo suggests that CR feels Steve could still be in a position to gather sufficient force to still achieve some sort of victory (at least in Sumatra). IMHO the only thing Japan can still accomplish in the game would be to further their "High Water Mark", victory is no longer possible and a culminating point is no longer attainable. The U.S. could in theory reach a culminating point at some later point in the game by suffering a reversal so disastrous that it would allow Japan to survive late into 1946, but I don't foresee this outcome.
Culmination point is an interesting concept that is one of the main building blocks behind the works of Clausewitz. Clausewitz concept is slightly different than what Nemo is talking about as Clausewitz refers to the Culminating Point of Victory.
".....In the progress of action in war, the combatant force is incessantly meeting with elements which strengthen it, and others which weaken it. Hence it is a question of superiority on one side or the other. As every diminution of power on one side is to be regarded as an increase on the opposite, it follows, of course, that this double current, this ebb and flow, takes place whether troops are advancing or retiring...." There is more to this concept than the part I clipped, follow the link below to read the whole chapter.
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Bk7ch21.html
I would surmise that Steve has been off balance since the loss of his fast AO's immediately following the attack at Pearl Harbor has has never been in a position to get the upper hand let alone reach a culminating point. To reach the culmination point of victory (in a historical context for Japan) Steve would have to be on the offensive yet for most of the game he has been in a reactive posture.
CR's latest question to Nemo suggests that CR feels Steve could still be in a position to gather sufficient force to still achieve some sort of victory (at least in Sumatra). IMHO the only thing Japan can still accomplish in the game would be to further their "High Water Mark", victory is no longer possible and a culminating point is no longer attainable. The U.S. could in theory reach a culminating point at some later point in the game by suffering a reversal so disastrous that it would allow Japan to survive late into 1946, but I don't foresee this outcome.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
CR I want to thank you for writing this AAR, I have really enjoyed this contest.
I think you should not be too humble when taking note that folks on the boards regard your play very highly.
When I first started playing I really wanted to be a Japanese Fan Boy because of the challenge, but the inability to really "win" the game was a nagging problem for me. Without a political aspect of the game forcing the Allies to contest Japan's early advances I soon lost interest in playing. I hated pilot training and working the economy, it became a chore instead of a game. So I moved on to play the Allies.
As an Allied player you know you will win, the only question is when. So where lies the greatest challenge? I have always felt that the "Sir Robin" approach was not only completely Politically unacceptable but boring for both sides, it really cheats the Japanese player of an opportunity to enjoy the game. This game has been exciting and challenging for the Allied player, all your moves have been fraught with peril. You still are using poor quality land, sea, and air units in your forward defense and taxing your imagination and ability to implement and execute stratagems throughout the entire map.
Because of this I have always been amazed when folks state that this game should end. Don't they understand the tension of taking on the Japanese at the height of their power? To deny yourself the opportunity to see the results of your forward defense would be a true tragedy. Winning is nice but the joy of the game and its inherent interactions is where the fun truly is.
I think you should not be too humble when taking note that folks on the boards regard your play very highly.
When I first started playing I really wanted to be a Japanese Fan Boy because of the challenge, but the inability to really "win" the game was a nagging problem for me. Without a political aspect of the game forcing the Allies to contest Japan's early advances I soon lost interest in playing. I hated pilot training and working the economy, it became a chore instead of a game. So I moved on to play the Allies.
As an Allied player you know you will win, the only question is when. So where lies the greatest challenge? I have always felt that the "Sir Robin" approach was not only completely Politically unacceptable but boring for both sides, it really cheats the Japanese player of an opportunity to enjoy the game. This game has been exciting and challenging for the Allied player, all your moves have been fraught with peril. You still are using poor quality land, sea, and air units in your forward defense and taxing your imagination and ability to implement and execute stratagems throughout the entire map.
Because of this I have always been amazed when folks state that this game should end. Don't they understand the tension of taking on the Japanese at the height of their power? To deny yourself the opportunity to see the results of your forward defense would be a true tragedy. Winning is nice but the joy of the game and its inherent interactions is where the fun truly is.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Desicat, I fully agree with your assertion that CR has played a masterful game. Quite an achievement we will all remember for a long time.
For months I thought as you did about the Japanese situation, but now I am not so sure. Read Nemo's Downfall AARs. If he can stonewall the Big Green Machine with the poo available to Japan in 1945 (in fairness some of the late war stuff isn't poo, but in relative terms it pales to the Allied might), I am re-evaluating the strategic possibilities of Japan in the late war period. It is still true that Japanese victory is nigh impossible, but I actually am looking forward to the later stages of my game with Cuttlefish to see what can be achieved against the odds.
For months I thought as you did about the Japanese situation, but now I am not so sure. Read Nemo's Downfall AARs. If he can stonewall the Big Green Machine with the poo available to Japan in 1945 (in fairness some of the late war stuff isn't poo, but in relative terms it pales to the Allied might), I am re-evaluating the strategic possibilities of Japan in the late war period. It is still true that Japanese victory is nigh impossible, but I actually am looking forward to the later stages of my game with Cuttlefish to see what can be achieved against the odds.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Hmm, I think my use of culmination point accurately reflects Clausewitz's usage and intention.
I don't think Culmination Points are necessarily limited to the offensive and they certainly aren't limited just to victory. A good definition follows:
So, utilising the portion of the definition in A above. Steve's culmination point happened during the Kuriles/Aleutians operation and he failed to recognise that he culminated. Since then he hasn't gained anything but lost far more than he would have had he, properly, transitioned to the defensive at that point in time.
I'd offer a counter-quote from Clausewitz to illustrate this:
Since the Aleutians Steve hasn't achieved anything strategically decisive but he HAS suffered excessive losses which will damage his ability to maintain a strong defence once he transitions to that stance.
Desicat,
Culmination points don't equate to victory. Offensives and defensive operations reach culmination points when they are no longer tenable. The Culmination Point of Victory which Clausewitz spoke of is a possible end state of offensive action but it is only one of the possible end states. If Culmination Point of Victory could be rephrased as "The Culmination Point which occurs when an offensive succeeds and you transition to the pursuit" another possible end state is that culmination point of the offensive when your offensive clearly won't succeed and you have to transition to the defensive.
Also Clausewitz's writing assumes zero sum game theory applies to war. While, in the end, that may be true it isn't necessarily true of all operations. E.g. A force can transition from a formed defence to a guerilla type defence not because its defensive operations have culminated and they no longer have the ability to resist and, as a corollary, the offensive force has reached a culmination point where its offensive has succeeded and can transition to a pursuit. This is the zero sum outcome Clausewitz envisaged. In reality though forces can transition to other states BEFORE they reach their culmination points such that, e.g. The Taliban transitioned to very much a guerilla war as opposed to trying to take on Allied forces head-on long before they reached the culmination point of their head-on strategy. Why? They could see that culmination point coming and cut their losses before coming up with a new approach. Likewise no-one could successfully argue that Allied forces reached the culmination point of their offensive operations and achieved "victory" and forcing the Taliban to transition to a more guerilla-based engagement strategy than previously in 2003/2004.
Also Culmination points were eminently applicable to the operational level in Clausewitzes thinking so it would be natural that a long war would feature multiple culmination points. When you say:
I have to disagree strenuously. There is more than enough time for each side to achieve, pass or fail to achieve another 20 culmination points each. It isn't as though any one side only has one culmination point throughout the entire war. Only that very last offensive of the war which gains complete, strategic victory and fulfills national policy objectives has a final culmination point. I think you either misunderstand that or from what you've written it is unclear.
I'll quote from FM 100-5 here. It isn't perfect but it is a good document written by smart people in a manner designed to be easily understood - whereas Clausewitz's writings can be indecipherable unless you understand the literary context and social context within which he wrote.
Transitioning this to the strategic level it is clear to me that by the end of the 1st week of April in-game Chez most definitely reached his culmination point ( attacking the AOs might be a bump in the road but most definitely wasn't even remotely close to a culmination point ). Canoerebel appears to have recognised this with prompting about 2 months later, CHez hasn't yet recognised it.
Obviously YMMV but the culmination point was clearly the 1st week in April with the fighting in the north of the map. You may argue it was actually mid-March when that decision was taken but I wouldn't have expected people to know that at the time. The end of the 1st week in April though was pretty clear as the culmination point. Since then Chez has achieved nothing but overextension at such cost that he is speeding his own coming defeat.
As to the Allies inevitably winning. Not necessarily so. In a long-term game ( Grand Campaign ) it should be possible for Japan to hold out with an intact perimeter and economy until the end of 1946. Unfortunately Allied players have always quit by the end of 1942 when such a stratagem was attemped. Even in 1945 though meaningful defence is possible - possible to such an extent as to inflict disproportionate losses and cause morale failure in opponents.
As to quitting now... Well, I agree winning is really an irrelevancy as far as I'm concerned. What matters is the challenge and being able to put good, skillfull plans into play. However, when an opponent will no longer provide a significant challenge it is better to accept a surrender and move onto another game. I think that Chez may well mount a solid defence but I don't think that solid defence will really challenge Canoerebel as much as he needs to be challenged to improve. IMO, right now, Canoerebel doesn't need to continue an average game vs a nice, solid player. He needs to take on someone at his own tier of the game or someone better. He can improve most, at this stage, by playing those as good or better than him. Given my view of the game my feeling is he should invest his time in what is most likely to improve his play over the decades of life he has left - and that would be taking on a game against someone really tough who will hand him some significant beatings or, at least, really challenge him even if that opponent loses.
Different strokes for different folks.
As an aside: For those looking for more reading on the issue I'd suggest:
1. Don't start with Clausewitz, it'll confuse you. He's brilliant but you need to read about his context ( social, philosophical and cultural ) for months before you can actualyl understand what he says. If you don't you'll THINK you get it and actually won't.
2. FM100-5 is good but I prefer the Marine equivalents. They're a bit more manoeuvrist and indirect while still hugely focussed by Clausewitz and the US Army philosophical precedent - Air Land Battle from the 80s - which got the idea out there but didn't really ensure small unit cohesion sufficiently for my tastes.
3. One lovely article I found online a while back is found at
Col Hall's Culminating Points PDF
He not only talks about culminating points but touches on how OODA loops and cognitive momentum play into the breach of culmination points. If there's interest that would be a pdf I'd be interested in discussing with others in one of my extant AARs. I think it is a very nice, succinct summary of the issues. There's also a very nice emphasis on the need to recognise your OPPONENT'S culmination point so you can transition onto the offensive ASAP before he recovers equilibrium. Vs Chez Canoerebel is fine because Chez keeps on not recognising he has culminated so the window of opportunity in which he continues to overbalance, overextend and fritter away forces is expanding. Against a good opponent Canoerebel's slowness in recognising the culmination point and his lack of reserves waiting to exploit said culmination point mean his opponent would have transitioned and recovered by now and the opportunity would have been lost. To be fair though Canoerebel wasn't, I believe, familiar with the concept of culmination points theoretically or practically and thus it cannot be expected that he would consciously prepare, promulgate and apportion forces to take advantage of the window of opportunity presented by his opponent's culmination point.
That's one reason why I think he needs to play top-notch people next. Right now even small misses like that are OK since his opponents make far, far bigger mistakes. Against a top notch player all these little issues will be exposed and since Canoerebel wants to improve once they're exposed he'll make a point of eradicating those little issues.
4. The absolute best sources for reading about Operational Art are, IMO, Soviet works on the subject. The Soviets had issues which turned their practice into something which was, at times, shoddy but their theoretical thinking was top-notch. Better than the Germans before WW2 and better than the Americans and Germans during the Cold War. So, read what you can get about it from House and Glantz. They've translated/written some good stuff focussing on the development of Operational Art - much of which deals with culmination points etc etc even if it doesn't use those terms.
Anyways, I've gotten too drawn back into the forum by this interesting issue. Lurk mode re-engaged.
I don't think Culmination Points are necessarily limited to the offensive and they certainly aren't limited just to victory. A good definition follows:
Culmination Point is the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its current form of operations, offensive or defensive.
A. In the offence, the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attemping an operational pause.
B. In the defence, the point at which counteroffensive action is no longer possible.
So, utilising the portion of the definition in A above. Steve's culmination point happened during the Kuriles/Aleutians operation and he failed to recognise that he culminated. Since then he hasn't gained anything but lost far more than he would have had he, properly, transitioned to the defensive at that point in time.
I'd offer a counter-quote from Clausewitz to illustrate this:
The natural goal of all campaign plans therefore is the turning point at which the attach becomes defence. If one were to go beyond that point, it would not only be a useless effort which could not add to succsss. It would in fact be a damaging one...
Since the Aleutians Steve hasn't achieved anything strategically decisive but he HAS suffered excessive losses which will damage his ability to maintain a strong defence once he transitions to that stance.
This is why the great majority of generals will prefer to stop well short of their objective rather than risk approaching it too closely and why those with high courage and an enterprising spirit will often overshoot it and fail to attain their purpose. Only the man who can achieve great results with limited means [i.e., the military genius] has really hit the mark.
Desicat,
Culmination points don't equate to victory. Offensives and defensive operations reach culmination points when they are no longer tenable. The Culmination Point of Victory which Clausewitz spoke of is a possible end state of offensive action but it is only one of the possible end states. If Culmination Point of Victory could be rephrased as "The Culmination Point which occurs when an offensive succeeds and you transition to the pursuit" another possible end state is that culmination point of the offensive when your offensive clearly won't succeed and you have to transition to the defensive.
Also Clausewitz's writing assumes zero sum game theory applies to war. While, in the end, that may be true it isn't necessarily true of all operations. E.g. A force can transition from a formed defence to a guerilla type defence not because its defensive operations have culminated and they no longer have the ability to resist and, as a corollary, the offensive force has reached a culmination point where its offensive has succeeded and can transition to a pursuit. This is the zero sum outcome Clausewitz envisaged. In reality though forces can transition to other states BEFORE they reach their culmination points such that, e.g. The Taliban transitioned to very much a guerilla war as opposed to trying to take on Allied forces head-on long before they reached the culmination point of their head-on strategy. Why? They could see that culmination point coming and cut their losses before coming up with a new approach. Likewise no-one could successfully argue that Allied forces reached the culmination point of their offensive operations and achieved "victory" and forcing the Taliban to transition to a more guerilla-based engagement strategy than previously in 2003/2004.
Also Culmination points were eminently applicable to the operational level in Clausewitzes thinking so it would be natural that a long war would feature multiple culmination points. When you say:
IMHO the only thing Japan can still accomplish in the game would be to further their "High Water Mark", victory is no longer possible and a culminating point is no longer attainable.
I have to disagree strenuously. There is more than enough time for each side to achieve, pass or fail to achieve another 20 culmination points each. It isn't as though any one side only has one culmination point throughout the entire war. Only that very last offensive of the war which gains complete, strategic victory and fulfills national policy objectives has a final culmination point. I think you either misunderstand that or from what you've written it is unclear.
I'll quote from FM 100-5 here. It isn't perfect but it is a good document written by smart people in a manner designed to be easily understood - whereas Clausewitz's writings can be indecipherable unless you understand the literary context and social context within which he wrote.
Unless it is strategically decisive every offensive operation will sooner or later reach a point where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender and beyond which continued offensive operations therefore risk overextension, counterattack and defeat. In operational theory, this point is called the culminating point. The art of attack at all levels is to achieve decisive objectives before the culminating point is reached. Conversely, the art of the defence is to hasten the culmination of the attack, recognise its advent and be prepared to go over to the offence when it arrives.
Transitioning this to the strategic level it is clear to me that by the end of the 1st week of April in-game Chez most definitely reached his culmination point ( attacking the AOs might be a bump in the road but most definitely wasn't even remotely close to a culmination point ). Canoerebel appears to have recognised this with prompting about 2 months later, CHez hasn't yet recognised it.
Obviously YMMV but the culmination point was clearly the 1st week in April with the fighting in the north of the map. You may argue it was actually mid-March when that decision was taken but I wouldn't have expected people to know that at the time. The end of the 1st week in April though was pretty clear as the culmination point. Since then Chez has achieved nothing but overextension at such cost that he is speeding his own coming defeat.
As to the Allies inevitably winning. Not necessarily so. In a long-term game ( Grand Campaign ) it should be possible for Japan to hold out with an intact perimeter and economy until the end of 1946. Unfortunately Allied players have always quit by the end of 1942 when such a stratagem was attemped. Even in 1945 though meaningful defence is possible - possible to such an extent as to inflict disproportionate losses and cause morale failure in opponents.
As to quitting now... Well, I agree winning is really an irrelevancy as far as I'm concerned. What matters is the challenge and being able to put good, skillfull plans into play. However, when an opponent will no longer provide a significant challenge it is better to accept a surrender and move onto another game. I think that Chez may well mount a solid defence but I don't think that solid defence will really challenge Canoerebel as much as he needs to be challenged to improve. IMO, right now, Canoerebel doesn't need to continue an average game vs a nice, solid player. He needs to take on someone at his own tier of the game or someone better. He can improve most, at this stage, by playing those as good or better than him. Given my view of the game my feeling is he should invest his time in what is most likely to improve his play over the decades of life he has left - and that would be taking on a game against someone really tough who will hand him some significant beatings or, at least, really challenge him even if that opponent loses.
Different strokes for different folks.
As an aside: For those looking for more reading on the issue I'd suggest:
1. Don't start with Clausewitz, it'll confuse you. He's brilliant but you need to read about his context ( social, philosophical and cultural ) for months before you can actualyl understand what he says. If you don't you'll THINK you get it and actually won't.
2. FM100-5 is good but I prefer the Marine equivalents. They're a bit more manoeuvrist and indirect while still hugely focussed by Clausewitz and the US Army philosophical precedent - Air Land Battle from the 80s - which got the idea out there but didn't really ensure small unit cohesion sufficiently for my tastes.
3. One lovely article I found online a while back is found at
Col Hall's Culminating Points PDF
He not only talks about culminating points but touches on how OODA loops and cognitive momentum play into the breach of culmination points. If there's interest that would be a pdf I'd be interested in discussing with others in one of my extant AARs. I think it is a very nice, succinct summary of the issues. There's also a very nice emphasis on the need to recognise your OPPONENT'S culmination point so you can transition onto the offensive ASAP before he recovers equilibrium. Vs Chez Canoerebel is fine because Chez keeps on not recognising he has culminated so the window of opportunity in which he continues to overbalance, overextend and fritter away forces is expanding. Against a good opponent Canoerebel's slowness in recognising the culmination point and his lack of reserves waiting to exploit said culmination point mean his opponent would have transitioned and recovered by now and the opportunity would have been lost. To be fair though Canoerebel wasn't, I believe, familiar with the concept of culmination points theoretically or practically and thus it cannot be expected that he would consciously prepare, promulgate and apportion forces to take advantage of the window of opportunity presented by his opponent's culmination point.
That's one reason why I think he needs to play top-notch people next. Right now even small misses like that are OK since his opponents make far, far bigger mistakes. Against a top notch player all these little issues will be exposed and since Canoerebel wants to improve once they're exposed he'll make a point of eradicating those little issues.
4. The absolute best sources for reading about Operational Art are, IMO, Soviet works on the subject. The Soviets had issues which turned their practice into something which was, at times, shoddy but their theoretical thinking was top-notch. Better than the Germans before WW2 and better than the Americans and Germans during the Cold War. So, read what you can get about it from House and Glantz. They've translated/written some good stuff focussing on the development of Operational Art - much of which deals with culmination points etc etc even if it doesn't use those terms.
Anyways, I've gotten too drawn back into the forum by this interesting issue. Lurk mode re-engaged.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
When this is over you have to ask Chez what he was thinking, why diddnt he...........
As to he ability to recover , put yourself in his shoes as far as you can.
How can he hurt you in Sumatra, land attack from Sabang area, heavy bomber campaign from Singapore, Batavia/Merak, Carrier/SS Blocakde. (I would chose the latter and get my LCU into Burma to push north to cut acces to Burma)
In the Gilberts he can do the same, interdict your bases by air, get a small CV force across your LOC (I would get out of Pago Pago after developing a different line of defense)
Dont compile a list and worry that he can do everything, just make sure that you have a counter, as mentioned earlier have a reserve capable of deploying to a threatened point (A Bde and Air Transport hub somewhere)
I think you have done well in your style, Its nice for others to quote Clausewitz or Sun Tzu and use big words and prostrate themselves at your feet.But you still have a big battle ahead, and the loss of your CV force in the Indian Ocean could see your Sumatra force left in the lurch.
Make sure you are ready for it.
As to he ability to recover , put yourself in his shoes as far as you can.
How can he hurt you in Sumatra, land attack from Sabang area, heavy bomber campaign from Singapore, Batavia/Merak, Carrier/SS Blocakde. (I would chose the latter and get my LCU into Burma to push north to cut acces to Burma)
In the Gilberts he can do the same, interdict your bases by air, get a small CV force across your LOC (I would get out of Pago Pago after developing a different line of defense)
Dont compile a list and worry that he can do everything, just make sure that you have a counter, as mentioned earlier have a reserve capable of deploying to a threatened point (A Bde and Air Transport hub somewhere)
I think you have done well in your style, Its nice for others to quote Clausewitz or Sun Tzu and use big words and prostrate themselves at your feet.But you still have a big battle ahead, and the loss of your CV force in the Indian Ocean could see your Sumatra force left in the lurch.
Make sure you are ready for it.
Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Its nice for others to quote Clausewitz or Sun Tzu and use big words and prostrate themselves at your feet.
That's highly pejorative, unhelpful and a gross misrepresentation.
John Dillworth: "I had GreyJoy check my spelling and he said it was fine."
Well, that's that settled then.
Well, that's that settled then.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Chez lost this game in February-March 1942. Stated that then and I believe it even more strongly now. When he lost the initiative in one theatre he allowed it to expand into two and now three. Game, Set, Match.
You could use any terms you want but the simple reality is he NEVER effectively responded to Dan. Never concentrated once it became obvious that he should and had to. Never found ANY sort of method to regain the initiative in any way, shape, or form.
My question is WHY? We KNOW he is a good, experienced Japanese player. I stayed away from his AAR because it seemed the right thing to do. Now I'm filled to the brim with questions...
You could use any terms you want but the simple reality is he NEVER effectively responded to Dan. Never concentrated once it became obvious that he should and had to. Never found ANY sort of method to regain the initiative in any way, shape, or form.
My question is WHY? We KNOW he is a good, experienced Japanese player. I stayed away from his AAR because it seemed the right thing to do. Now I'm filled to the brim with questions...
Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Nemo, I don't think you understand the context from which I was approaching the question. I was diagnosing the Japanese operations from a Strategic perspective in a historical context.
In the historical context the Japanese could have been considered to have reached their culmination point somewhere before the battle at Midway due to the results of the battle itself. That was an occasion where a tactical operation had decisive strategic impact.
In this game Chez never brought his forces to bare in such a way to ever force the Allies into a decisive battle that had an impact on any of his theater campaigns, hence no Operational or Strategic opportunities for victory. In a historical context in late 41 and early 42 the Japanese had several campaigns where they had decisive victories and due to Allied weakness, they never approached a culminating point until the loss of their greatest strategic asset (the KB - their center of gravity).
I was only referring to the culminating point in the context of offensive operations because I was taking the case of Japanese historical operations vs their actions in this game.
It would have been imprudent for Steve to halt offensive operations after his setback in the Kurile Campaign because he still has the ability to achieve both tactical and operational superiority in any theater he chooses by committing the KB - hence CR's concern about potential Japanese operations in and around Sumatra.
This AAR has been so interesting and the only thing I can compare it to is the Winter War where Finland held off the USSR and really had no business doing so. In the long run Finland could not match the Russians military power, but the Russians failure to use that power effectively had more impact on events than the military efforts of the Finn's themselves.
I think Clausewitz is a great read if one Understands that it was a work in progress when he died. Some of the better sections bring out "light bulb" moments for folks who read it. The FM's are fine, but I would recommend Masters of War, by Michael Handel. Easy to understand, great historical reference to make his points.
http://www.amazon.com/Masters-War-Classical-Strategic-Thought/dp/0714681326
Glantz is a great reference book but I have found him to provide more Order of Battle information and skimp on any analysis.
So to sum it all up I don't disagree with you, I just think were are discussing different shades of the same color.
***It is very difficult to discuss culmination points in a war that has multiple campaigns and theaters, too easy to misunderstand what the point of the conversation is and at what level of war the discussion is centered***
JeffK - I don't think anyone here is prostrating themselves, there is just a different conversation going on that may or may not be of interest to everyone reading the thread.
In the historical context the Japanese could have been considered to have reached their culmination point somewhere before the battle at Midway due to the results of the battle itself. That was an occasion where a tactical operation had decisive strategic impact.
In this game Chez never brought his forces to bare in such a way to ever force the Allies into a decisive battle that had an impact on any of his theater campaigns, hence no Operational or Strategic opportunities for victory. In a historical context in late 41 and early 42 the Japanese had several campaigns where they had decisive victories and due to Allied weakness, they never approached a culminating point until the loss of their greatest strategic asset (the KB - their center of gravity).
I was only referring to the culminating point in the context of offensive operations because I was taking the case of Japanese historical operations vs their actions in this game.
It would have been imprudent for Steve to halt offensive operations after his setback in the Kurile Campaign because he still has the ability to achieve both tactical and operational superiority in any theater he chooses by committing the KB - hence CR's concern about potential Japanese operations in and around Sumatra.
This AAR has been so interesting and the only thing I can compare it to is the Winter War where Finland held off the USSR and really had no business doing so. In the long run Finland could not match the Russians military power, but the Russians failure to use that power effectively had more impact on events than the military efforts of the Finn's themselves.
I think Clausewitz is a great read if one Understands that it was a work in progress when he died. Some of the better sections bring out "light bulb" moments for folks who read it. The FM's are fine, but I would recommend Masters of War, by Michael Handel. Easy to understand, great historical reference to make his points.
http://www.amazon.com/Masters-War-Classical-Strategic-Thought/dp/0714681326
Glantz is a great reference book but I have found him to provide more Order of Battle information and skimp on any analysis.
So to sum it all up I don't disagree with you, I just think were are discussing different shades of the same color.
***It is very difficult to discuss culmination points in a war that has multiple campaigns and theaters, too easy to misunderstand what the point of the conversation is and at what level of war the discussion is centered***
JeffK - I don't think anyone here is prostrating themselves, there is just a different conversation going on that may or may not be of interest to everyone reading the thread.
RE: Das darf nicht var sein!
Too bad.ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Its nice for others to quote Clausewitz or Sun Tzu and use big words and prostrate themselves at your feet.
That's highly pejorative, unhelpful and a gross misrepresentation.
Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum